What to do about the Balkans
The European Union at the Thessaloniki Summit of 2003 affirmed its most powerful tool of democratization: enlargement. The Balkans had often been viewed until then as a ‘dark hole’ of Europe. The EU hoped that conditionality would pull the war-ravaged landscapes of the Western Balkans closer to the liberal democracies of its members states and ensure regional stability.
Fifteen years later and $20 billion from the European Union and $4 billion from the United States (excluding military aid), the post-Yugoslav countries of the Balkans have arguably created legal frameworks that resemble the liberal democracies, and there has been no war. Yet the region remains a space where endemic corruption and stagnation rule.
May 17 another EU-Western Balkans Summit took place in Sofia, Bulgaria, bringing together heads of state or government from EU member states and leaders from the 6 Western Balkans partners: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. President of the European Council Donald Tusk announced that
the European Union is and will remain the most reliable partner of the entire Western Balkans. And in very concrete terms we discussed how to improve connections with and within the Western Balkans region.
Tusk underlined the EU’s “connectivity agenda” for the region and clarified that this is “
neither an alternative, nor substitute for enlargement. It is a way to use the time between today and tomorrow more effectively than before, so that our citizens and businesses are not waiting for the benefits of EU integration. Because I don’t see any other future for the Western Balkans other than the EU. There is no other alternative, there is no Plan B.
This reiteration calmed fears among local population and politicians that the EU was backtracking on its enlargement commitment.
On the same day, the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies hosted a discussion titled “The Transatlantic Alliance and the Western Balkans: Regional Challenges and Options for a Common EU-US Response.” The panel included:
- Lord Paddy Ashdown, Member of the House of Lord and former High Representative and EU Special Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Marsaili Fraser, Former Head of the Political Department of the EU Special Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina
- James O’Brien, Vice Chair of Albright Stronebridge Group (ASG) and Former Special Presidential Envoy for the Balkans
- Majda Ruge, Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins SAIS
The panelists discussed the current state of play in the Western Balkans and offered recommendations for a common EU and US response.
Ruge reiterated the challenges currently haunting the region arising from the tension between the EU agenda and political realities on the ground. The socio-political landscape in the Balkans 15 years after the Thessaloniki summit includes unresolved conflicts and bilateral issues, complex and muddled jurisdictions (as seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Northern Kosovo), irredentism (recent flirtations with the idea of changing borders and secession in Bosnia), and backsliding on crucial democratic institutions and norms.
Ruge stressed as well the effects of Middle East instability on the Balkans and the EU. In 2015, the flow of refugees reached unprecedented levels since WWII, with 764,038 border crossings through the Balkans route into the EU.
There are also successes in the region. Ruge cited the new government in Macedonia as building bridges rather than relying on divisive rhetoric, as well as Albania’s commitment to enhance the rule of law in line with EU standards by setting up internationally-supervised vetting procedures for the appointment of judges and prosecutors.
Ashdown stated that despite the transatlantic engagement in the region manifested through billions of dollars in aid and expertise, the Western Balkan states cannot operate at a level of functionality that would make them welcome EU members. Nor can they deliver to their citizens the benefits that justify loyalty to the state. The EU and the US have failed. Corruption remains endemic in the region, “as deeply embedded as when I went there in 2002 and not much has changed.”
Among the few successes, Ashdown listed the absence of war, and in some cases states that have shuffled a bit closer to the standards that would allow them to be members of EU. But overall, the Balkans pretend to reform, and the international community pretends to believe them.
Ashdown reminded his audience that you cannot save the maiden if you are not prepared to kill the dragon. The dragon we keep on failing to identify and slay is the dysfunctionality of the states. Brussels and Washington should sync their efforts and always act in a united fashion and employ muscular conditionality. The EU and the US should have a regional policy (and not different enlargement packages for each country) as a way to exploit regional linkages.
O’Brien spoke on US engagement in the region, emphasizing that Washington has a short-term focus on bigger wins, for example over the last year the Macedonia name issue and the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. These are efforts to put out fires and achieve outcomes within the 1-2 year lifespan of a deputy assistant secretary. O’Brien would prefer the US focus on institutions that allow for political competition and rotation of power as well as reach out to parts of society that do not feel represented.
