The protests are real, but Vucic is too
Ljudmila Cvetković of RFE/RL asked some questions. I answered. I don’t like the headline on the published Serbian version, but of course neither she nor I wrote it. Here is the original English version, with some subheadings inserted.
The protests are genuine
Q: How do you view the protests in Serbia? How would you describe what is currently happening in the country?
A: I view the protests as a genuine sign of of popular dissatisfaction with government performance, especially corruption and environmental protection.
The West is distracted, and Vucic has turned eastward
Q: When it comes to the international community’s response, officials seem much more reserved than the media. Why is that?
A: No one cares much. Washington and Brussels have other priorities.
Q: Does Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic still enjoy support from the West and EU?
A: Not as much as in the past. He has all too obviously turned to Moscow and Beijing.
Vucic has no one to blame but himself
Q: How do you interpret Vucic’s rhetoric, as he shifts between labeling the protests as “terrorism” and a “color revolution”?
A: He is desperate and reverting to his autocratic origins.
Q: Vucic is saying that protest are somehow organized from outside. Is there any sense in this accusations, who could potentially be that outside factor given that he has relatively good relations with European Commission, major powers from EU, Trump administration, and also with Russia and China?
Q: The US has dismantled its democracy-promotion institutions. The Europeans are doing little for democracy in the Balkans outside the accession process. Vucic has no one to blame but himself.
Russia is lying and has influence
Q: How do you read the statement from Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which claims that certain forces in Serbia, under the guise of seeking justice and democracy, are resorting to open aggression, barbarism, and violence?
A: That’s nonsense. There is no aggression or barbarism and little violence other than by the government security forces.
Q: Can Russia influence the direction of events in Serbia, and if so, how?
A: Sure. Moscow will pressure Vucic to crack down and even use its infiltration of the security forces to create as instability.
A partial geopolitical vacuum
Q: Do you think that Washington is interested in developments in Serbia?
A: Not much. The forging of a document seems even to have cooled Trump interest in its Belgrade construction project.
Q: Is there a risk that the protests in Serbia are being used as a platform for geopolitical games?
A: Of course geopolitical forces, especially Russia, may try to exploit the situation, but the discontent is real and based on poor government performance.
Q: Is there a risk of further escalation, and how could that affect regional stability?
Escalation risks
A: With Vucic and the Russians there is always a risk of escalation, or distraction by another destabilizing incident in Kosovo.
Q: Do the protests in Serbia have the potential to lead to political change, and do you see a possible successor to Vucic?
A: The protesters don’t seem to have generated a clear political alternative. That is a problem if Vucic calls new elections, which the will need to win by a large margin because he cheats, by dominating the media in the pre-electoral period, using patronage to buy votes, and bussing voters to wherever he needs them. Serbia is a semi-autocratic state these days. Winning an election will not be easy for the opposition.
Ludmila asked for some clarifications:
The partial geopolitical vacuum, again
Q: Among citizens who are demanding change, there is a perception of silence—except for a few exceptions—primarily from the EU. Could this lead to a further decline in support for Serbia’s EU membership?
A: Honestly, I don’t know. It seems to me that most of what the demonstrators want is consonant with EU membership.
Q: Still, the West and the EU have neither distanced themselves from Vucic nor expressed support for the civic protests, as was the case in some other European countries. Why is that?
A: Partly they are distracted. Partly they fear the alternatives. Partly they think the protesters will fail. And I suppose some of them are hoping to protect their interests in lithium or other investments as well as ammunition for Ukraine.
The geopolitical risk factor
Q: Is the EU afraid that by putting pressure on Vucic, it risks pushing him entirely toward Russia—similar to the Georgian government, which cut ties with Brussels after facing criticism and EU support for anti-government protesters in that country?
A: Sure. But there is no weaning Vucic any longer from Moscow and Beijing. He has made his preferences clear.
Q: Is there a danger that the protests will give birth to a more right-wing option and is the EU afraid of that?
A: Yes, I think that is a possibility and the EU is afraid of it.
Q: Why does Vucic persistently insist on the narrative of a “color revolution” and foreign orchestration? Is this rhetoric aimed at his voter base?
A: Yes, and in addition he is parroting Russian talking points. He is a master of propagandist.
Q: Could parallels be drawn with Belarus, in the sense that Alexander Lukashenko gradually intensified repression, culminating after the 2020 presidential elections? Could Vucic reach a point of no return—where a peaceful transfer of power following eventual electoral defeat is no longer possible?
