Weaponizing refugees
Beyond the headlines on Syria’s refugee crisis, a more sinister development involving displaced people has emerged in the country’s civil war. Fighting on behalf of the Assad regime, the Liwa Fatemiyoun is a Shia militia overwhelmingly composed of Afghan refugees who sought shelter in Iran during the 1980s. Since 2015, Tehran has recruited several thousand members of this community for its war effort in Syria, offering “high wages and residence permits for […] families [of fighters].” In so doing, the Iranian government has exploited the dire living conditions Afghan refugees on Iranian soil contend with. The plight of Afghans in Iran is a fate that many refugees in protracted refugee situations face.[*] A lack of perspective has made these populations easy targets of instrumentalization for political and military purposes.
Protracted refugee situations have proliferated in recent years and put strain on the international refugee regime. Mainly due to a spread of conflicts around the world, the number of refugees has significantly increased over the past two decades. At the same time, the successes in ceasing hostilities and enabling a safe return of displaced people to their homes have diminished. As a consequence, more and more refugees find themselves in situations of prolonged exile; as of 2016, some 12 million out of the 22.5 million refugees under UNHCR mandate lived in protracted refugee situations.
The international refugee regime is not able to cope with this development. Established after World War II to primarily address emergency situations, the current framework focuses on immediate humanitarian assistance for war-affected people and repatriation as well as resettlement efforts. In light of continuous conflict in many regions and little global willingness to resettle refugees, the regime has no adequate instruments to serve people in situations of prolonged exile. This leaves millions of refugees in limbo, with no prospects of a worthwhile future.
This situation has become a source of political instability and conflict. Disenfranchised and marginalized populations are susceptible to violent extremism. Terrorist groups and non-state actors such as the Palestinian PLO have a history of recruiting in refugee camps. More recently, states have started exploit the desperation of refugees in situations of prolonged exile. Iran established the approximately 12,000 to 14,000 men strong Afghan Liwa Fatemiyoun to support its war efforts in Syria.
Faced with great poverty and often threatened with deportation, Afghans as young as 14 have been pressured to join the militia in return for residency permits and a stable income (the Afghan community in Iran consists of refugees who fled their homeland during the 1980s Afghan-Soviet war). These refugee soldiers serve as ‘cheap’ shock troops who bear the brunt of Iran’s military actions in Syria. The instrumentalization of displaced people has thus reached a new level of intensity: host states entrusted with providing secure environments for refugees are now forcing displaced people to serve as combatants in conflicts they are not party to.
The case of the Liwa Fatemiyoun not only sheds light on Tehran’s ruthless foreign policy but also highlights that the international community must alter its approach towards protracted refugee situations. Despite being a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, Iran does not shy away from exploiting its refugees, who are utilized to cause human misery and more displacement in Syria.
The current refugee regime has developed into a mere administrator of unending crisis situations. These act as breeding grounds for perpetuating conflict. To overcome this vicious cycle and sustainably tackle sources of global instability, the international community must seek to fully integrate refugees in host countries and offer support in form of comprehensive development programs. These efforts will be pricey, but change is necessary. Only then, the Liwa Fatemiyoun will remain an isolated incident and not become a blueprint for future instrumentalization of refugees.
[*] The UNHCR defines protracted refugee situations as situations where refugees have been in exile “for five or more years after their initial displacement, without immediate prospects for implementation of durable solutions.”
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From bad to worse
President Trump’s choice of CIA Director Pompeo to replace Secretary of State Tillerson, tweet-fired summarily this morning, bodes ill.
Tillerson was a bad Secretary of State: notoriously out of touch with the President and the White House, he gutted both people and positions at his department, losing talent and capacity at a breathtaking pace. His views were nevertheless more sensible than Trump’s on many issues: Joyce Karam on Twitter pointed out that they differed on Iran, Russia, climate change, Qatar, trade and Jerusalem. I’d add North Korea to that list. But that only increased the incoherence of the Trump Administration, which is setting records for inability to sing from the same sheet of music.
Pompeo is made of different stuff. He mostly agrees with Trump’s radical views, in particular on Iran (he advocated bombing) and North Korea (he wants regime change, though he has presumably saluted for the one-on-one meeting with Kim Jong-un). He differs from Trump mainly on Russia, where he is much harder-nosed than a president who can’t bring himself to criticize Vladimir Putin even for attempted murder with nerve agent in an allied country. He is unlikely to be much friendlier to State Department personnel than his predecessor, but he will carry more weight at the White House. Pompeo is no dummy: he was first in his class at West Point and editor of the Harvard Law Review before going into business and eventually wining a Congressional seat in Kansas.
