Category: Daniel Serwer
From inside northern Syria
I get lots of email, little of it more interesting than this timely update on the sitution in and near Tal Abyad on the Turkish border in northern Syria, which was liberated from ISIS two days ago. This comes from Bassam Barabandi and Sasha Ghosh-Siminoff of People Demand Change, who have good on-the-ground sources in Syria (I’ve made some minor edits for clarity and readability):
Tensions over Raqqah
The Kurdish and Arab tribal heads from both sides along with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the Kurdish People’s Protection Unit (YPG) commanders are meeting today to continue discussing the status of Raqqah. The major dispute surrounds PYD’s claim that Northern Raqqah is part of “Rojave” or the Kurdish autonomous zone that they have claimed in Syria, and whether that means that their forces have the right to control this area militarily. Also it has implications for the areas future such as whether YPG will attempt to change the demography of the area to solidify Raqqah as a land-bridge between Kobani and Hasakah.
More and more tribal fighters from Raqqah have come to join under Abo Essa’s command and will continue to do so, especially if they think their lands will be taken by the Kurds.
Refugees from Raqqah (and especially Tal Abyad) who are in Akcakale [Turkey] have gathered into an informal militia of several hundred armed men in response to the YPG’s announcement that they considered Raqqah part of their autonomous zone. The situation there is very tense. Many of these armed refugees are crossing the border today back into Tal Abyad to support Abo Essa and show the YPG they will not give up their land without a fight. The Turkish Government thus far has not interfered in Akcakale regarding this tense situation. Some Raqqah community leaders went to Akcakale last night and asked everyone to calm down and not to make a violent confrontation in Turkey with either Kurdish refugees or the YPG. Kurdish civil society activists also made calls to Kurdish refugees and youth in Akcakale and pleaded with them sternly to stay out of the streets and not to make a fight with any of the youth from Raqqah.
Ahmad Haj Salah, the first president of the Raqqah local council was beaten by three youth when he was in Akcakale, but his injuries were not serious and he returned to Gaziantep.
Refugees crossing into Turkey not expelled
More civilians crossed into Akcakale, Turkey after the Turkish Government opened the border crossing today at 10am (Turkish time).
Some citizen journalists (Arab) have traveled to Akcakale to interview the Arab refugees fleeing Kobani and Raqqah. So far the responses have been that people are fleeing because they did not want to be caught between YPG and ISIS battles and that they needed food and water and preferred to come to Turkey until the fighting was over and it was clear who is in control of the ground. When asked about the issue of whether YPG had forced them to leave, until now the response was that they left voluntarily and were not forced to leave.
YPG commander had requested some villages in the Tal Abyad suburbs be evacuated by the civilians until the fighting was over. In these villages, civilians complied and left, but this same commander announced that all civilians who were requested to leave can return without fear and no harm will come to them. Some civilians have begun return and the YPG has worked to help a local bakery in the area open back up so the civilians can receive food.
Military situation still fluid
Ayn Essa has been liberated and the surrounding suburbs as well.
Western front is still moving south towards the Tal Abyad-Raqqah highway to cut the road just south-east of Ayn Essa.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Future Serbia
I’ve run into some flak for hosting Serbian Prime Minister Vučić at SAIS last week. Some people think providing an opportunity for someone to speak at a university represents a political endorsement of his views, past and present.
Certainly Vučić has said things in the past that I find odious, most notably this from July 1995:
one hundred Muslims would be killed for every dead Serb
I haven’t forgotten. But it is a mistake to harp too hard and too long on the past. My interest in hearing Prime Minister Vučić, and providing him a forum in which he could be heard by others, stemmed from the need to understand his vision of Serbia’s future. I’m not interested in settling scores but in bending the arc of history in a good direction.
What Vučić offered was a glimpse of a possible future Serbia, one that makes a strategic choice for Europe and gives up on the non-aligned balancing act it has performed since the end of World War II. In my book, that would be a welcome development.
Non-alignment lost its real meaning 25 years ago. All the other countries of the Balkans have already opted for Brussels, leaving Serbia surrounded by EU and NATO members and aspirants. Many maintain good bilateral relations with Russia, even while joining in Ukraine-related sanctions. Serbia hasn’t done that, despite its candidacy for EU membership.
The question is what would encourage and enable Serbia to take the necessary steps away from its traditional “non-aligned” stance. Here are some ideas worth consideration.
Internal reform
Serbia has progressed in many respects since the Milosevic era and is now in a position to claim that it is on the road towards democracy and to attracting foreign investment on a commercial basis. But it remains laggard in two key areas: media freedom and rule of law. It needs to up its game in both.
The media issue is not formal censorship but rather informal pressures and even self-censorship, often exercised through politically-appointed editors and fear of losing contracts for valuable government advertizing. In addition, politicians in Serbia frequently attack the medium, not only the message. This cows many outlets into submission–memories of what happened to media moguls who resisted Milosevic’s dominance are still fresh. The media need to be far freer to criticize without fear of retaliation.
