Stabilization again
During the Stabilization Symposium on Tuesday, a panel consisting of Frances Brown (Fellow – Carnegie Institute), Ciara Knudsen (Policy Planning Staff, Office of the Secretary – Department of State), Katherine Donahue (Office of Transition Initiatives – USAID), and Colonel Joe Holland (Chief, Stability and Humanitarian Engagement Division, J-5 Global Policy & Partnerships – Department of Defense) discussed avenues for building peace and stability in post-conflict situations, using the Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR) as a blueprint.
According to Brown, three key obstacles make it complicated to transition from conflict to peace: defining success, measuring progress, and governmental organization. The SAR states that post-conflict stabilization is inherently political, allowing the US to better confront the first challenge. Specifically, it provides the US government with the flexibility to candidly judge whether the legitimate political actor on the ground wants peace and stability, making it possible for interventions to succeed. This mindset would have been crucial in Afghanistan, where large sums were poured into stabilization efforts that derailed because president Karzai’s government was not on board.
Brown argued that the SAR also allows the US to adopt more realistic measures for success in stabilization operations. In Afghanistan, cherry-picked stories were used to evaluate US peace building efforts, causing onlookers in Washington to mistakenly believe that the success of three, US-implemented district councils was indicative of the state of affairs in the country as a whole. Brown expressed confidence that the SAR’s emphasis on a coordinated, cross-government strategy for stabilization will make US implementers more accountable to each other, increasing the likelihood that future interventions will adopt more accurate measures of success.
Knudsen used her experience with the Defeat ISIS Campaign to critique the SAR’s inapplicability to situations where short-term, cosmetic interventions will not work because no legitimate on-site actors exist. ISIS has systematically destroyed entire communities’ physical and social infrastructure by reducing cities to rubble, planting IEDs, assassinating tribal leadership, and leaving sleeper cells behind in liberated areas.
These conditions breed a climate of fear and distrust in target communities, making it nearly impossible to find actors who enjoy the legitimacy to inspire the unity necessary to accomplish stabilization. Thus, stabilizing institutions in destroyed cities like Mosul and Raqqa will require meaningful, long-term engagement. Knudsen argued that the SAR does not recognize that most conflict situations call for more than quick, low-budget interventions to develop lasting peace.
Donahue struck a more positive tone than Knudsen, praising the SAR for being realistic and encouraging swift governmental interventions to stabilize conflict zones. The SAR’s declaration that stabilization is an iterative process falls directly in line with the philosophy OTI uses for its intervention strategy. According to Donahue, this will give the US government the flexibility to behave more like OTI, allowing it to mobilize quickly instead of getting bogged down in crafting grand strategies that often do not apply to the situation on the ground. Instead, the SAR strategy centers around learning on the go, recognizing that moving quickly and being correct at the 80% level is more productive than shooting for 100% effectiveness and failing because of inaction.
During his assignment to Kirkuk in the Iraq War, Holland was responsible for facilitating provincial reconstruction teams in the area. In what was indicative of the broader White House strategy at the time, military officers were under the impression that the Department of Defense was spearheading stabilization efforts in Iraq. Little interagency coordination occurred as a result. This military-centric approach led to planning gaps, causing stabilization attempts to end largely in failure. Iraqis remained employed for a snapshot in time, so communities slid back into conflict following US withdrawal. The SAR’s emphasis on interagency coordination represents a building block for future stabilization success, opening the door for long-term, sustainable development by legitimate regional partners after US troops end the mission.
The Bottom Line: The SAR is promising, but it has limits and presents little more than a framework to guide future US stabilization efforts in conflict regions. While this general blueprint will give US actors on the ground considerable flexibility in crafting case-specific strategies, the SAR’s desire for quick, low-cost interventions ignores that most conflicts are multidimensional and can only be solved by long-term stabilization initiatives. Reluctance to commit significant time and resources to stabilization means that future US peace building efforts will likely fail, or that the US will avoid intervening in these situations altogether.
