Giving away the store for a photo op
President Trump today agreed to suspend US military exercises with South Korea during negotiations with the North and to provide Pyongyang with unspecified security guarantees in exchange for an equally vague commitment to denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. He and Kim Jong-un also got their photo op, which featured a stunning array of American and Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea flags.
The quid pro quo is clear: the US will be guaranteeing the permanence of one of the most brutal dictatorships on earth and reducing its commitment to its South Korean allies in exchange for some still-to-be-determined constraints on North Korean missile and nuclear weapons capabilities. The joint statement contains no reference at all to human rights issues or North Korean abductions, though it does refer to repatriation of the remains of prisoners of war and those missing in action from the Korean War. All you need to know about this deal is what the Republicans would be saying if President Obama had negotiated it.
Kim also got a lot from the photo op, which portrayed him as the equal of the President of the United States. The handshake was a de facto acknowledgement of North Korea’s nuclear power status, legitimizing both the regime and its acquisition of nuclear weapons. It will strengthen Kim both at home and abroad. Trump has no problem with that: he seems to relish relations with dictators and disdain democrats.
Trump will also benefit from the photo op, though less than Kim. He’ll use it to assert effectiveness in foreign policy, an arena in which the Administration has had absolutely no success and a number of significant failures, not the least at the G7 meeting in Quebec last weekend. The Atlantic alliance is a shambles, relations with European and Pacific allies and trading partners have been upended, and Russia continues its occupation of part of Ukraine as well as its marauding in Syria. America is more alone in the world, and less able to exert its will, than it has been in decades.
I don’t expect Trump’s supporters to understand or acknowledge this. Their enthusiasm for Trump is unconditional. I do hope that others can see through the photo op to what it really amounts to: Trump has given away the store in exchange for very little. He is a lousy negotiator. He put himself in the unenviable position of having no alternative to this premature and ill-advised meeting. The only hope left is that now some serious American negotiators will get busy making lemonade out of Trump’s lemons.
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Peace picks, June 11 – June 17
- Avoiding Nuclear War – A Discussion with the Mayor of Hiroshima | Monday, June 11| 10:00 am – 11:30 am | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here
Nuclear war remains the top man-made threat to global stability and the dramatic diplomacy around North Korea’s nuclear program highlights the challenge of averting it. Cities are mobilizing to counter this threat, including Hiroshima—a city which has already borne the brunt of nuclear conflict.
Join Carnegie for a discussion with the mayor of Hiroshima, Kazumi Matsui. Mayor Matsui will describe what the people of Hiroshima and other cities are doing to reduce risks of nuclear war. An expert discussion on diplomatic progress with North Korea and broader disarmament issues will follow, with Mayor Matsui commenting from the perspective of a municipal government. Panel also includes Jon Wolfsthal (Director, Nuclear Crisis Group) and James L. Schoff (Senior Fellow, Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
- Shaping a New Balance of Power in the Middle East: Regional Actors, Global Powers, and Middle East Strategy | Tuesday, June 12 | 9:00 am – 3:00 pm | Johns Hopkins SAIS | Register Here
The Gulf and the Middle East are suffering a paroxysm of conflict involving virtually all the regional states as well as the US and Russia and many different non-state actors. What dynamics are driving this chaos? What can be done to contain or reverse the damage? How might a new balance of power emerge? Conference schedule and speakers:
9-9:30: Registration
9:30-9:45: Opening Remarks
- Ezzedine Abdelmoula, Manager of Research, Aljazeera Centre for Studies, Aljazeera Media Network
9:30-11:00: Dynamics of Political Geography in the Middle East
- Chair: Daniel Serwer, Director, SAIS Conflict Management Program
- Ross Harrison, Non-resident Senior FellowMiddle East Institute
- Kadir Ustun, Executive Director, SETA Foundation
- Khalid al Jaber, Gulf International Forum
- Suzanne Maloney, Deputy Director, Foreign Policy Program and Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy and Energy Security and Climate Initiative, Brookings Institution
11:00-11:15: Coffee Break
11:15-12:45: Non-State Actors and Shadow Politics
- Chair: Paul Salem, Senior Vice President for Policy Research & Programs, Middle East Institute
- Randa Slim, Director of Conflict Resolution and Track II Dialogues Program, Middle East Institute; Fellow, SAIS Foreign Policy Institute
- Fatima Abo Alasrar, Senior Analyst, Arabia Foundation
- Crispin Smith, Harvard Law School
- Anouar Boukhars, Non-Resident Scholar, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Associate Professor of International Relations, McDaniel College
12:45-1:30: Lunch
1:30-3:00: New Balance of Power
- Chair: Mohammed Cherkaoui, Aljazeera Centre for Studies, and George Mason University
- Jamal Khashoggi, independent writer
- Terrence Hopmann, Professor of International Relations, SAIS, Conflict Management Program
- Camille Pecastaing, SAIS, Middle East Studies
- Hussein Ibish, Senior Resident Scholar, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
- Denuclearization or Deterrence? Evaluating Next Steps on North Korea | Tuesday, June 11 | 11:00 am – 12:30 pm | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here
Negotiations to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program remain highly uncertain. While diplomacy plays out, the United States and its allies in Asia will continue strengthening their deterrence capabilities to hedge against future threatening North Korean behavior. Yet, these actions could further exacerbate tensions in East Asia.
