Not enough to make a difference

My piece on the US/French/British attack on Syria’s chemical weapons plants is up on The National Interest, three days after I submitted it and without significant changes, but authors aren’t supposed to complain about such things. My only regret is that I didn’t get a chance to insert a few words about ways in which the attack could conceivably shift the political terrain, both internationally and within the US. I am grateful to an unnamed Syrian friend for inspiring this post.

Internationally, the attack in principle could send a strong signal to the Russians that they no longer have completely free reign in Syria. Three permanent members of the UN Security Council are prepared to act without its authorization. The Americans, Brits and French also managed either to evade Russian countermeasures or to convince the Russians not to use them. Of course President Trump undermined the strong signal when he backed off the Russia sanctions his Administration was recommending.

The attack also suggested that those within the Administration who want US troops to stay are gaining ground. There is no real connection between the troop presence in eastern Syria and the attack, but if we care enough to send 105 missiles against Assad presumably we also care enough not to withdraw the troops without something in return. Trump is also the joker in that pack, since he could of course just summarily withdraw, apparently hoping that some Arab force will materialize to do the hard work of stabilization and reconstruction. Fat chance of that.

So I’m afraid even with these political shifts, if in fact they have occurred, the likelihood of any further intervention in Syria is small. The Russians will continue their air assault on Syrian opposition-controlled areas. Assad will either abstain from chemical use for a while or test us by starting small and building up to larger attacks. He has gotten away with it for years–it is even possible the Douma attack was not supposed to kill so many people. I don’t see any sign Trump is ready to attack again unless something big happens.

The Russians meanwhile are delaying the arrival of the inspectors from the Organisation for the Prevention of Chemical Warfare (OPCW) at the attack site, hoping to clean it up thoroughly so that there will forever be some doubt in some people’s minds that a chemical attack even took place. The OPCW in any event doesn’t determine who was responsible for the attack, only whether the chemicals were used. So Assad and Putin can continue to claim that the rebels did it. Why they always use the chemicals against themselves and never against their Syrian, Iranian or Russian enemies doesn’t bother those who are pleased to hear the Russian denials.

So I stick with my main point: Trump did just enough not to be accused of failing to defend his red line, but not enough to make any real difference in Syria’s wars.

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Pragmatism, not ideals

The United States and France look back on a steadfast relationship. Providing support during the American War of Independence, France became the first ally of the nascent United States in 1778. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the Franco-American relationship was strong, despite minor tensions during World War II and the presidency of Charles de Gaulle. In the early 2000s, disagreements over the Iraq War cooled down relations, but cooperation between both states has flourished again in the last decade. However, Donald Trump’s election victory in 2016 and the President’s confrontational rhetoric towards Europe raises questions whether this positive trend will continue.

On April 12, the Atlantic Council hosted a panel discussing the implications of the upcoming state visit of French President Emmanuel Macron to Washington in mid-April. H.E. Gérard Araud, Ambassador of France in the United States, and Pierre-Andre Imbert, Social Policy Advisor to President Macron, offered their perspective along with Frances Burwell, Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council, and Atlantic Council Senior Fellow Jeff Lightfoot, whose recent publication “The French-American Alliance in an America-First Era” provides a broad overview of the current state of US-French relations. Damon Wilson, Executive Vice President at the Atlantic Council, delivered an introductory statement and Susan Glasser, staff writer at the The New Yorker, moderated the discussion.

 

President Macron has been able to establish a fruitful working relationship with President Trump, according to Ambassador Gérard Araud. As the other European heavyweights Great Britain and Germany have been preoccupied with internal problems during the past year, Macron was able to position France as the primary European interlocutor for the United States after coming to office in May 2017.

Both Washington and Paris are pragmatic. President Macron has decided that France needs to maintain a good working relationship with whoever is in power in Washington. The US administration respects Frances’s international engagement, particularly in combating terrorism in the Sahel and the Levant. Disagreements exist—for instance on the nuclear deal with Iran and trade policies—but are not fundamental. Both Presidents acknowledge each other’s position and remain invested in addressing common challenges with joint forces. The United States and France share similar interests and values and must thus solve global problems together, stresses Araud. The Franco-American relationship will remain strong in spite of Trump’s aggressive foreign policy rhetoric.

