Rebooting globalization
The American Enterprise Institute yesterday hosted a panel discussion entitled “Rethinking Globalization: How do we Rebuild Support?” to kickstart a joint project by AEI and Brookings about “Reconceptualizing Globalization.” The panelists were Jared Bernstein (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities), Daniel Drezner (Tufts University), Stephen Hadley (RiceHadleyGates), and Merit Janow (Columbia University). Neena Shenai (AEI) and Joshua Meltzer (Brookings) moderated the discussion.
Shenai highlighted the timeliness of the initiative and stressed the critical importance of understanding globalization’s flaws, which have led to the populist discontent that precipitated the rise of Trump and other leaders whose rhetoric and trade policies threaten the institutional foundations of the post- World War II international order. Shenai asked each of the panelists to identify key factors that have led to the current hostility towards globalization and to propose possible solutions to the issue.
Bernstein began by pointing out that the benefits of comparative advantage-based trade are such that the winners can compensate the losers and still come out ahead. But political realities in the US mean that this does not occur. Instead, the benefits of trade accrue to corporate leaders, who use their political capital to negotiate trade agreements that are advantageous to them, and not necessarily their workers. Thus, the benefits of globalization, a positive sum game, have remained with elites, causing widespread dissatisfaction among the working class, many of whom lose their livelihoods due to trade-associated job destruction.
Further, Bernstein pointed out that wages increased with productivity from the 1940’s until the 1980’s. Since then, wages have stagnated, even as productivity continued to increase. The globalization backlash arises from workers not being fairly compensated for the gains from trade. Globalization needs to be reset in favor of the worker. US workers should be better represented in trade negotiations, and US policymakers should give domestic manufacturers tax cuts. On a monetary policy level, the US should also take aim at currency manipulators.
Hadley traced the origins of current discontent with Western international institutions to the elites’ decision to ignore their deficiencies following the 2008 financial crisis. This refusal resulted in the Tea Party’s political success in 2010, as well as the rise of Trump in 2016. Internationally, US dominance of the Bretton Woods system led new economic powers, like China, to create their own banks, institutions, and trade alliances. The legitimacy of Bretton Woods is thus threatened by domestic pressures within countries in the US bloc, as well as by international pressures.
The solution to the problem, however, does not lie in the destruction that Trump has wrought on global institutions and US alliances since his election. Hadley believes that the US would be better served by reforming Bretton Woods to appease populist discontent, and adjusting these institutions’ leadership structure to better reflect the current, multipolar global political and economic landscape.
Janow agreed that international institutions are a major part of the globalization problem, using her time at the WTO as an example. She argued that the WTO is weak and ineffective. The international trade body should generate its own work program to address its deficiencies instead of relying on the activity of member nations to solve its shortcomings.
In spite of these, Janow emphasized that policymakers should place more weight on what gave birth to multilateralism in the first place as they evaluate its benefits and drawbacks. Global institutions have contributed immensely to world peace and security by significantly raising the cost of war and conflict between trading partners. Further, globalization has reduced the negative externalities associated with individual countries not thinking beyond bilateralism in their approach to international economics. The global system is doomed if people do not believe these basic points.
Drezner questioned whether a globalization backlash was even occurring. The narrative that the 2008 financial crisis inspired a populist groundswell against elite-promulgated globalism is not supported by public opinion polls. In fact, 70% of Americans have supported globalization over the past 10 years, while 75% of Americans favor preserving US alliances over getting better terms on a trade deal. Further, even if there is a backlash, Drezner believes that the domestic economic damage Trump’s aggressive trade policies will cause will provide a strong incentive to not vote anti-globalists into office in the future.
The Bottom Line: Globalization is flawed. Significant portions of the US population have been left behind by current US trade policies. But the bellicose approach president Trump is taking provides no cure. The post-World War II economic order should not be destroyed. It needs to be rebooted, with US workers gaining their fair share of the benefits.
