Peace picks October 30 – November 3
- Global Trends in Humanitarian Assistance | Monday, October 30 | 3:30 – 5:00 pm | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register Here | Improving humanitarian assistance is a foreign policy priority. The complex, multilateral humanitarian response system is stretched and in need of reform. Funding challenges remain a primary concern, as increased humanitarian demand is far outpacing global contributions. Please join us for a discussion on global trends in the humanitarian space as part of the official launch of The Humanitarian Agenda, a new, center-wide CSIS program created in partnership with the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). The launch is an opportunity to reflect on evolving trends in humanitarian assistance and to discuss how the global community can more effectively deliver humanitarian aid. Speakers, including Robert Jenkins of the U.S. Agency for International Development, Jérôme Oberreit of Médecins Sans Frontières, Ambassador Dina Kawar of Jordan, Sam Worthington of InterAction, and Kimberly Flowers and Jon B. Alterman of CSIS will explore emerging challenges and share innovative solutions. How will fragile states and protracted conflicts impact domestic priorities, foreign policy, and the international landscape? Will the United States remain the global leader in humanitarian response? What are the best practices to prepare and respond to sequential natural disasters? What are the major gaps on-the-ground and what critical new capacities do we have to create to address them?
- THO Teleconference Series: Crisis in US-Turkey Relations | Tuesday, October 31 | 10:15 – 11:15 am | Turkish Heritage Organization (participation in the teleconference is online) | Register Here | The events of the past month have brought new frictions to the fore of an already tense U.S.-Turkey relationship. After the Turkish government arrested a Turkish national employed by the U.S. consulate in Istanbul – one of three such detentions or attempted detentions this year – the U.S. Department of State suspended all non-immigrant visa services in Turkey. The Turkish government quickly responded in kind. This drastic step in diplomatic relations between the two countries has impacted Turkish and American citizens, from diplomats and business people to students and tourists. H.E. Matthew Bryza (former U.S. Ambassador and Former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Europe & Eurasia and Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council) and Prof. Ilter Turan (Professor of Political Science at Bilgi University and President of the International Political Science Association) will discuss the wide-ranging ramifications of the current crisis, from its impact on regional diplomatic action to people-to-people relations between the U.S. and Turkey. The experts will also tackle possible solutions to the situation. The discussion will be followed by Q&A.
- Pakistan’s Emerging Middle Class: Lessons from a Country in Transition | Tuesday, October 31 | 2:00 – 3:30 pm | Urban Institute | Register Here | Pakistan’s middle class has experienced substantial growth over the past 30 years. This surge has resulted in significant challenges for the country’s economy and politics. Understanding lessons learned from Pakistan’s middle class expansion can illuminate and inform policymakers about issues facing the developing world’s rising middle class. Join the Urban Institute, in collaboration with the Consortium for Development Policy Research, for a discussion about Pakistan’s emerging middle class. Our panel of leading researchers on Pakistan and global development will explore the rise of the middle class and discuss implications for economic mobility, inequality, education, and political participation. This event will include a panelist from Pakistan, who will participate virtually. The panel will feature Ali Cheema of the Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives, Homi Kharas of the Brookings Institution, Ghazala Mansuri of the World Bank, Ijaz Nabi of the Consortium for Development Policy Research, and Reehana Raza of the Urban Institute. The Urban Institute’s Charles Cadwell will moderate.
- Building MENA Stability in a Climate-Changed World: Defining a Transatlantic Agenda | Wednesday, November 1 | 10:00 – 11:30 am | Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars | Register Here | The European Union and United States are investing heavily in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region to fulfill political, economic, and security objectives. Infrastructure investment decisions being made today will largely determine the region’s future vulnerability and should be informed by a comprehensive understanding of the region’s risk profile. MENA faces growing risks of instability and is highly vulnerable to climate impacts, food, and oil price shocks. Development strategies need to focus more strongly on building economic, climate, and social resilience alongside broader-based economic growth. This will require deeper and sustained transatlantic dialogue and engagement with financial institutions. If successful, transatlantic cooperation in MENA could be a model for other regions. This event will feature Carlota Cenalmor of the European Investment Bank, James Close of the World Bank, and Nick Mabey of E3G. Roger-Mark De Souza of the Wilson Center will moderate.