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Elections have consequences
Here are the speaking notes I prepared for today’s noontime presentation at SETA DC:
- It wasn’t free or fair, but Erdogan has won his gamble: he has not only the enhanced presidency but also a coalition majority in parliament. He in effect controls the judiciary and press as well.
- The opposition is fragmented and likely to prove no more effective than in the last few years, though its hostility to Syrian refugees will guarantee it some support.
- Turkey looks headed deeper into one-man rule, even if Erdogan fulfills his pledge to lift the emergency.
- It would be foolish to imagine Erdogan will suddenly become generous to his enemies, end his crackdown on over 100,000 alleged coup-plotters, break with the Russians, re-focus attention on fighting Islamic extremism and qualifying for EU membership, negotiate peace with Turkey’s Kurds, or patch up the alliance with the US.
- I wonder if he would even restrain his body guards from beating up demonstrators were he to visit the US again.
- The question is what the US should do about it? How do we make it through the coming years, possibly even a decade or more, with an erstwhile ally moving in a direction it is hard to like?
- The current occupant of the White House makes these questions more difficult than they would normally be. He is on the outs with Erdogan, but not over human rights or relations with Russia. Trump and Erdogan might agree entirely on those issues.
- But President Trump has continued to insist on supporting the Syrian Kurds and hasn’t proven much help on the extradition of Gulen, which are the two things Erdogan cares about the most.
- Ironically, the best approach is one Trump might find attractive: a transactional relationship that relies less on Turkey as an ally and more on its usefulness to the US.
- The most important aspect of that usefulness is geography. The Incirlik air base is important to U.S. operations throughout the Levant. So long as it remains available, we are going to have to try to improve relations with Erdogan, who fortunately gets real benefits from those operations.
- As Syria’s northern neighbor with a long common border, Turkey is hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees. The US has spent around $600 million to support them and needs to continue.
- The immediate crunch issue is the sale of F35s to Ankara, which Congress is trying to stop. What is needed is a compromise, one that ends Erdogan’s threat to buy Russian S400 air defenses while allowing the transfer of the F35s. Secretary Mattis is said to be working a deal of that sort. I can’t help but wonder whether a Patriot sale might also still be something Erdogan still wants.
- The question of the Syrian Kurds is next. The agreement on Manbij appears to be working so far and needs to be completed with reformulation of the town’s governing body and withdrawal of YPG forces east of the Euphrates.
- Much tougher will be the issue of prisoner releases: Ankara holds dozens of Americans, apparently hoping to trade them for Gulen. It is hard to convince Erdogan that Trump does not have the same power over Gulen’s fate that Erdogan has over the Americans Turkey holds.
- If, however, a court decides in favor of extradition, I doubt the Trump administration will stand in the way.
- This, I’m afraid, is how we will need to proceed: issue by issue, looking for trades we can reasonably do that Erdogan will find attractive. It will be a hard slog, one during which concern about human rights abuses will likely find little public expression.
- I nevertheless hope the Administration will make a strong case in private against Erdogan’s continued crackdown. All but the immediate coup plotters should be freed, Kurdish political leaders and journalists should be released and amnestied or pardoned, jobs should be restored.
- The strongest potential leverage the Americans have now on human rights is economic: Turkey is headed in a bad direction that will be made much worse if secondary sanctions against Iran are instituted.
- Relief from secondary sanctions could be traded for easing the crackdown, but Trump isn’t likely to do that. Erdogan will have strong incentives to surreptitiously violate the sanctions, which he did even during the Obama era.
- Erdogan has won. Trump is in power. Elections have consequences.