Jeff Lightfoot highlights that the French public opinion of Trump is very low and Macron could easily define himself in opposition to the US president. If Trump decides to snub Europe, for instance by revoking the Iran nuclear agreement or imposing tariffs, Macron’s popularity might suffer. Yet Araud argues that the French are able to differentiate between Trump’s personality and the need to maintain a good working relationship with any US president. The ongoing positive dialogue indicates that there exist no fundamental disagreement The problem is rather the US press, which is using Macon against Trump. We should not expect any spectacular outcomes from the state visit.

Whether Macron will be able to maintain his role as Europe’s spokesman largely depends on the outcome of his domestic agenda. Pierre-Andre Imbert underlines that Macron is pursuing fundamental reforms in France. His successes in both the presidential and parliamentary elections have transformed the country’s political landscape. Now the president seeks to utilize his standing to deliver on his promises to prepare France for the future. The overall goal is sustainable, inclusive growth. To achieve this, fundamental reforms—for instance of the labor market— are needed.

Frances Burwell also stresses that the French president needs to maintain his strong domestic standing to be able to both shape the European Union and maintain his role as the primary European interlocutor for the United States. So far, Macron has pushed through his economic reforms with relentless effort. Even though domestic opposition is currently mounting, he still has time to reap the fruits of his policies ahead of the next elections schedule for 2022.

In the meantime, France will continue play a central role in global affairs, says Araud. On the micro level, Paris will in particular seek to revive the international dialogue on Syria to initiate a political transition in the country. Only by doing so, can Syrian be stabilized and vital threats like terrorism and mass migration tackled. On the macro level, Macron will address the crumbling of the Western-dominated world order and seek to reform the current system. The United States remain a crucial partner in taking up this challenge.

In a period of global turmoil, the United States and France depend on strong bilateral relations. Both Presidents are aware of the need for cooperation. In spite of Trump’s antagonistic rhetoric and other gloomy signs, we can expect this bilateral transatlantic relationship to remain strong.

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Peace picks, April 16 – 22

  1. Colombia Peace Forum: Elections & Peace Processes in Colombia | Monday, April 16 | 9:30am – 11:30am | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |

While threats of violence marred recent legislative campaigns in Colombia, the March 11 election was Colombia’s most peaceful in decades. Although the FARC’s new political party underperformed, its comprehensive demobilization was palpable and the National Liberation Army (ELN), the country’s second-largest rebel group, respected a temporary unilateral ceasefire. For the first time in 50 years, ballots were cast freely throughout the country and not a single incident of violence was recorded. With the composition of Colombia’s next Congress set, jockeying and coalition-building among the main candidates is fully underway ahead of the May 27 presidential polls. The outcome will have important implications for the precarious implementation of the 2016 FARC peace accord. Join the U.S. Institute of Peace for a discussion on security and protection throughout the electoral process, analysis of the impact the outcome may have on the implementation of the FARC peace agreement, and the implications for the ongoing process with the ELN. Featuring Alejandra Barrios (Director, Electoral Observation Mission), Juanita Goebertus (Colombian Congresswoman and Former Member of the Government Peace Delegation with the FARC), Mark Schneider (Senior Advisor, CSIS), Jonas Claes (Senior Program Officer, Preventing Election Violence, USIP), and Steve Hege (Senior Program Officer, Security & Justice, USIP) as moderator.

This event will be webcast live.

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  1. Hidden Wounds: Trauma and Civilians in the Syrian Conflict | Monday, April 16 | 1:30pm – 3:00pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |

Seven years of conflict in Syria have exacted an enormous human toll and led to widespread physical destruction. The psychological impact of the war, although less visible, has been just as devastating. The levels of trauma and distress impacting Syrian civilians, especially children have been staggering with nearly 500,000 killed, half the population displaced and more than 13 million Syrians in need of humanitarian assistance. The traumatic impact of the Syrian conflict is less often acknowledged, but could significantly impair the ability of Syrian civilians to recover and build a more peaceful future. Syrian doctors and humanitarian relief experts have increasingly engaged on this issue and are developing new and innovative approaches to help address and heal these invisible wounds. Please join USIP and specialists from the Syrian American Medical Society, the U.S. State Department and Save the Children for a panel discussion, addressing an aspect of the Syrian conflict that often receives less attention than it deserves. Featuring Catherine Bou-Maroun (Foreign Affairs Officer, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, DoS), Dr. Mohamed Khaled Hamza (Mental Health Committee Chair & Foundation Board Member, Syrian American Medical Society), Amy Richmond (Director, Child Protection in Emergencies, Save the Children), and Mona Yacoubian (Senior Advisor, Syria, the Middle East and North Africa, USIP) as moderator. With opening remarks by Nancy Lindborg (President, USIP).

