Tag: Al Qaeda
Yemen isn’t working
Daniel Byman, Brookings fellow and the moderator of Tuesday’s event about “Yemen and the Fight Against a Resurgent al-Qaeda,” noted that Yemen has become increasingly important in Washington over the past decade. Despite this, few understand Yemen. American political leaders have not found a successful strategy to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” al-Qaeda in Yemen. Ibrahim Sharqieh of Brookings Doha and Gregory Johnsen, Ph.D. candidate at Princeton, did not claim the expertise to address moral or legal questions about drone strikes, but they questioned their effectiveness in achieving U.S. objectives.
Sharqieh noted the fluctuations of U.S. interest in Yemen over the past 14 or 15 years. Until the Yemeni people elected a new president in parallel with “Arab Spring” reformation movements across the Middle East, the U.S. cooperated with the Ali Abdullah Saleh regime. When the al Qaeda threat was high, the U.S. gave Yemen more assistance, attention, and aid money. When the threat was low, the Yemen issue would be replaced with other more pressing foreign concerns. This approach makes it in Yemen’s interest to have some al Qaeda presence. Johnsen agreed that a mutually dependent relationship has formed between new President Hadi and the U.S. Hadi needs the U.S. because he lacks domestic support and the U.S. needs Hadi to continue its drone strikes. Sharqieh explained that this relationship excludes the Yemeni people from the discussion of fighting al Qaeda increasing a sense of alienation.
Sharqieh proposed a new approach focused on political settlement, development and local ownership of the conflict against al Qaeda. First, the Yemeni political transition must be successful in order to provide hope for the people and reinforce the nonviolence of the Yemeni uprising. The Iran-backed north, separatist south and influence of the old regime are barriers to the success of the political settlement. Second, the U.S. should adopt a sustainable assistance program to combat the serious challenges to stability: the 46% unemployment rate, 56% of people under the poverty line, 300,000 suffering from malnutrition, and significant illegal immigration. Third, Yemenis need to feel ownership of the al Qaeda threat. Many resent the U.S. drone attacks as a violation of national sovereignty.
Johnsen agreed that the “Yemen Model” for fighting terrorism has not been effective. It was on the day of President Obama’s inauguration in 2009 that Said Ali al-Shihri announced the joining of al Qaeda‘s Saudi branch with a Yemeni contingent to form al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In December 2009, Secretary of State Clinton added the organization to the list of known terrorist groups and the U.S. carried out its first drone attack in Yemen. Days later al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula placed a suicide bomber on a plane to Detroit. From the Christmas Day failed attack to today, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has grown from 200 or 300 to anywhere from 1,000 to 6,000 members.
How has the organization grown so quickly? Civilian deaths in drone attacks are partly to blame, Johnsen believes, in addition to economic and humanitarian challenges. The U.S. views Yemenis as terrorists and non-terrorists, but al Qaeda members in Yemen might also be tribal figures, community leaders, friends or family. Yemen is not like Afghanistan where al Qaeda members are often easily identifiable foreigners.
“Yemen is a broken country,” Johnsen said, and the path forward for the U.S. will not be easy. The U.S. cannot win the fight against al Qaeda alone. Yemeni tribes and Saudi Arabia are well-positioned to help, if they want to do so. The Obama administration has never explicitly defined for a foreign or domestic audience the moral or legal framework in which the drone strikes operate. It is possible that the U.S. has burned all bridges that could have encouraged tribal allies to take up the fight against al Qaeda, but Washington could improve the prospects with an apology for past civilian deaths and an honest effort to find a better strategy.
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This week’s peace picks
1. Secularism, Islamism, and Women’s Rights in Turkey, Monday November 12, 12:00 PM – 2:00 PM, Georgetown University
Venue: Georgetown University, 37th Street NW and O Street NW, Washington, DC 20057, Edward B. Bunn S.J. Intercultural Center, Room 450
Speaker: Serpil Sancar
Please join us on Monday, November 12 from 12-2pm in ICC 450 for a talk with Professor Serpil Sancar, Visiting Scholar at George Washington University as she discusses Secularism, Islamism and Women’s Rights in Turkey. Lunch will be provided.
Register for this event here.