Rule of law in Serbia suffers two ailments: slowness and lack of independence. Commercial disputes can drag on for decades. Tycoons and war criminals are too often protected from prosecution. One of the prime suspects in the murder of the Bytyqi brothers, American Kosovars killed in 1999 by Serb security forces, is a member of the prime minister’s political party and serves on its executive board. The courts need to be liberated and encouraged to pursue malfeasance wherever it occurs, provided they follow proper procedures. Read more
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
No easy answers
Lots of people were asking yesterday about President Obama’s decision to send more trainers and equipment to Iraq, mainly for Sunni fighters. Here is more or less what I’ve been saying:
Q. Why is the US sending troops to Iraq at this time?
A. They are sending more troops because the current effort is not succeeding. The Islamic State has lost some territory in the past year, but it has also gained territory and appears no closer to defeat than it was a year ago. Beefing up the training and equipment, in particular for Sunnis, is a move in the right direction, even if it is not likely the last one.
Q. What does this represents in terms of strategy?
A. In terms of strategy, not much. The objective is the same—to defeat ISIS—and this is a marginal addition of resources with which to try to do it. I don’t see any big shift in strategy with this decision.
Q. How is that going to help, if any, the fight against ISIS?
A. The key here is to try to get more Sunni tribal members into the fight. If and when the Sunni population wants to be rid of ISIS in a serious way, it will happen.
But that also depends on what the Sunni population can expect if they join the fight. Will they gain political and economic weight in Baghdad or in their own provinces? Will they be treated properly by the Iraqi authorities and adequate provision made for stabilizing and reconstructing their communities? There are no clear answers to these questions yet. The military dimension is not the only one that counts.
Q. Do you think the US is doing enough to help the Iraqis in their fight? If not, what more should the US does?
A. Most military experts think an important missing link is people on the ground to “spot,” that is target, the air strikes, which have been relatively few due in part to fear of collateral damage. But putting Americans into that role risks their lives and would raise questions about whether the effort is sustainable. Training Iraqis to perform that function risks its use to settle scores.
Like many other issues in the Middle East these days, there are no easy answers.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Bush, not Obama, decided Iraq withdrawal
As Republican candidates for President continue to raise the question of withdrawal from Iraq, “blaming” the supposed mistake on Barack Obama, I am reprinting from a previous post (published on May 2, 2014) the true story:
The notion that it was President Obama who decided to withdraw troops from Iraq is simply wrong. Here is a first-person account from Bob Loftis, who led the failed negotiations on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA):
[The decision to withdraw US troops] happened in mid-2008 [during the Bush Administration]. My team and I were instructed to work on an agreement that would allow a long term US military presence. At no time did the issue of withdrawal arise, even when the term “SOFA” became politically toxic in Baghdad. SOFA talks were suspended in May 2008, with the focus placed on negotiating the Strategic Framework Agreement (which would have some vague references to “pre-existing arrangements” (i.e. certain parts of CPA17). I then heard in September 2008 that…there were new SOFA talks which were about withdrawal. The “Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq” was signed on 17 November 2008 by Ryan Crocker: Article 24 (1) states “All the United States Forces shall withdraw from all Iraqi territory no later than December 31, 2011.”
People will tell you that President Bush thought the agreement would be revised in the succeeding administration to allow the Americans to stay in some limited number. But that doesn’t change the fact that it was Bush, not Obama, who decided on US withdrawal.
Once in office, Obama did try to negotiate permission for the Americans to stay. Prime Minister Maliki didn’t want to give up jurisdiction over crimes committed by US troops. Hard for me to fault the President for not yielding on that point, especially in light of the arbitrary arrests and detentions Maliki has indulged in since. Nor do I think US troops in the mess that is today’s Iraq would be either safe or useful.
Note added in 2015:
The circumstances that today are giving President Obama reason to send more troops back to Iraq are dramatically different from any that could have been anticipated in 2008 or 2009. But at least now they are going back to an Iraq whose government welcomes them. Withdrawal was not a mistake. It was a reaction to the political realities both in Washington and Baghdad. Second guessing is a fool’s game, especially when conducted by Donald Trump and Rudi Giuliani.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Mr. Vučić comes to Washington
Prime Minister Vučić’s visit to Washington this week, which included a public appearance at Johns Hopkins SAIS, prompted inquiries from the Serbian media. Here are their questions and my answers:
Blic
1. How do you evaluate the results of the visit of prime minister Vučić to SAD?
A: I think Prime Minister Vučić had a very successful visit to the US. He came asking for American political support for Serbia’s European ambitions and he got it.
2. In your opinion, how his lecture look like, what were the reactions?
A: His lecture at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies was great. The reaction was enthusiastic. He left lots of time for questions and was asked some difficult ones. He tried to respond directly to them, which is what Americans like to hear. He clearly wants Serbia to be seen as a reliable international partner, one that does not over-commit to things it cannot deliver.
