“A place to promote war criminals”

The Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Center writes:

At this year’s Book Fair, the „Defence“ Media Centre, publishing organ of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), will again present books whose author is Nebojša Pavković, and organise a panel devoted to the NATO Intervention. The panel speakers, beside the retired commanders of the Yugoslav Army (VJ)/Serbian Army (VS), Božidar Delić and Ljubiša Diković, will be Vladimir Lazarević and Vinko Pandurević, both convicted war criminals. The Humanitarian Law Center (HLC) points out that by financing and promoting books and public forums where convicts for the most serious crimes are speakers, the MoD are openly treating with contempt the victims of those crimes, and demonstrating a clear adherence to the politics that led to numerous crimes in the former Yugoslavia, and denying the facts established before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

As currently scheduled, the book by Nebojša Pavković will be presented at the 64th Book Fair on October 25, 2019, at 2 p.m. During the conflict in Kosovo, Pavković was the Commander of the Third Army of the VJ. He is a convicted war criminal. The book, entitled “The smell of gunpowder and death at KiM 1998”, is published by the Ministry of Defence in the “Warrior” series, whose author is Nebojša Pavković. Namely, at the last year’s Book Fair, Pavković’s war diary, entitled “Seventy-Eight Days of the Third Army in the Arms of the Merciful Angel” was presented, as well as three other books – the testimonies of war commanders and narratives of certain events (“The Battle for Paštrik” and “The Battle at Košare”). The HLC recalls that Pavković was sentenced to 22 years in prison before the ICTY for deportations, forcible transfers, murders and persecutions as crimes against humanity, and for killings as violations of the laws and customs of war. But this was not discussed at the presentation of the war diaries. The HLC also notes that the MoD spent almost 4 million dinars on costs related to the edition “Warrior” series. By promoting war criminals before the public as heroes and spending budget funds for this purpose, the MoD continues its past policy, which led to crimes against Albanian civilians in Kosovo, and had thereby reinterpreted the facts established before the ICTY.

On the same day, starting at 6 p.m. at the fair stand, the MoD is organising a panel on “Experiences from Actions during the NATO Aggression – Remembered by the Book” whose moderator will be the head of the publishing department of the Serbian Armed Forces, Miroslav Toholj, former Minister of Information in the Government of Republika Srpska (from 1993 to 1995). The panellists will be: Vladimir Lazarević, Commander of the VJ Priština Corps, sentenced by the ICTY to 14 years in prison for deporting and forcibly displacing the Albanian population during the Kosovo conflict; Vinko Pandurević, Commander of the Zvornik Brigade of the Republika Srpska Army, sentenced to 13 years in prison before the ICTY for helping and supporting crimes against humanity and violating the laws or customs of war; Ljubiša Diković, Commander of the 37th Motorised Brigade (37th mtbr) of the VJ and former Chief of the General Staff of the Serbian Armed Forces: and Božidar Delić, Commander of the 549th mtbr VJ. The HLC has recently presented evidence to the public about the role of Ljubiša Diković and Božidar Delić in crimes committed during the Kosovo conflict. Namely, the HLC presented facts and evidence in two Dossiers – Ljubiša Diković and Rudnica – regarding the involvement of the VJ 37th mtbr and Ljubiša Diković in crimes committed against Albanian civilians, as well as on the role of the VJ 549 mtbr whose commander was Božidar Delić. In the areas of responsibility of these two brigades in Kosovo, some 3,500 Albanian civilians were killed. The Serbian Office of the War Crimes Prosecutor has never investigated the HLC’s allegations of the involvement of Diković and Delić in these crimes.

In addition, the Media Defence Centre announces the publication of a book by Dragoljub Ojdanić, a former Chief of the VJ General Staff who was sentenced to 15 years in prison before the ICTY for helping and supporting the deportations and forcible transfers of the Albanian population from Kosovo.

The HLC calls on Serbian institutions to stop promoting and rehabilitating convicted war criminals and to pursue a policy that accepts established facts and takes into account the suffering of victims and their families.

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Croatia in context

I spoke this afternoon at a National Federation of Croatian Americans session on “Croatia’s Role in Southeastern Europe–Facing Instability in the Region.” Time was shorter than anticipated, so I started at 16. My assignment was to talk about the main issues beyond Croatia in the Balkans, but I got to the Bosnian Croats and Croatia at the end.