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Israel’s “center”
On Monday, the Brookings Institution hosted M.K. Yair Lapid, founder of the centrist Yesh Atid party, the largest opposition party in the Knesset. Lapid shared his views about current Israeli domestic and foreign policy, including its relationship with the US, as well as his vision for the country’s future. John R. Allen, president of the Brookings Institution, gave introductory remarks, and Tamara Coffman Wittes, senior foreign policy fellow at Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, moderated the discussion. Below, I discuss key takeaways from Lapid‘s remarks.
Foreign Policy Flashpoints
At a time when regional conflict threatens Israel’s relative stability, Lapid described how his country and the international community should approach Israel’s main foreign policy challenges to ensure future Israeli security. On the Palestinian front, Lapid stressed the importance of breaking the silence that has stalled negotiations on a two state solution since the Trump embassy move. A return to dialogue represents the only road to peace. A Palestinian Jerusalem, however, is off the table. Lapid stated that “Jerusalem is a capital; if someone came to DC and asked [the US] to share it with Mexico, they would refuse.” Lapid also criticized UNRWA, arguing that having a refugee agency solely for Palestinians allows Arab countries to maintain a false moral high ground in the conflict.
Lapid blamed Hamas for the recent killing of hundreds of protestors in Gaza by Israeli snipers, saying that the violent protests threatened national security. Although it is not at fault for the violence, Israel must work quickly to solve the humanitarian crisis; after all, Gazan sewage contaminates Israeli water. However, any Israeli efforts to solve the crisis must be predicated by Hamas’ fall from power, clearing the way for humanitarian aid to reach Gazan hands without funding terrorist activities.
Lapid also used national security to defend his country’s controversial position in the Golan Heights. In addition to their strategic importance in fending off the rising Iranian and Hizbollah threat, giving the Golan Heights back to Assad is simply not an option, as it would put 22,000 Jewish lives at risk. Similarly, opening the northeastern border to Syrian Arab refugees also represents an unacceptable security risk. Instead, Lapid called on the US to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Heights, arguing that this move would allow the US to send the message that it does not tolerate Assad’s human rights abuses.
Israeli-US Relations: Troubling Times Ahead?
While Lapid lauded the Trump administration’s goodwill towards Israel, he expressed concern that positive relations on the executive level are papering over fissures that will emerge after Trump leaves office. Chief among these is American Jewry’s increasing disinterest in Israel. Orthodox Jews in Israel have criticized American Reform Jews too much, causing them to feel alienated. Increasing anti-Israel discourse on US college campuses has prevailed over American Jews’ ties to their ancestral homeland. Lapid also linked heightened partisanship under Trump to the erosion of the bipartisan support Israel has enjoyed in the past. As a consequence, bilateral relations could deteriorate during the next democratic administration, leaving Israel more exposed than ever to national security threats from within the Arab world.
Careful Optimism: A Winning Call?
As he discussed his chances for beating Netanyahu in the next parliamentary elections, Lapid emphasized that Israelis are more hesitant about large political shifts than US voters. For that reason, Lapid argued that emphasizing satisfaction with the status quo while calling for gradual crackdowns on corruption and moving towards a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict will be a winning call in 2019. In addition, Lapid advocated for a move away from using empty rhetoric to avoid confronting issues head-on, saying that “we need a government that actually does stuff, not [one] that just eloquently describes the problem.” While his strategy of emphasizing continuation and subtle changes might mean that Yesh Atid does not differentiate itself enough from Likud enough to win in 2019, Lapid hopes that centrist success in Germany and France might bode well for Israel.