Pompeo’s replacement at the CIA will be Gina Haspel, the current deputy director and the first woman to be nominated as director. After 9/11, she is reputed to have run a CIA prison that tortured prisoners and to have ordered destruction of videotapes documenting the torture. She appears to have spent her entire career as a professional in the clandestine service, so little more is known about her. It is reasonable to expect continuity at CIA, but in any event we know little about what goes on there until well after the fact. It is likely that she will represent the views of the Agency’s professional analysts and operators, who are good at warning about all the things that can go wrong.
Trump is in a mood to surround himself with people who agree. Pompeo may not be a “yes” man–more likely he just shares the President’s far-out opinions. That raises again the question about how long National Security Adviser McMaster will last. He has been out of sync with Trump on North Korea, Iran, and Russia, three of today’s most pressing issues. Defense Secretary Mattis is a bit less contrary, and too weighty to fire without consequences.
Admittedly we are near the bottom of the barrel. But in my view, Pompeo and Haspel are in no way improvements. More likely we are going from bad to worse.
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It’s the region, stupid
The Middle East suffers from a whole range of problems. War and conflict are besetting wide parts of the region and have caused massive destruction as well as displacement in several countries, including Syria and Yemen. Climate change has brought about enormous environmental degradation such as desertification and water scarcity. At the same time, stressed domestic economies are increasingly unable to provide job opportunities for the region’s disenchanted youth. The Middle East faces enormous challenges that transcend borders and hence require answers that narrow-minded national policy making is no longer able to provide. Indeed, the region is today in dire need of regional responses.
On March 7, the Middle East Institute presented a roadmap of how future cooperation should look like in the Middle East. Resulting from Track 1.5 initiative involving current and former officials and senior experts from across the Middle East as well as from China, Europe, Russia, and the United States, the so-called Baghdad Declaration outlines 12 good neighborhood principles for the region. The discussion featured three major participants in the Middle East Dialogue. Naufel al-Hassan, deputy chief of staff to Prime Minister Haider al Abadi of Iraq, Abdullah al-Dardari, who serves as a senior advisor on reconstruction at The World Bank, and MEI’s senior vice president for policy research and programs Paul Salem provided their perspective on the Baghdad Declaration and the Middle East’s future. A full recording of the event is here:
Regional integration is already prevalent in the Middle East. Abdullah al-Dardari stresses that, excluding oil and gas, intraregional trade accounts for some 40% of total trade in the Middle East; taking the informal economy into consideration, this figure might even reach 60%. Moreover, the Middle East has the world’s highest level of intraregional level of remittances. Paul Salem underlines this observation and adds that only because of the high level of existing regional interdependence and interaction conflicts were able to spread that easily across the Middle East. However, the integration of today is neither well-structured nor reflected in the political relationships between Middle Eastern states.
The region is still in dire need of better cooperation among its members. Al-Dardari argues that the model of country-based economic growth has reached its apex in the Middle East. Self-sustained economic development is no longer possible as national labor markets, productive bases, and consumption levels have become too narrow. Instead, only regional economic integration and the resulting creation of an open regional market can attract extensive investment and the money needed to rebuild war-ravaged countries: an estimated one trillion dollar of assets has been destroyed since 2011. Naufel al-Hassan also points out that political and environmental challenges such as transnational terrorist networks and water scarcity go beyond the problem-solving capacities of single states and require common answers. In the same vein, the region’s governments can only bring back hope to the Middle East’s youth when they collaborate on providing decent job opportunities. A new regional framework is hence not an option, but a necessity.
Although the contemporary conflicts in the Middle East seem to make increased regional cooperation almost impossible to achieve, change is possible. Salem stresses that other regions of the world were able to transition from a conflict system to a stable order. Not even a century ago, Europe suffered from two wars which much exceeded the level violence that has beset the contemporary Middle East. Yet Europe has been able to overcome its international divisions and conflicts and has established a strong system of cooperation, the European Union. At the same time, the Middle East has proven to be able to move beyond regional standoffs, as the surmounting of rivalry between Egypt and Saudi Arabia of the 1950s has demonstrated. We can thus be hopeful whereby al-Hassan emphasizes that a new stage of integration has already begun. To defeat ISIS, the region has displayed a new level of cooperation, which can serve as a blueprint for future efforts to unite in face of political, economic, and environmental challenges.
