Category: Uncategorized
Stevenson’s army, September 8
-WaPo draws from new biography that Musk cut satellites to hinder Ukraine attack on Crimea.
– WaPo also has excerpt from the biography.
– Dan Drezner says Musk needs some foreign policy advisers.
– NYT warns pro-Russians lead in pending Slovakia elections
– Pro Publica criticizes the Littoral Combat Ship program
– NYT describes the upgraded Situation Room
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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No need for panic about the 2024 election
It is starting to look as if Donald Trump has the Repubican nomination for President in the bag. This has struck panic into the hearts of many Americans and non-Americans, who correctly understand that the outcome of US elections is unpredictable. But they are wrong to panic this time around.
The Republicans
Trump has capture the Republican Party. Both the institution and its registered adherents support him. Two-thirds of Republicans want him as their candidate. Seventy-three per cent say they will vote for him.
He is opposed by more or less 10 competitors, none of whom come close to challenging him among the rank and file. Even if the Republican opposition to Trump were to coalesce around a single competitor willing to openly oppose him, the odds would be long. The Republican primaries will be a beauty contest with little import, though they may influence the choice of the party’s vice-presidential candidate.
Trump’s four indictments in recent weeks have done little to undermine his dominance among Republicans. He has used them to claim that the system is unfair and to portray himself as a victim, not a perpetrator.
That said, no Republican can win the popular vote in a presidential election with only 73% of registered Republicans. That’s one strike against Trump.
Independents
The indictments have not shaken Republican support for Trump, but most independents agree with Democrats that he should stand trial before the election and that he is guilty of the charges. They also agree that the Justice Department is fair and that if convicted Trump should go to prison.
It is hard to imagine how any true independents would shift their votes from Biden in 2020 to Trump in 2024. What has Trump done in the past three years to move votes in his direction? Americans are still dissatisfied with Biden and especially his handling of the economy. But inflation is down sharply (from 9% or so a year ago to 3% now) while employment has held up and wages are beating inflation. It may take some time for this news to change minds, but the economic facts are good, not bad.
Democrats
Biden’s support among Democrats is solidifying. Rumors of primary challenges are fading. Trump as the Republican nominee will guarantee that 90% or more of Democrats will vote for Biden. While his overall approval ratings have continued to lag, his rating on the economy has improved. He also gets relatively good marks on Ukraine and race relations, issues that many Democrats care about.
In some key states, Democrats are doing well. Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania are three states that were crucial in 2016 to Trump and in 2020 to Biden. They will likely be close again in 2024. But, unlike Texas and Florida, they are not out of reach for Biden. Younger voters there and elsewhere give the Democrats a decided advantage. This is especially true among young women, most of whom are displeased with Republican-supported restrictions on abortion.
The spoilers: economy, third parties, voter suppression, the electoral college
Despite this overall favorable prognosis for Biden, three spoilers need to be kept in mind.
The economy is always an important factor in American elections. While inflation is still an issue, the Federal Reserve has so far seemed to manage the situation well. It is easy to imagine that inflation by November 2024 will be at the target of 2% without a severe recession. But that is not guaranteed. If the economy is in recession next spring or summer, Biden’s support could weaken.
A third party candidacy could spoil the election for the Democrats. There are already several threats of such efforts, at least one funded mainly by Republican donors to weaken Biden.
Republican-controlled state legislatures have tried hard to suppress the votes of Democrats. Limiting mail-in ballots, drop boxes, early voting, and poll hours as well as heightening voter identity requirements are all thought to limit Democratic turnout. But past efforts of this sort appear to have stimulated defiance rather than abstention. Let’s hope that continues.
The Electoral College is the real joker in this pack. It elects the President based on results in the individual states, using a formula that generally favors smaller population states (which favor Republicans). Each state gets a number of Electoral Votes equivalent to its number of members of Congress. That is always two in the Senate (no matter how small the state) plus the number of Representatives in the House. Gerrymandering of districts in many states has inflated the number of Republicans in the House.
Bottom line
American elections are not predictable. But there is no reason for panic about 2024. Hillary Clinton in 2020 won the popular vote by 2.8 million. Biden won by more than 6 million. It is hard to imagine Trump doing much better than that. The key question will be the geographic distribution of Republican voters and third party supporters. That could tilt the Electoral College away from Biden. But you won’t know at the earliest until the day after. So stop panicking and start hoping Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania do the right thing.
