Category: Daniel Serwer
Srebrenica and its implications
I participated in a panel Wednesday at Voice of America on Bosnia: Twenty Years After Srebrenica with Ambassadors Stephen Rapp and Kurt Volker as well as Tanya Domi. The video of the event is on the VoA website (it is too big to upload to peacefare.net).
The unwelcome news of Russia’s veto of a UN Security Council resolution marking the anniversary arrived just before we started. Angela Merkel at the time was in Belgrade, so Tanjug had some questions about her visit there and the blocked UNSC resolution:
Q: In short, what is your analysis of the results of the visit, and in your opinion, what was the most important message?
A: The visit went well. Merkel’s explicit message was praise for Serbia’s fiscal restraint. I imagine that has more to do with the Greek crisis than with anything else. I don’t imagine Merkel was pleased with the Russian veto of the Srbrenica resolution, but I don’t know what she said to Nikolic and Vucic about that.
Q: Also, how do you comment the fact that UNSC didn’t adopt British resolution on Srebenica because of Russian veto, as a consequence of disagreement on the text of resolution?
A: The disagreement appears to have been focused on use of the word “genocide,” which is a characterization both the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice have both used with regard to Srbrenica. The view from Washington is that that word characterizes a well-established fact. Russian and Serbian denial of that fact makes Prime Minister Vucic’s attendance at the Srebrenica commemoration less important than it otherwise might have been.
Q: What is your opinion on prime minister Vucic`s visit to Potocari? What will that step mean for the region?
A: As indicated above, I don’t think it will be seen as significant in the region, because of the Security Council veto. Only if he were to say something explicit condemning the genocide will there be much impact. That isn’t likely, but it would certainly be welcome here and in Brussels.
Srebrenica of course has broad implications far beyond the Balkans for international community and American policy, as Derek Chollet points out. But I disagree with Derek on a number of issues, as I pointed out to a correspondent this morning:
1. On Iraq, I think Derk’s argument is specious: the only viable justification for intervention in 2003 was weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Saddam was not doing much more harm to his population then than he had been doing for a long time (or that many other dictators have done since). Without WMD, the intervention was just a monumental mistake.
2. In Libya, Derek fails to mention that the Libyans did not want our help after Qaddafi was gone, because they thought (with some good reason) that they could handle it themselves. They did pretty well until late 2012 but then ran off the rails.
3. In Syria, lots of people saw the need for early diplomatic efforts to remove Assad, which among other things might have prevented the transformation of a peaceful rebellion into a violent one. Derek and Phil Gordon should be ashamed of their failure to get the President to act on his conviction that Assad had to go.
4. Rwanda and Srebrenica do inform such decisions, but I doubt there was much we could have done militarily in either case to prevent what happened. In Srebrenica, we tried to convince Izetbegovic to move the Muslims out of the enclave, which was obviously vulnerable. That is now being criticized as a proposal to assist ethnic cleansing. But military intervention on the scale required was out of the question at the time. In Rwanda, military intervention against whom? Individual machete wielding Hutus?
Bottom line: Our military strength has made our diplomatic capabilities atrophy. We should get back to using military strength to frame issues, which it seems to me the Administration has been pretty good about with Iran (the military option being so unattractive they hardly had a choice). But the solutions are often diplomatic rather than military.
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Yes, a nuclear deal means trouble
I am a proponent of a good nuclear deal with Iran. But I have taken some time this week to appreciate Israel’s perspective. Here is what I have understood and how I react.
The Israelis are concerned with the geostrategic impact of a deal with Iran that will accept and thereby legitimize its enrichment program. Other countries in the region that have in the past been constrained from pursuing enrichment will now proceed, in particular Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Whereas Turkey may be a more or less consolidated democracy, it is unpredictable who might come to power in the Kingdom or Egypt and what they might do with nuclear technology.
At the same time, Iran’s pernicious proxies in the region–until now deterred by Israel’s military capabilities–will be emboldened and enriched with resources once multilateral sanctions are lifted. Iran doesn’t much care about US sanctions. The ideology of the regime requires that the US remain an enemy. It will be sufficient for Europe, Russia and China to begin doing business with Tehran to put lots of money in its pockets. Any help the US gets from Iran and its proxies in fighting the Islamic State will be short-lived.
Everyone in the region, not just Israel, will feel less secure. An arms race will ensue. The buying spree will put advanced weapons into the hands of regimes that are not stable or reliable. No one knows where they will end up.
American reassurances are dubious. One hundred per cent access to Iranian facilities is impossible. No country has ever provided it. Iran won’t either. Nor can sanctions “snap back.” Neither the Russians nor the Chinese will agree to a mechanism that they are unable to block.
