Invasion is likely, but its outcome is uncertain

Russian President Putin regards democracy outside Russia as his enemy. He also faces internal challenges from Russia’s many ethnic groups and subnational units. He is nevertheless forging ahead with the build-up of an invasion force on Ukraine’s borders. The question is whether he is overstretching. Can Russia sustain the effort required to bring Ukraine to heel?

Putin has reason to be confident

On material measures, Ukraine is a relatively small strain on an enormous country. Putin has built up reserves of more than $600 billion, so spending $10 billion per month or even more to mount an invasion of Ukraine he can afford. The number of troops involved is still relatively small at about 130,000. Overall Russian active duty military number something like one million, not counting another half million or more reserves.

The political measures are also favorable to Putin. His popularity remains high. The seizure and annexation of Crimea in 2014 gave him a bump upwards in popularity. It would be reasonable for him to think that a successful invasion of Ukraine would do likewise, even if Russian concern about war has increased.

Western reaction could alter the calculus, but only marginally. Deterrence is difficult. Putin has made big efforts to sanction-proof the Russian economy. The loss of the Nordstream 2 pipeline to Germany would be a blow, but not a gigantic one. Technology sanctions, not imposed in the past, could reveal Moscow’s Achilles heel, but the impact would not be immediate.

The invasion would however be risky

The real risk for Putin is the invasion itself. Even small setbacks could undermine his position at home and abroad. Moscow has done little to prepare its own population for war. Few Russians currently support an invasion of Ukraine. If things don’t go well quickly, Putin could find himself in a difficult position domestically, though there is no apparent threat to him at the moment. He has obliterated any real opposition with murder and imprisonment.

Putin has several objectives that an invasion could serve. Occupation of more Ukrainian territory is only one. He also wants to split NATO and force the US to deal with Russia as a peer. He presumably knows well that the Russian army will not be welcome in large parts of Ukraine, making the process of occupying the whole country messy. A major invasion would also solidify NATO rather than split it.

More limited suits Putin better

A more limited intervention would suit Putin’s purposes better and reduce the risk. For example, extending the separatist-held areas along the Sea of Azov coast to Mariupol or even to Crimea might be attractive. Infrastructure close to the separatist-held areas is another possibility.

Limiting the intervention would make consensus within NATO difficult. Germany might not think Mariupol is worth keeping Nordstream 2 shut forever. A quick but significant addition to Russian-controlled areas in Ukraine could make Moscow’s claim to peer status more likely to elicit an acceptable American response than a messy effort to occupy the whole country.

A limited invasion of Ukraine will not only involve kinetic means like tanks, airplanes, drones, and troops. Moscow is expert in “hybrid” warfare, which will include at the least disinformation, political disruption, cyberattacks, feints, and ideological challenges. Ukraine is particularly vulnerable on the issue of corruption, which can be used to undermine the legitimacy of its government. Moscow can presumably reveal things that will embarass Western-oriented politicians in Kiev.

Still, the outcome is uncertain

Ukrainians are going to resist any Russian invasion, not only with their half million or so troops but also with guerrilla efforts in any territory Russia manages to take. Defense will be difficult, as the Russians will presumably control the air. But in the end, will, cleverness, and luck are big factors. There is often miscalculation in going to war. While Moscow looks strong compared to Kiev, the outcome is uncertain.