Please join the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for an expert panel discussion on denuclearization diplomacy, the potential Trump-Kim summit, and Plan B options to deter North Korean coercive behavior. At the event, Carnegie will release a new report, “Security Spillover: Regional Implications of Evolving Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula.” Panel includes Chung Min Lee (Nonresident Senior Fellow, Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Narushige Michisita (executive advisor to the president and director of the Security and International Studies Program, Strategic Studies Program, and Maritime Safety and Security Policy Program at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo), Tony Zhao (Fellow, Nuclear Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), and Toby Dalton (Co-director, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
- The Trump Administration’s Post-JCPOA Iran Policy | Wednesday, June 12 | 10:30 am – 12:00 pm | The SETA Foundation at Washington DC | Register Here
On May 8, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Iranian nuclear accord crafted by his predecessor. The withdrawal came after efforts by US allies in Europe to keep the US in the deal, and suggests division between the US and some of its closest partners in the years to come.
In a recent speech at the Heritage Foundation in Washington DC, Mike Pompeo, Trump’s newly appointed Secretary of State and a well-known critic of the Iran deal, declared that the Trump administration will take steps to punish the Iranian regime for regional aggression and impose stiff financial penalties. However, Pompeo also suggested that the administration is open to a new deal that addresses what it sees as the JCPOA’s failings. Under the guidance of Secretary of State Pompeo and Trump’s new national security advisor John Bolton, the Trump administration seems to be charting a much more confrontational policy towards Iran.
Please join the SETA Foundation at Washington DC for an insightful discussion with our panel of experts on this major turning point in US foreign policy as we discuss what it means for US relations with its allies in Europe and the Middle East and what US-Iranian interactions may look like moving forward. Panel includes Hussein Ibish (Senior Resident Scholar, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington), Reza Marashi (Research Director, National Iranian American Council), Sigurd Neubauer (Middle East Analyst and Columnist), Barbara Slavin (Director, Future of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council), and Randa Slim (Director of Conflict Resolution and Track II Dialogues Program, Middle East Institute). Moderated by Kilic B. Kanat (Research Director, SETA Foundation at Washington DC).
- Raising the Curtain on the 2018 NATO Brussels Summit | Wednesday, June 13 | 2:00 pm – 5:30 pm | Atlantic Council | Register Here
One month ahead of the July meeting, this event will serve as a primer for the Summit, highlighting many of the top issues on the Alliance’s agenda. The discussions will focus on priorities for strengthening collective defense and deterrence in Northern Europe and beyond, including US proposals to improve capabilities, readiness, and decision-making. The conference will also explore the Alliance’s broader agenda on the road to Brussels, including the way forward for NATO’s southern flank and what the Alliance must do to address terrorism, hybrid threats, and capacity-building in the region.
Convening senior officials, military leaders, top experts, business executives, and media from across the Euro-Atlantic policy community, the conference will provide a unique platform to discuss critical issues for the NATO alliance at a time when the threats have never been more pressing. Speakers include H.E. Raimundas Karoblis (Minister of National Defense, Republic of Lithuania), Dr. Richard Hooker (Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia, US National Security Council), Hon. Michael Turner (OH-10), (Head of the US Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and Member, US House of Representatives), Gen. Frank Gorenc, USAF (Ret.), (Fmr. Commander, US Air Forces in Europe and Africa and NATO Allied Air Command), Amb. Alexander Vershbow (Fmr. Deputy Secretary-General, NATO and Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council), Laura Rosenberger (Director and Senior Fellow, Alliance for Securing Democracy, German Marshall Fund), and Dr. Fabrizio Luciolli (President, Atlantic Treaty Association and President, Italian Atlantic Committee).