- Looking forward at US-Turkey Relations | Thursday, November 2 | 2:00 – 3:30 pm | Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research (SETA) | Register Here | On October 8, 2017, the US announced that it was suspending non-immigrant visa services at its diplomatic facilities in Turkey. Turkey responded in kind by suspending new visas to US citizens. As progress has been made toward resolving this crisis, it has created an opportunity for greater examination of the US-Turkey relations. Despite tensions between Washington and Ankara on a number of issues, both sides recognize the importance of remaining committed to the partnership. The SETA Foundation at Washington DC is pleased to invite you to an event to examine these issues, and the ways that Turkey and the US might renew and restrengthen bilateral relations through a resolution of the current visa crisis. Speakers include Richard Outzen of the US Department of State, Mark Kimmit of MTK Defense Consultants, and Kilic B. Kanat of SETA. SETA’s Kadir Ustun will moderate.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
War profits
Last week at the Middle East Institute, Tim Eaton of Chatham House defined “war economies” simply as an economy during wartime, including but not exclusive to the parts of the economy that directly fuel conflict. Eaton was joined by fellow Chatham House experts Lina Khatib and Renad Mansour on October 19 in a panel on “Wartime Economies in the Middle East: A Look into Libya, Syria, and Iraq.” The Middle East Institute’s Paul Salem moderated.
Eaton provided an overview of the economic situation in Libya, identifying four modalities: individuals with goods to sell, those who generate rent money, those who prey on state revenue, and those who receive salaries from external backers. Concerning those who sell goods, one of the main avenues for such activity has long been the smuggling of subsidized products, an industry which persists post-revolution. Criminalized trade, especially in drugs, has also been a major source of revenue, generating $400-$500 million per year. Additionally, since 2013, the movement of people has been included in this category. The biggest industry, however, is still oil and fuel smuggling, which generates about $2.5 billion.
Rents are another avenue for certain individuals, the money coming from the establishment of checkpoints and the control of territory. This has led to extortion through blockades imposed on roads and oil fields, with such blockades costing the state over $160 billion in the East alone. The state has also been experiencing losses due to those who are able to “prey upon state revenue.” Since 97% of revenue comes from oil and gas trade, Eaton considered this a critical area from which revenue has been taken. These losses have also been augmented due to the discrepancy between the US dollar to Libyan dinar exchange rate both in the official sector, where it is 1.4 dinars, and in the black market, where it is 8 dinars. Those with the means to buy products at the official rate and sell them in the black market have seen major profits.
Eaton emphasized that all actors in Libya have been benefiting from the conflict, finding ways to take advantage of the country’s situation. Since armed groups have been able to obtain salaries as a result of the conflict, this has encouraged them to maintain the status quo. There is little incentive to find a solution to the conflict or undergo a political process. On a state level, economic difficulties, as well as “administrative chaos” and questions of legitimacy, have hindered the functioning of the three most important state institutions: the National Oil Company, the Central Bank, and the Libyan Investment Authority.
Mansour focused on the effect of economic factors on the survival and functioning of ISIS in Iraq. The international community has tried military and political solutions. The one solution most overlooked has been the economic solution. The key concept here, according to Mansour, is that organizations and individuals are opportunistic: they go where jobs and money are available, such as ISIS. In looking for ways to defeat ISIS, creating alternatives that would allow potential members to survive economically is important. ISIS has three key sources of revenue: trade (goods, oil, antiquities, etc.), fees (through taxation, rents, and licenses), and state resources. Looking to the future, ISIS is now investing in “legitimate industries” such as hotels, pharmaceuticals, and currency exchanges, to maintain their economic power and facilitate a future revival. In response, Iraqi state institutions and international actors have been working on limiting ISIS’s influence. Their flaw, according to Mansour, has been that none of these actors are working together.
