Bob Marley, Israel, and Palestine
I made it home from Jerusalem in good order Saturday, just 20 hours after leaving the American Colony Hotel. Its reality was a bit shabbier than its reputation, but nonetheless welcome after a couple of weeks with our SAIS students in lesser accommodations. Fortunately, the opposite was true of Israel and Palestine: the reality is a better than their reputation.
Let’s start with security. Bad things can happen suddenly anytime anywhere, but on both sides of the quintessential Middle East conflict things were generally calm these past two weeks. Ramallah, Bethlehem, Beit Jala, and Nablus were no less normal than Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. A day of rage declared last week in response to President Trump’s Jerusalem decision and Vice President Pence’s visit seems to have mostly fizzled, though we did see some stone throwers on the outskirts of Ramallah. I’d be more concerned about the cold, wind, and rain in Jerusalem and the West Bank this time of year than the risk of terrorism. The State Department travel warning issued just before our trip is clearly intended to cover bureaucratic asses if something happens.
I’ve already reviewed how Palestinians and Israelis see things. Perhaps more important is how they view each other. You can get the official line at the top from the media: Israelis say they have no partner for negotiating peace, as Palestinians are still making bereavement payments to the families of suicide bombers, while Palestinians say Israel continues to blatantly violate international law in its more than 50-year occupation of the West Bank, its building of settlements, and its continuing constraints on Gaza (despite the withdrawal of its troops).
Israelis seem content with the current situation. They don’t see much of the Gaza or West Bank Palestinians, who are mostly kept on the opposite side of security fences. A very few Gaza Palestinians and more West Bankers work in Israel, especially in construction and menial jobs. Even in Jerusalem, many Palestinians keep to the eastern, Arab part of the city and to the Arab quarter. There are areas where Jews and Arabs mix a bit, especially in the Old City, and there are Palestinian citizens of Israel who are rising socially and professionally throughout Israel. Few of them are likely to prefer living in an independent Palestine, but all can describe the prejudice and discrimination they are subject to. It doesn’t take much to illicit from Jewish Israelis racist remarks about Arabs in general and Palestinians in particular.
Palestinians are holding the short end of the stick. The power imbalance is overwhelming and they know it. Israel’s vibrant economy, advanced technology, and military prowess make it a “First World” country, more akin to Europe than the Middle East. The West Bank and Gaza are poor and largely powerless, all the more so for having a customs and monetary union with Israel. The Israelis not only collect customs revenue on behalf of the Palestinians (and withhold it when they want to exert pressure), but the West Bank is unable to protect its nascent industries with tariffs or devalue its currency. Agriculture, not industry, is therefore still the mainstay of the West Bank economy. There is remarkably little Israeli investment in the West Bank except for its Jewish settlements, and of course none in Hamas-governed Gaza.
But the Palestinians still hold a trump card: their demographic growth. It may already be that there are more Arabs west of the Jordan river than Jews, but if not it will be so soon. Israel’s only option if it wants to remain a Jewish-majority state but prevent an independent Palestinian one is what the Palestinians term apartheid: a system of isolated “bantustans” in the West Bank that will govern themselves while Israel controls security, including freedom of movement, as well as the economy. The Palestinians do not think such a system can last. Some are advocating a one-state solution that will eventually be under Arab control. That, they remind, is what the Palestine Liberation Organization advocated until its 1993 recognition of Israel and acceptance in principle of a Palestinian state on 22% of Mandate Palestine.
Palestinians are fond of correcting foreigners when they ask about “the Jews.” The Jews they say come in many varieties, including those who support an independent Palestinian state and join in nonviolent Palestinian protests. The biggest problems for Palestinians come from the religious settlers in the West Bank, who are often verbally and physically abusive. But ultimately, Palestinians aver, their problems are not with Jews, whom they say they accept as one of the indigenous peoples, but rather with Israel, which refuses to allow them their state and is consequently headed in a non-democratic direction.
