Grading the stabilization review
I spent some quality time yesterday and today at an interagency unveiling of the US government’s Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR), which has produced “a framework for maximizing the effectiveness of US government efforts to stabilize conflict-affected areas.” As I’ve lived through at least four incarnations of US government efforts to recast its approach in conflict zones, I approach this one with a skeptical edge.
First, the good news: the SAR recognizes up front and explicitly that stabilization is an inherently political enterprise. That’s good, because it’s true. The now official objective is “to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence.” Nothing apolitical about that. Politics is primary, in particular in situations where people have recently been killing each other over the distribution of power. Any move you make, or don’t, has political implications.
The SAR also recognizes that you can put too much money into conflicted environments. This is convenient, since the Trump Administration isn’t going to want to spend much on stabilization, but it too is true. The US government wasted colossal amounts of money in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it flowed rapidly into the pockets of local power brokers and from there to foreign banks, real estate, and other mostly unproductive investments (at least from the perspective of the conflict country in question). The emphasis in the SAR on small projects and building up local capacity is particularly welcome, as is the emphasis on establishing security first. Without it, nothing good can happen.
Beyond this, the SAR reads as if it is walking on egg shells. We need, it says, to “set realistic, analytically-backed political goals” (duh), but then shies away from defining any. It is especially allergic to the “d” (democracy) word. Instead there is a quick cameo appearance of a political objective in a reference to USAID, which is said to define legitimate societal and governing institutions as “inclusive, responsive and accountable to all groups, including minority and marginalized populations.” And how do the Defense and State Department definitions differ, or are they just too chicken to speak out?
That is not just a rhetorical question. The SAR was the brainchild of H.R. McMaster, who has been through enough wars to know that conflict doesn’t end when the guns are silenced. He is gone. John Bolton couldn’t care less. I detected no National Security Council presence whatsoever at the symposium, on the program or in the audience (apologies in advance to any NSC people who were there). In fact, none of the agency principals (Defense, State and AID) spoke, though all were invited. Representation barely rose above the level of deputy assistant secretary, which is the top level populated mainly by professionals.
This makes sense, as the Trump Administration not only wants to limit foreign affairs expenditure, especially for State and AID, but the President (like all his predecessors since 1989) has also eschewed “nation-building.” The SAR is a pretty transparent effort to sneak an important element of that benighted enterprise past the powers that be. It even notes the inevitability of a follow-on effort at peacebuilding and proposes civilian-led stabilization teams for rapid deployment, an updated version of the defunct Civilian Response Corps and Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
The good news is that Congress said to be sympathetic to the SAR. The Hill is also preparing the way for marginally better funding for State and AID, with both Rs and Ds supporting. But no one has broken the bad news to the President: success in killing terrorists in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and elsewhere will be Pyrrhic, unless someone steps up to the need to create those “conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence.” The alternative is a return of Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, one of their many affiliates, or a dictatorship that will come close to their brutality.
So the SAR gets an A for effort, a B+ for content, and an incomplete on likelihood of implementation. That incomplete is a gift.
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Peace Picks – June 25-July 1
1. An Alternative Vision for Israel | Monday, June 25, 2018 | 10:00 am – 11:00 am | Brookings Institution | Register Here
On June 25, the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host Member of Knesset Yair Lapid for an Alan and Jane Batkin International Leaders Forum. M.K. Lapid will join for a public conversation on his vision for Israel’s future. M.K. Lapid, the former finance minister of the State of Israel, will discuss a wide-ranging set of issues confronting Israel today, from its position in the Golan Heights, its strategy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, to the state U.S.-Israel alliance and bipartisan support for Israel in the United States.
A former journalist, television presenter, and author, Lapid founded the centrist Yesh Atid Party in 2012. The party garnered a surprising 19 seats in its first elections, and was the second largest party in the Knesset. Yesh Atid today polls as the main opposition challenger to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party.
