The Balkan regatta

I’m not a handicapper, but it seem to me the race for EU membership in the Balkans is shifting. Serbia is often referred to as the “frontrunner,” but it no longer really is, if it ever was. Macedonia has been a laggard, but that too is no longer the case. Kosovo is having a hard time keeping up, but that is in part due to an unreceptive EU. Bosnia and Herzegovina still occupies last place.

Serbia was arguably never really in first place, but by now it has certainly yielded to Montenegro, which has opened 32 chapters of the acquis communautaire required to become an EU member (and closed 3 of the 32). Serbia has opened 16 and closed 2. But Montenegro also has an easier path to EU membership, as it lacks many of the industries that Serbia needs to make comply with EU regulations. Montenegro also has a far freer press, whereas Serbia’s is under the government’s informal but still tight control. Both countries lack the fully independent and professional judiciary that will be necessary before accession. That is the long pole in the tent throughout the Balkans.

The big difference between Montenegro and Serbia lies in foreign policy. Montenegro, already a NATO member, is fully aligned with the EU on Russia. Serbia is not: it hosts a Russian “humanitarian” base and has refused to go along with sanctions against Moscow for its annexation of Crimea. Belgrade has no intention of seeking NATO membership. Serbian President Vucic recently gave President Putin a hero’s welcome in Belgrade, complete with paid crowds bused in from the provinces.

Skopje’s resolution of its “name” dispute with Athens has thrown the door to NATO wide open. Accession for “the Republic of North Macedonia” will follow as soon as ratifications are received from the 29 other members. The name change will also re-initiate Macedonia’s stalled EU accession process. As with Serbia and Montenegro, the long pole in the tent will be an independent and professional judiciary, but North Macedonia will likely make quick progress on other chapters.

Kosovo carries several burdens that the others don’t, even though all its legislation has been required to be EU-compatible since independence. Its stalled dialogue with Serbia needs to get restarted. Only after a fully normalized relationship can it hope to open accession talks, because of opposition from the EU’s five non-recognizing members. In addition, the EU sets a particularly high bar for Kosovo. This was apparent in its postponement of a visa waiver program even after Pristina had fully met many more requirements than any other country in the Balkans. Judicial professionalism and independence will also be a serious challenge in a country where personal relations count for a lot and institutional consolidation is still limited.

Still, Bosnia brings up the rear. It has been saddled with a coordination mechanism that gives both its entities, the Federation and Republika Srpska, as well as the ten Federation cantons and the Brcko District veto power over negotiation and implementation of the acquis. This is unworkable. Only when the Sarajevo government gets full authority to negotiate and implement the acquis will Bosnia be able to make serious progress on EU accession. NATO membership for Bosnia is ruled out for now by the leadership of Republika Srpska, which shares Belgrade’s antipathy for the Alliance as well as its affection for Russia and Putin.

So here is my sense of the regatta: Montenegro>Macedonia>Serbia>Kosovo>Bosnia. Serbia has slipped a couple of places, Macedonia is gaining, Kosovo is lagging in part because the EU wants it that way, and Bosnia is bringing up the rear.

Of course there are serious questions about the condition NATO and the EU will be in when any of these countries accede. Brexit, President Trump, and ethnic nationalist populism are real drags on the liberal democratic evolution of the former Yugoslav states, where ethnic nationalist populism in the 1990s became homicidal and even genocidal. But let there be no doubt that the accession processes are still the best thing going for the Balkans: they give people and governments there purpose and hope.

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The not so Super Bowl

Today America consummates its love of football in a gigantic extravaganza called the Super Bowl. Unlike most of the country, I won’t be watching, wagering, drinking, or overeating.

I don’t like the Super Bowl, for many reasons:

  1. The game of football is a strange one, as it involves brief clashes between superhuman athletes protected by elaborate equipment followed by long intervals when nothing interesting is happening. Compare rugby, where the ball is almost constantly in play: “no pads, no helmets, just balls.”
  2. All that protection it turns out is pretty much useless. Professional football players are succumbing early and often to serious brain injuries. They also suffer many other serious ailments. The sport is deadly.
  3. But it is also appealing to minority youth, as most of the well-paid professional players are black. So we end up cheering minority athletes who are damaging their own health and well being for (mainly white) America’s amusement. Anything wrong with that?
  4. The National Football League that administers this murderous affair has succumbed to political pressure, cracking down on athletes who have tried to use their public exposure to protest racial abuse, mainly by America’s police departments.
  5. Much of American spends Super Bowl Sunday loafing, betting, and over-imbibing, so advertisers spend truly astronomical sums selling their wares to an insalubrious audience. The cleverness that once characterized Super Bowl ads has largely evaporated. Why bother when so many of the spectators are drunk?