PS: apropos
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All eyes on Russia
On Friday, a large convoy of tanks and military vehicles flying Syrian and Russian flags arrived at the Nasib-Jaber crossing into Jordan, marking the return of regime control over Syria’s strategic southern border for the first time in five years. Hours later, Al Jazeera reported that opposition fighters agreed to a cease fire with Russian negotiators representing regime forces in Dera’a Province. The story is familiar. Rebel forces will give up their heavy weapons and civilians in Dera’a will return to living under Assad’s rule, while fighters who refuse to surrender are transported to the last remaining opposition strongholds: a small area of Idlib Province and a thin sliver of land east of the Golan Heights.
One key aspect, however, differentiates this cease fire from its predecessors in Homs, Aleppo, and Eastern Ghouta: Russian military police will administer the newly-recaptured areas in an attempt to encourage the 320,000 Syrians displaced by the offensive to return to their homes. While largely symbolic, continued Russian influence on the ground, even after fighting ceases, represents another step in Russia’s evolution from one of several powerful players to the key actor in the Syrian conflict. The message is clear: Moscow will control how this conflict ends. Past inaction indicates that the US cannot do anything about it.
This development is particularly troubling at a time when US president Trump is angling to score a big win with President Putin at their summit in Helsinki on July 16, with Ukraine and Syria at the top of the agenda. In an April 9 interview with the Washington Post, King Abdullah II of Jordan argued that isolating the two conflicts would not lead to any significant progress on either issue. Instead, he said, the US must deal with the Russians on Syria and Ukraine simultaneously and “horse-trade.”
The problem is that Trump does not have a horse to trade in either case, making prospects for Russian deescalation in Syria or Ukraine unlikely. On the Syrian front, Trump has already made his intentions clear. He wants to remove the 2,000 US special forces headquartered in At-Tanf as soon as possible. Withdrawal would open the door for Assad to take back eastern Syria, as the US represents the driving force behind the fragile alliance that holds the area.
Trump has already shown his cards. His attitude during the southern Syria offensive demonstrates that Trump will not stand in Putin’s way if push comes to shove in eastern Syria. Further, Trump’s behavior at the G7 summit, where he argued that Crimea rightfully belongs to Russia and argued for Putin to be allowed back into the group, indicates that US sanctions imposed against Russia in retaliation for the invasion of Ukraine could be up for negotiation, for little to nothing in return.
Trump has weakened his position in recent months at a time when Putin has significantly strengthened his. This means that the US delegation will go into Helsinki with barely any of what Trump, of all people, should know is necessary: leverage. Putin will likely get what he wants in Syria: US troop withdrawal. In exchange, Trump will get no more than vague pledges to curb human rights abuses in Syria as well as the Iranian presence. He may also get a nonbinding agreement to deescalate in Ukraine.
All parties will leave the summit satisfied; Trump will have his tweetable win, while Putin will solidify his status as kingmaker in Syria and Ukraine. This result will continue to erode US credibility on the Arab street. US popularity in the Arab world is at a nadir after “nation building” turned Iraq into a failed state, Assad’s chemical weapons use was met mostly with military silence, and Jerusalem was given to Israel on a platter. Betrayal in Syria will only further damage American interests in the region, which are already hanging by a thread.
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Cause to celebrate
Why should you be pleased that NATO has invited Macedonia to join the Alliance? It’s a small country (2 million people) tucked away and landlocked on the Balkan peninsula without even much of a highway running through it. One quarter of its population is Albanian and 10% are all sorts of other things: Serbs, Croats, Vlachs and who knows what. It only declared independence in 1991 and has spent most of its existence squabbling with Greece, which claims Macedonia’s name exclusively for one of its provinces.
First and foremost, the NATO invitation will, one hopes, give both Macedonia and Greece the courage to end the squabbling. Skopje and Athens have negotiated an elaborate agreement that changes the official name (for all uses) to Republic of Northern Macedonia and resolves a host of contentious details concerning the country’s language, cultural history, textbooks, minorities, irredentist claims, economic cooperation….All that is needed is final approval in the two countries’ parliaments and in a referendum in Macedonia. That is a high water mark in a 25-year effort to resolve the issue.