Both Palestinians and Israelis should not forget Bob Marley’s message:
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Peace picks, January 29 – February 4
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- Modernizing Trade Rules: The TPP and Beyond | Monday, January 29 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Brookings Institution | Register here |
On January 29, the Center for East Asia Policy Studies will host a panel of experts to discuss the opportunities and challenges of disseminating TPP standards in two critical areas: the digital economy and internet governance, and competitive neutrality and state-owned enterprises. Experts from Japan and the United States will discuss strategies that each country can pursue in on-going or new trade negotiations to advance TPP rules in these critical areas. Featuring panelists Tsuyoshi Kawase (Professor of Law at Sophia University), Maki Kunimatsu (Chief Policy Analyst at Mitsubishi UFJ Research), and Joshua P. Meltzer (Senior Fellow in Global Economy and Development at Brookings), and Amy Porges (Principal at Porges Trade Law PLLC), with moderator Mireya Solís (Co-Director of Center for East Asia Policy Studies Senior Fellow at Brookings).
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- Games and Gamesmanship: Unity and Stability at Pyeongchang | Monday, January 29 | 1:00pm – 2:30pm | Wilson Center | Register here |
When athletes from North and South Korea unite under one flag at the Pyeongchang Olympics, it will be more than a political statement. It may also pave the way for a new approach to deal with Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. Join us for a discussion on the history of sports diplomacy in the Korean Peninsula and the significance of the latest Olympic détente in dealing with Kim Jong-un’s regime. With speakers Jung H. Pak (Brookings Institution), Matthew Kroenig (Georgetown University), and Kang Choi (Asan Institute for Policy Studies).
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- Preventing Atrocities in the 21st Century | Tuesday, January 30 | 9:00am – 11:00am | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
In recent decades we have seen new commitments to protect civilians from mass atrocities. Still, policymakers face obstacles. They may lack access to areas at risk, or leverage over possible perpetrators. So how can we translate political commitments into timely and effective practice? Is it possible to identify risk and prevent mass violence before it erupts? How can justice mechanisms help ensure accountability and prevent future mass violence? Join us on January 30 for a discussion on the state of atrocity prevention with leading experts. Featuring discussants Mô Bleeker (Special Envoy for Dealing with the Past and the Prevention of Atrocities, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs), Lawrence Woocher (Research Director, Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum), and Menachem Rosensaft (General Council, World Jewish Congress), with moderator Jonas Claes (Senior Program Officer, U.S. Institute of Peace). Opening remarks by Ambassador Martin Dahinden (Ambassador of Switzerland to the United States) and Carla Koppell (Vice President, Center for Applied Conflict Transformation, U.S. Institute of Peace).
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- On Refugee Integration and the Global Compact on Refugees: Lessons from Turkey | Tuesday, January 30 | 10:30am – 12:00pm | Brookings Institution | Register here |
The Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) will host a panel discussion on Turkey’s experience with integrating roughly 3.5 million refugees and how that experience can inform the Compact. Izza Leghtas, senior advocate at Refugees International, will discuss the findings of her recent report, “I am only looking for my rights,” on the difficulties refugees face in accessing legal employment and the need for livelihood programs in Turkey’s urban centers. On the basis of his recently completed Syrian Barometer 2017, Murat Erdoğan, director of the Migration and Integration Research Center at the Turkish-German University in Istanbul, will reflect on the attitudes of the Turkish public toward refugee integration, as well as attitudes of the refugees themselves toward their host societies. Elizabeth Ferris, research professor at the Institute of Study of International Migration at Georgetown University, will remark on how Turkey’s experience could relate to the broader issues surrounding global refugee governance and inform the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework. Kemal Kirişci, TÜSİAD senior fellow and director of the Turkey Project at Brookings, will moderate the discussion.