2. External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse: A Principal-Agent Analysis of Wartime Atrocities, Monday November 12, 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM, George Mason University
Venue: George Mason University, 3301 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22201, Truland Building, Room 555
Speakers: Thomas Flores, Idean Salehyan
While some militant groups work hard to foster collaborative ties with civilians, others engage in egregious abuses and war crimes. We argue that foreign state funding for rebel organizations greatly reduces the incentives of militant groups to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of civilians because it diminishes the need to collect resources from the population. However, unlike the lucrative resources such as minerals and petroleum, foreign funding of rebel groups must be understood in principal-agent terms. Some external principals – namely, democratic states with strong human rights lobbies – are more concerned with atrocities in the conflict zone than others.
Rebels backed by states with theses characteristics should engage in comparably less violence than those backed by other states. We also predict that multiple state sponsorsalso lead to abuse, for no single state can effectively restrain the rebel organization. We test these expectations with new disaggregated organization-level data on foreign support for rebel groups and data on one-sided violence against civilians. The results are consistent with our argument. We conclude that principal characteristics help influence agent actions, and that human rights organizations exert a powerful effect on the likelihood of civilian abuse and the magnitude of wartime atrocities.
RSVP for this event to Barre Hussen at carevent@gmu.edu.
3. Public Diplomacy in the Next Four Years: A Post-Election Look at American Strategies and Priorities for Engaging the World, Tuesday November 13, 9:00 AM – 11:00 AM, Elliott School of international Affairs
Venue: The Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Lindner Family Commons, Room 602
Speakers: James Glassman, Judith McHale, Paul Foldi, P.J. Crowley
The upcoming U.S. Presidential election may have a dramatic impact on American foreign policy. On November 13, an experienced panel of international affairs experts will gather at the George Washington University to discuss the course of U.S. Public Diplomacy for the next four years.
Please register for this event here.
4. The Procedural and Subtantive Elements of Prosecuting Cases of Trafficking in Persons: Comparative, Tuesday November 13, 9:00 AM – 4:00 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Nitze building, 1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Kenney Auditorium
Policymakers, attorneys, law professors, and representatives from legal clinics and NGOs will discuss this topic. For a complete agenda, visit bitly.com/Ublfr6.
Please register for this event here.
5. Conflict Prevention and Resolution Forum: “Comedy and Conflict”, Tuesday November 13, 9:30 AM – 11:00 AM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Rome building, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Rome Building Auditorium
Speakers: Yahya Hendi, Elahe Izadi, Craig Zelizer, S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana
Yahya Hendi, Muslim champlain at Georgetown University; Elahe Izadi, comedian and National Journal reporter; Craig Zelizer, associate director of the Conflict Resolution Program at Georgetown University; and S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana (moderator), visiting assistant professor in the Conflict Resolution Program at Georgetown University, will discuss this topic.
Register for this event here.
6. Yemen and the Fight Against a Resurgent al Qaeda, Tuesday November 13, 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Saul/Zilkha Room
Speakers: Daniel L. Byman, Gregory Johnsen, Ibrahim Sharqieh
Rife with political turmoil, Yemen has proven fertile ground for al Qaeda-linked groups in the post-9/11 era. Until the beginning of 2012, the United States cooperated with the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh, but his departure – orchestrated by the U.S. – raises questions for future counterterrorism cooperation. How much ground has al Qaeda gained in Yemen despite setbacks in Pakistan? Can the United States effectively manage events in Yemen without becoming entangled in another costly ground war? What more can be done to prevent al Qaeda’s influence from spreading further throughout the Arabian Peninsula?
Register for this event here.
7. U.S.-Turkish Relations: A Review at the Beginning of the Third Decade of the Post-Cold War Era, Tuesday November 13, 10:30 AM – 12:00 PM, CSIS
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K Street NW, Washingto, Dc 20006, B1 Conference Room
Speakers: John Hamre, Bulent Aliriza, Bulent Aras
Please join us on November 13 for the release of “U.S. – Turkish Relations: A Review at the Beginning of the Third Decade of the Post-Cold War Era,’ jointly prepared by the CSIS Turkey Project and the Center for Strategic research (SAM) of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. The report is the product of a year-long study that included workshops in Washington and Ankara. It incorporates U.S. and Turkish perspectives on the evolving relationship, examines the opportunities and challenges the alliance has confronted in the past six decades and looks ahead to those it is likely to face in the coming years.