In my view, these preoccupations all have their validity. The trouble is the outcomes feared are likely whether there is an agreement or not. Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are already under no legal restraint from enriching uranium whenever they please. Multilateral sanctions are unlikely to survive much longer, due to Chinese and European hunger for oil and gas as well as their interest in exporting to Iran. Arms have been pouring into the Gulf countries as well as Egypt and Jordan for years. There is already no lack of advanced equipment in hands that may or may not be reliable.
On top of all that, no agreement means no inspections and no constraints on the Iranian nuclear program. That is worse than the ample access to Iran’s nuclear program, and serious constraints, that an agreement will have to provide.
It is hard not to see the Israeli preoccupations as nostalgia for a region that they dominated for decades. Iran was marginalized, the Arabs were under America’s thumb, and Israel could do, and did, as it liked.
But that is not the eternal order in the Middle East. There is no way to keep Iran in its diminished position, much as we might like to try. Nor are the Arabs inclined to remain under American control. The prospect of a nuclear deal is ironically inclining them more than ever before to make common cause with Israel against Iran, whatever the Americans think. Just think what would happen if the Israelis were to settle with the Palestinians!
The bottom line: Israel wanted Iran to be forced to give up enrichment and will be satisfied with nothing less. But that was unlikely at best and impossible at worst.
Provided the verification mechanisms in any nuclear deal reached in the next few days are robust, including accounting for past military dimensions, all of us will need to learn to live with a still non-nuclear-armed Iran that is less constrained and more flush with cash than in the recent past. We’ll also need to be prepared to deter and counter its troublemaking, at least until someone who doesn’t see America as an enemy governs in Tehran.
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Coalition as the Syrian Kurds’ air force
My friends at peopledemandchange.org have put together the data to show it (and I’ve made a few minor editorial changes):
The international coalition members conducting airstrikes in Syria include the United States, Bahrain, Canada, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. According to information provided by the Pentagon in daily briefing a total of 1077 airstrikes were conducted in Syria in the first six months of 2015. More than half of the airstrikes targeted the ISIS targets in the area around Kobani.
The attacks were conducted as part of Operation Inherent Resolve which has as its mission “to eliminate the ISIL terrorist group and the threat they pose to Iraq, Syria, the region, and the wider international community.” In September 2014 the campaign of airstrikes started with the US taking out multiple Khorassan Unit targets in the wider Aleppo area, a place where al-Qa’ida had been operating a series of safe houses since 2003. The airstrikes conducted by the coalition in 2015 did not target the Syrian army, Jabhat al-Nusra or the Khorassan unit.
This analysis is based on the daily Department of Defense statements about the airstrikes:
In total 924 airstrikes where in support of the Kurdish YPG militia in Northern Syria. Around Kobani 603 airstrikes took place and in Hasakah 284. In June 2015, 37 strikes took place near the border town Tel Abyad, where the YPG started an offensive, with support of the FSA, to push back ISIS in their main province Raqqah. Also in June the Coalition air forces bombed 35 targets near Raqqah, the same amount of air raids as the five months before.
Most of the targets are ISIS assets like tanks, armored vehicles, AAA guns and ISIS tactical units. Other targets include ISIS fighting position and headquarters.
Deir Ez-Zur
As most of the targets are in direct support of defending or supporting YPG forces, there is a real difference with airstrikes by Coalition forces in the eastern province of Deir Ez-Zur. In the first six months of 2015 the province of Deir ez-Zur, including the border town Abu Kamal, got 57 coalition airstrikes. Most of the airstrikes took place in the months of January (17 airstrikes) and June, with 18 airstrikes. The airstrikes in the Deir ez-Zur province are different from other areas where the air strikes are directly linked to ongoing fighting. More than half of the airstrikes in Deir ez-Zur are linked to economic infrastructure. The Coalition targeted oil collection points, well heads, a refinery, oil pumps and pipelines and storage and staging facilities.
To specify the 57 airstrikes even more in-depth:
In total 31 of the 57 airstrikes in Deir Ez-Zur were economic targets, including 26 attacks on oil collection points, two wellheads, one on oil pumps, one refinery and one storage facility. The second group of targets was tactical in nature and included ten tactical ISIS units, two ISIS checkpoints and one fighting position.
The third group of targets, ten in total, were ISIS vehicles, including armored vehicles, a tank, an excavator, a piece of artillery and a MRLS system. Finally the last group of targets were ISIS buildings including two bunkers.
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Hangover coming
The folks celebrating the referendum “no” vote in Syntagma Square tonight in Athens are going to have a bad hangover. The Germans will likely stand firm, since doing otherwise would risk undermining the euro’s credibility. If Prime Minister Tsipras respects the referendum, Greek banks are unlikely to have sufficient euros to reopen as scheduled Tuesday.