A: Are you sure we are not already at the point of no return?
The outcome is uncertain
Q: The protests in Serbia have entered their tenth month. Are they unique in any way and can they be compared to any previous period or country?
A: Serbia has experienced lots of protests: the antibureaucratic revolution, the Zajedno protests, the protests that brought down Milosevic, anti-LGBTQ protests, more recent anti-violence and environmental protests. Each episode is unique and the outcomes quite different. But none have succeeded in putting Serbia on an irreversible path towards liberal democracy and EU membership. I wish the protesters well, but they are up against a formidable opponent and a lot of history.
Trump is never getting the Nobel Prize
Donald Trump has a peacemaking obsession. He claims to have ended six (or maybe seven wars) during his second term. Two of them (Egypt/Ethiopia and Serbia/Kosovo) were not wars and the conflicts are not ended. If he did anything to improve those situations, it was in his first term, not his second.
Only two (Democratic Republic of Congo/Rwanda and Azerbaijan/Armenia) show verifiable signs of Trump involvement. Both peace agreements were signed at the White House. The former is already failing and the second could as well. Cambodia/Thailand, where Trump’s involvement is undocumented, is also shaky. Trump was instrumental in bringing about the Israel/Iran ceasefire, but only because the US helped Israel to win. That’s not exactly peacemaking.
All these claims include lies, fabrications, and exaggerations.
Now Ukraine
Trump has in the past few days put himself at the center of peacemaking between Russia and Ukraine. He met Friday in Alaska with Russian President Putin and Monday with Ukrainian President Zelensky in Washington. Key European leaders accompanied Zelensky, to offer a counterweight to Putin.
Putin has convinced Trump that the conflict is about territory. That appeals to Trump’s real estate instincts. Real estate is divisible. That makes deal making easy. It is true that Russia has annexed four Ukrainian oblasts and occupied most of their territory. But it isn’t really about territory.
Putin’s real goal is to end Ukrainian sovereignty. A free and democratic Ukraine is a threat to Russia, but not because of its military might. What Putin fears is a Slavic alternative to his own increasingly autocratic rule. A thriving democratic state next door is not a good look for Putin. Russians might get ideas. Besides, they never really thought the “Little Russians” deserved independence.
Putin knows NATO will never invade Russia. If a free Ukraine of any size exists after this war, I’d bet Russia will want it in NATO. The Alliance is the best guarantee available that Ukraine will not attack Russia or seek its own nuclear weapons.
Making peace for real
If Trump wants peace in Ukraine, his assistance to Israel suggests how to make it happen. The US can’t bomb the Russian forces, as that would start a war we shouldn’t want. But giving Kyiv whatever weapons and ammunition it needs to win the war is the shortest way the end it. Also the best.
The “secondary” sanctions on Russia’s trading partners that Trump has talked about but not levied are another good idea. They would not need to last long before the Russian economy sinks into a severe recession. Putin would then himself be at risk. That is how to get him to the negotiating table.
Trump won’t do what is needed
Trump knows that a Ukrainian win is the quickest way to end the war. Russia would then be pushed back to its internationally recognized borders. Other would-be aggressors would be deterred.
Why he doesn’t do what virtually all Russia experts recommend is admittedly a mystery. It sends a clear signal of American weakness. Putin is enjoying that.
The Nobel Prize is out of reach
Trump’s craving for a Nobel Peace Prize is obvious. It isn’t going to happen. The meeting Trump wants with Putin and Zelensky may happen, but it won’t make peace. Zelensky won’t surrender territory and Putin won’t agree to a ceasefire. The Norwegians are too smart to fall for a Trump scam.
Since the Americans are siding with Russia, it is up to the Europeans to enable Ukraine to win. They don’t have a great record responding to aggression from the east, but let’s hope this time will be different. And maybe one of them earn the Nobel Prize for real.
Ukraine: Putin 3, Trump 0
Putin knows what he doing. Trump doesn’t. Sock puppet would be a compliment.
Russian President Putin scored three goals Friday in his meeting with Donald Trump in Alaska. Putin broke through the isolation the West had imposed due to the Ukraine war. He convinced Trump to advocate the Russian proposal for an end to the Ukraine war based on territorial swaps. This is instead of the ceasefire Ukrainian President Zelensky wants and Trump had promised the Europeans he would pursue. And Trump abandoned his threat of severe secondary sanctions on Russia’s trading partners.