Khatib gave an overview of the war economy in Syria, grouping the different areas of the country into three categories: areas under the control of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, areas besieged by the regime, and areas under regime control. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham has been following a similar model to that of ISIS in that they have been investing in formal industries while also setting up private companies to maintain the group’s economic independence. They have also been benefiting from their control of water and electricity in Idlib, collecting charges from residents. There has also been much trade activity between such rebel-held areas and regime areas, which has encouraged both sides to maintain the status quo, much like the situation in Libya.
Besieged areas have also witnessed trade activities, primarily through tunnels operated by middlemen. The government has been manipulating the formal exchange rate, making the rate inside besieged areas higher than elsewhere and consequently accumulating more revenue.
Regime-held areas have experienced much change. Since 2011, the state budget has decreased from $18 to $4 billion, with half now coming from external actors supporting the regime, and inflation has increased by 700%. To evade sanctions, the regime has set up front companies in loyalists’ names. For example, the Syrian Council for Metal and Steel set up in 2015 has contracts with its international partners Iran and Russia. Iran has militias and business-people working for it in the country. Khatib noted that the extent of outside interference has begun to worry the regime, and that true reconstruction, particularly including a return of refugees is not a goal of the state.
A key takeaway from the speakers’ overviews of the topic and the ensuing discussion is that economic alternatives to the present situation–which presents many economic incentives–must be found. The importance of political processes will not surpass the importance of economic security for citizens and state institutions alike. So long as the current situation is more profitable than any alternatives, it will persist.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Assad will fight to the last Iranian
I did this interview last week for Nozhan Etezadosaltaneh of the Islamic Republic’s Tehran daily Iran. I was informed today that it has been published. I’ll appreciate it if anyone can let me know whether it has been fully and accurately translated into Farsi:
- As a experienced Counselor who knows about the functioning of international institutions, do you think the UN can help to end the Syria crisis ? Some people say institutions like UN don’t have executive power and can not take positive steps toward peace in conflict regions. What is your opinion about the view?
A: The UN is already playing important roles: it provides a great deal of humanitarian assistance in Syria and to refugees in neighboring countries, it has a commission that has reported extensively on human rights violations in Syria, it has established an international, impartial and independent mechanism to assist in investigating and prosecuting international crimes committed in Syria, and it also sponsors the Geneva talks on political transition. Behind the scenes it has played a role in some particular ceasefires and other agreements that have saved lives. Of course it lacks executive power to determine the outcome of the war, but is doing things that lessen the war’s impact, make it possible to hold parties accountable for their wartime behavior, and may lead to an end to the fighting. Those aren’t bad things, they just aren’t all I might hope for.
2. After the end of ISIS in Raqqa, which actor can take control of the city and restore order and public services? Iran and Russia along with the Syrian government, the Kurdish forces or the Syrian armed opposition and their Western allies?
A: My impression is that initial control of Raqqa lies with the Kurdish-led but partly Arab-manned Syrian Democratic Forces, with support from the Western coalition. In the east, Iran and Russia have focused on Deir Azour.
3. Do you think the American troops will enter Syria directly after ISIS defeat in the country?
A: American troops have been in Syria for months fighting ISIS. I don’t know if they will stay. The Trump Administration might prefer that they withdraw, but that will leave US allies open to attacks from both the regime coalition (including Russia and Iran) as well as Turkey, which regards the Kurds who fought against ISIS under US protection as terrorists because they are connected to the PKK inside Turkey. If the Americans stay, it will be to ensure ISIS does not return, to restrain the Kurds, protect Arabs who have fought ISIS, and to prevent attacks from either Turkey or the regime coalition.
4. What will be the consequences of ISIS defeat for the neighboring countries in the region in your opinion? Do you think we should expect more confrontations and problems or it could help to bring stability and peace in the region?
A: I am not seeing an end to instability yet. With Assad still in power, I expect an insurgency to continue against his dictatorship, by both relatively moderate and extremist forces. Assad will not be happy with US troops in the east and Turkish troops in northern Syria and Idlib, or relatively moderate rebels in the south. Turkey, Iran and Russia, which have collaborated in recent months, may have a falling out, as their visions of a future Syria may well conflict.
4. Analysis shows that for example around six thousand Tunisian joined to ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Do you think the jihadists will return to their countries and cause trouble for their countries?