The only real virtue I can think of for the Super Bowl is its instruction on Roman numerals, as that is how the annual event is labeled. This year is Super Bowl LIII. That’s fitting, since the event resembles the deadly gladiatorial contests of Ancient Rome.

No, I won’t be watching. I’m heading out to visit an aged cousin. That will be much more satisfying than watching 300-pound behemoths do deadly damage to each others’ bodies and brains while America adds to its unfortunate obesity and alcohol abuse. And there won’t be much traffic.

 

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Doha impressions

I’ve been slow to write my impressions of Doha, where I spent four days last week after four days in Riyadh the week before (my impressions there are reported here). It’s fitting though that I should publish on Qatar the very day that its soccer team won the Asian Cup, defeating Japan 3-1 after triumphing in the semifinal 4-nil over arch-nemesis United Arab Emirates (in addition to beating Saudi Arabia).

The Qataris are riding high, at least in their own estimation and not only on the soccer field. They have more than survived what they term the blockade by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt imposed in June 2017. After an initial panic that emptied grocery stores, cut off family and other personal ties with compatriots, and caused a sharp fall in central bank reserves, the Doha government triggered a successful emergency response planned since the 2014 flare-up of their frictions with the Saudis and Emiratis.

The costs have been high, but the plan stabilized the situation and enabled Qatar to take advantage of its natural gas-derived wealth to make alternative arrangements and also  begin to stimulate domestic production to replace imports. People recount the story of flying in 3000 cows for milk production with smiles on their faces. Saudi food supplies, which dominated the market before the “blockade,” are no longer missed.

Relations with Iran and Turkey have improved. Turkey is often credited as having prevented a Saudi invasion early in the Gulf crisis by deploying 3000 troops. The massive US air base at Al Udeid is seldom mentioned, but Qataris clearly treasure their close relations with Washington. Outreach around the world to other countries has grown. Qataris regard the Gulf crisis as a “blessing in disguise,” a phrase heard repeatedly. It compelled Qatar to diversify and strengthen its ties around the world.

The result is pride and allegiance, including (from my limited contact) among the 90% of the population that is expats. Qataris and foreign experts think the government has done well and that the country’s star is rising. Portraits of the Emir, once ubiquitous, are still much in evidence, despite government instructions to remove them. World Cup 2022 preparations are said to be going well. Criticism of labor conditions on the many construction projects has declined, as accidents have proven much less common than some had predicted. The $6-7 billion of direct World Cup spending is only a drop in the bucket, as the government is building another $200 billion or so in new infrastructure. That’s on top of already lavish spending over the last two decades.

The ideological underpinnings are not, of course, democratic. Qatar is an autocracy that does not permit political organizations of any sort. But a lot of people we talked with are convinced that the traditional system of tribal consultations enables the top to hear from the bottom and the bottom to register its discontents. There is talk of elections this year or next for a newly empowered Shura Council, which now issues legislation on behalf of the Emir. But there are also concerns that elections will give the largest tribes dominance that the current system does not permit, thus reducing the diversity of voices and narrowing the political base of the monarchy.

Why did tiny, non-democratic Qatar support the Arab Spring and in particular the Muslim Brotherhood? The most common answer is that Doha supported the political forces it thought Egyptians, Syrians, Yemenis, Tunisians, Libyans, and others wanted. It has dialed back on that support and blocked private financing of radical groups, monitored by the US Treasury.

Doha claims to be a strong supporter of economic and military integration through the Gulf Cooperation Council, whose work has been disrupted. But Qataris want to conduct an independent foreign policy, not one dictated by Saudi Arabia or least of all by the UAE, which is believed to still resent Qatar’s choice to remain independent and not join the other sheikhdoms. Bahrain is the paradigm for what the Qataris do not want: a country forced to follow in the Kingdom’s footsteps wherever it goes.

What about Al Jazeera, the TV news channels that spare only Qatar and not its Gulf neighbors from criticism? Qatar’s neighbors view Al Jazeera Arabic in particular as promoting rebellion and extremism. At least some Qataris are willing to contemplate modifications in editorial policy, but all assume Al Jazeera is not going away, as the Saudis and Emiratis would like. Though said to be privately owned, it is under the government’s thumb and can be reined in when and if need be.