Trump intends to push Zelensky for territorial swaps when they meet, along with European leaders, Monday. There is little sign Trump got anything in return. Some are mumbling about Putin accepting European peacekeepers in Ukraine. But this proposition protects Russia as much as protects Ukraine. And the Europeans are not yet ready to take it on.
TACO
This ignominious outcome is unusual top-level meetings between Moscow and Washington. Both generally prepare well and are willing to walk if need be. That is what Trump had said he would do if he didn’t get the ceasefire. But he really does always chicken out when it comes to Putin.
I can think of a lot of reasons for this:
- Trump’s obvious admiration for Putin and his autocratic powers.
- Over-estimation of Russian power.
- His avowed goal of allying with Russia.
- Past dependence on Russian financing.
- Current business ambitions, in particular for a hotel in Moscow.
- KGB recruitment many years ago.
- Distaste for Ukraine and Zelensky.
- Disdain for European interests.
- Profound ignorance of European history.
- Trump’s desire for a Nobel Prize.
We don’t know which of these or others is decisive. But we do know that Trump is a pushover when it comes to Russia.
Putin’s weakness and strength
While Moscow’s forces have been advancing slowly in Ukraine, Russia’s economy is in trouble. Putting it on a wartime footing has reduced the availability of labor, accelerated inflation, increased interest rates as well as the government deficit and company debts, and slowed growth. While none of this ensures an imminent crisis, it would not be hard for the US to send the Russian economy into a tailspin. Trump knows this but refuses to do it.
Politically, Putin is still very much in charge and apparently popular with the public. While his ridiculously high polling numbers are likely due in part to fear, there is little sign of resistance to him or the war. He has succeeded in selling the lie that Ukraine started the war he initiated not just in 2022 but also in 2014.
Europe’s vital role
Trump’s loss to Putin in Alaska makes Europe even more important. Some of its major players will be accompanying Zelensky to Washington Monday for his conversation with Trump. UK Prime Minister Starmer, German Chancellor Merz, French President Macron, Italian Prime Minister Meloni, EU Commission President von der Leyen, and NATO Secretary General Rutte are all expected to accompany Zelensky.* They intend this extraordinary showing to bolster Zelensky and his proposal for a ceasefire in place without territorial changes.
In order to rebalance Trump’s lean toward Putin, the Europeans need to make clear that they intend to continue to support the Ukrainian war effort. European weapons, training, and sanctions could tilt the playing field in Zelensky’s direction. They will need to be unequivocal in opposing territorial changes, which would threaten to set a precedent that would put the Russian-occupied territories in Georgia and Moldova at risk. Any concession to Russian territorial ambitions will also call into question NATO’s security guarantees for the Baltics and Poland.
The home front leans toward Ukraine but doesn’t act against Russia
In the US, popular sentiment is turning in Ukraine’s direction. Even before the Alaska meeting, more than half of Americans were not confident in Trump’s handling of the war. Many more think he is favoring Russia too much, not Ukraine. While right-wing media will muffle news of Trump’s loss in Alaska, editorial sentiment in the mainstream media is unequivocal. None believe Trump did well. All believe Putin did.
Sentiment in Congress is also tilting towards Ukraine, though the Graham/Blumenthal sanctions bill still seems stalled. Senator Graham has repeatedly threatened Putin, but the Republican leadership in both Houses won’t want to stiff Putin unless Trump signals his approval. That is unlikely. Graham himself often caves to whatever Trump prefers.
Ending the war
Trump claims he wants to end the war. But he consistently refuses to supply the Ukrainians with the weapons or impose the sanctions that would incentivize Russia to negotiate. The Alaska meeting would convince any recent American president to abandon hope that Russia will negotiate seriously absent those incentives. It is high time that Republicans tell Trump they will impose the needed sanctions and arms sales if he is unwilling to do so.

*I missed Finland’s President Stubb.
Preventing structural destabilization of Serbia
The video above is much more analytical than its cover cartoon and title.
Dušan Janjić writes “I am deeply convinced that the window for a peaceful resolution of Serbia’s crisis is closing, and that timely preventive measures can avoid violence and armed conflict.” With this he conveys a “non-paper” on behalf of the unnamed Ad Hoc Expert Team for Security and Stabilization, which consists of leading experts in the fields of human security, security and defense, constitutional law, the rule of law and judiciary, and international relations.