A better future is hence possible for the Middle East. The Baghdad Declaration offers a distinct vision that can show the path towards deeper integration in the region. When this transition will materialize will however depend on the readiness of the region’s current leadership to cease hostilities and acknowledge that small-minded national agendas cannot act as a remedy. For the sake of the Middle East and its people, this change of mentality and political outlook should occur soon.
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Peace picks, March 12 – March 18
- Thinking the Unthinkable: War on the Korean Peninsula | Tuesday, March 13 | 9:00am – 12:00pm | Brookings Institution | Register here |
The possibility of a U.S. military strike against North Korea to prevent Pyongyang from acquiring the capability to hit the United States with a nuclear weapon has stimulated debates about North Korea’s intentions. Is Kim Jong-un’s primary goal deterrence against U.S. invasion? Or does he have a much more offensive agenda, such as the unification of the Korean Peninsula through the use of force? Analysis of North Korea’s intentions has profound implications for what policy responses are required to thwart the regime’s ambitions and get ahead of its tactical maneuvers designed to reach those goals. On March 13, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings will host leading U.S. experts to explore the possibility of an offensive-minded North Korea and its policy implications, and assess the humanitarian, economic, political, and logistical costs of a military conflict on the Korean peninsula. Featuring Sue Mi Terry (Senior Fellow, CSIS), Mara Karlin (Professor, Johns Hopkins SAIS), and Bruce Klingner (Senior Research Fellow, the Heritage Foundation), among others.
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- Egypt’s Private Sector In Challenging Regional Environment | Tuesday, March 13 | 2:30pm – 4:00pm | Johns Hopkins SAIS | Register here |
Egypt has embarked on a comprehensive reform package after signing a 12 billion USD loan agreement with the IMF. The government has passed laws to provide more incentives for both domestic and foreign investors, and US companies are increasing their presence in the country. At the same time, Egypt benefits from several FTA agreements with the Middle East and African countries and serves as an investment hub for multinational companies operating in the region. This panel will address the reforms achieved and those in making and discuss chances to further strengthen US-Egypt relationship. Featuring Tarek Tawfik (President, AmCham Egypt), Steve Lutes (Executive Director U.S.–Egypt Business Council, U.S. Chamber of Commerce), and Dina H. Sherif (CEO & Co-Founder, Ahead of the Curve), among others.
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- Present and future dangers on the eve of Vladimir Putin’s reelection | Wednesday, March 14 | 9:00am – 10:45am | American Enterprise Institute | Register here |
On the eve of his reelection, President Vladimir Putin has the world wondering what else he may do and what the political, diplomatic, and military fallout could be. Will the near-stagnant economy, Western sanctions, and diplomatic pressure lead to a more restrained Russian foreign policy? Or will Putin continue an aggressive, interventionist track to bolster his popularity at home? If aggression against post-Soviet states is key to Putin’s search for legitimacy, which countries are most at risk? And what are the implications for US and European policy? Join AEI for the release of “To Have and to Hold: Putin’s Quest for Control in the Former Soviet Empire,” which details the military, political, economic, and social vulnerabilities of six of Russia’s neighboring countries. To mark the publication, Leon Aron (Director of Russian Studie, AEI) will be joined by Seth Moulton (Congressman for Massachusetts), followed by a panel discussion featuring Agnia Grigas (Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council) and Michael Kofman (Fellow, Wilson Center), among others.
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- The Future of Asia: U.S.-Japan Cooperation in Southeast Asia and Beyond | Wednesday, March 14 | 9:15am – 10:45am | Center for American Progress | Register here |
Southeast Asia’s geopolitical profile is on the rise: It’s home to important sea lanes, the site of incredible economic growth, a landing spot for massive amounts of foreign direct investment, and a nurturing ground for a number of burgeoning democracies. Because of its achievements, potential, and geographic importance, Southeast Asia has become a natural point of cooperation between the United States and Japan based on shared values and security interests. However, cooperation in the region is becoming increasingly complex due to democratic backsliding. Now more than ever, it’s critical for the United States and Japan to strengthen their partnership in Southeast Asia to bolster the region’s stability, prosperity, and respect for democratic institutions. Join the Center for American Progress for a discussion with leading Japan-U.S.-Southeast Asia experts to discuss policy pathways the United States and Japan can take to protect democratic institutions and freedoms in Southeast Asia. Featuring Joaquin Castro (Congressman for Texas), Emma Chanlett-Avery (Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service), and Amy Searight (Senior Adviser and Director, Southeast Asia Program, CSIS), among others.