Fraser believes that the prospect of membership is still necessary (although it may not be sufficient) to stabilize the region. Enlargement remains the EU’s most effective foreign policy tool. However, the enlargement process that happened in the countries of Eastern Europe should not be copy-pasted to the Balkans. The EU should be mindful that political elites were crucial to the process and were conforming to EU standards before being asked to do so.
In the Balkans, the most glaring problem is lack of political will. Political elites are reluctant to undertake difficult reforms that undermine their own interests. Nonetheless, enlargement can still drive progress in the region. The EU should get better at selling the benefits of membership not only to political elites but also to the general population of the Balkans. Furthermore, the EU should get better at naming-and-shaming politicians who are not implementing EU reform policies.
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Peace picks, May 21 – 27
- After ISIS, Will Iraq’s Elections be the Next Step to Stability? | Monday, May 21| 2:00 pm – 3:00 pm | US Institute of Peace | Register Here
On May 12, Iraqis go to the polls to elect members of a new national parliament. This is the fourth election since the fall of Saddam Hussein, but the first since the military rollback of the Islamic State-declared caliphate. The country’s new leaders will be faced with the challenge of rebuilding, stabilizing, and healing their country as the United States and the West continue to decrease their military presence.
Join us on May 21 for a provocative town hall debate with foreign policy experts Kenneth Pollack, from the American Enterprise Institute, the National Defense University’s Denise Natali, and USIP’s Sarhang Hamasaeed, moderated by Joshua Johnson of the public radio program 1A. The discussion will focus on how Iraq’s leaders can overcome years of sectarian violence and find unity, as well as what a future alliance with the West may look like.
- North Korea and the Fine Print of a Deal: A View from Congress | Tuesday, May 22 | 9:00 am – 10:00 am | US Institute of Peace | Register Here
The United States is engaged in high-stakes negotiations with North Korea over its nuclear program as the White House prepares for the summit between President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un. But nuclear capabilities and missiles are not the only items on the negotiating table. An eventual settlement could include some difficult concessions and require significant oversight and legislative action on the part of Congress. In addition to a potential restructuring of U.S. forces in South Korea, a grand bargain could result in a range of due-outs for Congress, from sanctions relief and economic incentives to multilateral political arrangements.
Two Members of Congress and military veterans, Representative Ted Lieu (D-CA) and Representative Steve Russell (R-OK), will examine the importance of this ongoing diplomatic effort, possible outcomes of negotiations, and the role they hope Congress plays in the coming months at USIP’s third Bipartisan Congressional Dialogue on May 22.
- What Lies Ahead for Afghanistan: The Various Scenarios | Tuesday, May 22 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm | The Middle East Institute | Register Here
The way forward in Afghanistan seems as unclear as it has ever been. An outright military victory against the Taliban and other insurgent groups appears to be unachievable. The prospect of insurgents overrunning the country soon appears similarly unlikely. At the same time, a negotiated peace seems presently improbable. At least on terms outlined by the Kabul government and international community, the Taliban shows little interest in reconciliation. The long-term commitment of the United States and its coalition partners to an indefinite military presence and financial support cannot be taken for granted.
After nearly 17 years of fighting and state building in Afghanistan, we are still asking how conflict ends and what the endgame for Afghanistan looks like.
To discuss possible scenarios, the Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host an expert panel. MEI’s Director of Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies, Marvin G. Weinbaum, will moderate the discussion with Javid Ahmad, a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center; Courtney Cooper, an international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Seth Jones, director of the Transnational Threats Project and a senior adviser for the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic International Studies.
- The Implications of the US Embassy Move to Jerusalem | Tuesday, May 22 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm | The SETA Foundation at Washington DC | Register Here
On Monday, May 14, 2018, the US officially opened its embassy to Israel in Jerusalem. The move, which had been delayed by Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama, was announced by President Donald J. Trump on February 23. While Trump’s announcement was welcomed by Israel, it was condemned by Palestinian leaders and other US allies in the Middle East.