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Winners should stabilize, like it or not
Throughout the two-day Stabilization Symposium – held at the Elliott School of International Affairs on June 26-27, 2018 – panels were held to provide “Perspectives from the Frontlines,” sharing witness accounts from a conflict, or recently deconflicted areas, in which a stabilization framework is most likely to be implemented. The Symposium thus hosted a panel entitled “Perspectives from the Frontlines: Syria and Iraq.” Moderated by Moises Venancio, UNDP Regional Advisor for Iraq and Syria, the panel included:
Linda Robinson – Senior Policy Researcher, RAND
Katherine Krueger – Senior Advisor, Stabilization and Development, Creative Associates International
Aya Aljamili – Al Jazeera
Robinson emphasized how important effective coordination is for the success of stabilization on the ground. Different operating partners in Raqqa, Syria – probably different branches of the US government and NGO partners of the government organizations – have differing conceptions of what stabilization meant. This apparently delayed effective implementation. Robinson also stressed the need for government actors to bring non-government actors to the planning table early on if effective stabilization is to happen. Stabilization in Raqqa had been more successful than in some other cases thanks to better communication between partners; but more could be done to improve the process.
Asked how best to go about implementing stabilization, Robinson highlighted the importance of detailed community research. We need to look at the perceptions and priorities of every demographic group, not just local leaders, when determining what is best for a deconflicted region. Gathering such information is difficult when local populations are traumatized and hostile to foreign powers, as is often the case. This is why community outreach to build relationships and trust are important facets of a successful stabilization process.
Krueger pointed out the biggest obstacle to implementing stabilization in Syria: as an inherently political process, successful stabilization requires clearly defined political objectives. The American government has failed to provide such clear political objectives, leading to what Krueger called “stabilization lite.” Implementation is further complicated by the US struggle to find a satisfactory stabilizing intermediary on the ground, with American support for Kurdish troops proving particularly controversial with local Arab populations. She also pointed out how important continued American presence is to deterring radical groups such as ISIS.
In the same vein, Krueger reminded the audience not to forget about reconstructing Mosul and dealing with the huge number of internally-displaced people in Iraq. While the Iraqi elections were reassuring in their focus on corruption and the reduced role of sectarianism, international actors still have a lot to do to ensure that ISIS does not resurge in Iraq.
According to Aljamili, stabilization can only succeed in eastern Syria if a government is formed that not only provides basic services, but also unites disparate local communities under a common banner. According to the Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR), stabilization should function through cooperation with legitimate local actors. Unless the US succeeds in fostering a local government that satisfies the needs of both the Kurds and Arabs, stabilization efforts will flounder.
Because of this, Aljamili emphasized the need to take the time to work within communities, to ascertain what the population wants, before undertaking a stabilization process and “elite bargaining” that may run counter to popular desire. It is also essential to remember that Iraq and Syria are not one entity; even within each state, regions differ substantially, meaning that stabilization processes must be highly tailored to the region in which they are to be implemented.
During the Q&A portion of the panel, I asked whether – seeing the Turkish government’s apparent opposition to the creation of an autonomous Kurdish enclave in the north-east of Syria – stabilization in eastern Syria could function without American political support for the Kurds. To this, Aljamili answered that Turkey will at some point have to face the reality of a strong Kurdish political presence in northern Syria, whether that is as part of a negotiated settlement with Assad’s government or as an autonomous enclave for the foreseeable future.
Krueger said that two possible solutions exist for northern Syria. Maybe multi-sectarian local community rebuilding could occur with the consent of Assad and Turkey. Now that President Erdoğan has won a decisive victory at home, he may reopen negotiations with the PKK from a stronger negotiating position. The other solution would be an official deal between the PYD and the US, with Russia and the US then putting pressure on Turkey to accept the facts on the ground and some form of Kurdish autonomy in Syria, as Assad may be open to such autonomy in majority-Kurdish regions.
The bottom line: it is awkward to talk about an American-support stabilization process in Syria when President Trump has been advocating full American withdrawal. All three panelists emphasized the importance of the American presence in eastern Syria and in Iraq to not just stabilizing, but also rebuilding communities in these regions once the conflict with ISIS is over. Stabilization and peace-building are vital in the aftermath of the fight with ISIS, but the Americans may abandon the effort.