Introductory Remarks: John R. Allen, President, The Brookings Institution
Moderator: Tamara Cofman Wittes, Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution
Featured Speaker: Yair Lapid, Chairman – Yesh Atid Party
2. More Than Burden Sharing: Five Objectives for the 2018 NATO Summit | Tuesday, June 26, 2018 | 8:15 am – 9:45 am | Center for New American Security | Register Here
In early-July, NATO will host the first full-length summit at its new headquarters in Brussels. It will also be the first NATO summit for President Donald Trump’s foreign-policy team. President Trump will arrive in Brussels with only one thing on his mind: burden sharing. This is hardly a new concern for an American president, or indeed for many European leaders. Although continuing to push allies to take on a bigger share of the burden is important, the United States should not allow this single issue to eclipse the entire summit agenda. This summit needs to be about more than burden sharing. It is with this in mind that the Center for a New American Security’s Transatlantic Security Program has published its latest report, “More Than Burden Sharing: Five Objectives for the 2018 NATO Summit.”
We cordially invite you to the formal release of this report on Tuesday, June 26 at 8:15 AM at the CNAS office (1152 15th Street NW, Suite 950) as we examine the additional issues that NATO allies should tackle at the Summit including the Black Sea, counter-terrorism, emerging domains of warfare, NATO-EU defense planning, and readiness. This public, on-the-record event will feature opening remarks by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ine Eriksen Søreide. A panel discussion with CNAS experts Julianne Smith and Jim Townsend, along with Ian Brzezinski of the Atlantic Council will follow. The event will be moderated by Professor Rosa Brooks of Georgetown University.
3. Mapping the Role of Religion in Fragile States – Insights from Libya, South Sudan and Iraq | Tuesday, June 26, 2018 | 9:30 am – 11:00 am | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
From Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s influence in the Iraqi elections to the involvement of religious actors in South Sudan’s peace process, the role of religion in conflict zones continues to dominate headlines. Please join field researchers and U.S. Institute of Peace experts on June 26, as they present an approach for mapping the role of religious actors and institutions to better understand their legitimacy and influence in contributing to peace and conflict, exploring findings from three recent mappings from Libya, South Sudan, and Iraq based on work from the field.
The religious landscape of any conflict zone is undergoing constant change, making it difficult for stakeholders to engage and partner with religious actors. This event presents a methodology that relies on local researchers to understand the influence and legitimacy of religious actors and institutions, taking a unique approach to identifying key informants to facilitate trust and accuracy. Researchers who participated in the project in South Sudan and Iraq will be present to answer questions about challenges faced and how they were overcome.
Speakers:
Welcoming remarks: Col. Paul Hughes, Acting Vice President, Center for Applied Conflict Transformation, U.S. Institute of Peace
Introductory remarks: Rev. Susan Hayward, Senior Advisor, Religion & Inclusive Societies, U.S. Institute of Peace
Moderator: Rosarie Tucci, Director, Inclusive Societies, U.S. Institute of Peace
Palwasha Kakar, Senior Program Officer, Libya Project Coordinator, U.S. Institute of Peace
Dr. Jacqueline Wilson, Lead Researcher and South Sudan Project Coordinator, U.S. Institute of Peace
Dr. Ann Wainscott, Lead Researcher and Iraq Project Coordinator, U.S. Institute of Peace
Zainab Qassim, Networks Manager, Sanad for Peacebuilding, U.S. Institute of Peace
Monica Pio, South Sudan Researcher, Forcier Consulting
4. Is There Reason to Hope? – Turkey after the 2018 Elections | Tuesday, June 26, 2018 | 10:00 am – 11:30 am | Project on Middle East Democracy | Register Here
On June 24, Turkish voters will go to the polls to select the first president and parliament to be elected under the constitutional reforms of 2016. With President Recep Tayyip Erdogan poised to assume even greater powers if he wins, these elections have been described as Turkey’s last off-ramp before dictatorship. While some observers remain optimistic about the possibility of a surprise opposition victory, others fear that a contested or stolen vote could end in protests and violence.
With the stakes higher than ever, please join us for an expert panel on Tuesday, June 26, that will discuss the results of Turkey’s elections as well as their implications for the future of Turkish democracy and for the U.S.-Turkish relationship.
Please join the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) and the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) for a panel discussion featuring:
Moderator: Amy Hawthorne, Deputy Director for Research, POMED
Henri Barkey Cohen, Professor of International Relations, Lehigh University; Senior Fellow, Middle East Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
Nicholas Danforth, Senior Analyst, Bipartisan Policy Center
Howard Eissenstat, Associate Professor, St. Lawrence University; POMED Nonresident Senior Fellow
Lisel Hintz, Assistant Professor of International Relations and European Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
Gönül Tol, Founding Director, Center for Turkish Studies, Middle East Institute; Adjunct Professor, George Washington University
5. Impact of Turkish Election Results on Turkish-American Relations | Tuesday, June 26, 2018 | 11:00 am – 12:30 pm | National Press Club, First Amendment Lounge, 529 14th St NW Washington, DC 20045 | Turkish Heritage Organization | Register Here
Turkey’s snap Presidential and Parliamentary elections take place on June 24, and the outcome will shape the future of Turkey for years to come. How will these elections impact Turkey’s foreign policy toward the United States?