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  1. US-Europe Cooperation and The China Challenge | Tuesday, April 17 | 10:30am – 12:00pm | The Heritage Foundation | Register here |

The U.S. and nations of Europe are allies across a range of issues that have kept much of the world free, secure and growing in prosperity for decades since the end of World War II. Is there a future for greater such cooperation in the Indo-Pacific – particularly in the face of challenges presented by China? In areas like international trade and investment, China presents American and European capitals a dilemma. It brings capital to the table, but capital laden with state ownership and support that distorts the global economic environment, sometimes to the detriment of domestic concerns. Politically, Beijing models a system of governance that runs contrary to centuries of Western political tradition, while its growing clout gives comfort to some of the world’s most repressive regimes. And in some areas, like international maritime law, Beijing threatens to overturn standards that have underpinned not only the region’s peace and prosperity, but its own. How can the U.S. and Europe promote their common values in the face of these challenges? What is the balance between cooperation with China and opposition to the negative byproducts of its rise, and can the U.S. and Europe agree on that balance? Featuring Theresa Fallon (Director, Center for Russia Europe Asia Studies), Philippe Le Corre (Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, HKS), Jamie Fly (Senior Fellow & Director, Future of Geopolitics & Asia Programs, GMF), and Walter Lohman (Director, Asian Studies Center, Heritage Foundation) as moderator.

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  1. Democracies Under Duress: Are We Losing Central Europe? | Tuesday, April 17 | 11:00am – 12:00pm | CSIS | Register here |

Central Europe’s reintegration with the West and its commitment to democracy and the rule of law were signature foreign policy achievements in the post-Cold War era for the United States. Increasingly, European and U.S. policymakers question whether Central Europe is really committed to democratic values and principles. Corruption, nativism, anti-Semitism, and weak institutions and civil society contribute to the drift of some NATO and EU members in Central Europe toward illiberalism. Join CSIS for a timely conversation on what policy tools Washington and Brussels can use to address democratic backsliding in Central Europe. Featuring Dr. Charles Gati (Senior Research Professor of European and Eurasian Studies, Johns Hopkins SAIS), David Frum (Senior Editor, The Atlantic), Radek Sikorski (Distinguished Statesman, CSIS), and Heather A. Conley (Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic & Director, Europe Program, CSIS).

This event will be webcast live.

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  1. Countering Russian Kleptocracy | Tuesday, April 17 | 11:00am – 12:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |

Kleptocratic regimes use corruption and as a means of control at home and a weapon of influence abroad. Russian oligarchs and other Kremlin agents have become adept at exploiting the global financial system to launder illicit funds and convert them into new forms of power projection, including attacks on Western democratic institutions. The Kremlin’s attempts to influence elections have exposed a series of systemic vulnerabilities in the United States, whose national security now requires a sustained response. Hudson Institute’s new report, Countering Russian Kleptocracy, outlines policy that, if implemented, would provide a comprehensive and effective strategy to counter Moscow’s aims. Featuring Charles Davidson (Executive Director, Kleptocracy Initiative, Hudson Institute), Clay Fuller (Jeane Kirkpatrick Fellow, AEI), Jeffrey Gedmin (Senior Fellow, Georgetown University), Ben Judah (Research Fellow, Kleptocracy Initiative, Hudson Institute), and Nate Sibley (Program Manager, Kleptocracy Initiative, Hudson Institute).