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Grading the stabilization review
I spent some quality time yesterday and today at an interagency unveiling of the US government’s Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR), which has produced “a framework for maximizing the effectiveness of US government efforts to stabilize conflict-affected areas.” As I’ve lived through at least four incarnations of US government efforts to recast its approach in conflict zones, I approach this one with a skeptical edge.
First, the good news: the SAR recognizes up front and explicitly that stabilization is an inherently political enterprise. That’s good, because it’s true. The now official objective is “to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence.” Nothing apolitical about that. Politics is primary, in particular in situations where people have recently been killing each other over the distribution of power. Any move you make, or don’t, has political implications.
The SAR also recognizes that you can put too much money into conflicted environments. This is convenient, since the Trump Administration isn’t going to want to spend much on stabilization, but it too is true. The US government wasted colossal amounts of money in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it flowed rapidly into the pockets of local power brokers and from there to foreign banks, real estate, and other mostly unproductive investments (at least from the perspective of the conflict country in question). The emphasis in the SAR on small projects and building up local capacity is particularly welcome, as is the emphasis on establishing security first. Without it, nothing good can happen.
Beyond this, the SAR reads as if it is walking on egg shells. We need, it says, to “set realistic, analytically-backed political goals” (duh), but then shies away from defining any. It is especially allergic to the “d” (democracy) word. Instead there is a quick cameo appearance of a political objective in a reference to USAID, which is said to define legitimate societal and governing institutions as “inclusive, responsive and accountable to all groups, including minority and marginalized populations.” And how do the Defense and State Department definitions differ, or are they just too chicken to speak out?
That is not just a rhetorical question. The SAR was the brainchild of H.R. McMaster, who has been through enough wars to know that conflict doesn’t end when the guns are silenced. He is gone. John Bolton couldn’t care less. I detected no National Security Council presence whatsoever at the symposium, on the program or in the audience (apologies in advance to any NSC people who were there). In fact, none of the agency principals (Defense, State and AID) spoke, though all were invited. Representation barely rose above the level of deputy assistant secretary, which is the top level populated mainly by professionals.
This makes sense, as the Trump Administration not only wants to limit foreign affairs expenditure, especially for State and AID, but the President (like all his predecessors since 1989) has also eschewed “nation-building.” The SAR is a pretty transparent effort to sneak an important element of that benighted enterprise past the powers that be. It even notes the inevitability of a follow-on effort at peacebuilding and proposes civilian-led stabilization teams for rapid deployment, an updated version of the defunct Civilian Response Corps and Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
The good news is that Congress said to be sympathetic to the SAR. The Hill is also preparing the way for marginally better funding for State and AID, with both Rs and Ds supporting. But no one has broken the bad news to the President: success in killing terrorists in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and elsewhere will be Pyrrhic, unless someone steps up to the need to create those “conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence.” The alternative is a return of Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, one of their many affiliates, or a dictatorship that will come close to their brutality.
So the SAR gets an A for effort, a B+ for content, and an incomplete on likelihood of implementation. That incomplete is a gift.
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Peace Picks – June 25-July 1
1. An Alternative Vision for Israel | Monday, June 25, 2018 | 10:00 am – 11:00 am | Brookings Institution | Register Here
On June 25, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host Member of Knesset Yair Lapid for an Alan and Jane Batkin International Leaders Forum. M.K. Lapid will join for a public conversation on his vision for Israel’s future. M.K. Lapid, the former finance minister of the State of Israel, will discuss a wide-ranging set of issues confronting Israel today, from its position in the Golan Heights, its strategy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, to the state U.S.-Israel alliance and bipartisan support for Israel in the United States.
A former journalist, television presenter, and author, Lapid founded the centrist Yesh Atid Party in 2012. The party garnered a surprising 19 seats in its first elections, and was the second largest party in the Knesset. Yesh Atid today polls as the main opposition challenger to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party.
