Day: May 11, 2025
Ukraine’s opportunities and threats
Based on proceedings at the Kyiv Security Forum, I’ve already tried to summarize Ukraine’s strengths and weaknesses. Here are some opportunities and threats.
Opportunities still abound
The West still has opportunities to improve Ukraine’s position vis-a-vis Russia, which responds only to actions (not just words):
- Strengthen sanctions, including secondary sanctions against firms doing business with Russia.
- Use Russian assets frozen in Europe and the US to fund Ukrainian defense.
- End European dependence on Russian natural gas, as pledged, by 2027.
- Integrate Ukrainian and European industry to produce more of what Ukraine needs.
- Raise defense spending sharply.
- Exploit any ceasefire to help Ukraine gain against Russia.
- Provide military assets to Ukraine on lend/lease terms.
- Improve Alliance interoperability.
- Deepen relations with Ukraine through the NATO/Ukraine Council.
- Encourage Russian brain drain to the West.
Carpe diem
Europeans, participants in the Forum thought, need to seize the day. Their political will has to match Ukrainian courage. Saturday’s visit of Polish Prime Minister Tusk, French President Macron, UK Prime Minister Starmer, and German Chancellor Merz started that process. The Europeans joined with Ukrainian President Zelensky in issuing an ultimatum for a 30-day ceasefire to begin Monday. So far, Russia has not accepted the proposition.
Having reappropriated the language of peace, the Europeans need now to reach out to the rest of the world. They also need to convince their own right-wing nationalists that Kyiv, not Moscow, merits support. Europe’s position should stay values-based but firm.
The Europeans also need to bring President Trump on board. The Congress is already restraining his worst pro-Putin impulses. The Euros should offer to acquire unique US capabilities and even to pay for deployment of US troops. They should also underline to Trump that peace through strength requires the US to do more for Ukraine. MAGA cannot make America great if it abandons Kyiv.
Russia’s future
The war with Ukraine has degraded the Russian military, compromised its intelligence, and devastated its economy and society. Even while advancing slowly on the ground, Moscow is losing the war. It has achieved none of its objectives. The West has not recognized its annexations or ruled out NATO membership and security guarantees for Ukraine.
While by no means guaranteed, defeat will open the possibility of a democratic transition in Russia. Putin will in any case eventually be gone. Moscow will then have to reconsider its relations with the West. We can hope the Russians will opt for improvement.
The threats are still real
Putin has gone too far to compromise now. His overall objectives have not changed. He wants to eliminate an independent Ukraine. A successful democracy on Russia’s borders is a threat to his regime. If Ukraine loses, Moldova and Lithuania will be next. Appeasement will encourage further aggression. Putin isn’t an idiot or crazy but rather a determined bully. He wants to impose his own rules to make the world safe for kleptocratic autocracy. The closing of Voice of America and Radio Free Europe are precisely what he wants.
NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense guarantee is the only thing that will stop him. But President Trump’s attitude toward NATO, including threats against Greenland, make Europeans doubt that he will do what it requires.
Even if the war ends, the fighting will go on through hybrid warfare. Russia and China will remain allied. Trump’s efforts to separate them will fail. The US should not promote a division of labor that assigns Europe to the Europeans and Asia to the Americans. That would divide the Alliance and limit Europe’s support in Asia.
Putin has effectively used nuclear blackmail to limit US aid to Ukraine. He has also promoted grievances in the West that threaten democratic governance and aim to make autocracy look more attractive. He will continue these successful efforts.
On balance
While the mists of war are still hiding the outcome, Ukraine is far from defeat. Even if Russia could occupy the whole country, which it can’t, many Ukrainians would resist. Putin’s best bet now is a Georgia-style political takeover of Ukraine by forces friendly to Moscow. But that gets less possible with every day of continued conflict. Killing people because of their identity strengthens that identity. Ukrainians are feeling more Ukrainian, not less, due to the war.
Russia is at the point of diminishing returns. Western appeasement would be a serious mistake. Ending Putin’s threat to Ukraine will prevent war elsewhere. That is a worthy cause.
Ukraine’s strengths and weaknesses
The Kyiv Security Forum last Thursday and Friday was a crash course in Ukraine’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. Here I’ll do the strengths and weaknesses. I’ve already reported on other aspects of my experience here in Kyiv.