  1. The world today is a disordered one. The unipolar moment that enabled so much of what the United States and Europe did in the Balkans in the 1990s ended with the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001.
  2. There ensued a war on terror that initially enlisted much of the world in response: NATO triggered Article 5 and supported the US invasion of Afghanistan, but unanimity was quickly lost with the invasion of Iraq and the Sunni insurgency there, led by Al Qaeda and Ba’athist diehards.
  3. The 2008 financial crisis further frayed international consensus: European growth has still not recovered while China’s rise accelerated, and high oil and gas prices gave Russia opportunities to reassert its great power status, which it has done with interventions in Ukraine and Syria.
  4. The Greek financial crisis, Brexit, immigration, and the rise of the populist ethno-nationalist right within the EU and in the US have changed the basic parameters of our geopolitics.
  5. Today we live in a world in which the liberal democratic consensus, based on free markets and the conviction that everyone is entitled to equal rights and opportunities, has frayed.
  6. Russia, China, Turkey, and others are offering an alternative autocratic bargain: in exchange for unfettered long-term power, their leaders are offering state-sponsored economic growth and political stability, at least to those who identify with the majority ethnic group.
  7. How does all this impact the Balkans?
  8. First and foremost slow economic growth in Europe depresses the Balkans economies; the region can only thrive when the EU does.
  9. Europessimism correlates closely with the business cycle. A revival of growth in Europe is vital for renewed interest in enlargement, which will provide the young labor Europe lacks and needs.
  10. Second: Moscow’s trouble making is plaguing Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia. Croatia’s neighbors are facing concerted efforts to slow or block NATO and EU accession. Even Montenegro and North Macedonia are still targeted.
  11. Moscow has re-introduced into the Balkans assassination, state disinformation and propaganda, and rent-a-riot techniques we all hoped had disappeared with the Soviet Union.
  12. Third: China is offering financing for much-needed infrastructure.
  13. Unlike many Westerners, I see lots of potential benefit in Beijing’s Belt and Road projects, but caveat emptor: China isn’t giving aid, it is financing projects it regards as beneficial to China on terms that can be onerous.
  14. Fourth: Turkey, as a former colonial power in much of the Balkans and a near neighbor, naturally plays an important role in the region. But President Erdogan has taken a turn in the autocratic and Islamist direction.
  15. His example is no longer as positive as once it was, and his efforts to get Balkan countries to capture and render his enemies are undermining rule of law in young Balkan democracies.
  16. Let me turn now to put the focus on the Balkans themselves.
  17. My view is that there are only two remaining war and peace issues in the region.
  18. One is normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.
  19. The other is fixing the dysfunctional government we gave Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Dayton peace agreement.
  20. Before anything can happen on normalization, Pristina needs a new government. I imagine that means the LDK and Vetevendosje will share power in a post-electoral coalition, perhaps supported by some lesser parties, including some representing minorities.
  21. As far apart as the LDK and VV are on some issues and in electoral constituencies, they both grew out of the nonviolent protest movement in Kosovo and will be replacing a KLA coalition whose partners grew out of the violent rebellion.
  22. I hope that betokens a renewed commitment to Kosovo statehood, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, as well as a broader coalition for the dialogue with Belgrade, along the lines of the platform that the last parliament prepared but the Kosovo constitutional court ruled was the responsibility of the government.
  23. The Europeans and Americans will be pressing Pristina hard for an agreement with Belgrade in advance of Serbia’s April 2020 election. I see no advantage to Kosovo in giving in to this pressure.
  24. Pristina will need to be ready to walk away from a bad deal in order to get a good one. A bad deal is one that in any way breaches the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; a good one will allow for ample decentralization and self-governance for minority communities.
  25. Some of you will no doubt ask, but what does the appointment of two US envoys betoken about US policy on normalization?
  26. The short answer is that I don’t know. I think it reflects more confusion than intention. But I won’t be surprised if the ethnic nationalist Ambassador Grenell, who has done his best to offend the German government, tries to revive the land swap idea that failed on its merits so miserably the last time around.
  27. The failure of the EU to move ahead with accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia will undermine the credibility of Brussels and Washington in upcoming talks between Belgrade and Pristina.
  28. But neither Tirana nor Skopje should give up hope. Both should do as Montenegro did with NATO membership and continues to do for EU membership: get ready, implement the needed reforms, improve your qualifications, so that when the political window opens you can move quickly in.
  29. As for Bosnia and Herzegovina, I fear it will need to wait. The international community is simply incapable of dealing with two big issues at once.
  30. Milorad Dodik will continue to fulminate about independence, somoe Croats will continue to dream of a third entity, and the Bosniaks will try to ignore both and defend the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
  31. But until there is a concerted effort that gains the support of all three constituent peoples to enable the Sarajevo central government to negotiate and implement the acquis communautaire, I fear little will change.
  32. That’s my message to Bosnian Croats: stop wasting effort on the third entity, which isn’t going to happen.
  33. You own a third of the State, use it to help Bosnia and Herzegovina do the reforms necessary for EU accession.
  34. Beyond that, Croatia can play a crucial role as an EU and NATO member state in keeping hope alive. I trust it will do that.

