Next year in Jerusalem
Israel’s use of deadly force against mostly nonviolent Gaza demonstrators on Friday raises lots of questions: as none of the Palestinians succeeded in crossing the border fence, why did the IDF use live ammunition? They claim to have fired only on those using violence or trying to cross into Israel, but on the Gaza side there are lots of videos and eye witnesses contradicting that claim. Was the Israeli government focused on violent militants, or was it really trying to frighten masses of nonviolent Palestinians away from the demonstrations? “Violence” in this instance seems to refer to throwing of stones, but the Israelis present seem to have been well out of range. Burning tires and approaching the border fence are definitely not violent or terrorist acts. Why are they being referred to as such?
I suppose we’ll never know the answers to these questions, as the Israelis will not allow an independent investigation. They appear to me genuinely frightening by the prospect of thousands of Palestinian refugees walking peacefully into Israel and claiming their rights to land their grandparents left, or were compelled to leave, in 1948. The Israelis are determined not only to stop that kind of popular protest, even if peaceful, but also to scare Palestinians into submission. Doing so redounds to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s benefit in domestic politics: his supporters are unconcerned with the deaths of Palestinians and devoted to an expansive vision of Israel’s security needs.
During my visits to both Israel and Palestine in January, I was unable to visit Gaza, but talked with a nonviolent activist who lives there. Gaza is desperate. Even the White House recognizes that the conditions in which its two million people are living–without adequate clean water, little electricity, limited medical care, and few jobs–are unacceptable. Who would not want to demonstrate? The Israelis and the Palestinian Authority would like the refugees to blame Hamas, which has controlled Gaza since 2006. Hamas is supporting the demonstrations, trying to deflect criticism for its governance failures. It seems to be succeeding, not least because it too uses violence and brooks little opposition.
Of course Palestinian lives matter to the friends, families, and communities from which they come. The fifteen or more reported killed Friday will have hundreds if not thousands of relatives and personal acquaintances who will mourn them, in addition to a far wider circle who feel they are martyrs to the Palestinian cause. Will future protests attract more than the 30,000 or so who attended the first demonstration? The plan has been to repeat them until May 15, the day Israelis celebrate the country’s 1948 independence while Palestinians mark the nakba (catastrophe).
But Palestinian lives matter in other respects too. Israel may be an electoral democracy, but it is not a liberal democracy that treats everyone as having equal rights. This matters because its friends in Europe and the US shouldn’t settle for less. Either Israel needs to treat the Palestinians whose Gaza and West Bank territory it embargoes as equal to its own citizens, or it has to let them establish their own state and allow them to govern it as they see fit, so long as it doesn’t threaten Israel. For most American Jews, there is no acceptable in-between, as Ron Lauder recently pointed out. Most of us will not support an increasingly theocratic Israel in which Palestinian lives don’t matter.
It is ironic that the Jewish and Palestinian historical narratives are mirror images of each other. The Jews were exiled almost two thousand years ago and now feel it is time to reclaim their ancient lands. The Palestinians were exiled 70 years ago, from lands they had occupied for most of those two thousand years. “Next year in Jerusalem,” the cry with which Jews finished the Passover Seder Friday evening, could just as well be uttered by Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza, most of whom do not have the permit required to reach the Haram al Sharif. It is time for all of us to acknowledge the others’ aspirations. Palestinian lives do matter.
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Peace picks, April 2 – April 8
- Cross-Strait Relations Under the Trump Administration | Monday, April 2 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Stimson Center | Register here |
Since the unprecedented phone call between President Trump and Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen in December 2016, the Trump administration’s approach to Taiwan has fluctuated. The latest twist came on March 16 when President Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act. This law, which permits American officials to visit their counterparts in Taiwan and encourages high-level officials from Taiwan to visit the U.S., prompted a strong protest from Beijing. On the heels of the signing of the TTA, the U.S. sent two deputy assistant secretaries of state to Taiwan. Given these developments, where will relations between U.S., the PRC, and Taiwan go from here? Join us for a timely conversation between Bonnie Glaser, Director of the China Power Project at CSIS, and Yun Sun and Yuki Tatsumi, Co-Directors of Stimson’s East Asia Program. A light lunch will be served.