Unity and commitment are gaining advantage
Ukrainians, according to Rasumkov Centre surveys, believe in victory. But my conversations suggest that there are some nuances when it comes to defining victory. A minority are prepared to see the territories Russia occupies, especially Crimea, continue for now under Moscow’s rule. But even they would not accept recognition of Russian sovereignty, which would be a violation of Ukraine’s constitution. Trump was foolish to suggest it. Zelensky can’t do it.
Now that the minerals agreement has been signed, the tables are turning in Ukraine’s favor. Washington and Kyiv are more aligned. President Zelensky has reappropriated the language of peace and put the monkey on Putin’s back. He also learned how to manage President Trump. Better to say “yes, but let me suggest something” than to say simply “no.” The Russian economy is sinking. Europe is undergoing a strategic reawakening. And both Europe and the US are seeing the need to deter Russia’s territorial ambitions, which extend beyond Ukraine.
Ukraine as an asset, not a burden
Ukraine, rather than a burden to NATO, is becoming an asset. After independence, it reformed its intelligence services and refocused them on external threats. They have cooperated well with the West. Kyiv has the technology to attack deep inside Russia and the intelligence needed to use it. The Russian intelligence services still focus mainly on domestic repression. They are finding it difficult to plan and execute sabotage operations inside Ukraine. On the battlefield, Kyiv’s more innovative, higher quality weapons are still beating Russia’s advantages in quantity and manpower. Kyiv has also hit Russian proxies and forces in Libya, Sudan, and Syria.
Ukraine has good engineers who are innovating rapidly. Its designers, suppliers, and manufacturers are working closely together. They are bringing innovations to battle more rapidly than the Russians are adapting. The result is a mostly static front with little use of armor and air cover.
NATO last year provided $50 billion in military aid to Ukraine, equaling Kyiv’s own spending. The June NATO Summit in The Hague is an opportunity. The Europeans should make it clear to the US that they are taking on more burden. But still they need the US to supply some advanced weapons and security guarantees.
Disunity is the main weakness
The theme of the Kyiv Security Conference is “United Again.” That already tells you that disunity is an issue. The “again” refers to Allied success in World War II, which ended in Europe 80 years ago.
Within Europe, disunity comes in two forms. Right-wing nationalist governments in Slovakia and Hungary have tied themselves to Russia. And within many other countries right-wing political forces would like to do the same if they come to power. The Alternative for Germany and the National Rally in France are the two most important. This greatly complicates and limits European decision-making on Ukraine. No proposal at the conference received more applause from the participants than spending Russia’s frozen assets on Ukraine’s military needs. But that requires unanimity at least in the EU.
Divisions within the Alliance
Divisions within NATO are also important. President Trump is erratic. Europe is increasing its defense expenditures and is getting ready to deploy peacekeepers if negotiations succeed. But Trump could fail to provide needed assistance to Ukraine, or even betray it by returning to his pro-Putin stance. Despite some signs of a shift, US pressure on Moscow to negotiate is still minimal. The American negotiator, Witkoff, is unprepared for the task and lacks an serious team. Trump has given Putin far too many carrots. He still hopes to relieve sanctions on Russia and wean it from China, a fool’s errand.
Standardization within the Alliance is weakly implemented. While grenades are standardized in size, in practice the Alliance still produces 14 different ones. In both Europe and the US, military production capacity is inadequate. Neither has been willing to fund military production in Ukraine, which has excess capacity. With financing, it could produce twice as many drones as it does today. Europe has lots of soldiers, but few ready to deploy into conflict. Moscow knows this. It also knows the US wants to reduce its presence in Europe.
Russia won’t do what it says it will do
In thinking about a negotiated outcome to the war, one thought prevails among the Ukrainians, European, and Americans here. Whatever the strengths and weaknesses on the Ukrainian side, Moscow will not implement whatever it signs. The best that can be hoped for is a pause in the war. Conference participants believe Putin is serious about taking control of all of Ukraine. The question is whether Russia or Ukraine would gain more from an opportunity to rest and rearm. My sense is the Ukrainian military thinks Russia would gain more, since it has deeper resources and a bigger population. Some Ukrainian civilians think a pause would refresh political support for the war.
Culture, religion, and education in Ukraine
I’ve had a chance now to sample–in tiny doses–Kyiv’s cultural, religious, and educational institutions. Some would be impressive even without the war. But conflict makes it doubly difficult to keep high standards. Money is short and people have other things to think about. We shouldn’t expect world class museums, performances, and universities. When we find them, they merit not only praise but support.
The internet I am using is too slow to upload pictures for this post. I’ll try to do that when I am in a better cyber environment.