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- Violent Extremism: Historical Patterns and Precedents, Ancient and Modern | Wednesday, March 14 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |
Middle Eastern history is often portrayed as a succession of empires and political orders harassed and occasionally brought down by violent opponents–usually labeled as terrorists at the time. This was true in ancient times as well as modern. And today’s violent extremist groups resurrect historical narratives and grievances to fuel contemporary conflict. How do 21st century socio-political and geopolitical trends interact with historical ethnic, sectarian, and anti-colonial narratives to fuel the rise of extremist movements? How can we understand these dynamics? How can this understanding contribute to better policy to counter violent extremism? The Middle East Institute is pleased to host a panel discussion on the ancient and modern dynamics of extremist transnational movements featuring Sandra Scham (author of Extremism, Ancient and Modern: Insurgency, Terror, and Empire in the Middle East). She will be joined by Paul Salem (Senior Vice President for Policy Research and Programs, MEI) and Hassan Mneimneh (Director of the Extremism and Counterterrorism Program, MEI). Charles Lister (Senior Fellow, MEI) will moderate the discussion.
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- Politics in the Maghreb: Continuity or Change? | Wednesday, March 14 | 6:00pm – 7:30pm | Brookings Institution | Register here |
Seven years after the Arab uprisings, the Maghreb Region remains in flux. Once again, Morocco has witnessed large-scale protests, as thousands in the Rif region and in Jerada have held demonstrations to express socio-economic and political grievances amid demands for change. Algeria has been the picture of continuity, but the lack of a clear successor to the ailing president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, clouds its future. Lower hydrocarbon prices has meant that the state is less able to allocate oil rents to the population to maintain stability. Even Tunisia, arguably the success story of the region, is struggling amid political squabbling and protests by marginalized Tunisian youth. The economy remains weak and the unemployment rate is high, leaving much of the country frustrated with the ongoing transition. This panel discussion will bring leading experts together to examine ongoing socio-economic and political issues in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. Featuring Amel Boubekeur (Research Fellow, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales and the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris), Maâti Monjib (Patkin Visiting Fellow, Middle East Democracy and Development Project), and Larbi Sadiki (Professor, Qatar University). Adel Abdel Ghafar (Fellow, Brookings Doha Center) will moderate the discussion.
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- Journalism at War: The Evolution of Independent Reporting in Syria | Thursday, March 15 | 11:00am – 12:30pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |
Prior to the outbreak of protests in Daraa in 2011, media in Syria was state-controlled and heavily regulated. However, in the face of escalating conflict with the Assad regime, independent media outlets emerged that gave voice to Syrian journalists and civil society activists sharing information domestically and to an international audience. Although these new outlets provided hope as state authority weakened, in the seven years since the outbreak of war, journalists attempting to share their stories from within Syria face daunting challenges including uncertain security, difficulty in verifying sources and the absence of a reaction from international audiences. The Middle East Institute is pleased to host a panel discussion to examine this topical issue. Rania Abouzeid (author of No Turning Back: Stories of Life, Loss, and Hope in Wartime Syria) will be joined by Ibrahim al-Assil (Syrian Activist and Scholar, MEI) and Antoun Issa (Director for Public Relations, MEI) to discuss the important role of Syria’s independent media. Uri Friedman (Staff Writer, The Atlantic) will moderate the discussion.
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- The US-Georgia Partnership | Thursday, March 15 | 2:00pm – 4:00pm | Atlantic Council & National Democratic Institute | Register here |
Since emerging from the Soviet Union as an independent state in 1991, Georgia has struggled to maintain its sovereignty in the face of separatist movements and military incursion from Russia. Still, the country has taken steps toward political reform and improved relations with Europe, the United States, and international bodies like the European Union and NATO. Georgia, together with Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, were “captive nations” of the former Soviet Union; today, the three countries are still held hostage by Russian interference with their territorial integrity. As Georgia continues to work internally and externally to strengthen its ties to the West, Western powers must also do their part in forming partnerships with states in the region. Join the Atlantic Council and the National Democratic Institute for a discussion on the importance of Georgia’s path forward and the US-Georgia partnership for transatlantic security. Featuring Amy Klobuchar (Senator for Minnesota), H.E. President Giorgi Margvelashvili (Republic of Georgia), and Ambassador Paula Dobriansky (Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard’s Kennedy School), among others.