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- Broadcasting Change: Arabic Media as a Catalyst for Liberalism | Tuesday, January 30 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |
Given the turmoil in the Middle East, liberals in Arabic-speaking countries have been routinely dismissed as too small in number to make a difference. Yet today, Arab liberals lead some of the largest regional media outlets, using their broadcasts to promote religious toleration and pluralism, civil society, gender equality, and rule of law. With the new National Security Strategy’s emphasis on “Competitive Engagement,” how can the United States work to bolster the efforts of these reformers in Arab media? Hudson Institute will host a discussion to assess the challenges to strengthening reformist media in the Arab World. The panel will consist of Joseph Braude, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and advisor at the Al-Mesbar Center for Research and Studies in Dubai; Ambassador Alberto Fernandez, President, Middle East Broadcasting Networks; Adam Garfinkle, Editor, The American Interest; Eric Brown, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute. This event will be live streamed on Hudson’s homepage.
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- Taking Stock of the Transatlantic Relationship: Female Thought Leaders Reflect on 2017 | Wednesday, January 31 | 4:00pm – 5:15pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
Please join the Atlantic Council and the Robert Bosch Foundation Alumni Association for a conversation with female thought leaders about the current state of the transatlantic relationship. This panel discussion will convene leading female voices from across the transatlantic policy community to reflect back on the past year, and discuss the future of NATO and US engagement in Europe, how the transatlantic partnership must adapt to today’s strategic environment, and the importance of female leadership in foreign policy and international security. This expert discussion featuring female leaders in transatlantic foreign and security policy is the inaugural event of the Atlantic Council’s Global Diversity and Inclusion Initiative. A conversation with Amb. Kristen Silverberg (Managing Director,
Institute of International Finance; Former US Ambassador to the European Union), Julianne Smith (Senior Fellow and Director, Transatlantic Security Program, Center for a New American Security), and Christine Wormuth (Director, Adrienne Arsht Center for Resilience, Atlantic Council; Former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, US Department of Defense). Moderated by Sally Painter (Chief Operating Officer, Blue Star Strategies; Senior Advisor, Future Europe Initiative, Atlantic Council). A networking reception will follow the event.
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- Changing Dynamics in the Gulf: A Conversation with Qatari Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani| Thursday, February 1 | 9:00am – 10:00am | American Enterprise Institute | Register here |
Once an important mechanism for cooperation, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) since June 2017 has been fractured with one member state, Qatar, the focus of a diplomatic and economic blockade spearheaded by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. A Kuwaiti-led mediation process has not resolved the crisis, at a time when Russia’s reemergence in the Middle East, the growing influence of disinformation campaigns, and Iran’s ongoing malign activities all suggest that deeper challenges lie ahead. Who benefits from this standoff between traditional American allies? What are the implications of a continuing crisis in the GCC for the region and for US partnerships? Join AEI’s Andrew Bowen and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar HE Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani as they discuss US-Qatar relations and the challenges confronting the Gulf region. With introductory remarks by Danielle Pletka of AEI.
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- Protests in North Africa: Parallels and Prospects | Thursday, February 1 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |
Seven years after the outbreak of the Arab Spring in North Africa, demonstrators are taking to the streets again in Tunisia and Morocco. How do these protests compare with each other, and to previous waves of uprisings across the Arab World since 2011? How are these activists starting new conversations around social, economic, and political issues in their countries? The Middle East Institute is pleased to host a panel discussion examining the social and economic drivers behind these demonstrations, as well as prospects for resolving these inequities. MEI’s senior vice president for policy research and programs, Paul Salem, will moderate a discussion with Wafa Ben Hassine (MENA policy counsel for Access Now, via Skype), Intissar Fakir (editor-in-chief of Sada, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), and Dokhi Fassihian (senior program manager, Middle East and North Africa, Freedom House) to discuss these issues.