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  1. Sustaining Growth in Africa: Economic Diversification, Job Creation, and Infrastructure Financing | Tuesday, April 17 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Brookings Institution | Register here |

Improved economic and political governance, together with a favorable global external environment, over the past two decades or so, have set the foundation for Africa’s economic prosperity. Most economies across Africa responded with resilience to the 2014 commodity price shock, and the recovery is gaining momentum. However, obstacles, including jobless growth and increasing debt, loom in the distance. In its 2018 “African Economic Outlook,” the African Development Bank assesses these challenges and provides some policy recommendations, including economic diversification, development of labor-absorbing sectors, as well as investments in human capital, and in industries with high payoffs. It also recommends a focus on smart and catalytic debt management and infrastructure development. In particular, policymakers should consider institutional, regulatory and project-level challenges to infrastructure development and prioritize sectors and access given large infrastructure financing needs of $130-$170 billion, almost double the long-accepted estimate of $93 billion a year. Featuring Bongi Kunene (Executive Director, The World Bank), Alan Gelb (Senior Fellow and Director of Studies, Center for Global Development), Jeffrey Gutman (Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development), Louise Fox (Chief Economist, USAID), and Brahima Sangafowa Coulibaly (Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development & Director, Africa Growth Initiative, Brookings Institution) as moderator. With introductory remarks by Charles O. Boamah (Senior Vice President, AfDB), and a presentation by Abebe Shimeles (Manager, Macroeconomic Division, AfDB).

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  1. Politics and Policy of East Asia’s Economic Future | Thursday, April 19 | 1:90pm – 4:00pm | Wilson Center | Register here |

The Trans-Pacific Partnership is the most recent, and a highly ambitious, step along a familiar road of international economic liberalization and integration through multilateral trade-plus pacts.  It promised to deepen and extend openness through commitments on trade in goods and services, investment, harmonization of national regulation on a wide range of economics-related matters labor and the environment, and robust protections for intellectual property and processes for transnational dispute resolution.

Panel 1: After the U.S. TPP “Opt-Out” 1:00 PM to 2:15 PM

Shortly after taking office, President Trump announced that the U.S. would be opting out of the TPP. Although less prominent in the U.S. and elsewhere in the West, domestic political pressures and policies favoring greater protectionism have been on the rise in some East Asian states as well. At the same time, the China-centered alternative to the once-U.S.-led TPP—the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership—persists.  And the remaining members of the TPP have determined to go forward without the United States.  All of this has been occurring against the backdrop of the WTO’s fading as a force for global economic liberalization. What do these developments portend for economic relations within East Asia and U.S. economic relations with the region? Featuring Inu Manak (Visiting Scholar, Cato Institute), Derek Scissors (Resident Scholar, AEI; Chief Economist, China Beige Book), Bruce Hirsh (Principal and Founder, Tailwind Global Strategies), and Jacques deLisle (Director, Asia Program, FPRI; Professor of Law and Political Science and Deputy Director, Center for the Study of Contemporary China, University of Pennsylvania) as moderator.

Panel 2: Looking to the Future 2:30 PM to 3:45 PM

The politics of international economic policy have created much uncertainty.  But this is far from the only, or potentially the most disruptive, force in play.  Technological transformation, the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” and kindred developments pose additional challenges and impetuses for change.  These shifts are potentially especially significant in East Asia. The region is home to many of the world’s most dynamic economies, has long been a hub of technological innovation, and now faces the consequences of China’s ambitious agenda to create an “innovation economy.”  What do these trends and possible future developments portend for economies in East Asia? Featuring Eleonore Pauwels (Director of the Anticipatory Intelligence (AI ) Lab, Science and Technology Innovation Program, Wilson Center), Samm Sacks (Senior Fellow, Technology Policy Program, CSIS), Robert Atkinson (Founder and President, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation), and Shihoko Goto (Senior Northeast Asia Associate, Asia Program, Wilson Center) as moderator.

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  1. China’s Growing Influence in the Indian Ocean: Implications for the U.S. and Its Regional Allies | Friday, April 12 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |

For a long time, the Indian Ocean was considered a secondary concern with less strategic value than other parts of the region. This view is rapidly changing, driven in large part by China’s entry into the Indian Ocean. Recently, China signed an almost century-long lease of Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, demonstrating its interest in establishing a long-term presence in the region. China is already deploying warships in the Indian Ocean and playing a more active role in regional conflicts. The Hudson Institute is delighted to host a panel to discuss the growing strategic relevance of the Indian Ocean and the implications for the U.S. and its regional allies. Featuring Toshi Yoshihara (Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments), Asanga Abeyagoonasekera (Director General, Institute of National Security Studies of Sri Lanka, Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence), Aparna Pande (Research Fellow and Director, Initiative on the Future of India and South Asia, Hudson Institute), Satoru Nagao (Visiting Fellow, Hudson Institute), and Jonas Parello-Plesner (Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute) as moderator.