Please join the SETA Foundation at Washington DC on May 22 for a timely discussion on what the move of the US embassy in Israel to Jerusalem means for future US policy in the region, how US allies and adversaries will react to the move, and what it means for the Israel-Palestine peace process. Panel includes Geoffrey Aronson (President, The Mortons Group), Lara Friedman (President, Foundation for Middle East Peace), Ghaith al-Omari (Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute), Kadir Ustun (Executive Director, The SETA Foundation at Washington DC). Moderated by Kilic B. Kanat (Research Director, The SETA Foundation at Washington DC).
- Can Power-sharing Arrangements Deliver Peace? | Thursday, May 24 | 10:00 am – 12:00 pm | US Institute of Peace | Register Here
Power-sharing arrangements are often touted as a means to address conflict between two parties. But practitioners and policymakers alike agree that the foundation for such arrangements requires considerable strategy and planning, including articulating clear objectives and expectations. Under what conditions do power-sharing arrangements work? What are the key ingredients to help unity governments succeed? Do power-sharing arrangements build political trust by delivering to citizens?
Join the U.S. Institute of Peace for a discussion exploring these critical questions. By exploring recent research in the Philippines, the panel will consider the effects a power-sharing peace agreement has on citizens’ trust in the national government, helping policymakers better understand how to build political trust in the aftermath of intrastate conflict. Panel includes Rosarie Tucci (Director, Inclusive Societies, US Institute of Peace), Susan Stigant (Director, Africa Programs, US Institute of Peace), Caroline Hartzell (Professor, Political Science Department, Gettysburg College), Matthew Hoddie (Associate Professor, Towson University), and Joseph Eyerman (Director, Center for Security, Defense and Safety, Research Triangle Institute International).
- America First, Europe alone? | Thursday, May 24 | 2:00 – 3:30 pm | Brookings Institution | Register Here
For the first 16 months of the Trump administration, European governments have sought to work closely with the United States, rather than opposing it publicly. However, differences over the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris Climate Accord, trade, and the nature of sovereignty have led some observers to predict the end of the Atlantic alliance. On May 24, the Brookings Institution will convene an expert panel to discuss the trajectory of trans-Atlantic relations; whether the allies can bridge the gaps that divide them; how important Europe, and particularly the European Union, is to the Trump administration; and whether European states can and will fend for themselves.
The discussion will feature Brookings’s Robert Bosch Senior Fellows Amanda Sloat and Constanze Stelzenmüller, and Kenneth R. Weinstein, president and CEO of Hudson Institute. Edward Luce, Washington columnist and commentator for the Financial Times, will moderate the discussion.
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Up a creek without a paddle
A Wilson Center panel yesterday considered recent developments with Iran, particularly Trump’s groundbreaking decision to exit the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, aka Iran nuclear deal). With the Wilson Center’s Aaron David Miller as moderator, panel members Michael Singh of the Washington Institute, Tamara Coffman Wittes of the Brookings Institution, Robert Litwak of the Wilson Center, and Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations discussed the JCPOA, the American departure from it, and future prospects.
Singh argued that Trump’s decision had both political and substantive roots. The President decided to use a problematic model of “maximum pressure” to create a new Iran deal. Where there was once convergence with foreign allies and partners on the way forward with Iran, with diplomatic efforts creating a multilateral sanctions campaign, there is now divergence, which makes Trump’s strategy of “maximum pressure” harder to implement.
Next steps, Singh believes, should include:
1. Heal the rift with European allies and reach a US-E3 agreement, at least an agreed roadmap on the way forward.
2. Nest the withdrawal from the JCPOA in a more comprehensive Iran strategy, as sanctions alone are not enough.
There is no real Administration strategy on Iran, Singh suggested. It talks tough but is reluctant to get dragged into the Middle East. Iran is a revisionist state and the only way to confront it is with commitment to the Middle East and the use of every policy tool.
Wittes understands Trump’s JCPOA decision as based on a desire to fulfill campaign promises and cater to domestic policy and interests. But it was reckless. Iranian influence, opportunities, and gains since 2011 have expanded as they compete with Sunni states and Israel for power. This unfortunately comes at a time of US pullback from the Middle East, which troubles US allies concerned more about Iran’s regional behavior than nuclear weapons, and a turn of foreign policy focus towards Asia. Wittes does not see how a new US-Iran agreement can happen. She does believe, however, that in the current Israel-Iran standoff, both sides are sending careful and calibrated messages as neither side seeks escalation, although it could still happen.