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- Syria and the Outside Powers: What They Want and Can They Have It? | Monday, April 2 | 1:30pm – 3:00pm | Wilson Center | Register here |
The Syrian civil war is many overlapping conflicts, including the competition and cooperation among outside powers vying to protect their interests, often at the expense of Syria’s sovereignty. What are Russian, Iranian, Turkish, Israeli, and American objectives in Syria, and can they achieve them? Join us as four analysts of Syria and the region address the issue of outside powers and the future of Syria. A conversation with Paul du Quenoy (Associate Professor of History at American University of Beirut), Amy Austin Holmes (Associate Professor of Sociology at American University in Cairo), David Pollock (Kaufman Fellow at the Washington Institute and Director of Project Fikra), and Robin Wright (journalist/author and USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow), with moderator Aaron David Miller (Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director at the Wilson Center). There will be a webcast of this event.
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- Iraq and Syria: Views from the U.S. Administration, Military Leaders and the Region | Tuesday, April 3 | 10:00am – 2:30pm | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
With ISIS driven from its urban strongholds in Iraq and Syria, the urgent task of stabilizing the region – and preventing the return of terrorists – is underway. While Iraq and Syria face many internal challenges and tensions, Iran, Turkey, Arab Gulf State, the United States and Russia are advancing competing agendas. What are the stakes for Iraq, Syria, the region and the world as the struggle for leverage, stability, and reconciliation continues after ISIS? What is the U.S. role? Please join U.S. Administration and military leaders, senior Iraqi representatives and regional experts as they explore one of the most complex and consequential conflicts of our time.
On Panel 1 (10:00am – 11:00), A Pivotal Moment for Iraq – Amb. Fareed Yasseen (Ambassador to the United States, Republic of Iraq), Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman (Kurdistan Regional Government Representative to the United States), and Sarhang Hamasaeed (Director, Middle East Programs, U.S. Institute of Peace), with Amb. Alberto Fernandez (President, Middle East Broadcasting Networks) as moderator.
On Panel 2 (11:20am – 12:30pm), Entering the Post-ISIS Era: Iraq and Its Neighbors – Dr. Elie Abouaoun (Director, Middle East and North Africa Programs, U.S. Institute of Peace), Dr. Mark N. Katz (Professor of Government and Politics, George Mason University), Alireza Nader (Senior International/Defense Researcher, RAND), and Mona Yacoubian (Senior Advisor for Syria, U.S. Institute of Peace), with Kevin Baron (Founding Executive Editor, Defense One) as moderator.
On the Keynote Panel (1:30pm – 2:30pm), Fraught Terrain: Stabilizing Iraq and Syria After ISIS – Gen. Joseph L. Votel (CENTCOM Commander), Amb. Mark Green (Administrator, USAID), and Brett McGurk (Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, U.S. Department of State), with Stephen J. Hadley (Chair, Board of Directors, U.S. Institute of Peace) as moderator.
Network lunch will be held with box lunch provided; RSVP required.
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- The Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen | Thursday, April 5 | 2:00pm – 3:00pm | CSIS | Register here |
Labeled the worst humanitarian crisis in today’s world, the conflict in Yemen is entering its fourth year. To understand the impact the war is having on the Yemeni people, and the challenges it poses to policymakers, join us for a discussion with David Miliband (President and CEO, International Rescue Committee) which will be followed by a panel discussion with Barbara Bodine (Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University), Peter Salisbury (Senior Consulting Fellow, Chatham House), and Abdulrahman Al-Eryani (International Economist and Development Specialist).
This event will be webcast live.
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- The Future of the JCPOA: Implications for the U.S., Its Allies, and Adversaries | Thursday, April 5 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |
The future of the Iran nuclear deal may soon be clarified. President Trump has asked Congress and our European allies for revisions to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by May 12, and in the meantime will be advised about how and whether to continue American participation in that plan by a significantly reorganized foreign policy team—including new leadership at the State Department, National Security Council, and CIA. Join a panel of experts to explore near-term U.S. policy options, and their international ramifications, with respect to the JCPOA. Including New America International Security Fellow Oubai Shahbandar; Hudson Institute Adjunct Fellow Michael Pregent; Heritage Foundation Policy Analyst Michaela Dodge; Foundation for Defense of Democracies Freedom Scholar Michael Ledeen; and Foundation for Defense of Democracies Senior Advisor Richard Goldberg.