Second, the invitation sends a strong signal in two directions:
- to the other countries in the Balkans who are not yet members of either NATO or the EU.
- to the Russians, who have been determined to slow if not block NATO expansion.
The signal to the rest of the Balkans is just this: if you have the political courage to take on and resolve tough issues, the trans-Atlantic institutions will hold their doors open to you. First NATO, then the EU. Solve your inter-ethnic issues and problems with your neighbors, reform your economies and political systems to reduce corruption and prevent state capture, and you will get a place at the table in the two most important alliances ever created.
To the Russians, the signal is just as clear: you may try to block NATO expansion and try to drive a wedge between Europe and the US, but you will not succeed. Even the relatively weak states in the Balkans will stand up to you. Macedonia has already expelled some of your intelligence agents trying to sow dissension from the “name” agreement. Montenegro last year, Macedonia this year. Maybe Kosovo the year after. Then only Serbia and Republika Srpska will stand between the Alliance and a Balkans whole and free. You can try to shore up your proxies, but they stand to gain more joining the West than continuing to bet on Vladimir Putin.
Third, NATO membership will add Macedonia’s small army and military capabilities to an Alliance that needs them. The Macedonians have already served years embedded in the Vermont National Guard in Afghanistan, where their commanding general thought they performed as well as US troops in combat. Who knows where they will be needed next, whether by NATO or the EU military structure? They are still short of the 2% of GDP goal NATO set for 2024, but their invitation gives Macedonia every incentive to reach it, sooner rather than later.
Of course in the scheme of things, “Northern Macedonia” in NATO is a small victory. It isn’t nearly as earthshaking as an American president who can’t find anything good to say about the Alliance while praising the Russian president who attacked the American electoral system. But it’s a good thing and something to celebrate.
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Who can fix Bosnia?
Delvin Kovač of Bosnian website Vijesti.ba asked questions; I replied:
- Should the international community increase its presence in Bosnia, since Bosnian politicians can’t come to an agreement on any important issues regarding Bosnia’s future?
A: No. It may need to adjust its presence, for example by moving all the EU military forces to Brcko to forestall any attempt to seize it by one entity of the other, but Bosnia’s politicians need to learn to deal with their own problems.
- Will Bosnia be sliding into a constitutional crisis after the autumn elections this year, as some politicians already announced such scenario due to unresolved electoral law issue?
A: No. As I’ve explained, there are adequate provisions in the existing Federation constitution to deal with any issues that may arise.
- Bosnian Croat lawmakers refused to attend a session of the lower house of the Federal Parliament because the body recently adopted an election-related law without them. Is boycotting a Parliament maybe a part of a Croat Democratic Party Leader Dragan Covic’s so called “Plan B”?
A: You’ll have to ask him. For me, boycotting is a way of eliminating yourself from the political equation, not getting what you want. If you want to protect your rights, show up.
- A coalition of parties representing Bosnian Serbs in the Government said that it would not allow Bosnia to enter NATO while neighbouring Serbia is not part of the international alliance. Should Bosnia really depend on neighbouring countries Serbia’s and Croatia’s decisions when it comes to foreign policy issues?
A: No. But it is up to Bosnia’s voters to punish at the polls politicians who want to follow foreign leaders rather than their own.
- Milorad Dodik is no longer the only ally of Russian Federation in Bosnia, since it is expanding an influence in Bosnia and Croatia through the Croat Democratic Party Leader Dragan Covic and the group of lawmakers in the Croatian Parliament. Russian Federation is obviously penetrating NATO countries territory increasingly. Is that to be considered dangerous?
A: Yes, but again it is up to voters to punish at the polls those leaders who kowtow to the Russians.
- Dragan Covic said that local parties cannot agree on the solution for the local election in Mostar and that the local election will almost definitely not be held in this city, which faces an indefinite wait for a new municipal council. What do you think is a adequate solution for this problem?
A: I think an adquate solution for this problem is one Bosnians can agree on. I don’t think you should expect foreigners to be very interested any longer in your municipal elections. I spent a lot of time on Mostar at the Dayton peace talks. It is time for you to invest the political energy needed to overcome the problems there.