- America, Russia, and Vladimir Putin: Russian Opposition Perspectives | Thursday, June 14 | 2:30 pm – 4:00 pm | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register Here
As of May 7, Vladimir Putin has begun his fourth term as the President of the Russian Federation. The next six years seem poised to be pivotal, with U.S. foreign policy in flux, the world responding, and Russia redefining its roles and responsibilities. Yet, one trend that continues unabated is a downward spiral in tensions between Moscow and Washington. Many western experts see Putin himself as the reason for problems past and present. What, then, does his continued rule mean for U.S. Russian relations, and how might each country adjust its policies to better further domestic, foreign policy, and security goals? Join us in this conversation with past Russian government and opposition leaders regarding what Moscow and Washington can do, and what they are likely to. This event is organized in cooperation with the Institute of Modern Russia (IMR). Panel includes Andrei Kozyrev (Fmr. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation from 1991-1996), Vitali Shkliarov (Russian Political Strategist, Fmr. Senior Campaign Advisor to Ksenia Sobchak), Vladimir Kara-Murza (Vice Chairman, Open Russia and Fmr. Deputy Leader of the People’s Freedom Party), and Olga Oliker (Senior Adviser and Director, Russia and Eurasia Program).
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Atlantic alliance shattered, Pacific next stop
Having trashed the G7 summit in Quebec, President Trump is now getting ready to meet with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un on Tuesday. Last week President Trump said
I don’t think I have to prepare very much. It’s about attitude.
He might be right, because he has defined down the goals of the summit:
I think it’s going to be a process. But the relationships are building, and that’s a very positive thing…a beginning and a getting-to-know-you meeting-plus.
While Secretary of Defense Mattis is still declaring the American goal to be “compete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization” (CVID in the trade), the President has retreated from achieving that. Under cover of the furor caused by his temporary cancellation of the meeting, he has lowered the bar. Now he is even saying he’ll know within a minute whether the summit will be successful.
CVID is not going to happen. Kim Jong-un is not giving up his nukes or his missiles, though he may limit the number of the former and the range of the latter. He’ll want in return not just relief from sanctions but also withdrawal of at least some American forces from South Korea. There is simply no better guarantee of his regime than holding on to a limited number of nukes and missiles, which ensure no invasion and no US effort at regime change.
The question is whether those possible limits can simultaneously satisfy the US, South Korea, and Japan. It doesn’t look likely. South Korea and Japan aren’t interested in limiting the range of the missiles, since that decouples their security from the US: the US will feel safe but they won’t. Nor will they be interested in US withdrawal from South Korea, since the American forces there provide a vital tripwire to ensure that the US is prepared to intervene with force if the South is invaded.
There is no way such difficult issues can or should be resolved in a meeting where Seoul and Tokyo are absent. The best Trump can do is to initiate a negotiation that will likely take years to complete. The outcome cannot be nearly as satisfactory as the Iran nuclear deal, which set back Tehran from nuclear weapons and included a permanent commitment to the international safeguards required to prevent any future nuclear weapons program. North Korea is going to remain a nuclear power with significant missile capabilities.
The worst Trump can do is sell out our South Korean and Japanese allies by agreeing to withdraw US troops from Korea and accept Pyongyang’s nuclear status. This cannot be entirely ruled out. The man is desperate for a win and cares not a whit about allies. He admires dictators and likes to break crockery. Kim Jong-un has so far played him like a fiddle. Trump might well be vulnerable to flattery and the prospect of the Nobel Prize the Norwegians will never give him. They are not as dumb as he is.
Trump did serious damage to the Atlantic alliance in the past couple of days. Let’s hope he doesn’t repeat the disaster in the Pacific.
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The 7 – 1 reality sitcom
That’s what is meeting in Quebec today. The odd one out at the G7 is the United States, which has managed to unite Canada, the UK, Germany, France, Italy and Japan in a display of pique against President Trump’s trade policy. That’s what you get for using spurious national security arguments to raise tariffs on steel and aluminum rather than pursuing your complaints through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and withdrawing from a nuclear deal with Iran that the other 6 view as vital to their security.