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- Seeking Solutions for Somalia | Friday, April 6 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Brookings Institution | Register here |
Despite important progress through years of international counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and state-building assistance, peace and sustainable stabilization remain elusive in Somalia. Pernicious governance processes give continual lease on life to al-Shabab and other destabilizing armed actors. Improving governance and state-building—and subjecting Somalia’s governments and powerbrokers to accountability—are fundamental for conflict reduction and eventual stabilization. On April 6, Brookings Senior Fellow Vanda Felbab-Brown will brief her December 2017 fieldwork in Somalia and review key security and political developments. Landry Signé, a David M. Rubenstein fellow in the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative, will discuss how the persistence of bad governance, corruption, marginalization, and economic mismanagement have led to state failure and insecurity in the country. Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon will moderate the discussion.
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- Iran’s Sunnis Resist Extremism, But for How Long? | Friday, April 6 | 10:30am – 12:00pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
Iran, a predominantly Shia nation, has a substantial Sunni minority estimated at 15 million of its 80 million population. Politically and economically disadvantaged, these Sunnis receive relatively little attention compared to other minorities and are potential victims of radicalization as tensions flare between regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Atlantic Council’s Future of Iran Initiative invites you to a discussion of Iran’s Sunnis and the launch of a new paper, Iran’s Sunnis Resist Extremism, But for How Long?, by veteran journalist Scheherezade Faramarzi. Faramarzi, who has covered Iran and the Middle East for four decades, traveled in 2015 and 2016 to the southern Iranian province of Hormozgan on the Persian Gulf and also conducted interviews by phone and in person in the United Arab Emirates and with experts based in Europe. Also featuring expert on Middle Eastern and South Asian affairs Fatemeh Aman and Future of Iran Initiative Director Barbara Slavin as moderator.
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Russia should be job 1
Far be it from me to in any way align myself with John Bolton, but there are things he could get the Administration to do consistent with at least some of his stated positions that would be preferable to the hodge-podge of contradictory signals Washington is currently sending on foreign policy.
For the moment, President Trump has prioritized the Iran nuclear deal. He is trying to use his threat to withdraw as leverage to get the Europeans to agree to amend the deal in order to gain access to Iranian military sites, restrain Tehran’s missile program, and end the “sunset” (expiration) clauses. His self-imposed deadline is May 12, when Congress requires him to certify once again that the deal is in the US interest. He didn’t do that last time around and said he would withdraw if the agreement wasn’t fixed by the next deadline.
Withdrawing from the deal is patently not in the US national interest. Either Iran will also withdraw and re-initiate its nuclear program, giving it the potential for nuclear weapons within a year or so. Or Tehran and Brussels will decide to proceed without the US, splitting the Western alliance on a vital issue. US withdrawal would also spell the end of any distant hope (but see below) for a deal with North Korea, as Pyongyang would be correct to conclude that the US can’t be trusted to hold up its end, and strain relations further with China and Russia (who helped negotiate the agreement with Iran and continue to support it). There are simply no gains from withdrawal, only losses, unless you want to provide yourself with an excuse to go to war. That means risking the Sixth Fleet as well as numerous US bases and troops in the Gulf and Iraq, as well as attacks elsewhere in the Middle East and even inside the US.
Another apparent priority is North Korea. It already has nuclear weapons and credible if not certain means to deliver them, at least against US forces and allies in South Korea, Japan, and Guam. The odds of successfully negotiating “denuclearization” with Pyongyang are risible. There simply is no better protection for North Korea against an American attempt at regime change than Kim Jung-un’s nukes. Once again, the only real option to “denuclearize” is war. The consequences would be worse than catastrophic: at the very least a massive artillery barrage by the North against Seoul, killing tens of thousands, if not a nuclear exchange.