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Stevenson’s army, October 24

HASC has a panel that seems well-focused on a major future problem.
– The USG may have to survive on a CR lasting until Feb or March.
– Lawfare has more on illegal delays in Ukraine aid by OMB.
Dean Cohen on Trump.

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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Getting ready is the best revenge

Artiana Matoshi of Radio Television Kosovo asked questions. I replied:

Q: The western Balkan states can’t be included in the European Union and this was proved with not opening the negotiations for Albania and North Macedonia. How you assess the refusal of these two countries by EU?

A: This is not a refusal, it is an unexpected and unwelcome postponement caused mainly by French and Dutch internal politics.

Q: Is this injustice towards western Balkans?

A: EU members are entitled to their own decisions on enlargement, but of course they affect the situation in the Balkans. Certainly the decision was unfair after Tirana and Skopje made herculean efforts to meet all the criteria. But those efforts are not wasted: the reforms they have adopted are already benefiting North Macedonia and Albania. 

Q: How much will Kosovo be damaged by this [denial of] access of EU towards Balkans?

A: Kosovo is still waiting for the visa waiver, which has also been unfairly denied, but accession talks are still far off. The important thing to remember is that the reforms are vital, even if European promises are not fulfilled. Delay should not be seen as definitive rejection.

Q: Which is the best way for the Balkans to be included faster in EU and what happens if this cannot happen?

A: The only route I know is to qualify as quickly as possible and then wait for the political stars to align. Paris and The Hague have been very short-sighted, but in any case Albania and North Macedonia still have a lot of work to do to qualify for EU membership. Best to get on with that work and demonstrate unequivocally that they are qualified for accession, thus shortening the negotiation process.

Failure of the EU to enlarge will cause serious problems in the Balkans and benefit Russia. But that can only happen if people in the Balkans lose focus and hope. There is no better place for Tirana or Skopje than in Europe.

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Murder most foul

The House yesterday passed concurrent resolution 32. Here it is:

Expressing the sense of Congress regarding the execution-style murders of United States citizens Ylli, Agron, and Mehmet Bytyqi in the Republic of Serbia in July 1999.

Whereas brothers Ylli, Agron, and Mehmet Bytyqi were citizens of the United States, born in Chicago, Illinois, to ethnic Albanian parents from what is today the Republic of Kosovo, and who subsequently lived in Hampton Bays, New York;

Whereas the three Bytyqi brothers responded to the brutality of the conflict associated with Kosovo’s separation from the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of which Serbia was a constituent republic by joining the so-called Atlantic Brigade of the Kosovo Liberation Army in April 1999;

Whereas a Military-Technical Agreement between the Government of Yugoslavia and the North Atlantic Council came into effect on June 10, 1999, leading to a cessation of hostilities;

Whereas the Bytyqi brothers were arrested on June 23, 1999, by Serbian police within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia when the brothers accidently crossed what was then an unmarked administrative border while escorting an ethnic Romani family who had been neighbors to safety outside Kosovo;

Whereas the Bytyqi brothers were jailed for 15 days for illegal entry into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Prokuplje, Serbia, until a judge ordered their release on July 8, 1999;