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- U.S. Leverage in South Asia | Thursday, March 15 | 2:30pm – 4:00pm | United States Institute of Peace | Register here |
Following the announcement of a new South Asia strategy in August 2017, the Trump administration has laid out significant policy goals in the region, including preventing the Taliban insurgency from winning ground in Afghanistan, deepening the U.S. strategic partnership with India, and forcing a shift in Pakistan’s security strategies towards its neighbors. Does the U.S. have the necessary leverage and influence over key policy makers in South Asia needed to accomplish its policy goals? Does the U.S. have the means to change the calculations of the major players in the region, given their own conflicting goals and priorities? Join the U.S. Institute of Peace for a forward-leaning conversation as experts discuss the future of the U.S. role in South Asia and opportunities for the U.S. to mold decisions by Afghan, Pakistani, Indian and Chinese players to best achieve American interests. Featuring Anish Goel (Senior Fellow, New America Foundation), Robert Hathaway (Public Policy Fellow, Wilson Center), Tamanna Salikuddin (former Senior Advisor, U.S. State Department), and Jay Wise (Jennings Randolph Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace). Moeed Yusuf (Associate Vice President, U.S. Institute of Peace) will moderate the discussion.
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- The National Security Implications of Withdrawing from NAFTA | Friday, March 16 | 1:30pm – 3:00pm | Heritage Foundation | Register here |
Join the Heritage Foundation for a discussion on the national security repercussions of a NAFTA withdrawal and how a strong NAFTA amplifies the U.S.’s regional agenda. Featuring Ben Sasse (Senator for Nebraska), Eric Farnsworth (Vice President, Americas Society/Council of the Americas), and Ambassador John D. Negroponte (Vice Chairman, McLarty Associates), among others.
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A race to save democracy in Venezuela
“If I’m honest to you, I don’t know if I’m going to be able to speak like this again in the near future. I don’t know if this afternoon or tomorrow they will seize some of us, silence the rest of us.” So spoke María Corina Machado, present via video conference at CSIS Headquarters. Machado, one of many Venezuelan opposition leaders threatened with prison since protests in 2014, said that the regime of Nicolás Maduro had closed off possibility of electoral route of restoring democracy in Venezuela. “Every day that Maduro stays in power cannot be counted anymore in hours, but in deaths,” she said, “Venezuelans that are killed with arms and hunger. But, at the same time, it is a growing threat for the whole region.”
Machado’s testimony underlined the urgency of developing a plan to save Venezuela, discussed in an event, “Restoring Venezuela’s Democracy and Halting the Humanitarian Disaster,” at CSIS on February 23. Joining her were Organization of American States Secretary General Luis Almagro and former Bolivian President Jorge Quiroga, along with CSIS experts Moises Rendon and Michael A. Matera, while CSIS President and CEO John J. Hamre delivered opening remarks. Watch full video of the event here:
Takeaways:
Venezuelan democracy, along with the sanctity of surrounding states, is under dire threat. The political crisis has become a humanitarian crisis, with potentially one million refugees already and hunger spreading – Venezuelan citizens having lost on average of nearly 20 pounds over the past year. Secretary General Luis Almagro confirmed the OAS’ opposition to the Maduro regime, calling on the international community to “support action to fashion a way to end the 21st-century narco-dictatorship that is Venezuela.” He welcomed Peru’s decision to disinvite Venezuela from April’s Summit of the Americas in Lima, describing the action as underscoring Maduro’s growing diplomatic isolation and furthering the fracturing of the regime. “Our mission is clear,” Almagro declared, “adopting at this hour increased pressure on the Maduro regime while simultaneously and concretely preparing for the day it falls.”
After Almagro, Jorge Quiroga emphasized the political importance of stemming the Venezuelan crisis. He described the rare confluence of political events in 2018: adding to the quadrennial convergence of elections in Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil (scheduled for May, July, and October, respectively), 2018 will see two historic changes in Cuba and Venezuela. Maduro’s regime, after replacing the opposition-controlled parliament last year, has now brought forward general elections that Quiroga stated would bring about “the second full-out, full-blown Cuba in Latin America in 2018, 58 days from now.” This move leaves the international community in a race against time to pressure the Venezuelan regime to change course from their “slow-motion coup” before peaceful resolution of the crisis becomes impossible.
Almagro and Quiroga proposed a plan of immediate action. Following Almagro’s declaration of the OAS’ commitment to action in Venezuela, Quiroga detailed a plan of immediate action to be taken before the regime is able to conduct its sham elections on April 22 (which have since been delayed until May 20). In this limited time, Quiroga called for “toda la carne el asador” – that is, putting everything on the table. His plan fits under eight points (which, as a means of branding, spell out the acronym CSISMODE):
- Charter – Invoking of Article 20 of the OAS Democratic Charter before April 22 to martial “necessary diplomatic initiatives” from OAS states “to foster the restoration of democracy”.