Athens will need to issue a new currency, which will take time. Once issued, it will fall rapidly in value, making repayment of euro-denominated debt even more difficult. Several debt payments are due during July. The biggest slice is, ironically, owed to Germany (via Aljazeera): 
Sixty per cent is owed to EU member states and the European Central Bank (ECB). The amount is however relatively small from their perspective, so the default is unlikely to affect the euro much, unless nervousness spreads to Portugal, Italy and Spain. The ECB will want to focus its resources on preventing contagion. Negotiation of the “haircut” on the existing debt, which is what Greece hopes for, will take months if not years, making lenders leery of pouring good money after bad.
Out of the euro and issuing its own currency, Greece will theoretically be able to increase its exports and decrease its imports. But austerity will not end. Greece’s government will be insolvent and not creditworthy, making it impossible to stimulate the economy (or even pay government workers and pensions, except by printing money). Russia may ante up, but with far less than the situation requires. It will also insist on tough terms. Religious orthodoxy is no substitute for repayment guarantees.
Politics could intervene at any point, forcing Prime Minister Tsipras out and leading to formation of a new government committed to cleaning up the mess. But it will be years before confidence is restored. Greece has chosen a hard road that leads to an uncertain destination. Greece used to think it could get the Elgin marbles back from London. Now it will be lucky if it doesn’t have to mortgage the Parthenon.
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Independence and interdependence
It is Independence Day in the US, which marks 239 years since the representatives of the thirteen colonies declared in 1776:
That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do.
The war that had begun the year before at Lexington and Concord (Massachusetts) continued, ending only in 1781 at Yorktown (Virginia). The peace was signed only in 1783 in Paris.
The United States and the United Kingdom fought again in 1812-15, but the UK did not intervene in the American civil war. By then British sentiment was mainly anti-slavery but the UK still relied on cotton produced in the Confederacy and feared industrial competition from the American north. It was only in the 1890s, more than a hundred years after the revolution, that America’s familiar friendly ties with the UK began to be established.
I tell this story not only because it is July 4, but also because it provides perspective on some of today’s problems. Kosovo and South Sudan are the world’s newest “independent” states. It would be easy to bemoan their current situations. Kosovo is suffering from economic doldrums and serious corruption. South Sudan is suffering a ferocious civil war that overshadows the economic doldrums and corruption that would otherwise be much in evidence.
Neither country is yet 10 years old. Kosovo has made good progress in normalizing its relations with Serbia, which is potentially Kosovo’s biggest market and its most obvious security threat. Khartoum may be aggravating South Sudan’s problems, but they are mainly internal. If only because of the Nile, which flows through both, Sudan and South Sudan will need eventually to establish what the Europeans like to call “good neighborly relations.”
Other trouble spots in the Middle East are also relatively young independent states: Libya (1951), Egypt (nominally 1922, but British troops didn’t leave until 1956), Yemen (British soldiers left in 1967, but the current state dates from the unification of north and south in 1990), Syria (1945) and Iraq (1932). They are suffering mainly from internal conflict, all too often precipitated or aggravated by outside powers. It is tempting to think that 100 years is still a reasonable time frame for state consolidation. Some of these states may not make it to that milestone.
Ukraine is in a similar situation. It achieved independence only in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It would have had internal problems in any event, but Russia has aggravated them by annexing Crimea and invading two of Ukraine’s eastern provinces.
Independence is hard, but many countries figure out how to govern themselves if left to their own devices. It is the interdependence dimension that often causes problems. The Saudi/Iranian rivalry has aggravated internal conflicts in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Egypt and Libya have generated most of their own problems, which Islamic State affiliates are exploiting.
I can only wish that the evolution in the Middle East will follow the course that US/UK relations took, with many ups and downs, during the 19th century. Iran and Saudi Arabia, which are doing so much to fuel conflict today, have good reason to come to terms. Both are spending too much to achieve too little in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. ISIS challenges them both. It is not hard to imagine a positive-sum outcome to their current negative-sum rivalries. Interdependence may be hard, but it is a lot better than war.
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Unfuck Greece
It is difficult to write anything about Greece in the current confused course of events, but I thought this Guardian video captured the situation well:
Unfucking Greece will not be easy. I take it this is the International Monetary Fund report the government is relying on to claim that austerity won’t work. But what the report says is that the debt is unsustainable because of Greek government policy failures.
Later today the Greek Council of State is supposed to rule on the validity of Sunday’s referendum. If it goes ahead, it will be a referendum on staying in the eurozone, though the question posed is not about that but rather about the austerity package the European Union has been pressing.
If I were betting, it would be on a Greek exit from the eurozone, which seems to be the only way to force its creditors into restructuring and reducing its debt. But anyone expecting the good life to return with the drachma is fooling themselves. Devaluation will impoverish Greeks even further.
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