RSVP for this event to rbeardsley@csis.org.
8. A New Deal? Renegotiating Civil-Military Relations in Egypt, Tuesday November 13, 2:00 PM – 1:30 PM, Elliott School of Interntional Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Lindner Family Commons, Room 602
Speaker: Yezid Sayigh
Yezid Sayigh is a senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, where his work focuses on the future political role of Arab armies the resistance and reinvention of authoritaian regimes, and the Israel-Palestine conflict and peace process.
Register for this event here.
9. Middle East Institute’s 66th Annual Conference, Wednesday November 14, 8:45 AM – 5:30 PM, Grand Hyatt Washington
Venue: Grand Hyatt Washington, 1000 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20001
The Middle East Institute’s 66th Annual Conference is an opportunity for policymakers, government officials, students, the media, and the interested public to come together to discuss the future of the Middle East. Entitled “New Horizons, New Challenges: The Middle East in 2013,” the conference the conference will convene experts from across the U.S. and the Middle East to examine the momentous political trnsitions underway in the Arab World and forecast the year ahead for a region in flux. The full-day conference will analyze the obstacles impeding democracy in Egypt and Syria, and the reaction of countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia to the shifting regional dynamics brought about by the Arab Awakening. It will also look at evolving U.S. policy in the Middle East in response to the new realities on the ground and to the demands of the Arab revolutions. The conference will include four 90-minute panels on “U.S.-Mideast Diplomacy in Transition: New Era, New Principles”; “Challenges Ahead for Egypt”; “After the U.S. Election: What’s at Stake for Iran?”; and “Syria and the Regional Implications of the Crisis.”
10. Launch of the Asia Foundation’s 2012 Survey of the Afghan People, Wednesday Novembe 14, 9:30 AM – 11:30 AM, The National Press Club
Venue: The National Press Club, 529 14th Street NW, Washington, DC, 20045, 13th Floor
Speakers: Andrew Wilder, Sunil Pillai, Palwasha Kakar, Mark Kryzer
The Asia Foundation will release findings from Afghanistan in 2012: A Survey of teh Afghan People – the broades, most comprehensive public opinion poll in the country – covering all 34 provinces with candid data gleaned from face-to-face interviews with nearly 6,300 Afghan citizens on security, corruption, women’s rights, the economy, development, and the Taliban. This marks the eighth in the Foundation’s series of surveys in Afghanistan; taken together they provide a barometer of Afghan public opinion over time.
Register forthis event here.
11. How to Promote Local Order and Property Rights Under Weak Rule of Law?, Wednesdday November 14, 12:30 PM – 2:00 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Bernstein-Offit Building, 1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 736
Speaker: Chris Blattman
Chris Blattman, assistant professor of international and public affairs and political science at Columbia University’s School of Internatonal and Public Affairs, will discuss this topic.
RSVP for this event to itolber1@jhu.edu.
12. Serbia’s Road to EU Accession: Prospects and Potential Pitfalls, Thursday November 15, 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Bernstein-Offit Building, 1717 Massacusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 500
Speaker: Ljubica Vasic
Ljubica Vasic, member of the Serbian Parliament, will discuss this topic.
Register for this event here.
13. Benghazi and Beyond: What Went Wrong on September 11, 2012 and How to Prevent it from Happening at Other Frontline Posts, Thursday November 15, 10:00 AM, The Rayburn House Office Building
Venue: Rayburn House Office Building, 45 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20515, Room 2172 Rayburn HOB
Speakers: Michael Courts, William Young
14. Protest and Rebellion in the Middle East, Thursday November 15, 12:00 PM – 2:00 PM, Elliott School of International Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street, Washington, DC 20052, Lindner Family Commons, Room 602
Speakers: Marc Lynch, Wendy Pearlman, Jillian Schwedler, David Patel
Three leading political scientists will discuss opportunities, resources, and emotions in regional social protest movements. A light lunch will be served.
Register for this event here.