At times in Doha and Riyadh, I felt I was in a hall of mirrors: both claim leadership in modernizing the Arab world, both see the Gulf conflict as a struggle over what one Saudi termed “seniority” in the region and many Qataris termed Saudi/Emirati “hegemony.” In both Saudi Arabia and Qatar these days conservatism is bad, diversity is welcome, dialogue and consultation are promoted, and freedom to organize political activity is restricted. These are absolute monarchies with the deep pockets required to buy their way into the 21st century.

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The Berlin Wall is falling in Venezuela

The Atlantic Council held a discussion on January 30 about supporting the new Venezuelan interim government (VIG) led by Juan Guaidó. The panel included Carlos Vecchio, chargé d’affairs to the United States of the interim government of Venezuela, Julio Borges, VIG representative to Lima Group, David Smolansky, former Mayor and exiled activist. They were joined by David O’Sullivan, Head of EU delegation to the US, Manuel Maria Cáceres, Paraguay ambassador to the US, Alfonso Silva, Chile Ambassador to the US, and Edward Royce, former chairman of the House International Relations Committee.

Vecchio spoke about three types of pressure to make President Maduro quit power: internal pressure by the opposition; pressure from the National Assembly, which Vecchio sees as the legitimate democratically elected institution; and pressure from the international community. The regime has always tried to play the dialogue card to get enough oxygen and to divide and manipulate the international community. But unless Maduro is gone, the sociopolitical condition will not change and constitutional transition to a stable democracy will not be possible.

Borges spoke about three intersecting factors that prevented Maduro from falling quickly: the military, oil, and Cuba. Nowhere in Latin America have these three factors ever coincided. Maduro came to power and led Venezuela to ruin, including the economy. A few generals along with Cuba are keeping hold of the country.  According to Borges, two dynamics persist in Latin America: the axis of Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela still play the Cold War card and the rest of the countries, who follow the post-Cold War rules of freedom and democracy. But Borges is optimistic the Berlin Wall is falling in Latin America thirty years later, opening the door to a new system of democracy, human rights, and freedom.

Exiled in Washington DC for almost eighteen months, Smolansky described Guaidó as the interim president, head of state, and commander of arm forces, promising fair and democratic elections. Almost 3.5 million migrants are the result of the current crisis, the largest in the history of Latin America. Venezuelans are fleeing to neighbors: Colombia has one million, Ecuador seven hundred thousand, Chile two hundred thousand, Brazil more than one hundred thousand, and US more than half a million. For Smolansky, the most viable way out to this crisis is by restoring democracy in the country, regaining its freedom and establishing rule of law.

O’Sullivan presented the EU’s position, which supports transition in Venezuela. The EU did not accept the May election results and decided not to attend the inauguration, preferring to back the National Assembly and interim president Guaidó in restoring democracy. Alarmed by the humanitarian crisis in the country and its implications for the region, the EU provided $66 million for humanitarian support. EU countries have allowed Maduro some time to hold democratic elections, and the member states continue to engage with each other to have one stand on the issue.

As the first country recognizing the interim government, the newly appointed ambassador of Paraguay to the US, ceres, stated it was the right thing to do as Venezuelan people are suffering beyond imagination. Cáceres added that upon his recent inauguration, the president of Paraguay gave a pledge to support the people of Venezuela. A few days later, Paraguay broke diplomatic relations.

Silva stressed the commitment of Chile to the freedom in Venezuela. Although losing the resolution to recognize the interim government by one vote at the Organization of American States (OAS), Silva stressed the importance of more diplomacy to convince countries in the region and elsewhere to recognize Guaidó as legitimate. Venezuela needs humanitarian aid; pressure should be brought on Maduro to allow it in.

Royce painted the humanitarian situation as dire. Maduro’s military controls the importation of food and medicine. He also brought in the Chinese ZTE cooperation to run the social credit system, which makes Venezuelans rely on a card from the government to get food, pension, medicine, and basic services. ZTE, which belongs to Chinese intelligence, tracks people who write on social media through a database, and if you are against the regime, you will end up in jail. Jails are at over capacity. Out of 83,000 people in jail, 60% do not have potable water, leading to malaria and tuberculosis outbreaks.

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Smart only if it succeeds

I’ve hesitated to write about Venezuela, a country I don’t know, but perhaps a few words based on experience elsewhere are in order.

Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó is claiming to be the constitutional interim president replacing Nicolás Maduro, who still controls the security forces. The US, EU and many other countries, including most of Latin America, are recognizing Guaidó’s claims. US sanctions are depriving Maduro of the country’s revenue from oil sales to the US, which is a big part of its hard currency earnings. Russia, China, and others are backing Maduro.

