Month: January 2022
What terrorism tells us about northeast Syria
Former Syrian diplomat Bassam Barabandi sounds the alarm about support for Kurdish governance in northeast Syria:
In Syria, people differ dramatically on the attack the Islamic State carried out in Hasakah last week. Those affiliated with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) believe that Turkey was behind it. Pro-Turkey Syrians believe that the battle was a ploy serving SDF. Opposition not affiliated with SDF or Turkey believes the regime is behind the attack. Anti-imperialists think the US remote-controls ISIS. Regime supporters blame Turkey, the SDF, the US, the Gulf States and NATO.
What is clear
Some things are clear. US and British commandos managed the anti-ISIS operations and partook in them, exposing SDF weakness and the likelihood it is infiltrated. ISIS has the ability to surprise. That raises many questions about how the terrorists got past checkpoints in large numbers, with their weapons. Northeast Syria is just not a priority for the Arab opposition. It is keen on nothing but continuing to receive funds from donors; it did not even issue a statement condemning ISIS or calling for civilian protection.
No Arab voice in the northest has publicly condemned the terrorist attack. There are several reasons:
- SDF has failed to build trust with the Arab majority.
- Failure of the SDF to eliminate, or provide protection from, terrorist sleeper cells.
- Lack of leadership by elders, groups of elders, leaders of local councils.
All are fearful of their interests at home or in the countries where they live. Their real influence doesn’t go beyond the boundaries of their homes.
The missing ingredient
None of the international actors in the northeast have an interest in dealing with heavyweight Arab leaders. Those who claim to be representing Arabs and other local populations know that they are in their positions only so long as they have no real weight or influence. This has led to the Arab majority feeling marginalized.
Marginalization promotes instability. All powers – the Assad regime, Russia, Iran, terrorists – are working to fill the void. They make promises of a better future if the Arabs cooperate against the Kurds and the Americans. Fortunately, the population does not trust these countries or the terrorists. The local Arabs for years have raised their complaints with Amerrican and Western officials at every meeting. They still hope that the international coalition will be more positive in dealing with them, despite the SDF’s behavior.
Nearly a year ago, the SDF announced it had released the ‘less dangerous terrorists’ upon a request from local leaders, elders and others. Now we need to know who those elders were. Who came forward with those demands? Who submitted lists of names? Who claimed to represent the people of Deir Ezzor, Raqqa and Al-Hasakah? Their identities should be published.
Arab leadership is needed
All the projects of restoring stability, governance, building social peace, and the international initiatives aimed at enhancing Arab-Kurdish communication are useless in achieving real, longterm stability if it does not address the local political questions. They may be good for building the region’s economy, creating jobs and establishing infrastructure, but the principal problems are political—not the lack of services. None of the projects will achieve the essential goal of restoring stability to the region and fighting terrorism.
A new social contract between Kurds and Arabs is needed, one that achieves political, economic and social balance. This will require genuine elections, at least among Arabs, to produce real political leaders who can run their communities and bear responsibility. Otherwise, the northeast will remain unstable. The regime, Russia, and Iran will take advantage of the situation. The Arabs and Kurds of the northeast will miss the opportunity created by the presence of the international coalition forces.
Everyone would benefit
The Americans – including politicians, lawmakers, and think tanks, even those run by Arabs – want to establish a Kurdish entity with special status (an independent region or a federalist unit). They exaggerate the strength of SDF in all fields (military strength, protecting minorities, economy, social service, promoting democracy, and equal representation). The reality is different. More than 60% of the SDF are Arabs. They represent the largest number of dead and wounded during the battles to liberate the region from ISIS. Continuing with the illusion that the Kurds are responsible for the defeat of ISIS is unrealistic.
The Assad regime, not the Syrian people, persecuted the Syrian Kurds for the last 60 years. No one should believe that Assad will give the Kurds their political rights. Neither political pressure nor oil will be persuasive. It would be a dangerous misadventure for which Arabs and Kurds will pay its price. Real decisions should be taken to enhance stability by empowering serious Arab leaders—for the sake of all parties.
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Stevenson’s army, January 25
– FT notesincreased Chinese activity near Taiwan and Japan.
– BTW, Russian navy worries Ireland.
– NYT has good rundown of possible pretexts for Russian action in Ukraine.
– Fiona Hill says Putin has US where he wants it.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Russian ambitions are making a fight more likely
A colleague whom I respect suggests President Putin’s force mobilization on Ukraine’s border has little to do with Ukraine or Russian domestic politics. He thinks It could be Putin’s effort to reassert Russia’s claim to a seat at the “high table” with the US and China. The US looks weak in the aftermath of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Trump. So Putin wants to seize the day to re-establish Russia as indispensable to global decisionmaking.
What does this perspective suggest about ways to defuse the current situation?
The facts
President Obama suggested Russia was a middling regional power. This is in many respects numerically true. Russia has an economy about the size of Brazil’s that is wholly dependent on oil and gas exports. Its population is old and declining, both in numbers and life expectancy. Its people, who include not only Russians but lots of mistreated minorities, are mostly beyond discontent and just seeking to get by.