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- Iranian Public Opinion after the Protests | Friday, February 2 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
The Atlantic Council’s Future of Iran Initiative and the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland invite you to a panel discussion on Iranian public opinion in the aftermath of recent protests. The event will present new public opinion data gathered since demonstrations broke out in more than 100 Iranian cities and towns in late December protesting poor economic conditions, Iran’s interventions abroad, and domestic political constraints. The event will also relate Iranian attitudes on political and economic issues to a broader set of regional and international issues, including Iran’s regional influence, Iranian relations with the West, and the Iranian nuclear deal. A conversation with Kelsey Davenport (Director for Nonproliferation, Arms Control Association), Dr. Ebrahim Mohseni (Research Scholar, Center for International and Security Studies, University of Maryland), and Adnan Tabatabai (co-founder and CEO, Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient). Moderated by Barbara Slavin (Director, Future of Iran Initiative, Atlantic Council).
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Trump will fail
I’ve been in Israel and Palestine for the past two weeks, contrary to the State Department’s unequivocal guidance. It would be foolish of me to suggest that I know what people here think. Khalil Shikaki’s polling will serve you much better. But personal contact and conversation also have their virtue.
One Israeli early in my time here suggested that he knew why the conflict has lasted so long and proved so intractable. While many here refer pejoratively to the “peace industry” that grew up around and after the Oslo accords, there is also now a war industry: politicians so attached to derogatory images of the other side that they don’t believe they can survive without it. Yitzhak Rabin, assassinated by an ultra-nationalist supporter of settlements in the West Bank in 1995, was the last Prime Minister to have both the political clout and the confidence in the peace process to deliver.
This rings true to me. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Abbas need each other for political survival: Netanyahu’s over the top positions provide Abu Mazen with what he needs to remind Palestinians, many of whom are not fond of the PA, that the Israeli state does not treat them fairly. When Netanyahu says Jerusalem has been the capital of the Jews for 3000 years, the more than 35% of the population that is Arab runs (figuratively) to embrace the PA. When Abbas says he intends to end security cooperation with Israel, many Jews embrace Netanyahu’s hard line.
Netanyahu is also fond of saying he has no negotiating partner. The Palestinians feel the same way. Their view is that Israel wants to hang on to the West Bank and East Jerusalem, allowing the Palestinians self-governance but preventing them from joining the Palestinian citizens of Israel (20% or so of the population) in having the right to vote. Netanyahu confirmed that is his one-state plan at Davos yesterday. This from the Palestinian perspective is no better than apartheid, since it denies Arabs equal political rights within a single state.
President Trump signaled that he supports this idea when he tried to take Jerusalem off the table by American support for Israeli sovereignty over the entire city. He thought this would facilitate negotiations, which he described as stuck on Jerusalem. That is false. Jerusalem has never really been on the negotiating agenda as it was always left for last of the so-called “final status” issues. Even so, the various negotiations since Oslo have made significant progress on defining shared solutions for the city, as Israeli scholar Lior Lehrs points out. As usual, Trump upset the apple cart, but to no apparent purpose, while also proposing the barbaric idea of cutting humanitarian assistance for refugees.
The result is that people here are gloomy about the prospects, but most are also enjoying the relative peace and stability of the past few years. Many Jews like the separation wall that keeps the Palestinians separate, though tens of thousands cross it daily both legally and illegally to work in Israel. Many Palestinians are resentful of Israeli restrictions on their freedom of movement, of which the wall is but one example: West Bankers need special permission to visit Jerusalem and some even need permission to leave Ramallah. Palestinians regard the West Bank and Gaza as “occupied” and many believe violence in resisting occupation is justified.
But few in the West Bank take up arms, which are not generally available, while virtually all Israelis have weapons and its security forces have excellent intelligence capabilities. Instead, the Palestinians are pursuing non-violent means: international acceptance of the Palestinian state as well as a campaign for boycott, disinvestment and sanctions (BDS) against Israel and the West Bank settlements. Israel finds that much harder to respond to than terrorist acts, and Jews worldwide are uncomfortable to the point of complaining about “de-legitimization” of Israel.