A: Trouble from jihadis returning to their home countries is certainly to be expected. Local grievances in those countries played an important role in recruitment. Now that they are trained and deadly, their return could generate big problems.
5. Do you think that ISIS defeat in Syria will be an opportunity for re-rise of Al-Qaeda in the country and the region?
A: Al Qaeda has played a savvier game in Syria and elsewhere by embedding itself with local forces, whereas ISIS sought a monopoly on power and was content to be led and partly manned by people who were not native to the country they were fighting in. But I also think a lot of people are fed up with the jihadis and will get rid of them if empowered to do. That is certainly true in parts of Idlib.
6. Some analysts believe that the Arab countries of the region especially Saudi Arabia have directly and indirectly contributed to ISIS. Do you agree with the opinion? What will the effect of ISIS failure in Syria on Saudi Arabia?
A: Wahhabi ideology has had a role in generating ISIS, but it has been clear for some time now that ISIS and Al Qaeda are enemies of the Saudi monarchy and Saudi Arabia does not support them through official channels. There may be Saudi private individuals who do however, including of course Osama bin Laden. This, too, the Saudis have tried to stop.
7. Saudi Arabia consistently criticized Obama’s policy toward the Syria crisis and and accused Obama of passivity and strengthening Hizbollah and Iran in the region. What do you think about current Saudi Arabia approach about US policy on Syria ? do you think Trump is able to satisfy the Saudis in this regard ? What will be the impact of the recent US and Saudi Arabia getting closer to each other on the future of Syria?
A: The Saudis haven’t shown a lot of interest in Syria lately. Trump has doubled down on what Obama started–the drone war plus cooperation with the Kurds and their Arab allies against ISIS–but I haven’t heard a lot of applause from Riyadh, which is far more focused for now on Yemen. That said, the Saudis clearly prefer Trump to Obama, because they think he will do more to counter Iranian influence in the region, even if not in Syria.
8. Which one will be winner in a possible conflict in Syria in your opinion? Iran or US?
Both will win the war they are fighting: the US will win its war against ISIS; Iran will win its war to keep Assad in power, at least for now. Tehran may also gain its desired land bridge through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon, as well as a permanent presence for Hizbollah in Syria. Washington has, oddly, not yet begun to counter those efforts in a serious and concerted way.
9. What do you think about Israel policy after ISIS defeat in Syria? It seems that ISIS presence in Syria to have benefited Israel. What do you think about the view? Do you think Israel will get into the phase of military operation in Syria fearing that Hizbollah will be closer to Golan and the borders of that country? Will ISIS failure be a threat for Israel?
A: I don’t think the Israelis think they benefited from ISIS in Syria. They do not want ISIS on the border. Nor do they want Hizbollah on their border. Many have thought they would prefer Assad, who has done nothing against Israel despite a lot of talk. Hizbollah and ISIS are both threats to Israel, and I expect it to take what measures it needs to protect itself. Assad has shown little will or ability to respond effectively.
10. Recently, The King of Saudi Arabia traveled to Russia. Some believe that in exchange for economic privileges he urged Russia to persuade Iran to withdraw from Syria and limit its role in the country. Do you think he has succeeded in convincing Putin on the matter?
A: I think the Russians already want to withdraw some of their forces from Syria, no matter what the Saudis say. Syria has cost Moscow quite a bit in money and lives. I don’t expect Iran to reduce its influence (presence is a different matter), so long as Assad is in power. He is now essentially an Iranian puppet.
11. What will Russia program for Syria after the ISIS defeat in your opinion? How long will Russia be able to move between the Shiite and Sunni poles? Don’t you think Putin finally will have to choose one side? Do you think Russia will leave Tehran and cooperate with Saudi Arabia and Sunni countries or will continue to cooperate with Iran on the Syria issue?
A: Russia has already chosen the Shiite side, though it maintains Sunni links even inside Syria. So long as Iran is not hostile to Russia’s military presence in Syria, I think Moscow will continue to cooperate with Tehran.