But Moscow’s military forces are the fifth largest on earth and increasingly modernized (especially the air force). Its nuclear weapons are equal to those of the US. It is the largest country in the world by area. It has grown a sovereign wealth fund of over $620 billion. Russia’s extensive geography places it more or less contiguous to important places: the Arctic, the European Union, the Black Sea, the Gulf, Central Asia, and China. Russia has also managed to project its reach to Venezuela, Cuba, Libya, Mali, and other places in Africa.
So Russia is not Brazil, but it is not China either.
The history
The US was not unkind to Russia after the Cold War. Washington harbored hopes Moscow would no longer relish the role of adversary but rather join the Western “world order.” Russia kept the Soviet Union’s UN Security Council permanent membership, with a veto. NATO and Russia established a Permanent Joint Council intended to end hostility between the Alliance and Moscow. Russia joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace. Commitments made to the Soviets were initially maintained, until George W. Bush started dismantling them in the first decade of the twentieth century.
Moscow for much of the past decade has been on a tear. In Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine Russian forces have established de facto puppet regimes in territory where Russian speakers are the majority. Moscow used force to reclaim and annex Crimea. Russian forces have found their way not only to Armenia but also to Azerbaijan and most of the ‘stans, not to mention Belarus. Russia has threatened non-NATO members Finland and Sweden, undermined NATO members Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (all former Soviet possessions), and tried by nefarious means to block NATO membership for Macedonia and Montenegro.
Is there a way?
No wonder Washington has been seeking to reset relations with Russia. Moscow has put its price on the table. It wants American acceptance, in a legally binding document, of Russian hegemony in the former Soviet republics not yet NATO members. And it wants limits on NATO’s presence in its newer member states. This would amount to acknowledging a Russian sphere of influence, making the newer member states buffers between Russia and what we used to call Western Europe. NATO would abandon the ambition of Europe “whole and free,” at least for now.
There may be some other way. After all, the Russians knew when presenting their maximum demands that they would not be acceptable. Europe whole and free has long been out of reach. NATO could clarify that there are no current plans for accession of Ukraine, which is true. Some force limitations in eastern Europe are possible too, provided they are reciprocal. Upgrading the NATO-Russia Council is conceivable. So too is more bilateral consultation with Russia.
But Russian ambitions exceed all those moves. The odds of a fight are increasing by the day.
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Stevenson’s army, January 24
Lots of leaks following the Camp David meeting to discuss Ukraine options. Most strike me as authorized, rather than an effort by those losing the interagency debate. NYT says US might send more troops to Baltics. WaPo says US plans heavy sanctions to prevent transfer to Russia of US semiconductors and aircraft parts.
– Meanwhile, US & UK have begun withdrawals of dependents and some staff from Ukraine.
– FT suggest all the publicity has undercut effectiveness of deterrent.
– WSJ sees Russia angle in US sale of F16s to Turkey.
– NYT writer says Pakistan army wants US back in region.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, January 23
– UK says its intelligence sees Kremlin plot to install pro-Russian leader in Ukraine. NYT reports; here’s WaPo report. Baltic states have been shipping arms.
-WaPo reports NATO help.
– But Germany blocks transfer of German equipment.
–Biden is meeting with advisers at Camp David.
– Conservative Ross Douthat urges”retreat from Ukraine”
-LAT sees few options for US in Yemen.
-CARE reminds us of under-reported humanitarian crises.
– FP has several experts grading Biden’s foreign policy.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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What Macron meant to say
President Macron of France said Wednesday that the countries of the Western Balkans should be given a clear perspective on joining the EU within a reasonable timeframe. France has been reluctant on enlargement. So the press in the countries concerned has highlighted the statement and wondered what it means.
My guess is less than many might hope. Macron omitted the when, where, and how.
Macron also underlined on the same day that European culture evolved through Christianity:
But we come from Ancient Greece to the Roman Empire, from Christianity to the Renaissance and to the Enlightenment, heirs of a singular way of envisaging the human adventure.
https://presidence-francaise.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/french-president-emmanuel-macron-s-speech-at-the-european-parliament-strasbourg-19-january-2022/
He makes no mention of Europe’s considerable debt to the Islamic world. That casts a shadow on any hope Macron’s statement applies to the three Muslim-majority countries of the Western Balkans: Albania, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. All three are already laggards in adoption of the acquis communautaire compared to Serbia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia.
Macron could have signalled openness to their EU accession. Kosovo has fulfilled the hundred or so requirements the EU levied as preconditions for the visa waiver. France has blocked it, making Kosovars the only Balkanites who need visas to enter the EU. Albania is awaiting a date to start its accession negotiations. Macron might have promised that. He didn’t.
My guess is that the excitement over Macron’s “opening” to the Western Balkans is unjustified. If France does anything to fulfill Macron’s promise, it will accelerate Serbia’s accession and perhaps Montenegro’s. They are both Christian-majority. This would be little more than continuation of longstanding French policy, which favors Belgrade’s interests over those of other Western Balkan countries. Liberté, égalité, fraternité for Christians is what Macron meant to say.
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