The vodka will be flowing in Moscow, which will be delighted to hear its Shanghai Cooperation Organization (that’s China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) compared favorably with the more venerable, more powerful, and in the past more effective G7. President Putin is getting his money’s worth: Trump is dismantling Washington’s relationship with its friends and allies in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, dramatically weakening the West and providing openings for Moscow and Beijing to fill the vacuums. Trump has even called for Russia to be invited back into the G7 (which for a time was the G8). If you find that hard to believe, watch it:
Trump is also claiming this morning that Iran has moderated its behavior due to his withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal:
They’re no longer looking so much to what’s going on in Syria, what’s going on in Yemen and lots of other places. They’re a much different country over the last three months.
This is completely untrue. Iran has done nothing to withdraw or lessen its involvement in Syria, Yemen, and other places. It is not only the same country over the last three months, it is getting ready to start up a plant to produce advanced centrifuges for uranium enrichment.
And the President is vaunting his meeting next week with Kim Jong-un:
Obama, Schumer and Pelosi did NOTHING about North Korea, and now weak on Crime, High Tax Schumer is telling me what to do at the Summit the Dems could never set up. Schumer failed with North Korea and Iran, we don’t need his advice!
No Democratic president ever wanted to concede a summit with the North Korean dictator without getting something in return up front. Trump has done so, to no noticeable benefit to the US so far. Nor is there any sign he will get anything tangible in Singapore, though you can bet on his vaunting a fantastic triumph.
The simple fact is that Trump is finding it a lot easier to offend America’s friends and allies than to get anything from our adversaries, who recognize that he is a bullshitter who flogs flim-flam. It would all be laughable–a kind of reality sit-com–if it weren’t real. The G7-1 is however unified and represents an economy larger than that of the US. Trump may prefer a light-on-substance summit with Kim Jong-un, and he may want to falsely claim that Iran has moderated its behavior, but neither our friends nor our adversaries will be fooled. The only fool in this reality sit-com resides in the White House.
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Shaping a New Middle East Balance of Power
The Conflict Management Program and the Aljazeera Centre for Studies
are pleased to invite you to
Shaping a New Balance of Power in the Middle East:
Regional Actors, Global Powers, and Middle East Strategy
Tuesday June 12, 2018 9:00 AM – 3:00 PM
1740 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20036
Kenney Auditorium
Register
The Gulf and the Middle East are suffering a paroxysm of conflict involving virtually all the regional states as well as the US and Russia and many different non-state actors. What dynamics are driving this chaos? What can be done to contain or reverse the damage? How might a new balance of power emerge?
9-9:30: Registration
9:30-9:45: Opening Remarks
Ø Ezzedine Abdelmoula, Manager of Research, Aljazeera Centre for Studies, Aljazeera Media Network
9:30-11:00: Dynamics of Political Geography in the Middle East
Ø Chair: Daniel Serwer, Director, SAIS Conflict Management Program
Ø Ross Harrison, Non-resident Senior Fellow Middle East Institute
Ø Kadir Ustun, Executive Director, SETA Foundation
Ø Khalid al Jaber, Gulf International Forum
Ø Suzanne Maloney, Deputy Director, Foreign Policy Program and Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy and Energy Security and Climate Initiative, Brookings Institution
11:00-11:15: Coffee Break
11:15-12:45: Non-State Actors and Shadow Politics
Ø Chair: Paul Salem, Senior Vice President for Policy Research & Programs, Middle East Institute
Ø Randa Slim, Director of Conflict Resolution and Track II Dialogues Program, Middle East Institute; Fellow, SAIS Foreign Policy Institute
Ø Fatima Abo Alasrar, Senior Analyst, Arabia Foundation
Ø Crispin Smith, Harvard Law School
Ø Anouar Boukhars, Non-Resident Scholar, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Associate Professor of International Relations, McDaniel College
12:45-1:30: Lunch
1:30-3:00: New Balance of Power
Ø Chair: Mohammed Cherkaoui, Aljazeera Centre for Studies, and George Mason University
Ø Jamal Khashoggi, independent writer
Ø P. Terrence Hopmann, Professor of International Relations, SAIS, Conflict Management Program
Ø Camille Pecastaing, SAIS, Middle East Studies
Ø Hussein Ibish, Senior Resident Scholar, Arab Gulf States Institution in Washington
Tuesday June 12, 2018 9:00 AM – 3:00 PM
1740 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20036
Kenney Auditorium
photo ID will be checked at the door
For disability accommodations, please contact saisevents@jhu.edu or 202-999-3332 at least one week prior to the event.