Whereas instead of being released, the Bytyqi brothers were taken by a special operations unit of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs to a training facility near Petrovo Selo, Serbia, where all three were executed;

Whereas at the time of their murders, Ylli was 25, Agron was 23, and Mehmet was 21 years of age;

Whereas Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic was removed from office on October 5, 2000, following massive demonstrations protesting his refusal to acknowledge and accept election results the month before;

Whereas in the following years, the political leadership of Serbia has worked to strengthen democratic institutions, to develop stronger adherence to the rule of law, and to ensure respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia evolved into a State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in February 2003, which itself dissolved when both republics proclaimed their respective independence in June 2006;

Whereas the United States Embassy in Belgrade, Serbia, was informed on July 17, 2001, that the bodies of Ylli, Agron, and Mehmet Bytyqi were found with their hands bound and gunshot wounds to the back of their heads, buried atop an earlier mass grave of approximately 70 bodies of murdered civilians from Kosovo;

Whereas Serbian authorities subsequently investigated but never charged those individuals who were part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs chain of command related to this crime, including former Minister of Internal Affairs Vlajko Stojilkovic, Assistant Minister and Chief of the Public Security Department Vlastimir Djordjevic, and special operations training camp commander Goran Guri Radosavljevic;

Whereas Vlajko Stojilkovic died of a self-inflicted gunshot wound in April 2002 prior to being transferred to the custody of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia where he had been charged with crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war during the Kosovo conflict;

Whereas Vlastimir Djordjevic was arrested and transferred to the custody of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in June 2007, and sentenced in February 2011 to 27 years imprisonment (later reduced to 18 years) for crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war committed during the Kosovo conflict;

Whereas Goran Guri Radosavljevic is reported to reside in Serbia, working as director of a security consulting firm in Belgrade, and is a prominent member of the governing political party;

Whereas the Secretary of State designated Goran Radosavljevic of Serbia under section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2018 as ineligible for entry into the United States due to his involvement in gross violations of human rights;

Whereas two Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs officers, Sretan Popovic and Milos Stojanovic, were charged in 2006 for crimes associated with their involvement in the detention and transport of the Bytyqi brothers from Prokuplje to Petrovo Selo, but acquitted in May 2012 with an appeals court confirming the verdict in March 2013;

Whereas the Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic promised several high ranking United States officials to deliver justice in the cases of the deaths of Ylli, Agron, and Mehmet Bytyqi;

Whereas no individual has ever been found guilty for the murders of Ylli, Agron, and Mehmet Bytyqi or of any other crimes associated with their deaths; and

Whereas no individual is currently facing criminal charges regarding the murder of the Bytyqi brothers despite many promises by Serbian officials to resolve the case: Now, therefore, be it

That it is the sense of Congress that—

(1) those individuals responsible for the murders in July 1999 of United States citizens Ylli, Agron, and Mehmet Bytyqi in Serbia should be brought to justice;

(2) it is reprehensible that no individual has ever been found guilty for executing the Bytyqi brothers, or of any other crimes associated with their deaths, and that no individual is even facing charges for these horrible crimes;

(3) the Government of Serbia and its relevant ministries and offices, including the Serbian War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office, should make it a priority to investigate and prosecute as soon as possible those current or former officials believed to be responsible for their deaths, directly or indirectly;

(4) the United States should devote sufficient resources fully to assist and properly to monitor efforts by the Government of Serbia and its relevant ministries and offices to investigate and prosecute as soon as possible those individuals believed to be responsible for their deaths, directly or indirectly; and

(5) progress in resolving this case, or the lack thereof, should remain a significant factor determining the further development of relations between the United States and the Republic of Serbia.

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Stevenson’s army, October 23

Read Amb.Taylor’s prepared statement.
NBC news confirms that Gen. (ret.) Keane and Sen. Graham convinced the president to keep troops in Syria to hold oil fields.
Sen. McConnell has introduced a measure criticizing administration policy in Syria but lacking any sanctions or legal consequences.See Cong Rec p. S5974.
NYT explains Russia-Turkey deal.
Administration is divided over limiting Chinese access to technology

My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).

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