- What can Bosnian citizens expect if Milorad Dodik and Dragan Covic become the Serb and the Croat member of the Bosnian tripartite Presidency. They both openly call for the destruction of Bosnia and the creation of a para-state – third entity? Who can confront such dangerous politics of the two?
A: Bosnia’s citizens, principally. But the West can be relied upon not to recognize any state that attempts to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nor will Croatia or Serbia want that.
PS: Here it is in Bosnian.
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Tighten your seatbelts
We are in that car crash moment: we can see the collision coming but can’t stop the vehicle or predict precisely the outcome. Only this time there is more than one crash coming:
- President Trump’s nomination of a Federalist Society-certified conservative to the Supreme Court pretty much guarantees that abortion will be a key issue in November’s Congressional election. To whose advantage that will be is not clear. But whether Judge Kavanaugh is approved before the poll, or especially if confirmation is delayed until afterwards, his apparent inclination to overturn Roe v. Wade will push women towards the Democrats and men towards the Republicans.
- In the foreign policy community, everyone is holding their breath for the NATO Summit in Brussels tomorrow and Thursday. Trump has been hyperventilating about Europe’s failure to spend more on defense, even as many of the allies have been raising their expenditures in order to meet the 2024 NATO target of 2% of GNP and to increase the Alliance’s odds against an increasingly aggressive Russia. If Trump repeats his dissing of the G7 last month in Canada, the Europeans will conclude the Alliance is dead.
- Next Monday Trump meets President Putin in Helsinki. Speculation is rife that he will hand Syria and perhaps also Crimea to Putin, in return for essentially nothing. If either happens, it will cause worldwide repercussions, the former because US withdrawal from Syria will strengthen Iran (Russian promises to restrain Tehran should be ignored entirely) and the latter because every would-be breakaway minority will be encouraged by US acceptance of Russia’s annexation.
- A bit further along on the time horizon is the escalating trade war with China, which is causing a lot of distress in the US, both because Trump’s tariffs raise prices to US producers and consumers of Chinese goods and because Chinese retaliation is hitting US exports hard. The tit-for-tat tariffs with Canada, Mexico, and Europe are also damaging, though the stock market isn’t yet feeling the pain. It will eventually, as the inflationary impact of the budget deficit, the tax cut, and the tariffs pushes the Fed to raise interest rates.
- The dialogue with North Korea about its nuclear program has degenerated into a diatribe, with Pyongyang accusing Secretary of State Pompeo of gangster-like behavior for insisting on quick denuclearization, rather than the long-term, phased (and likely never completed) process the North Koreans favor. No telling whether or when Trump will be back to threatening fire and fury, but it is already clear that his classic bait and switch tactic–he doesn’t seem to have mentioned quick denuclearization during the Singapore summit–won’t work with Kim Jong-un.
Trump will be in London Thursday evening and Friday, meeting with a Prime Minister teetering on the brink as she tries desperately to rescue the United Kingdom from the worst impacts of Brexit, which Trump supported. He’ll be flying everywhere, so as to avoid what are predicted to be massive protests.
Then he’ll spend the weekend in Scotland at one of his own golf clubs. We can hope he’ll spend some time with the briefing books, especially the ones that detail Russian interference in the US election and Moscow’s role in nerve agent murders in the UK. But I wouldn’t bet on it.
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Bad assumptions make bad policy
The Post recently published Jamal Khashoggi’s “It’s time to divide Syria.” A few assertions that Khashoggi made jump out as pertinent examples of biases and assumptions that can often be found in Western media reports about Syria. Here are a few examples of this:
To bring about a permanent peace in Syria, the southern part of the country must be protected. Victory for Assad there is not a complete solution so much as it is a pause. The territories governed by Assad are ruled by fear and a loss of hope for prosperity.