3. What are the key messages from that lecture and how do you interpret that message?
A: The Prime Minister made it clear that Serbia has made a strategic choice for Europe, that it is not trying to balance between Europe and Russia, but that NATO membership and Serbia’s ultimate relationship with Kosovo are still open questions.
He was modest about what Serbia can deliver in its OSCE chairmanship on Ukraine. He explained Serbia’s failure to align with EU sanctions against Russia as due to lack of EU compensation for Serbian producers who would suffer the consequences.
The Prime Minister was clear about his personal commitment to media freedom, a more efficient and independent judiciary, and resolution in the courts of responsibility for the murder of the Bytyqi brothers. Those of us interested in the Balkans will be interested to see how and when these commitments fulfilled, but the overall impression was very positive: he is thoughtful, clear and committed.
He made it clear he wants Serbia to be a factor of stability in the region, which is suffering a rise in nationalist sentiment that could lead to more problems. He is also committed to Serbia’s internal stability, which is challenged by difficult social and economic circumstances.
Tanjug
1. In short, what is your analysis of the results of the visit?
A: The Prime Minister came looking for American political support for Serbia’s European Union prospects. He got that so far as I know. He also wanted to make a good impression as someone who considers his commitments carefully and fulfills them. He succeeded at that as well. And he wanted to portray Serbia as a factor for stability in the region, which is something Americans welcome.
2. In your opinion, what was the most important issue for the US side and what for the Serbian prime minister?
A: For the US, I think the most important point was this last one: Serbia is central to the region. Its commitment to stability and peaceful conflict resolution makes a big difference in Kosovo, Bosnia, Croatia and Montenegro. I imagine officials discussed this in some detail with respect to each of these countries.
For the Prime Minister, the main thing seems to have been gaining US political support for Serbia’s EU candidacy. I think he got that commitment in general terms. But of course Serbia has to deliver on the EU requirements, especially with respect to an independent judiciary and media freedom.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The Perils of Macedonia
With the European Union mediating, Macedonia’s four major political parties have agreed to some sort of transition arrangement to allow voter rolls to be cleaned up and the electoral mechanism lubricated, followed by elections next April, three years earlier than necessary. This presumably offes a way out of the crisis brought on by opposition publication of wiretaps demonstrating high level government malfeasance.
It’s a win-win-win-win, as one of my correspondent’s declared. Opposition leader Zoran Zaev, who lost a parliamentary election 14 months ago, gets another opportunity. Prime Minister Gruevski so far at least is avoiding calls for his resignation. He came out just one vote short of an absolute majority in parliament last time around and may well be able to beat his rival again in 10 months. The governing coalition’s Albanian leader Ali Ahmeti is relieved of pressure to bring the government down and can still hope to do well next year. The Albanian opposition gets another bite at the apple.
But it still has a big hole in it: that transition arrangement. The opposition will want a technocratic government. Gruevski will want to hold on to at least nominal control. It is not clear how they are going to square that circle.
But once again, Macedonia has taken at least half a step away from the brink of disaster. It has done that repeatedly since handily managing to escape Yugoslavia in 1991 without the secession wars that marked independence for Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. It managed a massive influx of Albanians during the NATO/Yugoslavia war of 1999 without the often predicted dire consequences. It negotiated an end to a burgeoning inter-ethnic civil war in 2001 before things got out of hand. Macedonia is the Balkan Pauline: always in dire danger, but escaping somehow at the last moment.
Credit for this latest escape goes in part to the EU, whose Commissioner for Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn did the honors. He reiterated the EU’s commitment to Macedonia’s European perspective, which I suppose involves some sort of assistance promise. He also made it clear the EU wants the government to stop mucking about with the media and the judiciary.
That has become the standard European and American refrain, as Gruevski–originally elected and successful as an economic reformer–has demonstrated an increasing tendency to follow Vladimir Putin’s lead on governance (not to mention Ukraine sanctions and natural gas supplies).
The villain of this episode is Greece, which has blocked Macedonia’s progress towards EU membership for years because it claims the exclusive right to use the name “Macedonia.” That means there is little gain, and much pain, in Macedonia’s politicians doing what is needed to adopt the acquis communitaire as well as align the country’s foreign and security policies with Brussels. Macedonia has already qualified for NATO membership and its soldiers have fought integrated with Americans in Afghanistan. But Greece has blocked that road to international respectability as well, despite a clear, unequivocal and binding decision of the International Court of Justice that in doing so Athens violated a 1995 commitment.
So Pauline lives to provide even more excitement in the next episode, which I imagine isn’t far off. Will Gruevski resign? Will the election be transparently free and fair? Will the judiciary and media act independently and not face repercussions? Will Albanian insurgents try to kidnap the process? Tune in next month for another exciting episode of the Perils of Macedonia.
RSS - Posts