Neither side at this point has the kind of leadership or strategy that could lead to a negotiated peace. Netanyahu regards the current situation as better than anything he can get at the negotiating table. It allows him to continue expanding settlements on the West Bank, to the glee of his right-wing coalition partners, and to pursue an anti-Iran coalition with Sunni Arab states. Abbas is serving the ninth year of a four-year term, validated only by a vote of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s Central Council. His relatively moderate strategy may make Jews uncomfortable, but it hasn’t raise the costs to Netanyahu significantly. The US, whose proper role in the negotiations is to deliver its ally Israel to an otherwise unsatisfactory outcome, has chosen instead to align itself with Trump.
I do think peace is possible, despite the enormous power asymmetry. But not now. Until the US, PA and Israel have new leaders committed to a negotiated outcome, all three will muddle through, with the Israelis changing the reality on the ground and the Palestinians trying to undermine Israel’s international legitimacy while increasing their own. Trump will fail to deliver the deal of the century, as he has at everything but enriching himself and gaining enormous notoriety.
PS: For a marginally more optimistic view, see Chatham House’s recent commentary.
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Israeli advantages
I wrote a couple of days ago about the current Palestinian narrative. Today I’ll try to describe the Jewish Israeli narrative, though that is more difficult because there is a far wider range of views. The Palestinians seem to me to have become a nation (that is: a community with a common language, culture and beliefs about their identity, even though most are Muslim and a small percentage Christian) but failed to complete their state, partly due to Israeli resistance. The Jews have built an impressive state that dominates both in Israel inside the 1967 borders and outside them, but their nation is less fully formed. My liberal Judaism, to which most American Jews adhere, is a small and sometimes barely tolerated minority in Israel.
Many Israeli Jews believe their presence in the West Bank and the (not complete) blockade of Gaza are security necessities. They attribute the decline of terrorist attacks in Israel to the security barrier, which they like to call a fence (they claim it is 92% fence and only 8% wall). They are pleased with the recently unveiled capacity to detect and destroy tunnels Hamas and others dig into Israel from Gaza. Even Israeli Jews who would like to see withdrawal from the West Bank in order to allow the creation of a Palestinian state emphasize that the Jewish settlements there constitute a small percentage of the land area: some say less than 3%, others less than 6%, as it depends on what you count.
There is little doubt though that someone in Jerusalem is planning the settlements and infrastructure (roads, electricity, water) for a permanent presence in the West Bank, especially but not only in the territory near Jerusalem that the Israelis have formally annexed. The settlements already break up the areas the Palestinian Authority controls or administers into more than 150 enclaves (islands). Some are connected by tunnels, but not most. The right-wing parties that participate in Prime Minister Netanyahu’s government want to expand the population living in the West Bank to one million, while legalizing many outposts that are currently considered illegal.
Some claim that the settlements built on state or privately owned land are legitimate. This relies on a claim that Israel is the successor state to Jordan, the British mandate, and the Ottoman Empire in the territory it controls, a claim that has been neither agreed nor adjudicated so far as I am aware. Some also believe legitimate settlements should be able to stay under Palestinian sovereignty after final status is decided. That is difficult to imagine in practice, but there are certainly Israeli Jews putting it forward in theory.
When talking about the Palestinians, many less liberal Israeli Jews–and for that matter American ones–betray an attitude that can only be described as discriminatory, or worse. One carefully explained that the more Orthodox Jewish settlements outside the 1967 borders were built to give poor Haredim more acceptable living conditions than in the crowded neighborhoods of West Jerusalem. There is little concern or funding for the crowded Palestinian neighborhoods, and certainly no building of new towns for them near Jerusalem. Another cited his settlement’s good relations with its Arab neighbors–a laudable achievement–in terms that suggested their social and cultural inferiority. Americans should be familiar with these attitudes: in a more virulent form, they now occupy the mind of the current inhabitant of the White House when it comes to Mexican and African Americans, not to mention all of Africa and Haiti.