Please join THO on June 26 for a timely discussion on the results of the Turkish Elections. Our distinguished experts will provide insight on how the election will impact U.S.-Turkey relations. ***A light lunch will be provided for all guests***
Speakers:
Moderator: Melike Ayan, Bloomberg TV
Peter Van Praagh, President, Halifax International Security Forum
Defne Sadiklar-Arslan, Executive Director, Atlantic Council Turkey ( via Skype from Istanbul)
Luke Coffey, Director of Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy, The Heritage Foundation
Paul McCarthy, Deputy Director of Europe, International Republican Institute
6. Who won Turkey? Implications from Erdoğan’s Snap Elections | Wednesday, June 27, 2018 | 10:30 am – 12 pm | Brookings Institution | Register Here
Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has called snap presidential and parliamentary elections for June 24. Following the failed coup attempt in July 2016, the constitutional referendum in April 2017 that approved a more powerful executive presidency, and recent economic turbulence, Turkish politics have become increasingly volatile. Recent polls suggest it is likely that Erdoğan will win the presidency in a run-off, but his Justice and Development Party (AKP) will lose its majority in parliament. What would be the domestic, economic, and foreign policy implications of such a mixed result? And what would a renewed mandate for Erdoğan mean for Turkey’s democracy, economy, and relations with the United States and Europe?
To address the outcome of the elections and its wide-ranging implications, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings will convene an expert panel on Wednesday, June 27. The panel will feature Ali Çarkoğlu, professor in political science at Koç University; Charles Johnston, BIAC executive board vice chair and managing director of international government affairs at Citi; Amanda Sloat, Robert Bosch senior fellow at Brookings; and Kemal Kirişci, TÜSİAD senior fellow and director of the Turkey Project at Brookings. The discussion will be moderated by Karen DeYoung, associate editor and senior national security correspondent for The Washington Post.
7. Russia in the Middle East: A View from Israel | Wednesday, June 27, 2018 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm | Wilson Center | Register Here
Since Russia entered the Syrian conflict in September 2015, it has positioned itself as a major player in the region. Israel in particular has had to contend with Russia’s presence right across its border. How does Israel perceive Russia’s influence in the region? How does it impact on Israel’s ability to maintain its security interests? The speakers will address these questions and related issues.
Speakers:
Moderator: Matthew Rojansky, Director, Kennan Institute
Major General (Res.) Amos Gilead, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy and Strategy at Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya
Dr. Col. (Res.) Shaul Shay, Director of Research of the Institute for Policy and Strategy at Interdisciplinary Center, Herzilya
Dr. Dmitry Adamsky, Professor, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzilya
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The Levant: from bad to worse
The Wilson Center hosted a panel yesterday entitled “The Middle East: A Region in Chaos?” to discuss the current situation in the Middle East and the U.S. government’s reaction to this situation. Jane Harman, Director, President, and CEO of the Wilson Center, introduced the speakers before the moderator, Michael Yaffe, Vice President, Middle East and Africa at the U.S. Institute of Peace, provided a brief summary of the many developments in the region in 2018. The panel included:
Robin Wright – USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow
Bruce Riedel – Senior Fellow and Director, Brookings Intelligence Project, Brookings Institution
Mona Yacoubian – Senior Advisor, Syria, Middle East and North Africa, U.S. Institute of Peace
Aaron David Miller – Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director, Wilson Center.
This post will focus on the panel’s analysis of recent developments in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the Syrian Conflict. A previous post focused on the Iran/Saudi Arabia dimension.