A third priority for Trump has been trade, in particular the North American Free Trade Agreement, (that is, Canada and Mexico) as well as China’s intellectual property expropriation and excess capacity in steel and aluminum. There is little hope of anything good coming of Trump’s unilateral measures (tariffs on steel and aluminum as well as on Chinese products), beyond the agreement already reached with South Korea (which has lots of reasons to be nice to the US these days). Tariffs are a blunt tool that has nothing to do with intellectual property theft, and the US doesn’t import much steel or aluminum from China. It does from Canada and Mexico, which have already been exempted from the tariffs, whose main impact will be to raise prices to American consumers (not only for steel and aluminum but for all the products in which they are used).
The remaining priority is Russia, which has distinguished itself in recent years by defying the norms of the liberal international order: murdering its opponents abroad and at home (including with nerve gas in a public place!), refusing to leave parts of other countries (Moldova and Abkhazia), annexing Crimea, invading Ukraine, threatening the Baltics as well as Sweden and Finland, meddling in democratic elections while making its own non-competitive, and intervening to slaughter the relatively moderate opposition as well as thousands of civilians in Syria while launching a mercenary attack on US troops and allies there. Moscow is the capital of a state that has gone rogue.
Bolton is no friend of Russia. He recognizes and has denounced most if not all of the offenses listed here. The problem is the President. While the Administration rightly boasts that it has done more against Russia (in expulsion of diplomats and sanctions) than Obama did (partly because Russia has done more against the US than in Obama’s time), President Trump has still not uttered a word of criticism against Vladimir Putin. Such consistency is not his normal habit and raises the question worldwide whether the US really speaks with one voice. That incoherence limits the impact of the modest moves made so far to counter Russia’s troublemaking.
It seems to me the right order of priorities is this:
- Russia: pushback worldwide, with a view to reaching a new, more balanced, modus vivendi
- Iran: no withdrawal from the nuclear deal but instead get it and its proxies out of Syria, where they pose a threat to Israel
- Trade: by using the WTO and other well-established multilateral mechanisms, not unilateral tariffs and exceptions that will shift imports but do little to limit them
- North Korea: deterrence is really the only option
More in a future post on how to accomplish at least 1 and 2.
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A more coherent approach
Turkey’s relations with the United States and the European Union are under strain. In light of continuous US support for the Kurdish YPG, Washington and Ankara are split over the way forward in Syria. Due to President Erdogan’s hostile rhetoric and increasingly authoritarian governing style, policy makers in Europe have advocated a suspension or even end of Turkey’s accession process to the EU.
Still, Ankara and its Western partner need each other. Turkey depends on the EU as a market, and cannot adequately address the Syrian refugee crisis as well as conflict at its southern border without Western support. Washington and European policy makers rely on Turkey as a pivotal member of NATO to provide stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. Where is the relationship headed?
On March 26, the Brookings Institutions convened a panel of experts to discuss how the West should handle its important but challenging ally. Eric Edelman, former US ambassador to Turkey and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Kemal Kirişci, director of the Turkey Project at Brookings, Amanda Sloat, Robert Bosch Senior Fellow at Brookings, and Stephen F. Szabo, senior fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, offered their perspectives on the future of relations between Turkey and the West. Lisel Hintz, assistant professor at Johns Hopkins University School of International Studies, moderated the discussion. A recording of the event is available online.
Domestic politics in Turkey drive the country’s relations with its Western partners. Eric Edelman highlights that Erdogan’s domestic agenda of establishing a presidential system has determined Ankara’s stance towards Washington and Brussels. The Turkish president utilizes sentiments against the West to rally support for his political project. In particular, Erdogan has stirred up anti-Americanism to mobilize voters and will likely draw again on nationalistic rhetoric ahead of the parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for 2019.
Edelman proposes that the United States should adopt a more transactional approach towards Ankara. Washington has so far remained silent about Erdogan’s political game and expected that “if Turkey is treated like an ally, it will behave like an ally.” This perception has proven false. Thus, the United States must increase pressure on Ankara. For instance, Washington could close one of Turkey’s consulates. This would both send a clear message to Erdogan and provide the United States with leverage.