Israeli Jews both inside and outside the 1967 borders find the current situation tolerable. Most have little contact with Arabs, apart from those who do construction or menial jobs. Intellectual interchange with Palestinians is now mostly limited to a Jewish elite that sympathizes with their desire for self-determination. The fence/wall is not only physical but psychological and cultural. The costs of securing (the Palestinians would say occupying) the West Bank and blockading Gaza are tolerable. Tuesday’s “day of rage” against Trump/Pence proved eminently manageable. The Israelis exploit the water and other resources of the West Bank with abandon, training their soldiers in its nature parks and raiding supposedly Palestinian-secured areas at will while denying building permits.
There is an enormous power imbalance between Israel and the Palestinians: politically, militarily, and economically Israel is overwhelmingly dominant. Its per capita GDP is perhaps 20 times that of the Palestinians outside the 1967 borders. The Palestinians have no army and apart from their police no legitimate weapons. Their state is largely dysfunctional and their security forces beholden to the Israelis. The Palestinians say the West Bank and Gaza live under an apartheid system in the making, or some say already made. The Israelis see these asymmetries as advantages to be exploited.
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Promising
Meeting today for the first time in Davos, Greek Prime Minister Tsipras and Macedonian Prime Minister Zaev exchanged friendly words and gestures. Tsipras said in part:
We must find a solution to all our pending issues, so that as our neighbor country wishes its European accession process and its membership to NATO can move ahead so in particular I made clear that we must find a mutually agreed solution, erga omnes, and in this framework we agreed to intensify the negotiation process that is taking place under the UN in order to reach a solution on the name.
He also announced unblocking of his “neighboring country’s” hopes in connection with the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (can I confess I don’t know what that is?) and further progress in EU accession.
Zaev said in part:
The final solution has to be acceptable to both sides, we need to take care of the interest of one another, the solution has to take care of the national dignity and identity of our peoples to show practically that we are stronger committed to finding a solution, I announce that our government will change the names of the airport and highway, the highway will be called Friendship. Our actions show our good faith, this testifies to the fact that we have no irredentist aspirations towards our neighbor.
For the uninitiated: the airport and highway were both named for Alexander the Great, whom the Greeks claim exclusively as their own, along with the name “Macedonia.”
This exchange sounds pretty good to me. There is willingness on both sides to try to move things forward, in the context of the more than two-decade-old UN mediation. Particularly promising is Tsipras recognition that EU and NATO accession for his neighbor are important, implying that Greece should bend to make them happen.
The devil is of course in the details, especially those two Latin words: erga omnes. What the Greeks want is a name for the country the United States has been calling the Republic of Macedonia for more than a decade that will be used for all applications (“towards all”). This means not only in its relations with Greece, but also with other countries and even internally, requiring a change in the country’s constitution.
That’s difficult for the Macedonians, who have been calling their republic Macedonia and themselves Macedonians at least since 1944. Of course the Greek claim is far more ancient, but it is hard for many of us to see how a place called the Republic of Macedonia can be confused with Alexander’s Macedonia, any more than the Estados Unidos Mexicanos can be confused with the United States, or New Mexico with Mexico. Nor is there any more irredentist claim associated with the the use of the name Macedonia than in these other cases, where no such claim exists.
What’s at issue here is not really the name but rather identity. Many Greeks believe themselves, their language and their culture to be descended from the ancient Greeks and admit no other claim. The language of the Republic of Macedonia is Slavic, not Greek, in origin and most of its citizens make no claim to descent from the ancients, though some part of ancient Macedonia is inside the Republic (most of which was Paeonia I am told).
So what’s the problem? Most citizens of Macedonia are happy for their republic to be called Macedonia. Though they have been glad to repeatedly and definitively reject any implication of a claim to Greek territory, they don’t want to change their identity or their republic’s to suit a neighbor. Greece has wanted to deny them this privilege, seeing it as an assault on Greek identity and feeling the need to defend themselves.