The team commenced its work on January 15, 2025 as an Ad Hoc mechanism addressing the present state and threats to human security, human rights, and freedoms in the Republic of Serbia. The monitoring findings and recommendations were subsequently released in the Policy Paper “Report on the State and Threats to Human Security, Human Rights, and Freedoms in the Republic of Serbia. Reporting Period: January 15 – March 31, 2025.”
This Non-Paper is intended for domestic and international social, business, political, and other stakeholders whose actions influence the course of the ongoing crisis in Serbia.
The Non-Paper
The document is based on available information regarding the severity of the crisis, the state of security in the country, and political will, preparedness, and capacity of various actors to help preserve peace and stabilize the situation.
A. Serbia Facing Structural Destabilization
Political and social crises, coupled with growing security instability, have come to dominate everyday life in Serbia. The government’s response has included measures reminiscent of a state of emergency and a creeping coup, raising the risk of further escalation.
President Aleksandar Vučić remains one of the most influential actors in this crisis. He has consolidated control over the media, key budgetary and investment decisions, and the management of the Serbian government, particularly its diplomacy, the military, and the police. The president is using this authority to advance the values and interests of a single segment of society and to build the Movement for the Defense of the State. His conduct violates both the letter and the spirit of the Constitution and the Law on the President, which define the president’s primary duty as safeguarding the unity of the state.
Public protests and widespread sentiment challenge the legitimacy of such conduct, raising calls for current president’s resignation or impeachment, and for extraordinary presidential elections. There is an emphasized need to undertake appropriate activities to strengthen political will and reach a political agreement on the conditions for electoral verification of the government.
B. Activities and Mechanism for a Peaceful Exit from the Crisis
B.1 Measures for De-escalating Threats to Human Security
- Independent Expert Commission: Establish a body to monitor and report on social conditions and security trends, and propose measures for de-escalating threats to human security, human rights, and freedoms. The Commission should cooperate with domestic and international experts, institutions, and organizations, supporting the work of an Ad Hoc Mechanism for Facilitating a Peaceful Exit from the Crisis.
- Countering advocacy of intolerance, violence, and extremism: All competent institutions must take lawful measures to suppress advocacy of intolerance, hatred, and extremism; to stop the increase in police violence; and to prevent the abuse of prosecutorial and judicial functions, including misdemeanor courts.
- Role of the President and National Security Council: Adopt measures to stop the increase of police violence and torture. Take measures to dismantle para-police groups and stop their activities and violence —especially those supported by the ruling parties, funded through misuse of public resources or illicit means, supported by the police, and tolerated by parts of the judiciary.
- Role of the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office: Fulfil legal obligations to combat extremist and para-police activities, especially those connected to political parties, public officials, and organized crime.
- Parliamentary and institutional oversight: Activate existing mechanisms for parliamentary and other forms of public oversight over the security and intelligence community in Serbia, especially the police and the Security Intelligence Agency (BIA).
- Assessment of institutions of special public importance: Urgently review whether the key institutions— Constitutional Court, Anti-Corruption Agency, Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection, and Protector of Citizens—are fulfilling their constitutional and legal mandates and effectively contributing to the protection of human security, rights, and freedoms in Serbia.
- National Security Agency: Consider establishing an agency legally designated as one of key actors in upholding the rule of law, responsible for providing critical security and defense information to authorized institutions, countering cyber and communications threats, protecting individuals and facilities, safeguarding the national currency and payment systems, and leading or assisting in investigations into war crimes, terrorism, and politically motivated murders.
- Police reorganization: Create legal and operational conditions to reorganize the police into a single structure with a unified chain of command and management.
B.2 Roundtable on Stabilizing the Situation in Serbia
The Roundtable on Stabilizing the Situation in Serbia is an ad hoc mechanism that enables reaching a political agreement to overcome the current legitimacy crisis and irregularities in the work of the National Assembly of Serbia, Assembly of AP Vojvodina, city and municipality assemblies, as well as local community councils throughout Serbia.
Rationale:
- Deep political and social divisions;
- High public distrust in authorities;
- Conflict between the opposition and the government;
- Limited crisis capacity management on both sides;
- Lack of acceptable institutional framework for dialogue;
- Risk of radicalization, parallel institutions, and violent resistance;
- Infiltration of para-state structures and organized crime into state institutions, especially in the security and intelligence sector.