Sloat counters that pressure alone cannot work. She stresses that a purely transactional approach has limitations as it could undermine the West’s efforts to promote the rule of law and good governance. Likewise, abandoning Turkey by either forcing it to leave NATO or ending the EU accession process is not a good option, as it would diminish US and EU leverage over Ankara. Rather, they should pursue a policy of constructive engagement. Washington has to address relations with Turkey from a broader perspective, which goes beyond security-related issues. Moreover, policy makers in both the United States and Europe should acknowledge the utility of engaging with a broad section of Turkish society and increase their outreach to civil society.
Kemal Kirişci highlights that the EU already has considerable leverage over Turkey. The EU is by far the biggest market for Turkish goods, absorbing almost 50% of the country’s exports. Likewise, there are significant Turkish communities in the EU that affect politics in Turkey. Erdogan, who relies on a good performance of the Turkish economy to maintain domestic supremacy, recognizes this dependency relationship.
Szabo hence argues that Western states should follow the example of Germany. Berlin has consistently emphasized the importance of the rule of law when dealing with Ankara. At the same time, the economic powerhouse of Europe has pursued a transactional approach, using its role as a major market for Turkish goods to press Erdogan for concessions. Moreover, Berlin has adopted a long-term view towards Turkey. Instead of simply formulating a rather reactive and shortsighted Erdogan strategy, Germany follows a comprehensive Turkey strategy that looks beyond the president’s time in power.
The West’s biggest challenge in handling Turkey is internal division and confusion. Szabo stresses that growing anti-Turkish sentiments among Germany’s population compromise Berlin’s foresighted approach. Kirişci points out that the erosion of the rule of law and liberalism within the EU has helped Erdogan to push his authoritarian agenda. Likewise, discrepancies in US policies have damaged Washington’s credibility among Turkish policy makers. Edelmann adds that any approach towards Turkey will fail as long as the US government does not sing from the same song sheet. Turkish consternation about conflicting statements concerning Washington’s support for the Kurdish YPG in Syria exemplifies this shortcoming, Sloat says.
Turkey under President Erdogan is certainly a difficult partner. Inconsistent policies in the West have aggravated this challenge. The United States and EU are advised to pursue a more coherent approach towards Ankara. This will ameliorate current strains and potentially bring about positive change within Turkey. The West should not waste this opportunity.
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Only a beginning
I greatly appreciated yesterday’s March for Our Lives here in DC. The speakers, mostly kids, were eloquently inspiring and the enormous crowd supportive, peaceful and determined. I half imagined they would trash the Trump hotel on leaving, as it stood towards the far end of the “march” (more a “stand”: the group didn’t have a permit to move from Pennsylvania Avenue). But no one seemed to be in a mood to cause trouble, so the police stood around as virtual participants. I imagine they’d be very happy to see fewer guns on the street, as they are among the more vulnerable of our fellow citizens.
The March goals were relatively modest:
- Passing a law to ban the sale of assault-style weapons
- Prohibiting the sale of high-capacity magazines
- Closing the loophole in our background check law
None of these would change the current situation: there would still be several million assault-style weapons in the US and a comparable number of high-capacity magazines. Requiring background checks of those who buy guns online or at gun shows would only affect future purchasers, not the armed potential perpetrators already out there.
Nor are school killings of the type that motivated the March our biggest numerical problem, even if the mass murder of children merits heightened moral denunciation. Most gun deaths in the US are suicides: almost twice as many as homicides. And most homicides are committed with handguns, not assault-style weapons. The gun-related murder rate in the US is more than an order of magnitude greater than that in other developed countries, but not because of school shootings, assault-style weapons or high-capacity magazines.
Achieving the March’s goals would thus not do much to improve the situation, but there is little risk the current Congress will do anything like what the students want. The gun lobby owns the Republican members of Congress, who have the majority in both Houses. President Trump is not going to buck the National Rifle Association, which raised a lot of money for his campaign, some of it now under investigation because it may have come from Russia. The Administration has probably reached the limit of what it is prepared to do with its proposed prohibition on the sale of “bump stocks” (which enable a non-automatic weapon to fire like an automatic one) and a requirement that Federal agencies report more data on people ineligible to purchase guns. Those amount to a nothingburger compared even to the March’s modest goals.