Have questions about Shaping a New Balance of Power in the Middle East: Regional Actors, Global Powers, and Middle East Strategy? Contact SAIS Conflict Management Program
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Tea leaves won’t say who won
In a post last month, I attempted to forecast the outcome of Iraq’s May 12 parliamentary elections. With the final count in, what do the results reveal?
- Will Abadi win a majority?
No – Far from first place, Abadi’s coalition landed in an embarrassing third, beaten both by populist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and militia leader Hadi al-Ameri. This puts Abadi’s future as prime minister in question, but it doesn’t necessarily mean he’s done for. Abadi can count himself lucky, in fact, that electoral victory went to the only coalition without an obvious pick for prime minister. Abadi’s likely path forward will be to ally with Sadr and parlay his international reputation to win a high position, possibly the prime ministry, in a Sadrist-aligned government.
- Will Maliki be eclipsed by Ameri?
Yes – With Ameri winning nearly twice the number of seats, Maliki comes out of this election greatly diminished. Much like Abadi, Maliki’s political future depends on his ability to build alliances with stronger figures in order to remain relevant, although Maliki’s divisive reputation gives him far fewer avenues to explore.
- Will Hakim and Sadr’s rebranding pay dividends?
Emphatically yes – Sadr’s victory, however narrow, also means a victory for his strategy of cross-sectarian anti-corruption populism. While Hakim’s seventh-place showing hasn’t won him the same attention as Sadr, his new party can claim a small victory in winning more seats (19) than Hakim’s former associates in ISCI and Badr combined.
- Is this the debut of a Kurdish opposition?
No, with qualifications – With a paltry 9 seats between them, this election marks a massively disappointing debut for the upstart Nishtiman alliance. So disappointing, in fact, that multiple Kurdish parties have called the results of the election into question. While tangible evidence is scarce, six out of seven major Kurdish parties (all but for the PUK) have called for a recount of votes in Kurdish-majority areas, particularly those controlled by the PUK.
- Is the PUK done for?
No, with qualifications – With a loss of only 3 seats since previous elections, the PUK appears to have emerged unscathed from its recent crisis. This steady appearance is undermined, however, by allegations of vote rigging targeting the PUK strongholds in particular. While these allegations have been mostly vague on specific claims, charges have been widespread enough that the they may force the PUK to respond. Much depends on the next few weeks, but it appears for now that the PUK remains strong.
- Will small parties earn enough to gain influence?
Unclear – While Sadr’s coalition has achieved an undisputed victory, it is far from overwhelming. Sadr’s low numbers (54 of a total 329 seats) mean he could still be outmaneuvered by his rivals in negotiations to form a government. See Ameri and Maliki’s meeting with delegates from the KDP and PUK – an alliance between these four groups would corral an impressive 162 seats (only 3 seats short of an absolute majority). Smaller parties – that is, those with fewer than 10 seats – make up 19.5% of parliament. Their support may become valuable but it hardly seems decisive at this point.
- Was turnout down?
Emphatically yes – With a measured turnout of 44.5%, this election had the lowest turnout of any Iraq has seen. Anecdotal evidence suggests that voters stayed home not due to lack of interest, but due to skepticism that voting will bring change. Notably, this depressed turnout is clearest in Shiite-majority regions – the voting rate in the capital in particular dropping by over 30%. More than sectarian discontent, disenchantment with politics seems to have spread across Iraqi society.
- Was violence down?
Emphatically yes – The near-complete absence of violence around May 12’s vote may be the most important underreported fact around Iraq’s elections. It’s even telling how unsurprising this fact is. While many voters stayed home, it was not fear that kept them away from the ballot box. Whatever Abadi’s political future, history will mark the successful handling of these elections as another point to his legacy.
- Will there be accusations of fraud?
Yes, with qualifications – As mentioned above, fraud allegations have spread among Kurdish parties. While Iraq’s High Elections Commission has responded to various reports of electoral violations across the country, it has expressed confidence in the general results. Though parliament has been discussing the matter, the IHEC’s statements suggest they believe the impact of fraud was minor. Whether this will settle distrust in the Kurdistan region, which is due for regional elections this September, we can only wait to see.
With elections now over, the real trial begins. Iraq’s newly-elected parliament now begins the arduous process of government formation, where party leaders jostle for influence in the new body. How long until a government emerges is anyone’s guess – much like the May’s elections, the sensible approach is to expect the unexpected.
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