Round peg won’t fit square hole

Yesterday I speculated on how Hamas might react to the Trump proposal for Gaza. Here I’d like to assume that Hamas accepts or evaporates. How does this proposal for the Day After jibe with past experience?

Little new in the overall outlines

The basic outline looks much like past experience, especially in Bosnia and Kosovo. Both experienced armed external interventions that ended their wars. The international community then set up local structures to implement peace agreements. Multilateral military forces ensured a safe and secure environment.

In Bosnia, a High Representative supervised the local structure, which was a national government. A “Peace Implementation Council” oversaw the process. In Kosovo, the initial structure was a local “Interim Administrative Council” (later “the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government”). A Special Representative of the Secretary General supervised implementation. He reported to the UN Security Council. In both instances, the supervisory authorities wielded legislative powers as well as the power to remove local officials from office.

Trump’s Gaza scheme is similar, without however specifying the powers of the internationals. He would create a bombastically named “Board of Peace,” chaired by Trump himself and including Tony Blair. While Trump doesn’t specify Blair’s role, he is pretty clearly slated to be the senior international official responsible for day to day supervision of a still not clearly defined process.

But the contexts are very different

The world has changed a great deal since the 1990s, which were a unipolar moment, albeit one in which the US was more often than not committed to multilateralism. Now unilateralism, and might makes right, are in vogue. In addition, the Middle East isn’t the Balkans.

The UN Security Council approved the Bosnia military intervention and the Day After effort in advance in the Security Council. The UNSC did not approve the Kosovo military intervention, but it did approve the post-war process was. It is well-documented that impartial interventions approved by the great powers are more likely to achieve their objectives.

In Bosnia and Kosovo, the process aimed explicitly at democracy and open societies, as specified in the Dayton peace agreements and the Ahtisaari Plan, respectively. Trump’s plan doesn’t mention those things. It focuses on delivering services and developing the economy, in addition to de-militarization. It doesn’t mention approval in the Security Council.

Where is the needed neutrality?

Nor is neutrality possible with the President of the United States in the chair. He has allied himself strongly with Israel, which is one of the warring parties in Gaza. Its forces would not withdraw immediately. They would remain at least until the expected Arab and Muslim peacekeeping forces arrive. Past experience suggests that as many as 30,000 of them will be needed for a heavy enforcement action in a territory of 2 million people, in addition to about 7000 Palestinian military and 3500 Palestinian police.

It is going to be more than a few months before we see those numbers in Gaza. In the meanwhile, the Israelis will rule the roost. And once the Arab and Muslim forces arrive they will need close cooperation with the Israelis, who will continue to control access to Gaza.

Can this work?

It is hard to see how this will work. The peg is not only round, it is big and challenging. It won’t fit in a square hole from the 1990s. I suppose it might be better than the alternative, which is continued fighting. But I can also see a lot of people getting killed in a peace operation of these dimensions and difficulty. The President should not be volunteering himself to be responsible for it.