Nothing announced today even comes close to resolving this deeper identity conflict. But confidence building is a good thing. Today’s mutual announcements are a promising new start in the right direction. Ethnic nationalist politicians in both countries will now try to slam the door shut to any further progress. Tsipras and Zaev will need determination and luck to keep things moving in the right direction.
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Resist to exist in dignity
I’m in Jerusalem, where Vice President Pence declared to the Knesset today:
We stand with Israel because we believe in right over wrong, good over evil and liberty over tyranny.
That confirms what President Trump had already made clear with his decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem, without even mentioning the Palestinian hope of a capital there: that Washington will no longer even pretend to be neutral in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.
I’ve spent the last four days or so on a SAIS study trip talking mainly with Palestinians, having spent the previous several talking with Israelis. Here I’ll focus on the Palestinians, since their views will be less reported and are far less known. I’ve also spoken to quite a few Jewish Israelis who would agree at least in part with their Palestinian colleagues, though the majority is thrilled with Trump’s move and Pence’s audacity.
The mood among the Palestinians I’ve talked with is annoyance, sadness, frustration, and exasperation. They are profoundly disappointed that the United States, which they have seen as the standard bearer of human rights and international law, has abandoned that vocation for an America First policy that guarantees declining American influence and strengthens Israeli determination to maintain its settlers in occupied Palestinian territory. The rumor that the Americans intend to relabel their East Jerusalem consulate as the embassy, in order to make the move more quickly, rubs salt in Palestinian wounds, since it means that the Americans will not accept a Palestinian capital in that traditionally Arab part of a city.
The Palestinians are planning a general strike and demonstrations tomorrow in response to Trump/Pence. That of course may boil over into violence, not least because in the Palestinian view the Israeli security forces seem to prefer it that way: they can more easily disperse a crowd with tear gas and rubber bullets if given even a slight excuse to do so. But at least those Palestinians we’ve been talking with are hopeful that violence will be avoided. The successful nonviolent confrontation in July, when massive crowds of praying Palestinians forced the Israelis to remove security devices from the entrances to the Al Aqsa compound in Jerusalem, is the paradigm many hope will prevail. There is of course no guarantee it will.
Conditions for Palestinians vary from catastrophic in Gaza and the refugee camps of the West Bank to maddening in the more or less middle class neighborhoods of Ramallah, Beit Jalla, and Nablus. The Israeli occupation is evident to Palestinians every day:
- Checkpoints not only coming into the West Bank but between the major Palestinian towns
- Settlements that loom like recently arrived space ships over the West Bank
- Prohibited roads used only by settlers, who hope to number 1 million within the next few years
- Settler violence, rarely punished, against Palestinians, including murder
- Destruction of olive trees and other factors of production
- Jerusalem Palestinians “exiled” to the West Bank without permission to return to the city and the vast majority of Gaza residents who can never leave their densely populated strip
- Gates that close off particular towns without any apparent or announced security justification
- House and other building demolitions, ostensibly due to lack of permits, which are almost never granted to Palestinians while Jewish illegal outposts are not only tolerated but often legalized
- Israeli security raids into areas that are supposed to be under exclusive Palestinian control
Some Jewish Israelis would claim these measures are justified, but that reminds me of a story one told: he found one of his two children crying uncontrollably and when asked what happened she responded “It all started when she hit me back.”
The Palestinian leadership is aging. No one knows who will succeed Mahmoud Abbas as President, or many other figures now reaching into their late 70s and 80s. Seventy per cent of their population is under 30 years old. Many young people are looking not to Fatah and Hamas for leadership but rather to “popular struggle”: resist to exist in dignity is their motto. They trust no one, one elder statesman advised, follow no one, and want to define their own future. Let’s hope they do so nonviolently, and with more wisdom and restraint than the President and Vice President of the United States.
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