As the conversation shifted to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Miller painted a bleak picture of future prospects for a two-state solution. At a time when Syria, Iraq, and Egypt – traditional, vocal allies of the Palestinian cause – are projecting less power across the region because of unrest at home, the US-Israel relationship has reached unprecedented strength. This realignment is a central premise of Jared Kushner’s peace plan strategy. Kushner hopes that aligning fully with Israel on previous roadblocks, such as the governance of Jerusalem, will take these issues off the table while heaping pressure on Netanyahu to accept concessions made to the Palestinians. At the same time, Palestinian demoralization with the current state of affairs will push them back to the negotiating table if any unexpected compromises are made. Miller argued that Kushner’s moves will have the opposite effect; Palestinian trust in America to be an honest broker has evaporated over the last six months, leaving them less inclined than ever even to engage with the United States to find a viable two-state solution.
Miller and Yacoubian also highlighted the diminishing US leadership as power vacuums emerge across the region due to the dysfunction of many Arab states. As Trump continues the Obama administration’s hands-off approach to the region, these voids are being filled by Russia, Turkey, Israel, and non-state actors. US aversion to conflict has also allowed Iran to dramatically increase its influence in Syria, leading to direct military engagement between Israel and the Islamic Republic. Yacoubian argued that a possible Israeli airstrike on Iranian positions close to the Syria-Iraq border could mean that more escalation is on the horizon. Paradoxically, continued hostilities could drag the United States into a proxy war between Israel and Iran fought in Syria and Iraq.
On the southern front, the Syrian Arab Army’s ongoing siege of Dera’a and Al-Quneitra provinces could force even more refugees to flee to Jordan. The Hashemite Kingdom is already reeling from the political blowback to tax hikes designed to combat the country’s ailing economy, and another refugee influx would further inflame internal tensions. Yacoubian argued that recent US inaction in Syria suggests that the State Department’s promise for “firm and appropriate measures” in response to cease fire violations in Southern Syria is also bluster, so Jordan is on its own. Yacoubian also revealed that efforts to convince the Kurds to leave Manbij and move east of the Euphrates in northern Syria could easily derail, leading to more violence, while Trump’s desire to quickly withdraw US. troops could leave a power vacuum that ISIS would exploit.
The Bottom Lines: The political situation in the Levant has gone from bad to worse over the last six months. Increased US support of Israel at the expense of Palestinian goodwill appears to have driven them away from the negotiating table completely, at least for now. In Syria, immediate US withdrawal will only lead to further destabilization. While the train has left the station for Trump to intervene in the south to limit further economic and political strain on Jordan, maintaining a presence in the east could prevent a resurgence of ISIS in this sparsely populated, US-controlled region.
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Middle East chaos: the Saudi-Iranian axis
Since the four following panelists last met at the Wilson Center on December 5, 2017 (click here for that event’s summary), turmoil and chaos in the Middle East seem to have only increased in range and intensity. Faced with developments across the region, the Wilson Center hosted a follow-up panel entitled “The Middle East: A Region in Chaos?” to discuss the current situation and the US government reaction. Jane Harman, Director, President, and CEO of the Wilson Center, introduced the speakers before the moderator, Michael Yaffe, Vice President, Middle East and Africa at the U.S. Institute of Peace, provided a brief summary of the many developments in the region in 2018. The panel included:
Robin Wright – USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow
Bruce Riedel – Senior Fellow and Director, Brookings Intelligence Project, Brookings Institution
Mona Yacoubian – Senior Advisor, Syria, Middle East and North Africa, U.S. Institute of Peace
Aaron David Miller – Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director, Wilson Center.
This post will focus on the panel’s analysis of Iran and Saudi Arabia; a following post will consider the topics of Syria and Israel/Palestine.
Wright began by emphasizing how the past six months have seen the worst domestic turmoil in Iran since President Rouhani was elected in 2013. Economically, Iran has been on the defensive, with stubbornly low prices and the Trump Administration’s re-imposed sanctions creating a “vulnerable moment.” Iran has also been on the defensive politically; President Rouhani is failing to fulfill two of his campaign promises – preserve the JCPOA, and improve the economic situation.
Diplomatically, Iran has actually gone on the offensive by campaigning to convince the five other signatories of the JCPOA – France, the UK, Germany, China, and Russia – to uphold the agreement, despite U.S. sanctions for businesses investing in Iran. Militarily, Iran has been surprisingly restrained in the Persian Gulf, with incidents involving the Iranian navy at a record low. Iran has however ramped up its involvement in Syria, especially as a military confrontation with Israel in the south becomes likelier.
Wright concluded by speculating that the Trump Administration may be quietly pushing for regime change in Iran, although the prospect of such change is dim. While President Trump won 46% of the votes in an election with a 56% voter turnout, President Rouhani and his government were elected with 57% in an election with a 73% voter turnout. He thus commands a broad swath of popular support, despite the protests. The current system will be difficult to displace, especially by a hostile power such as the United States.