A fine opera house
I particularly enjoyed a performance of Semen Gulak-Artemovskiy’s Zaporozhian Beyond The Danube. It’s not the greatest 19th century opera, but it has significance for our time. It concerns Cossacks in Ottoman captivity who want to return to their Zaporozhian homestead. Today, part of that oblast is in Russian hands. Wikipedia tells me the opera premiered in 1863 in Russian in St. Petersburg, but today it is normally performed in Ukrainian, as in Kyiv. The opera house is a handsome one of the traditional variety.
The performance was very good. One or two the singers didn’t seem quite up to their roles, but the chorus and dancers were great. The choreography was mostly chic traditional, but done with real flare. The capacity of humans to defy gravity long enough to twirl gracefully three times in the air always amazes me. I caught no outward manifestations of nationalist sentiment in the audience or cast. But the plot certainly tugs at the heart strings under current circumstances. And yes, it’s a comedy, so the Cossacks do get to go home.
Museums
The National History Museum was another high point. I found it hard to resist its juxtaposition of a weapons exposition with a show featuring haute couture. Best was the 10th century cross archaeologists excavated from the church Volodomyr the Great founded after his conversion in 988. This and the many other objects found there disprove President Putin’s claim that Russia’s czars founded the Rus. It was more than three hundred years later that Moscow emerged as a governing center.
I can’t compliment the Kyiv Picture Gallery, where I viewed a colorful exhibit by a forgettable trans-Carparthian painter. I think the Khanenko Museum down the street was where I should have gone. The exhibit of ancient coinage and modern paper money at the gargantuan Ukrainian House only had labels in Ukrainian. But I gather it aimed to demonstrate the continuity of Ukrainian statehood.
Religion gets shorter shrift
Ukrainians mostly regard themselves as Orthodox Christians of one variety or another. Seventy per cent are self-avowed “believers.” The Russian Orthodox Patriarchate is now nominally illegal, but some churchmen are still loyal to it. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which exists in two institutional forms, is dominant. The Greek Catholic Church, which the Soviets prohibited, has revived. Originally “Uniate,” it recognizes the authority of the Pope and aims to bridge the gap between Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism.
Ukrainians told me they are not as devout as many Poles and some Russians. They identify as Orthodox more because of family tradition and national culture than personal faith. But during services the orthodox churches see some prayerful traffic while the service proceeds behind the iconostasis barrier.
The St. Sophia complex, which originated in the 11th century, and St. Andrews, designed in the mid-18th century by Italian architect Bartolomeo Rastrelli, are impressive. The Soviets put them to other uses. The state now administers them. St. Andrews and the park below have spectacular views over the Dnieper River. The St. Sophia bell tower has a view over much of the center of Kyiv.
Also impressive is the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra religious complex. A current exhibit there of Crimean artifacts underlines its relationship to Ukrainian history and culture.
The Jews seem ok
What remains of the Jewish community feels fairly comfortable in contemporary Ukraine. Some have chosen, wisely, to focus on ecumenical humanitarian work rather than serving only the Jewish community. The President comes from a Jewish family, though he himself has not been active. The community is, as often, fragmented. The Orthodox are dominant, but there is a Reform congregation.
Babyn Yar, where the Nazis shot more than 33,000 people in late September 1941, is amply memorialized. Maybe overly so. The monuments there seemed less than coherent to me. Two big ones were too explicit for my tastes, but this haunting “symbolic” synagogue hit my chords.
Education is less valued
Here I can only repeat what some Ukrainians have told me. Education is not highly valued in the society, especially now with the war on. English is taught from first grade, but few people on the street speak more than a few words. The quality of the state universities is not high. Two historically important ones get low grades. Their professors’ salaries are low.
The Kyiv School of Economics, where I’ve been speaking is the exception. Founded only in 1996 and struggling even a decade ago, KSE has raised a lot of private and foreign money. It now sits in a building with a clever internal design a few miles from central Kyiv. But it plans to move at some point to terrain and buildings it has purchased near the Dnieper. By all reports, it pays its professors much better than the other universities in town and subsidizes its students.
The result is an institution that is generating some of the best minds and technocratic work in the country. Its social sciences department chose to be accredited in Germany rather than Ukraine. That is an option open to other Ukrainian institutions but not generally used. KSE also has a thinktank concerned with current issues like how to tighten the EU sanctions on Russia. They are also trying to correct World Bank statistics on Ukraine’s GDP.
Next up
I attended the Kyiv Security Forum. Next up will be some wisdom I gathered there.