Goals:
- Reach political agreement on conditions for fair and democratic elections;
- Ensure peaceful, democratic resolution of the political and security crisis;
- Establish basic rules and mechanisms to reduce tensions and security risks.
Participants:
- Representatives of protesting citizens, civic initiatives, student, professional, local, and other movements with significant public support;
- Parliamentary political parties.
Moderation:
- Moderator of the Roundtable may be an individual or a collective body, either a Serbian citizen and/or a representative of the international community (the Quint is recommended).
- Moderator selection requires unanimous approval of all participants.
Expected outcome:
- Consensus on creating conditions for free and fair elections, including:
- Integrity of voter register and prevention of biometric and data abuse;
- Independent monitoring of the activities of the Republic Data Center;
- Decision on the electoral system model (majority or proportional);
- Introducing larger number of electoral districts;
- Direct voting procedures and ballot security;
- Balanced regional and minority representation;
- Financing of political parties and campaigns.
Recommendations:
- The National Assembly elected in early elections should serve as a constituent assembly;
- It is necessary to set a specific timeframe for the transitional period. For the president and the constituent assembly, this period should be shorter than the term established by law for those elected in regular elections;
- Reaching an agreement on the schedule for holding extraordinary elections at all levels.
C. Role of the President in Serbia’s Stabilization
Given the serious security challenges facing Serbia and the need to prevent further destabilization, particular focus is on the role of the president, National Security Council, and the security and intelligence community in Serbia.
Public debate frequently raises the question: Who will replace Vučić? This Non-Paper does not answer this question but stresses the need for electoral change of this function and outlines tasks for the president to ensure a peaceful, democratic transfer of power and stabilization in the country.
It is the Responsibility of the President of the Republic of Serbia to:
- Initiate measures to guarantee the property rights of citizens, public and state property, as well as the property of companies and cooperatives, legacies, and more; promote an effective restitution process to return unjustly taken property to its rightful owners.
- Support the creation of an environment fostering business, political, and social cooperation, respect for the rule of law, institutional recovery, and solidarity.
- Encourage dialogue on Serbia’s Reform and Sustainable Development Strategy for the coming decade, involving the businesses community, experts, civil society, and international partners.
- Support opening Serbia to multinational corporations that contribute to sustainable development, while respecting the interests and needs of domestic economy and the public, especially in strategic sectors, such as, food production, water management, mining and processing of rare metals, energy, and human security.
- The Law on the President and other related laws should clearly define the President’s rights, duties, and responsibilities to uphold the Constitution, laws, and strategic documents essential for Serbia’s sustainable development, stability, security, and defense. The President must adhere to these responsibilities when deciding on granting a mandate to form the government, approving laws, and appointing Constitutional Court judges and diplomatic representatives.
- When signing decrees promulgating laws, the President is obliged to provide explanations for the decision to give consent and point out appropriate and necessary amendments to the law and Constitution.
- Contribute to strengthening judicial independence; eliminate the practice of protecting acquired privileges and monopolies; prevent the National Assembly from acting as a “party personnel filter” in the judiciary.
- Provide support to judicial and investigative authorities in combating corruption, organized crime, and terrorism, directly and/or through the National Security Council.
- Initiate comprehensive monitoring, review, and reporting on cooperation with foreign intelligence services; initiate ending the practice of involving BIA and VOA members in prosecutorial teams and overseeing prosecution work; initiate removing VOA’s influence over the War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office.
- In carrying out duties of appointments and awards, the President is obliged to respect and is accountable for the integrity of the individuals being appointed or honored.
- Respects diversity and promotes the integrative policies. Given the importance of interethnic relations for Serbia’s development, stability, and security, and considering the prolonged inactivity of the National Council for National Minorities, the President of the Republic should be legally authorized to chair this Council.
D. Urgent Measures
The Law on the President of the Republic should clearly define, in line with the Constitution and other laws, the criteria for granting amnesty and pardon, along with the President’s accountability for failing to adhere to these criteria.
It is necessary to examine the President’s past actions in relation to sustainable development issues, with an immediate focus on halting the President’s involvement in bodies and institutions that approve major capital investment projects.
It is necessary to ensure adequate infrastructure and human resources to enable effective performance of the President’s public duties. To this end, a review of the legal status and responsibilities of the National Security Council is required, recognizing it as a key body for improving security conditions and guiding the activities of the security and intelligence community.