15. The Obama Administration and U.S. Foreign Policy, Thursday November 15, 12:30 PM – 2:00 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Rome Building, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 812
Speaker: James Mann
James Mann, author-in-residence at the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute and author of The Obamians: The Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power, will discuss this topic.
RSVP for this event to reischauer@jhu.edu.
16. Drafting Egypt’s Constitution, Thursday November 15, 1:00 PM – 2:15 PM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036
The new Egyptian constitution is surrounded by controversy over who should write it, when it should be drafted, and which principles and values it should embody. With a draft already published, debate is as intense as ever.
Register for this event here.
17. Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb, Thursday November 15, 3:00 PM – 5:00 PM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speakers: Feroz Khan, George Perkovich, Peter Lavoy
The story of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons developments remains in dispute, with a rich literature of colorful and differing accounts. In his latest book, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2012), Feroz Khan presents a comprehensive picture of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. What internal and external pressures threatened Pakistan’s efforts? What conditions contributed to its attainment of a viable program in the face of substantial political and technical obstacles?
Register for this event here.
18. Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring – A Conversation with Michael Willis, Thursday November 15, 5:30 PM – 7:30 PM, Elliott School of International Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Lindner Family Commons, Room 602
Speaker: Michael Willis
Professor Willis will be discussing his new book Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring.
Register for this event here.
19. Lebanon in the Shadow of Syria Civil War, Friday November 16, 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs
Venue: Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, 3307 M Street NW, Washington, DC 20007, Suite 200
Speaker: Irina Papkova
The car bombng that killed Lebanese security chief Wissan al-Hasan last month has raised new concerns that Lebanon is being increasingly drawn into the Syrian civil war. Indeed, predictions that Lebanon would descend into sectarian violence as a result of the Syrian uprising have abounded since the begining of the conflict. Yet, Lebanon – once a byword for religious civil war – has managed so far to avoid that catastrophic scenario. Irinia Papkova, a Berkley Center research fellow now living in Beirut, will address the current political situation in Lebanon and the threats and challenges facing its leaders in the shadow of the Syrian conflict.
Register for this event here.
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Is there a political solution in Afghanistan?
Allison Stuewe writes:
The members of yesterday’s panel hosted by the Middle East Institute believed that a political solution is desirable but concluded nevertheless that the question of whether or not one is possible is harder to answer than it seems. The panel was more inclined to raise additional questions than provide definitive answers.
Marvin Weinbaum of the Middle East Institute, the event’s moderator, introduced some of the questions: Is a political solution possible? Are there incentives that would facilitate an agreement among all interests involved in the Afghan conflict? What will the U.S. or other participants in the peace process have to sacrifice to reach a negotiated solution? Has the opportunity for productive U.S. involvement in conflict resolution passed? Or should we still be pushing for a political solution? Are we failing to see the possibilities? Will U.S. government efforts to find a political solution be viewed in the region as a gesture of desperation for an easy exit?
Ambassador Omar Samad, previously Afghanistan’s ambassador to France and Canada and currently a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, structured his presentation around two questions that must be addressed in the peace process. First, he asked, what is the Afghan conflict? Is it an insurgency, civil war, or proxy-driven conflict? Is it about resources, ethnicity, geopolitical rivalries, anti-terrorism, or historical narratives? From the Afghan perspective, which looks at the conflict with history in mind, it is all of these.
In the 1960s, the country was stable, with a constitutional and democratic order. The communist coup and subsequent Soviet invasion ended three generations of peace and destroyed the government, infrastructure and human capital while killing over a million Afghans. The U.S.-backed resistance was successful in defeating the Soviets, but when the Soviets left and the United States lost interest, a void remained. Radical Islam thrived. As it became clear an agreement would not be reached between the powers that emerged after the Soviet defeat, the interests of external players became more pronounced. Pakistan and Iran had their own political agendas and used Islamic extremism to achieve their own ends.
9/11 was a game changer. The tragedy showed the world that there are consequences to ignoring conflict in Afghanistan. Previous mistakes should not be repeated in the current attempt at conflict resolution. The Bonn Agreement creating what Arif Rafiq, scholar at the Middle East Institute, views as a consociational government pointed in the right direction. There are divisions between Afghans based on ethnicity, language, and religion, but these divisions are shallow and reflect only part of Afghanistan’s history. Ambassador Samad believes there is an Afghan national identity, history and sense of belonging to the same state. It is unlikely that Afghanistan will collapse. What it needs is an inclusive political system.