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Stevenson’s army, May 2
Hard to believe I am watching The Diplomat, and harder to believe that I am enjoying it, but I am. No, DCMs don’t spend all day outside the Embassy or get involved in their Ambassador’s marital problems. Nor do Ambassadors, especially professional ones, get tapped for VP. But still, it’s amusing. So:
– Congress has barely a month to raise or suspend the debt ceiling. Politico reports the state of play. CBO warns of the deadline. CRS has background on debt legislation and the “extraordinary measures” Treasury has been taking.
– Defense News updates how far DOD has pivoted to Asia.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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An agreement without agreement
I did this interview last Tuesday for Arbnore Zhushi of Kosovo daily Bota Sot:
Q: Mr. Serwer, on March 18, Kosovo and Serbia agreed at the Ohrid meeting on the implementation plan of what is known as the Agreement towards the normalization of relations between them. How do you see this Agreement?
A: The March 18 agreement is devoid of substance and focuses on procedure, without however setting deadlines. It is a weak agreement, if it is any agreement at all.
Vucic has been clear on one point
Q: How did you see the opposition of Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic to sign the Ohrid “agreement” on paper, do you think that this will be a stable and applicable agreement for both parties?
A: No. Vucic has made it clear he will not implement parts of the February agreement, which is the main one.
Kurti hasn’t been clear yet on the Association
Q: The parties agreed on one of the most important points – the immediate launch of the creation of a self-management mechanism for the Serbian community in Kosovo. How will this mechanism be implemented, since Serbia wants an Association with executive powers, while for Kosovo this constitutes a constitutional violation?
A: The agreement provides for immediate launch of negotiations on the self-management mechanism. I see no possibility of an “association” with executive powers. Kosovo municipalities already have a good deal of self-management authority. I’d be interested to know what more Serbia is asking for, provided it complies with the Kosovo constitution, and whether Belgrade is prepared to offer reciprocal arrangements to Albanian communities in southern Serbia.
Q: How do you evaluate the whole role of Prime Minister Albin Kurti, in this agreement, what should Kurti have (not) done that he has not done, in your opinion?
A: I’m not going to play professor to the prime minister, but I think the time is coming when a proposal on “self-management” is in order. Kurti says it won’t be territorial or monoethnic. I am interested in learning what he has in mind.
The EU will go easy on Serbia
Q: How do you think it will affect the integration processes and visa liberalization for Kosovo, if the latter does not implement the point related to the self-management of the Serbian community in Kosovo?
A: That is up to the EU, which hasn’t been generous with Kosovo.
Q: Although European diplomats confirmed that the parties are obliged to fully implement every article of the Agreement, Vucic warned that he will not implement the part of the agreement related to Kosovo’s membership in the UN. Do you believe that there will be sanctions against Serbia for the “red lines,” or will the “caress” from the EU continue?
A: No. Appeasement will continue. There seems to be no limit.
The Church needs a settlement
Q: How do you see the request for officializing the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo from Article 7 of the European plan? Do you think this represents a danger for Kosovo?
A: No. I think the Church’s status is an important issue that needs to be resolved, including the property of the monastery at Decan/Decani.
De facto recognition is better than nothing
Q: Although it does not include mutual recognition, the Franco-German plan was described as very beneficial for both sides, especially for Kosovo. In your opinion, is this plan expected to lead to mutual recognition and when?
A: My view is that Serbia has already de facto recognized Kosovo, but not de jure. I can’t predict when it will cross that barrier. Likely only after Vucic is gone.
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Renewing the old may be better than new
A distinguished group of colleagues has offered “a new policy framework” for Syria to President Biden and Secretary Blinken. It advocates a more robust Western effort in Syria focused on security (including both stabilization in the northwest and northeast as well as continuing the fight against ISIS), increased humanitarian and early recovery assistance, and continued pushback against the Assad regime.
US troops would stay in northeastern Syria. Implicit is that President Assad would remain in power in Damascus, but the group opposes “normalization,” which several Arab states are pursuing.
The virtues
There is great virtue in many of the specific ideas offered. More cross-border assistance, if need be outside the UN framework, is needed. Better international coordination and cooperation with Turkiye is vital. Repatriating ISIS prisoners and their familities is important to reducing the threat of resurgence. Accountability for war crimes and missing people is indispensable.