Litwak thinks the exit from the JCPOA is a departure from the US grand strategy of exerting power via international institutions. The US, not Iran, is being seen as the foreign policy issue and outlier state. America First is turning into America Alone. The JCPOA had a transactional, not transformational, basis as it sought to constrain Iran’s nuclear program, which has existed for over 40 years. Without the JCPOA, it is harder to address other Iran issues. The re-imposition of US sanctions could lead to a trade war with Europe should it take a defiant stance. It also strengthens Iranian hardliners and opens the door for Iran to leave the deal and restart its nuclear program. The exit from JCPOA could make it more difficult to negotiate a nuclear deal with North Korea. Trump’s transformational goal for a new Iran deal is over-reach. Litwak believes the US should be more pragmatic.
Takeyh anticipates that the US and Iran will eventually return to negotiations, considering the dearth of unofficial dialogues with Iran. The JCPOA was seriously flawed, especially the sunset clauses. A new deal with Iran must be permanent, a treaty approved in the Senate with minority party support. Ultimately, arms control will need to be an aspect of Iran policy, not the totality of it.
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North Korea bites back
Here, via @JChengWSJ, is North Korea’s statement on the prospective Summit between Presidents Trump and Kim:
This tirade is aimed not at Trump but at Bolton, who over the weekend cited the “Libya model,” by which he seems to have meant the access Qaddafi provided to his nuclear and chemical weapons programs when he committed to abandoning them. But of course the North Koreans remember what happened to Qaddafi thereafter. They are trying to signal to Trump that his hawkish National Security Adviser is not with the program, which has to include Kim Jong-un’s survival, hoping that Trump will throw “regime change” Bolton under the bus.
Bolton may be what provoked Pyongyang’s ire, but the statement is clear enough on other issues: it rejects the standard American versions of what “denuclearization”means as well as the notion that North Korea can be bought off with economic benefits, an idea Secretary of State Pompeo has been touting. It essentially says that Washington needs to end its belligerence towards North Korea, possibly by removing troops from South Korea as well as signing a peace treaty formally ending the Korean war, without clarifying precisely what Pyongyang is prepared to provide in return, but the implication is some sort of limit on, but not abandonment of, its nuclear weapon and missile programs. The zero option is out, the North Koreans are saying.
This is far short of what the US has wanted, and far short of what it had achieved in the Iran nuclear deal that Washington has abrogated. The North Korean statement, however, was made only in the name of a vice minister of foreign affairs, which is far from the top of the hierarchy. There is certainly the possibility that Kim will be more forthcoming at a summit.
But I wouldn’t bet on it. Just the fact of the Rocket Man/Dotard Summit is an enormous “get” for North Korea, as it puts Kim on an equal footing with the US President, confirming the North Korean leader’s legitimacy both domestically and internationally.
Kim needs a successful summit only if he needs sanctions relief. That is not yet clear. A lot depends on whether China and Russia are prepared to keep tightening the screws. Their annoyance with US withdrawal from the Iran deal, Moscow’s peeve at US sanctions, and Beijing’s concern about bilateral trade issues will all factor in to their willingness to continue the united front against North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.
Trump and Bolton are nowhere near Kim’s diplomatic league. Their skills were honed on Fox TV, where they rarely face any opposition. They are used to saying what they feel like and having everyone nod yes. Kim knows how to bite back.
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The peril ahead
The US was never an honest broker in the Israel/Palestine conflict. Its roles were to push Israel into a process it didn’t want and guarantee an outcome neither side would otherwise trust. Washington abandoned those roles when it moved its embassy to Jerusalem, rewarding Israeli intransigence and failing in any way to compensate the Palestinians, even with a cost-free hint of a possible future capital in East Jerusalem.
Without the US fulfilling its responsibilities, the dominant party is now wrecking havoc with impunity. There is no legitimate excuse for firing on unarmed civilians. I might prefer that the Palestinians at the Gaza fence not throw stones, burn tires, fly kites adorned with swastikas, or try to breach the fence, but their doing so in no way justifies Israeli snipers responding with live rounds. Blaming the resulting deaths on Hamas for inciting the Palestinians, as the State Department has done, ignores a much more serious crime: the use of deadly force against civilians. No doubt Hamas will benefit politically from Israel’s mistake.