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Delay can be good

Yesterday’s bravado has given way to today’s hesitation. President Trump tweeted this morning:

Never said when an attack on Syria would take place. Could be very soon or not so soon at all!

This kind of inconsistency creates confusion and uncertainty that can undermine US standing in the world and even contribute to crisis escalation. Flip-flops are no better in diplomacy than they are in domestic politics. In addition, the delay has given the Syrian government time to park its aircraft and other assets close by the Russians, whom the Americans will not want to hit.

But this particular delay could still be a good thing, if it gives Washington time to do three things:

  • Assemble unequivocal evidence that Syrian President Assad was responsible for the chemical attack last week on Douma;
  • Plan a serious combined military and diplomatic campaign to end at least the use of chemical weapons in Syria, if not the war itself;
  • Rally domestic as well as international support for that combined campaign.

I don’t see much sign that the US is working on any of these things, but it should.* This post is about what Washington should be doing now, before any military action.

First is to gather the evidence. Intelligence doesn’t flow instantaneously. Materials often have to be translated and analyzed, not the least for veracity. Many countries may have collected against Syrian targets. To put together an unclassified version of the evidence against the Syrian government, cleared by all those agencies and governments that have contributed something, takes time and concentration.

That material should then be presented publicly, first and foremost to the Congress. Members on both sides of the aisle are nervous about allowing the President to act without at least Congressional consultation, if not approval. They fear another exclusively presidential decision, like last year’s cruise missile attack on the Syrian base that had launched a sarin attack, would set an undesirable precedent for military action against North Korea and Iran. Some in Congress are also loathe to do anything that will get the US more involved in Syria, as the President has also been. Americans are not keen on taking on more responsibility for that devastated country.

Evidence against Bashar al Assad also needs to be presented internationally, both in classified and unclassified formats. France and the UK are thought to be considering participation in military action. Others, like Germany and Saudi Arabia, have good reason to be sympathetic with the US even if they are reluctant to participate. Russia de facto controls Syrian air defenses, which have mostly stood idly by while the US and especially Israel flies at will over and near Syria. If Moscow can be convinced to continue to hold its fire, Assad will be more chastened. It is not only cruise missiles that send a message.

A one-off strike, tightly targeted on those who launched the chemical attack on Douma, will do no more this year than last year. Assad is fighting not only to hold on to power, but also for his life. Only the prospect of a broad, sustained military campaign against his capabilities will affect his calculations about using chemical weapons, which are important to him because he is short of manpower after 7 years of war. The Administration needs to be asking whether targeting the presidential palace (with or without a warning) or the Syrian Air Force intelligence facilities that plan chemical attacks would send a stronger message than targeting just runways and aircraft.

The Administration also needs to consider what happens if Russians or Iranians or their proxies are killed, intentionally or unintentionally. Does the US have the capability to respond to escalation? Would it want to do so? Is it prepared for what Russia might do in Ukraine, the Baltics or the Balkans? Does it have the capability to respond to what Iran and its proxies might do in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, or even inside the US?

The Syrian conflict has widened from non-violent protests against autocracy to a civil war and now to a geopolitical contest between some of the most powerful states on earth. It behooves the US to think carefully about the many diplomatic, political, and military consequences that may follow from military action. Once it has carefully chosen a course of action, it needs to assemble as much support as possible and move decisively, not only in Syria but also defensively worldwide.

*Curt Mills at The National Interest attributes the hesitation to domestic, rightwing pressure. I suspect he is correct.

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Rattled now, unglued next

Donald Trump this morning tweeted:

Russia vows to shoot down any and all missiles fired at Syria. Get ready Russia, because they will be coming, nice and new and “smart!” You shouldn’t be partners with a Gas Killing Animal who kills his people and enjoys it!

Mara Liasson on NPR nails just how dumb and inconsistent this bravado is: it gives the Russians ample notice (something Trump criticized Obama for doing), it compels Trump to enforce a red line (something he also criticized Obama for doing), and it ensures that the US will not be able to leave Syria anytime soon (as Trump has said he wants to do). If Trump now backs off, he looks weak. If he goes ahead, he gives Putin an opportunity to show the prowess of Russian air defenses.