Is the effort to displace Maduro and replace him with Guaidó smart? Certainly Maduro and his predecessor, Hugo Chávez, impoverished Venezuelans and denied them their rights, wrecking the economy and reducing much of the population to desperation. Guaidó’s claim that in the wake of a stolen election the National Assembly has the right and responsibility to name an interim president sounds reasonable.

But success is by no means guaranteed, even if the US sends the marines as National Security Adviser Bolton has hinted the President might. That is unfortunate, as the military threat is entirely a unilateral one. The Administration’s best bet for getting what it wants in Venezuela is multilateral: the 14 Western Hemisphere countries of the “Lima group” have rejected the results of the May election as invalid. Their political weight is a much better diplomatic instrument than the military threat.

But in the end Maduro’s fate will depend mainly on what Venezuelans do and how they do it. The best bet based on experience elsewhere is peaceful protest of one sort or another. Violence will only make it harder for the security forces to go over to Guaidó. And nonviolence generally has quicker and more democratic outcomes. It requires enormous discipline and unity to overthrow an autocrat, especially in a country that has suffered decades of deterioration. But violence and disorder will not appeal to those whose mass presence in the streets is vital to making a transfer of power happen.

There is a risk it won’t work. Venezuela could end up like Cuba: ostracized and impoverished, but with a dictatorship that most of the population is willing to tolerate for fear of worse. Or it could end up at war with itself, or occupied by the US. Maduro and Chávez before him mobilized lots of enthusiasm in the past among poorer Venezuelans. Guaidó’s move and American support for it will only be judged smart if he succeeds, not if the effort fails and leaves a basket case. Some smart people think it can work. Let’s hope they are right.

 

 

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Not the deep state

Yesterday’s testimony in Congress by America’s intelligence elite was dramatic: it contradicted President Trump’s ill-founded opinions on Iran, ISIS, North Korea, Russia, and China. Iran, the intel chiefs said, is still observing the nuclear deal. ISIS is not gone from Syria or Iraq. North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons, which Kim Jong Un views as vital to regime survival. Russia not only interfered in the 2016 election but is expanding its efforts. China’s economic difficulties are not due to America’s tariffs. It is almost as if they decided, with Ben Franklin, that we all hang together or we all hang separately.

Trump remained unimpressed. He denounced them all for failing to agree with their master. The President thinks he knows better. He is unwilling to entertain even the possibility he might be wrong. This is ignorance compounded with lack of intelligence. Only a profoundly stupid and lazy person would fail to ask himself why so many well-informed and manifestly intelligent people disagree, even at peril of losing their jobs. The notion that they would do it to protect their country from its greatest security risk–the man in the Oval Office–is anathema to Trump. He recognizes only egotism as a motive, since that is the only one he knows.

Fortunately, the Congress is moving for good reason to hem Trump in. You don’t have to think the US should stay in Syria or Afghanistan forever to believe that Trump’s tweeting and leaking of precipitous withdrawals is unwise. American diplomats needed more time than the President gave them to get a decent price for shipping out and making sure that whoever fills the vacuum will not put the US at risk. Pretending that North Korea will exchange its nukes and missiles for Trump-like hotel developments is silly.

Trump’s meeting with President Putin in Buenos Aires last November with no US officials present was revealed today. This is not just a breach of protocol. It is profoundly dangerous, since Moscow knows more about the meeting than Washington. Only a neophyte maverick would allow himself to be trapped into such a meeting, unless of course the purpose was to get instructions from Putin. Which do you prefer, a President who is embarrassingly unsophisticated or a President who qualifies as a Russian dupe or maybe even agent?

There is another explanation: that Trump enjoys defying convention and is happy to see his name in the headlines, no matter the occasion. No publicity is bad publicity for him and Roger Stone, who is blabbering himself into a lifetime in prison. Trump’s eldest son, Don Jr., looks set to follow him soon, as he was also enmeshed with Wikileaks during the campaign and lied to Congress about it. The missing link is evidence that the President was privy to or even ordered the contacts with the Russians that led to the publication of the Democratic National Committee’s emails. But there too doubts are hard to harbor: he appealed to Moscow in public to hack Hillary’s emails. Putin gave Trump the closest approximation within his control, in precisely the time frame Don Jr. favored.

President Trump really is America’s greatest security risk today. The intelligence people I know would find that proposition appalling but incontrovertible. Are they aiming to unseat him before he does much more damage? Their well-founded, professional testimony to lawmakers who have that power is one more step in the right direction: removing a president who is endangering the United States.

 

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