Riedel noted that in recent times, Saudi foreign policy has been characterized by recklessness, unpredictability, impulsiveness, and capriciousness, in a manner unprecedented in Saudi history. The best example of this is the civil war in Yemen, which King Salman and his son, Muhammad bin Salman (MbS), expected to be quick and painless. It has now dragged on for more than three years with no end in sight. It may now be reaching a more decisive stage with the ongoing battle for the port of Hodeida. Current Saudi recklessness is also evident in its blockade – or, as Riedel put it, the “siege” – of Qatar.
In the past six months, however, Riedel sees a trend away from recklessness and interventionism. The April 2018 Jerusalem Summit and the June 2018 Mecca Summit put King Salman at the center-stage at the expense of MbS, who seems to be getting sidelined as Saudi Arabia returns to a more risk-averse, conservative style of foreign policy.
As for the US, Riedel noted that while Saudi Arabia is happier dealing with the Trump Administration than with Obama’s, the Kingdom seems to pay little heed to American interests and advice – especially when it comes to the Qatar blockade, which the U.S. sees as playing into the hands of the Iranians. Riedel concluded by calling the legalization of women driving in Saudi Arabia a big deal, although the accompanying repression of female activists shows that there is no room for political dissent in the government’s Vision 2030 program.
The Bottom Line – the most interesting contrast between these two panelists was the way in which they qualified current Saudi-Iranian tensions. Riedel saw them as being based in sectarianism, with political tensions the way in which this sectarianism manifests itself, while Wright instead tried to avoid the usual “tribalist trap” by reminding the audience that there is more to Saudi-Iranian disputes than the Shi’a-Sunni divide. As traditional regional powerhouses – Egypt, Syria, Iraq – lose influence in the region, Saudi-Iranian relations will become one of the main determinants of Middle Eastern politics for years to come.
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Chemical weapons: how and who
The deployment of chemical weapons in Homs, Syria by the Assad regime in late 2012 ended a 20-year freeze on state employment of chemical weapons. Since then, the use of these weapons of mass destruction has exploded, with over 200 attacks reported in Syria alone, in addition to incidents in Iraq, Malaysia, and the United Kingdom.
One week before the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OCPW) meets to discuss multilateral methods to enforce accountability for users of chemical weapons, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) convened a group of chemical weapons experts to share their ideas for enforcing accountability for users of chemical weapons. Ahmet Üzümcü, Director-General of the OCPW, gave the keynote address before a panel moderated by Rebecca Hersman, Director of the Project on Nuclear Issues at CSIS, discussed the issue of chemical weapons proliferation. The panel included:
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance
Samantha Job, Counsellor for Foreign and Security Policy, British Embassy Washington
Nicolas Roche, Director of Strategic, Security and Disarmament Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Üzümcü detailed the successes of his tenure as OPCW Director-General, which included the elimination of 96 percent of declared chemical weapons stockpiles worldwide. He also delved into the challenges the OPCW faces in the coming years, emphasizing that increased chemical weapon attacks in Syria and elsewhere call for heightened international coordination to reinforce nonproliferation. However, Russia’s enabling attitude towards Syria’s chemical weapons use has actually eroded this norm. In recent years, Russia has vetoed UN Security Council resolutions to condemn Assad’s actions. Putin has also led a defamation campaign against the OPCW’s investigation methods. In the face of this challenge to the OPCW and its mission, the Director-General advocated for member states to give the organization the power to conduct investigations to identify the perpetrators of chemical weapons attacks.
Roche focused on France’s desire to combat chemical weapons use by strengthening multilateral institutions. He stressed the importance of international partnerships for information gathering and sharing, as well as the need for a stronger OPCW with the power to identify perpetrators of chemical weapons violence. In what could be seen as a slight to both the US and Russian behavior vis-a-vis international institutions over the last year, Roche emphasized that a multilateral regime for addressing the attribution gap in chemical weapons investigations is a greater good. France will move forward with multilateralism in combating the chemical weapons threat, regardless of who is on board.