These are not new ideas. The group is essentially recommending that the Biden Administration take more seriously its existing objectives and pursue them more aggressively. They take it to task for failing to meet its own objectives:
The Biden administration’s foreign policy priorities of great power competition, international and Middle East stability, human rights, humanitarianism, or combating food insecurity are insufficiently advanced through the current Syria policy.
The new policy framework is mostly the old framework, renewed.
The defects
That said, there are some defects as well. The group advocates a formalized ceasefire, without however specifying how it would be monitored and enforced. They also advocate renewed civilian stabilization assistance in the northeast, where conflict between Iranian proxy forces and the Americans is growing. Civilian assistance requires civilian presence, which is becoming more difficult, not less. They urge accounting for 100,000 missing Syrians, without however specifying a mechanism.
A lot of what the group suggests would require more Western focus on Syria. The more than ten years of war and chaos there as well as the requirements in Ukraine militate against Europe and the US paying greater attention. Three American presidents have decided that US interests in Syria are not a priority. The group is not asking for a major new effort. But even a marginally increased push in Syria may lie beyond what President Biden’s limits. Pressure for removal of the US troops is more likely to increase than decrease.
Alternatives
What are the possible alternatives? That is always an important question, especially when the obstacles to success are formidable. Let me offer a few, without however recommending any of them:
- Negotiated withdrawal of US troops: At some point, maybe now, US troops in northeastern Syria will reach the point of diminishing returns in the fight against ISIS. The US could negotiate with the Russians and the Syrian regime withdrawal of US troops in exchange for commitments to their Kurdish and Arab allies, promising “normalization” in exchange. Of course there would be little guarantee that the commitments would be kept once the withdrawal is complete.
- A big push for stabilization and reconstruction in the northeast: The US could pour a few billion into civilian stabilization and reconstruction directed by their Kurdish and Arab allies. This would create a de facto state in the northeast, financed on a continuing basis by revenues from the oil produced there. That parastate would attract however the enmity of both the regime and Turkiye, making its survival in the long term parlous.
- Back a Turkish takeover of the entire border area and the northeast: President Erdogan has long been threatening another invasion of segments of the northern Syria border Turkiye does not already control. Washington could back his ambition in exchange for commitments to its Kurdish and Arab allies. Such commitments would however likely prove worthless. The Turks see the Kurds as terrorists, not freedom fighters.
- Renew the civilian and military effort against the Assad regime: The US and Europe could urge Gulf partners to renew the armed rebellion against President Assad and Syrian activists to return to the streets. But neither the Arab partners nor anti-regime Syrians are anywhere near ready to do this.
It is easy to see why the group that wrote yesterday’s statement stuck with more modest proposals. All the more dramatic ones have obvious downsides.
Conclusion
It is not satisfying to propose more and better when you know that something else is needed. But under current circumstances, enewing the old may be better than new.
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Normalization >> license plates
Nevena Bogdanovic of REF/RL asked for my view of today’s failed dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. I replied:
The “emergency” talks appear to have failed to reach agreement both on the specific issue of license plates and on the broader French-German proposal that would normalize relations between Belgrade and Pristina. The EU has blamed primarily Kosovo for the failure on license plates and is hoping that the proposal will be implemented despite the lack of agreement.
I hope so too. My understanding is that it includes an end to Serbia issuing license plates for communities inside Kosovo as well as delay in Kosovo’s crackdown on those who do not use the correct license plates. That would be progress.
The far more important issue is normalization. My understanding has been that Belgrade has rejected the French-German proposal for normalization, which of course would have to include exclusive Pristina authority to issue license plates on its territory. Certainly the license plate issue on its own is not worth risking violence that the Pristina authorities might be unable to control. The consequences have already been negative, with Serb withdrawal from Kosovo institutions.
Pristina needs now to consider how it might defuse the situation and prevent itself from being blamed by the EU for a breakdown on the lesser issue, when it is the greater issue that really counts.
Kosovo also needs its Serb citizens back in its institutions. Belgrade controls them. The EU and US should be doing everything they can to ensure that they re-enter the Kosovo institutions if Pristina shows flexibility on the license plates.
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