Yesterday the White House spokesperson made clear that Trump thinks he can get rid of Special Counsel Mueller and is thinking about doing so. Monday’s FBI raid on the President’s personal lawyer/fixer, Michael Cohen, precipitated that forewarning, even though it was not requested by Mueller. Trump called the raid a “break-in,” though the search warrants were approved by Justice Department officials Trump appointed, as well as by a judge, who all had to agree that there was probable cause Cohen had committed a crime.

The President has met opponents who don’t yield to bullying. Putin and Assad are murderers, not schoolyard toughs or New York real estate rivals. It is pitiful to see a president of the United States all but pleading for Moscow’s cooperation, also in a tweet this morning:

Our relationship with Russia is worse now than it has ever been, and that includes the Cold War. There is no reason for this. Russia needs us to help with their economy, something that would be very easy to do, and we need all nations to work together. Stop the arms race?

The guy who was going to make America great again is trying to bribe Putin into submission and offering to back down on US military modernization. Putin isn’t likely to bite. Nor is Trump’s calling Assad an “animal” going to intimidate a man whose name means “lion.” He has already killed hundreds of thousands of Syrians and mauled many more.

The only real question about Trump at this point is when he becomes completely unglued. My guess is that the search of Cohen’s premises is not only related to his admitted payment of $130,000 in hush money to Trump’s porn star fling but that her account of a threat of physical harm has attracted the prosecutor’s attention. A prosecutor might well hope to find evidence of Cohen ordering up that threat in his office, home, or hotel room.

Hard to see where and how this ends, but we haven’t seen the worst of it yet. Trump is rattled now, unglued next.

PS: Here’s an interview I did last night for CGTN on the Syria situation:

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The missing ingredient

Syrian President Assad, thumbing his nose at the US, launched another major chemical attack Saturday, this time against Douma on the outskirts of Damascus, a year and a couple of days after the deadly Khan Shaykhun sarin attack last year. Assad has been using chlorine frequently over the past year. It is not yet clear which chemicals were used in Douma, but dozens died.

This attack attracted President Trump’s attention. First he blamed President Obama for not holding to his red line (actually he said for not crossing the red line, but the literate know he meant the opposite). Then he skipped golf after threatening that Assad would pay a BIG PRICE and blaming in part Vladimir Putin, the first time anyone can remember his criticizing Russia’s president by name.

Last year Trump launched 59 cruise missiles against the base from which the Khan Shaykhun sarin gas attack was launched. There was no serious or lasting impact, except for those unlucky enough to be at the base. It got back to operation quickly and chlorine, but not sarin, attacks continued.

Both Russia and Syria have denied Syria used chemicals on this recent occasion. Moscow issued a stern warning of “gravest consequences” if Syria is attacked. That presumably means US military intervention could precipitate Russian escalation. The Americans have already killed dozens if not hundreds of Russian mercenaries who attempted in February to cross the Euphrates to capture oil and gas fields American allies now control in eastern Syria. Moscow downplayed that incident. This time it is likely to retaliate with escalation of its own. Where that cycle would end is dreadful to contemplate.

I suppose the Americans will be tempted. But even if they double or triple the number of cruise missiles, it won’t make much difference. What was lacking last time around, and is likely to be lacking this time as well, is a viable diplomatic strategy for bringing the Syrian war to an end. Using military force without a political game plan is senseless.

The missing ingredient here is not force. It is diplomacy. The Americans should desist from another one-off with cruise missiles unless they have a serious diplomatic initiative in mind that would benefit from it. Assad is only going to yield at this point if the military balance is significantly altered and he fears he may be unable to hold on to power. It is difficult to imagine how the Americans could make that happen, though depriving Assad of his air force might make a difference.

The first step is to demonstrate unequivocally that the attack originated from Assad-friendly forces. That is not as difficult as it sounds, because only those forces fly airplanes. It is in any event not credible that the Syrian opposition–even its most extreme factions–use chemical weapons only against their own and never against Assad’s forces or their Iranian and Russian supporters. Once responsibility for this particular attack is established for all to see and hear, the Americans need to line up their allies and friends for a sustained campaign, with a political game plan Assad’s only way out.

If we are not willing to do that–and I doubt we are–maybe we had best do nothing beyond the usual condemnation. If we are missing the key ingredient to the secret sauce, force isn’t going to work.

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