Introductory Remarks: John R. Allen, President, The Brookings Institution
Moderator: Tamara Cofman Wittes, Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution
Featured Speaker: Yair Lapid, Chairman – Yesh Atid Party
2. More Than Burden Sharing: Five Objectives for the 2018 NATO Summit | Tuesday, June 26, 2018 | 8:15 am – 9:45 am | Center for New American Security | Register Here
In early-July, NATO will host the first full-length summit at its new headquarters in Brussels. It will also be the first NATO summit for President Donald Trump’s foreign-policy team. President Trump will arrive in Brussels with only one thing on his mind: burden sharing. This is hardly a new concern for an American president, or indeed for many European leaders. Although continuing to push allies to take on a bigger share of the burden is important, the United States should not allow this single issue to eclipse the entire summit agenda. This summit needs to be about more than burden sharing. It is with this in mind that the Center for a New American Security’s Transatlantic Security Program has published its latest report, “More Than Burden Sharing: Five Objectives for the 2018 NATO Summit.”
We cordially invite you to the formal release of this report on Tuesday, June 26 at 8:15 AM at the CNAS office (1152 15th Street NW, Suite 950) as we examine the additional issues that NATO allies should tackle at the Summit including the Black Sea, counter-terrorism, emerging domains of warfare, NATO-EU defense planning, and readiness. This public, on-the-record event will feature opening remarks by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ine Eriksen Søreide. A panel discussion with CNAS experts Julianne Smith and Jim Townsend, along with Ian Brzezinski of the Atlantic Council will follow. The event will be moderated by Professor Rosa Brooks of Georgetown University.
3. Mapping the Role of Religion in Fragile States – Insights from Libya, South Sudan and Iraq | Tuesday, June 26, 2018 | 9:30 am – 11:00 am | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
From Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s influence in the Iraqi elections to the involvement of religious actors in South Sudan’s peace process, the role of religion in conflict zones continues to dominate headlines. Please join field researchers and U.S. Institute of Peace experts on June 26, as they present an approach for mapping the role of religious actors and institutions to better understand their legitimacy and influence in contributing to peace and conflict, exploring findings from three recent mappings from Libya, South Sudan, and Iraq based on work from the field.
The religious landscape of any conflict zone is undergoing constant change, making it difficult for stakeholders to engage and partner with religious actors. This event presents a methodology that relies on local researchers to understand the influence and legitimacy of religious actors and institutions, taking a unique approach to identifying key informants to facilitate trust and accuracy. Researchers who participated in the project in South Sudan and Iraq will be present to answer questions about challenges faced and how they were overcome.
Speakers:
Welcoming remarks: Col. Paul Hughes, Acting Vice President, Center for Applied Conflict Transformation, U.S. Institute of Peace
Introductory remarks: Rev. Susan Hayward, Senior Advisor, Religion & Inclusive Societies, U.S. Institute of Peace
Moderator: Rosarie Tucci, Director, Inclusive Societies, U.S. Institute of Peace
Palwasha Kakar, Senior Program Officer, Libya Project Coordinator, U.S. Institute of Peace
Dr. Jacqueline Wilson, Lead Researcher and South Sudan Project Coordinator, U.S. Institute of Peace
Dr. Ann Wainscott, Lead Researcher and Iraq Project Coordinator, U.S. Institute of Peace
Zainab Qassim, Networks Manager, Sanad for Peacebuilding, U.S. Institute of Peace
Monica Pio, South Sudan Researcher, Forcier Consulting
4. Is There Reason to Hope? – Turkey after the 2018 Elections | Tuesday, June 26, 2018 | 10:00 am – 11:30 am | Project on Middle East Democracy | Register Here
On June 24, Turkish voters will go to the polls to select the first president and parliament to be elected under the constitutional reforms of 2016. With President Recep Tayyip Erdogan poised to assume even greater powers if he wins, these elections have been described as Turkey’s last off-ramp before dictatorship. While some observers remain optimistic about the possibility of a surprise opposition victory, others fear that a contested or stolen vote could end in protests and violence.