Poblete agreed that multilateralism should be at the forefront of the fight against chemical weapons proliferation, but argued that bilateral negotiations between states should also play a role. International approaches fail when compromise becomes the enemy of the good. Poblete defended president Trump’s bilateral strategy with North Korea, repeating multiple times that the administration was well-informed going into the Kim summit. Trump’s failure to mention Kim’s chemical weapons program in the buildup or the aftermath of the meeting in no way indicated that dismantling North Korean stockpiles was off the table.
Job took the point about the need for multilateralism a step further, focusing on the critical role OPCW plays in strengthening the international norm against chemical weapons proliferation. Job emphasized the need to combat Russia’s attacks on the legitimacy of the Chemical Weapons Convention’s regulatory body, arguing that member countries should appoint permanent representatives to the OPCW to accomplish this goal. OPCW also needs increased funding to face the threat of chemical weapons attacks by non-state actors. Like Roche, Job also explicitly endorsed giving the OPCW the power to fill the attribution gap that currently exists in the prosecution of chemical weapons crimes.
Bottom Line: The international community is currently at a crossroads when it comes to dealing with the rejuvenated threat of chemical weapons attacks. Our European allies have already decided on the way forward: multilateralism. The United States is still welcome at the international negotiation table, but like with the JCPOA, France and other European powers will not capitulate to the US preference for bilateralism. The United States must present a united front with its allies on the chemical weapons issue, both for the sake of nonproliferation and for prevention of further erosion of American credibility in the current international framework.
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Less heat, more light
@JonEHecht tweeted yesterday:
Kelly: We need to do it for security, but the kids will be fine, don’t worry.
Trump: We’re only doing this cause Democrats made us do it.
Sessions: The Bible told us to do it.
Miller: Hell yeah we’re doing it.
Nielsen: We’re not doing it! Fake news!
The Administration has dug a deep hole for itself since early spring by separating “unlawful” immigrant children from their parents. It appears to be doing this not only for people who cross the border illegally, but also for those who present themselves to border officials seeking asylum, claiming a well-founded fear of persecution if they return to their homelands. The above justifications, while not quotes, are reflections of what different Administration officials have said to justify a policy most of the US views as inhumane and unjustified, even if a Republican plurality supports it.
The underlying political purpose is all to clear: President Trump is using the separation and detention of children as leverage to get Congress to pass an immigration bill that is consonant with his priorities: funding for the border wall, an end to family reunification (he calls that “chain migration,” aka what his wife did to get her parents into the US), and replacement of the visa lottery (which ensures diverse immigrants) with a new system of “merit-based” (i.e. as white as possible) immigration. These changes are unlikely to pass before the November election, but if they don’t the Administration will use immigration issues to mobilize turnout of its increasingly loyal base.
There is room for lots of debate on immigration, which has always been a sensitive issue in the US and elsewhere. But it is important to distinguish between those who come illegally into the US and those who come seeking refuge, either as refugees or asylum-seekers. Neither are unlawful immigrants: they are people seeking to avail themselves of humanitarian provisions in US and international law. There are also remarkably few of them who make it to the US. This year we may not take in more than half the 45,000 refugees that the Administration has set as a ceiling. This is a small fraction of the about 1 million legal immigrants to US admits yearly.
I know a number of Syrian asylum seekers who have been here for years. While their cases have not yet been adjudicated, let there be no doubt: each of them would be at risk if forced to return to Bashar al Assad’s Syria. The defected diplomats and the leaders of early non-violent demonstrations for democracy in Syria would be obvious targets for persecution. The day may come when they can return, but only to a Syria where democracy and rule of law have replaced the brutality of a cruel and unforgiving personal dictatorship. There is no sign of that on the horizon.
In the meanwhile, my Syrian friends and many others who are admitted as refugees or seek asylum in the US are benefiting our country enormously: they help us all to understand what is going on abroad, they work hard to support their families once they get work permits, they pay their taxes, and they enrich our cultural and social life. They are people trying to survive a period of exile that will surely last longer than they would like, but that redounds to our benefit.
The bigger immigration issue concerns people who cross the border illegally, often for economic reasons. I understand people who worry about that, but the number of unauthorized people living in the US has declined since the beginning of the Obama Administration (which coincided with the depths of the financial-crisis induced recession). And they are not responsible for a disproportionate share of crimes, which are committed more often by those born in the US. To talk of them as “infesting” the US, as the President did today, is an effort to mobilize the Republican base, not an effort to encourage a reasonable approach to a difficult issue. Immigration needs less heat and more light.
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