Members of the National Security Council can only be worthy citizens of Serbia, with proven qualifications and experience in the fields of strategic planning and directing security development in all its aspects.
The Council should be chaired by the President of the Republic and/or the Security Adviser to the Republic of Serbia.
The current Bureau for Coordination of Security Services should be replaced by a Bureau for Coordination of Activities of the Intelligence and Security Community. Its members should be representatives from the National Assembly, the Government of Serbia, and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, European Integration, Internal Affairs, and Defense. The existing Bureau for Coordination of Security Services should be transformed into a Coordinating Body of the Intelligence and Security Community, composed of the heads of security and intelligence agencies.
For the Ad Hoc Team of Experts on Security and Stabilization
Belgrade, August 13, 2025 Dr. Dušan Janjić
Double your public broadcasting donation
I’m an NPR enthusiast. Less so PBS, which I find stodgy. But both beat the competition, broadcast and even print. Give me either one on a desert island rather than the New York Times or the Washington Post. The Wall Street Journal (news pages, not the editorials or opinions) is more competitive, both in breadth and depth.
So you’ll assume I’m upset about the Republican Congress nixing funding for public broadcasting. I’m not.
Why I’m not upset
That’s not just because the percentage of their direct funding from the Federal government is relatively small. It’s just 1% for NPR and 15% for PBS. They also get some Federal money from the local stations, which pay NPR and PBS for content.
Whatever the total, it would be far worse to continue getting these subsidies during the Trump Administration.
The MAGAtes would insist their voices increase in volume. Already I am hearing more of their nonsense, especially on NPR, than in the past. Three more years of Trump pressure would make NPR and PBS virtual mouthpieces of liars and charlatans. If I want truly independent media in today’s America, the government should not be funding them.
What to do
Both NPR and PBS have given up the “non-commercial” label and now have lots of relatively low-key ads. I suppose they can increase corporate funding if they allow higher profile corporate sponsorship.
I’d prefer to see more citizen support. I’ve already doubled what I regard as my considerable contribution. That won’t help much, but if others join the “double the money” effort it really would make a big difference.
So too would greater foundation contributions. Pressure on foundations from the many civil society organizations losing government money will be enormous for the next few years. But maintaining space for in-depth, honest journalism has to be a priority.
Join the movement
Even if 20% of those giving to public broadcasting double their money, a good bit of the shortfall would disappear. That will be difficult in a year in which many listeners and viewers are losing their jobs with the government. So the rest of us will need to step up.
It’s by now obvious that our democracy is at risk. Keeping a space free of lies is going to be vital to preserving it.
The Ukraine war isn’t going well for anyone
The war in Ukraine has long since become one of attrition. Kyiv and Moscow are wearing down each other down through losses of personnel and equipment rather than decisive territorial gains. The economic warfare has also become a grinding semi-stalemate. It is time to have a look at where things stand.
On the battlefield
Russia has been advancing slowly along much of the front in eastern and southern Ukraine since November 2022:

But the advances are agonizingly slow, amounting to little in the past three months:

And the advanced come at rising cost, according to the UK Defence Ministry:

Russian equipment losses are gigantic, but they had a lot of outmoded equipment to lose. The Russians have improved their battlefield tactical drone performance. And they are raiding Ukrainian cities with increasing numbers of missiles and drones:

Ukrainian losses of personnel appear to be far lower, perhaps half the Russian number.

But Ukraine’s prewar population was less than one-third of Russia’s.
Ukraine’s equipment losses also appear to be less than half of Russia’s. NATO countries have been supplying Ukraine with a lot of advanced equipment. More important is that Ukraine has rapidly adapted its own drone technology to battlefield exigencies.
In the economy
Russia’s much larger economy has held up better than Ukraine’s over the past few years. Russia’s GDP growth has been higher, its (percentage) budget deficit lower, and its interest rates lower. But smart people think the end is near. The housing market is imploding, interest rates are rising, cargo turnover is falling, debt service is exploding:
Oppression of dissent is rising. The space for public debate is narrowing.
Bottom line
The war is not existential for Russia, but it is existential for President Putin. Economic and financial collapse would put him and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at risk. The war isn’t going well for anyone. But Russia’s small gains on the battlefield are generating to big risks at home.