With the stakes higher than ever, please join us for an expert panel on Tuesday, June 26, that will discuss the results of Turkey’s elections as well as their implications for the future of Turkish democracy and for the U.S.-Turkish relationship.
Please join the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) and the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) for a panel discussion featuring:
Moderator: Amy Hawthorne, Deputy Director for Research, POMED
Henri Barkey Cohen, Professor of International Relations, Lehigh University; Senior Fellow, Middle East Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
Nicholas Danforth, Senior Analyst, Bipartisan Policy Center
Howard Eissenstat, Associate Professor, St. Lawrence University; POMED Nonresident Senior Fellow
Lisel Hintz, Assistant Professor of International Relations and European Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
Gönül Tol, Founding Director, Center for Turkish Studies, Middle East Institute; Adjunct Professor, George Washington University
5. Impact of Turkish Election Results on Turkish-American Relations | Tuesday, June 26, 2018 | 11:00 am – 12:30 pm | National Press Club, First Amendment Lounge, 529 14th St NW Washington, DC 20045 | Turkish Heritage Organization | Register Here
Turkey’s snap Presidential and Parliamentary elections take place on June 24, and the outcome will shape the future of Turkey for years to come. How will these elections impact Turkey’s foreign policy toward the United States?
Please join THO on June 26 for a timely discussion on the results of the Turkish Elections. Our distinguished experts will provide insight on how the election will impact U.S.-Turkey relations. ***A light lunch will be provided for all guests***
Speakers:
Moderator: Melike Ayan, Bloomberg TV
Peter Van Praagh, President, Halifax International Security Forum
Defne Sadiklar-Arslan, Executive Director, Atlantic Council Turkey ( via Skype from Istanbul)
Luke Coffey, Director of Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy, The Heritage Foundation
Paul McCarthy, Deputy Director of Europe, International Republican Institute
6. Who won Turkey? Implications from Erdoğan’s Snap Elections | Wednesday, June 27, 2018 | 10:30 am – 12 pm | Brookings Institution | Register Here
Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has called snap presidential and parliamentary elections for June 24. Following the failed coup attempt in July 2016, the constitutional referendum in April 2017 that approved a more powerful executive presidency, and recent economic turbulence, Turkish politics have become increasingly volatile. Recent polls suggest it is likely that Erdoğan will win the presidency in a run-off, but his Justice and Development Party (AKP) will lose its majority in parliament. What would be the domestic, economic, and foreign policy implications of such a mixed result? And what would a renewed mandate for Erdoğan mean for Turkey’s democracy, economy, and relations with the United States and Europe?
To address the outcome of the elections and its wide-ranging implications, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings will convene an expert panel on Wednesday, June 27. The panel will feature Ali Çarkoğlu, professor in political science at Koç University; Charles Johnston, BIAC executive board vice chair and managing director of international government affairs at Citi; Amanda Sloat, Robert Bosch senior fellow at Brookings; and Kemal Kirişci, TÜSİAD senior fellow and director of the Turkey Project at Brookings. The discussion will be moderated by Karen DeYoung, associate editor and senior national security correspondent for The Washington Post.
7. Russia in the Middle East: A View from Israel | Wednesday, June 27, 2018 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm | Wilson Center | Register Here
Since Russia entered the Syrian conflict in September 2015, it has positioned itself as a major player in the region. Israel in particular has had to contend with Russia’s presence right across its border. How does Israel perceive Russia’s influence in the region? How does it impact on Israel’s ability to maintain its security interests? The speakers will address these questions and related issues.
Speakers:
Moderator: Matthew Rojansky, Director, Kennan Institute
Major General (Res.) Amos Gilead, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy and Strategy at Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya
Dr. Col. (Res.) Shaul Shay, Director of Research of the Institute for Policy and Strategy at Interdisciplinary Center, Herzilya
Dr. Dmitry Adamsky, Professor, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzilya
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