The sad fact is that no solution to the gun problem is possible without getting a significant percentage of the nation’s more than 300 million guns out of the hands of their owners, especially those who possess them illegally. I’ll happily join those demanding less when they turn out the kind of crowds they did on Saturday, because their efforts may contribute to electing a different Congressional majority in November. But at best the March was the beginning of something big, not the end.
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Fragile states pose security threats
State fragility is on the rise. In recent years, civil wars have proliferated throughout the world. In 2015, the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) reported 49 active intrastate conflicts, the highest number since 1991; likewise, casualties have increased consistently during the past 25 years. These developments are worrying. In contrast to most interstate conflict, civil wars are extremely difficult to resolve. Studies on intrastate conflicts since 1945 have shown that civil wars tend to last an average of about seven to twelve years, making their repercussions tremendous. As the brutal civil war in Syria exemplifies, the fallout includes humanitarian crises, the rise of extremist organizations, and regional political instability. Policy makers in the West must thus adopt more effective policies to stabilize fragile and failed states.
On March 19, the United States Institute of Peace hosted a high-profile panel discussing how the United States and the international community can address better the national security challenges stemming from state fragility. Nancy Lindborg, President of the US Institute of Peace, was joined by Ilan Goldenberg, Director of the Middle East Security Program at Center for a New American Security, and Kimberly Kagan, founder and President of the Institute for the Study of War. Joshua Johnson, host of NPR’s program 1A, moderated the discussion.
State fragility poses critical security threats. According to Nancy Lindborg, fragile states are characterized by the inability to provide basic public goods such as security and lack political legitimacy as governments typically exclude parts of their citizenry from participating in politics, the country’s social life, and the economy. As a result, fragile states suffer from weak institutions and are less able to manage shocks like disasters and conflict. In this respect, Ilan Goldenberg emphasizes that fragile states often require merely a spark to disintegrate. Collapsing states create serious security vacuums. As outside actors are concerned about losing political influence, they are incentivized to intervene. This generally exacerbates and perpetuates the conflicts already unfolding within failed states.
Syria is a prime example for this vicious dynamic. Goldenberg argues that the 2011 Arab Spring caused the disintegration of the Syrian state and ignited a domestic conflict, which has developed into a regional and international fight over influence in the Levant. Today, Syria is divided into five different zones of influence: a Jordanian-supported rebel pocket in southwestern Syria, the Iran-backed Assad regime in the center of the country, an al-Qaeda safe haven in the province of Idlib, a Turkish-controlled territory in the north, and a Kurdish canton that enjoys US support. Conflict erupts at the intersections of these “tectonic plates.” To pacify Syria, all involved parties must first agree on long-term political arrangements concerning these hotspots before a national reconciliation project can be launched. Goldenberg is however not hopeful that positive change will occur soon. Kimberly Kagan affirms this observation and stresses that the diverging interests of the foreign actors involved in Syria impede any peace progress.
To avoid more Syria-like scenarios, the United States must invest more effort in stabilizing fragile states and pacifying failed states. Given U.S. economic strength, Lindborg argues that Washington has a moral obligation to help fragile states. Support must thereby exceed simple humanitarian assistance and rather address the sources of fragility. Kagan highlights that moral obligations often align with political and security interests such as counteracting breeding grounds of terrorism. She thus advocates more US engagement in form of a balanced hard and soft power approach to help fragile states recover themselves and create situations whereby governance can return. Goldenberg adds that the United States also acts as a role model in addressing state fragility. If the US demonstrates leadership, other states follow suit.
However, Washington is currently unwilling to meets is obligation of providing stability around the world. Lindborg points out that US policies are too reactive. Although consecutive administrations have identified state fragility as a key security threat, they have only responded to crises after they had become far too problematic. The United States is in a state of “hunkering down” whereby Americans are “tired of playing world police.”
It is clear, however, that the United States and European states must tackle state fragility more proactively. While conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, or South and Central America often appear to be localized problems at first glance, they have critical repercussions on the political, societal, and economic situation in the developed world. The international refugee crises and its impact on European and US politics is evidence enough for this circumstance.
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