Assad has been responsible for the murder of hundreds of thousands of his own people. He has chemically attacked his compatriots and will go down in history as one of the cruellest and bloodiest despots in modern history. This can lead people to assume that he has managed to stay in power only by keeping the population under his control in a constant state of fear and oppression. It is this assumption – that Assad’s dictatorship commanded little or no popular support – that led international actors, particularly regional powers such as Turkey and Qatar, to believe that Assad’s regime would collapse quickly in 2011.
They were ultimately proven wrong. Syrian sectarian tensions, as well as the government’s historical use of clientelism and patronage to foster elite support, provided Assad with broad support from some ethnic minorities in Syria – particularly his own group, the Alawis. In addition, many non-minority Sunnis see Assad as the sole source of stability in the country. Judging and condemning Assad for the way in which he has treated his people is justified and right. It is, however, a tenuous and possibly counter-productive justification for intervention, particularly if we repeat the mistakes of Iraq in failing to properly plan for the aftermath.
The United States should propose partition in Syria. Assad can keep what he controls, and the rebels can form local governments and establish a new entity. With international recognition and support, it would be possible to hold elections for local councils [and] curtail radicalized individuals […].
Portraying Islamist and jihadist rebels as “radicalized individuals” makes them sound like a few bad apples within a more moderate rebel ensemble. Yet broad swathes of the Syrian opposition are radical, with the salafist Ahrar al-Sham or the jihadist Tahrir al-Sham among the largest and most effective opposition groups in Syria today. These are not just individuals but unavoidable strategic actors, determined power players, who will have a role to play in Syria for years to come.
The ideological composition of the opposition, and its fragmented nature, mean that distinguishing between “radical” and “moderate” elements is near-impossible. Curtailing radical groups would not only require more military power than any international actor is willing to currently provide, it would also require a level of insight and decisiveness in determining who needs to be curtailed and who should participate in governing a new Syria that no foreigners currently possess.
The assertion that we can – and should – eliminate radical elements of the opposition also underestimates the support these groups command within the population. American hostility and distaste for radical Islam clouds the fact that for many Syrians, particularly those who are Sunni Arabs, these groups are a viable and even desirable alternative to Assad’s rule. Many also see them as a necessary evil to counter creeping Iranian influence in Syria, a sort of counter-Hezbollah that will fight fire with fire.
What would Khashoggi recommend if his elected local councils installed radical Muslims in power? More generally, Western commentators should not assume that radical elements in Syria will be “curtail[ed]” by the Syrian population once it votes.
Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State will always be threats, but they will likely be rejected by the local Syrian community if there are international and regional forces supporting Syrian aspirations for moderate civilian rule.
Many Syrians want peace and stability more than they want “moderate civilian rule;” many fear that a transition to a more democratic form of government would prove a new source of chaos and instability, as it was in Iraq after 2003 and Egypt after 2012.
The assumption that democracy is something people inherently yearn for has plagued Western interpretation of Middle Eastern political crises for decades. It was particularly visible during the “Arab Spring” uprisings of 2010-11, when news organizations such as The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal heralded the popular desire for democratic rule in the region.
Of course there are large numbers of local activists and citizens who call and hope for more popular representation and participation across the Middle East; but assuming this a basic and widespread concern for everyone is misleading. Not because they are inherently attached to strongman rule or too passive for civic participation, but because democracy is for many a privilege that comes after security and prosperity. If foreign powers intervened in Syria assuming that its citizens are on the same page as they are about what Syria should look like post-civil war, they could be in for a big surprise.
We should stop making assumptions and generalizations that we can’t back up with evidence. Western powers have too often intervened in Middle Eastern politics – often with destructive consequences – because of false assumptions and an inflated belief in the obviousness and infallibility of their liberal and democratic values.
The United States could do a lot to help the Syrian population today: more humanitarian assistance to the displaced Syrians in the South, and more political support to ensure that Syrian Kurdish interests are represented in negotiations about the future of Syria, for instance. For productive American involvement in the Syrian conflict to happen, however, it can’t be obscured by flashier plans based on misleading statements; they may sound more appealing, but are not grounded in reality. Accurate information should be a prerequisite, not an afterthought, of American foreign policymaking in the Middle East.
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