12. Do you think the situation of Syria without ISIS will be better for all of the region or this is only beginning a new phase of war among the main international and regional actors? Are you optimistic about the future of Syria after ISIS and the consequences? Read more
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
White flag
Therefore, in order to fulfill our responsibilities and obligations towards the people of Kurdistan and Iraq, we propose the following to the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi and world public opinion:
1. An immediate ceasefire and halt to all military operations in the Kurdistan Region.2. Freeze the results of the referendum conducted in Iraqi Kurdistan.3. Start an open dialogue between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Iraqi Federal Government on the basis of the Constitution.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Two chairs
Hoyt Yee, the deputy assistant secretary of State whose bailiwick includes the Balkans, said yesterday in Belgrade that Serbia “cannot sit on two chairs at the same time.” He was referring to Belgrade’s efforts to both accede to the EU and maintain close relations with Vladimir Putin’s Russia. These goals are just too far apart, he suggested.
I agree, but the question arises: why would anyone in a country that needs economic and political reform latch on to Moscow? Russia has an economy the size of Spain’s (with Catalonia) and a political system that resorts to prosecution and assassination to eliminate competition. While the Russian military has enjoyed some success in its interventions in Ukraine and Syria, it has nowhere near the capacity the West has to protect its friends and allies. Russia is a declining regional power, one heavily dependent on hydrocarbons rather than a diversified economy.
There are nevertheless people in Serbia who feel they need “the warm embrace of the Russian bear,” as one of them put it to me. “When,” he asked, “was the last time an American president visited Belgrade?” I didn’t know it at the time, but the correct answer seems to be Jimmy Carter, in 1980. That is indeed a long time ago. President Trump has allegedly promised to visit next year.
What does the warm Russian embrace entail? While fundamentally a political link, Belgrade’s affection for Moscow also entails military cooperation, economic interests, and Slavic cultural affinity. The Russians have given Serbia MiGs, involved Serbia in military exercises, and established a “humanitarian” logistics base near Nis. They prevent Kosovo from entering the United Nations. They have also taken possession of much of the Serbian energy sector. Belgrade might prefer F16s, but Washington doesn’t give them away, and lack of appropriate pipelines hinders efforts to wean Serbia from Russian gas. Russia Today and Sputnik News are making big efforts to sustain the long history of Slavic brotherhood with Serbia, not to mention the efforts of the Serb and Russian Orthodox Churches.
The Russian embrace also entails acceptance of Putin’s governing norms. They include assassination. Last year, Moscow attempted to mount, through Serbia, an assassination plot against Montenegrin Prime Minister Djukanovic, a good friend of Vucic. To his enormous credit, Vucic not only helped to foil the plot but also provided vital testimony as to its reality. Fear of such an attempt in Serbia is motive enough for some politicians to hedge their bets.
But they have other reasons too. The reforms the European Union seeks as a condition for accession require political leaders to do difficult things that block at least some of the corruption endemic to the Balkans. At least one Balkan leader, Ivo Sanader (erstwhile prime minister of Croatia) found himself arrested, tried, and convicted as a consequence of the judicial reforms for which he himself was responsible. The “Sanader effect” has made other Balkan leaders extra cautious about judicial independence and anti-corruption prosecutions.
President Vucic, who has repeatedly won elections on a pro-EU platform, would make an enormous mistake not to opt for the EU chair, though in doing so he will need to give up his control of the press and accept a far more independent judiciary ready to take on corruption and other official malfeasance. Those are not easy things for a former Information Ministry in a Milosevic government to do. Some bad habits are so ingrained they are hard to break, even if you in principle want to do so. I even wonder whether the Serbian media and courts would believe Vucic if he were to signal clearly that he was surrendering his influence over them.
That however is what he needs to do, not to please me or Hoyt Yee but to enable Serbia to emerge as a real and liberal democracy politically more tied to the EU and far less to the Russian bear.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Compare and contrast
I’m just going to leave this eloquent and dignified testimony here:
Most of my readers will have no difficulty comparing and contrasting it with the mendacity of the Donald Trump, who tweeted this morning:
I had a very respectful conversation with the widow of Sgt. La David Johnson, and spoke his name from beginning, without hesitation!
Would someone who respected the families of fallen soldiers react this way?
RSS - Posts