- Sanctions – Slapping individualized sanctions on Maduro, his government, and their relatives, as well as sectoral sanctions against revenue sources for the Venezuelan government.
- ICC – Referring Maduro regime figures to face charges in the International Criminal Court, following the recent announcement of the opening of an investigation involving Venezuela.
- Seizures – Closing regime figures’ bank accounts and seize their assets in foreign countries, to be returned to the Venezuelan people.
- Migration – Creating an international program and temporary protected status to manage refugees leaving Venezuela.
- Oil – Embargoing Venezuelan oil or placing Venezuelan oil funds in an escrow account to be disbursed by the Venezuelan National Assembly.
- Diplomatic relations – Cutting relations immediately with the Maduro regime based on their credible threats to democracy.
- Expulsions – Expelling Maduro associates and assets from foreign countries and suspending Venezuelan membership of UNASUR.
Maduro must be eased toward regime change. Maria Corina Machado emphasized that there exists a “short but real window of opportunity” to compel the Maduro regime due to the erosion of three of the regime’s five pillars of support. The regime’s cashflow is running dry, popular disapproval is at 90%, and international tolerance is at a breaking point. The Venezuelan government’s survival now rests on support from the drug cartel system and the weakened loyalty of the armed forces. Machado noted prominent defections from Maduro’s government and growing strife within the military as evidence that the regime’s control is shaking.
Machado pressed that allies of democracy can bring regime change by raising the cost of ruling cliques staying in power and lowering the cost of backing down. To Almagro and Quiroga’s plan Machado added that guarantees must be established for civilian and military officials willing to support democracy, and that foreign states supporting Maduro (Russia, China, some Caribbean nations) could be incentivized to side with Venezuelan democracy. She vowed that internal opponents of Maduro would build a civilian platform with the clear objective of a democratic transition, easing the way for regime change in the shortest time possible.
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Another botched move
Josh Marshall gets it right in this morning’s tweet:
The reality is already pretty clear, though it’ll take a few days for people to admit it. The President accepted a non invitation to a summit with Kim Jong un on an clueless impulse. White House now trying to make it unhappen.
Specifically, the National Security Council, where the adult in charge is General McMaster. He managed to get the White House spokesperson to say “”concrete and verifiable action” is required from Pyongyang before the meeting.
That condition has been nowhere evident in the President’s utterances. Nor is it clear that Pyongyang ever issued an invitation, though a meeting with the US president has been a priority goal for the North Koreans for decades. It is certainly reasonable to try to get them to pay something for it.
Unfortunately the clumsy way the non invitation has been accepted and conditions imposed only afterwards undermines US standing in the matter. Of course we can just fail to schedule the meeting if the North Koreans don’t comply with the conditions, but that will make the US look responsible for the failure. It might be better than the alternative: a meeting without substantive accomplishments that gives the North Koreans what they want and the US nothing but an ego-moment for Trump. But if I had to guess, Donald Trump will want to go ahead anyway, convinced that he can by force of personality bring Kim Jong-un around.
The odds of North Korea abandoning its nuclear weapons and missiles are vanishingly small. Unlike Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qaddafi, Kim really does have weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. It is difficult to imagine what diplomatic assurances could equal the guarantee they provide that the US will not attack or seek to overthrow the regime. Nuclear weapons are Kim’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement, a pretty good one. He is not going to abandon them completely.
Our best alternative to a negotiated agreement is tightening sanctions. Certainly they have started to bite. But the history of sanctions is clear: their effectiveness decays with time (because the target country learns how to maneuver around them), and you get what you want from them mainly when you negotiate relief, not when you impose them. So they are not a very good alternative to negotiated agreement, but rather an interim means to getting to the negotiation table.
There is another issue with sanctions: they are only effective so long as others join in imposing them. If the US is perceived as responsible for nixing the presidential meeting, China and others won’t necessarily join the tightening. That would make the sanctions ineffective and strain US relations with whoever doesn’t want to play along with us.
Trump has once again botched a diplomatic move. That’s not surprising: his Secretary of State knew nothing of the President’s intentions and the State Department is a wreck. McMaster is trying to impose some discipline and rescue the President from his own bad and irresistible impulses. This is not the way the US government should be operating.
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