My eldest aunt, Rose Halperin, is buried in East Jerusalem, on the Mount of Olives. She had been a president of Hadassah. My mother worked on a kibbutz in Israel in the early 1930s. She spoke decent Hebrew and tried her best to teach me and my reluctant classmates in Sunday school, without much success. She and her elder brother were both avid supporters of Israel.
But they were also advocates of Jewish/Arab understanding, because they understood that ultimately there would be no security for Israel or for the Jews who live there without it. Givat Haviva, Wahat as Salaam/Neve Shalom, the Israel/Palestine Journal and other organizations devoted to improving communication between the two main populations of Israel and Palestine all survive today on fumes, but they survive because they are necessary.
I am all too familiar with ethnic territoriality, from my many decades working on the Balkans. Precious as “the land” is to Jews, they survived for at least two millennia outside the Holy Land. Had they attempted to remain there without migrating at all, no doubt they would have suffered the same fate as the Canaanites, Midianites, and other long-forgotten Biblical peoples. They were saved not because of their attachment to the land but because of their willingness to leave it.
Israel thus represents a sharp departure from the successful Jewish survival techniques of the past. After 70 years of defending itself, it is a strong state with strong security forces and a strong Jewish national identity. But what it is doing now is not wise, sustainable, or equitable. The Torah tells us 36 times (more often than any other injunction) to treat the stranger who lives among us like one of us. No one who visits the West Bank or Gaza could conclude that commandment is being fulfilled. Even within Israel proper, Arabs do not enjoy equal treatment.
American Jews enjoy a country where their rights are equal–no longer just in theory but also for the most part in fact–with those of the majority. Most like that system and hold tight to liberal democratic ideals. They want to see equal rights in Israel as well as the United States. A relatively few like Sheldon Adelson and David Friedman are committed to something dramatically different: an Israel that occupies the entire West Bank and pays no heed to the rights of Palestinians. They want to chase as many Palestinians away as they can and keep those who remain in second-class status, lacking political and economic rights.
This is not an Israel many American Jews can support. I’m not sure about my Zionist aunt, but I am certain my Hebrew-speaking mother would have been disgusted, as I am, by the unilateral move of the US Embassy to Jerusalem and the performance of the Israeli security forces on the Gaza border. There will be a price to pay for this departure from Jewish and American values. Israelis need to open their eyes to the very real peril that lies ahead.
Here is the CGTN appearance I did May 14:
- John Sitilides is a global risk analyst and a consultant to the U.S. State Department.
- Nour Odeh is the former spokesperson for the Palestinian Authority.
- Yossi Mekelberg is a senior research fellow with Chatham House.
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Stop griping
Marija Jovicevic at the Montenegrin daily Pobjeda asked some questions. I answered:
- New elected president of Montenegro Mr. Đukanović said that he will work on better relations with Moscow. Can we expect improvement of relations because Mr. Putin congratulated victory to Mr. Đukanović for presidential elections and said that relations between two countries should be better? How do You read this messages? Does anything at all depend on Montenegro?
A: There is no harm in principle for a NATO member to seek good relations with Moscow, but it depends on what terms. I think President Djukanovic has demonstrated his fortitude in resisting Moscow’s worst behavior, which included a murder/coup attempt. If he can now improve relations with Moscow while remaining faithful to EU and NATO concerns, all to the better. I might doubt it can be done, but it is worth a try.
2. Representatives of non-governmental organizations wrote letter to European commission that Brussels should stop negotiations with Montenegro because we not do enough in the fields of judicial reforms .Do You think that it is a work of non-governmental organizations or they should help government in the process of European integrations?
A: Insisting on judicial reform will help with the process of European integration, and civil society should be free to do as it sees fit, within legal limits. Writing a letter to Brussels is certainly within those limits. Civil society may also want to help, but it is not the government’s handmaiden.
- EU and western Balkans will host a big summit in Sofia on 17 May. Do you expect any big steps in this partnership? Do You think that big summits are not enough that EU needs to do more for Western Balkans?
A: I think the Western Balkan countries need to do more for themselves. They’ve been offered a date for new accessions to the EU, which is also prepared to help them meet the requirements of the acquis. It’s time to stop griping and start performing.
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