Ambassador Samad’s second question was about the meaning of a “political solution.” Does this mean an intra-Afghan, regional, or international solution? From the Afghan perspective, all three are critical to ensuring future stability. A peace plan must be Afghan-inspired and include input from regional interests, but these imperatives will be hard to accomplish without international support. There will be a transition in 2014 when President Karzai concludes his term and much of the United States and NATO presence is withdrawn. We have between now and the end of 2014 to address security issues, ensure citizens will be able to vote, plan for legitimate elections, and invite the Taliban to participate in politics as equal citizens of the Afghan state.
Shamila Chaudhary of the New American Foundation (but previously at the National Security Council) contributed a former policymaker’s perspective.
American politics have hindered the search for a political solution. At the beginning of the war, the U.S. treated the Taliban and al-Qaeda as essentially the same terrorist organization and refused to negotiate on principle. We know now that there were divisions in the Taliban even over the 9/11 attack and that the U.S. government ignored some of what might have been indications that Taliban members were willing to talk. The military’s “fight, talk, build” strategy has made negotiation difficult. Congress is angry that it has not been consulted more. Despite Administration efforts, many members are unwilling to acquiesce to two Taliban requests: the transfer of Guantanamo detainees associated with the Taliban and the recognition of a Taliban office outside of Afghanistan. The rise in “green-on-blue” attacks, the Taliban attack on Camp Bastion in September and last year’s attack on the Embassy Kabul have made negotiation with the Taliban harder for the Americans, who won’t be able to engage seriously until after the U.S. election.
The second obstacle Chaudhary identified was Pakistan. Pakistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Hina Rabbani Khar spoke in Washington last month, clarifying Pakistani goals: an Afghan-led political solution that is satisfactory to Islamabad, no further destabilization in the border areas and the return of Afghan refugees still residing in Pakistan. Pakistan is in a bind because it does not have sufficient Afghan partners to guarantee these interests. Pakistan wants to curb pro-Indian sentiment and block moves towards an independent Pashtunistan in the border areas. Islamabad relies heavily on the Haqqani network, a group associated with the Afghan Taliban that could turn on Pakistan at any time. A productive agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan would include acceptance of the Durand line, limits on India’s security presence in Afghanistan and assurances that the border areas will not become an anti-Pakistan, pro-Indian hotspot.
Arif Rafiq thought a political solution possible but was pessimistic about the likelihood of one happening. He listed many reasons for his doubts: the Bonn framework is slowly unraveling. President Karzai, once respected as a leader from a prominent family, is now a divisive figure. Though he has said he will step down as planned, it appears he is working to consolidate his power and choose a successor who will allow him to continue to influence politics. He faces real challenges: Mullah Muhammad Omar’s Afghan Taliban does not want Karzai to be a part of peace talks and the opposition National Front not only opposes President Karzai but also envisions a constitutional overhaul to establish a federalized parliamentary democracy.
The surge is over and it did not accomplish what it set out to do. The Afghan army is not ready to take over primary security responsibility for the whole country. If anything, the surge emboldened militia groups and resulted in a huge influx of weapons. The insurgency is alive even if fragmented (there are divisions between Mullah Omar’s Taliban and Gulbiddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami). The Taliban did not participate in the Bonn talks of December 2011. “Exploratory” talks among the Taliban, President Karzai and the U.S. have been on hold since March. There is no indication that Mullah Omar’s Taliban intends to participate in elections. The NATO-led coalition of the willing is fraying.
Rafiq did note some reasons for optimism. The U.S. helped build a functioning, if not fully effective, Afghan parliament . Pakistan needs the U.S. presence in Afghanistan to limits cross-border risks. It might be possible to exploit splits in the Taliban, some of whom are looking for the international legitimacy they lacked when they ruled most of Afghanistan. Most Afghans reject the emirate that the Taliban advocate.
The panel agreed time is running out. Political transition in Washington, Islamabad and Kabul is eating into the time available. Despite the Taliban’s motivations and goals, all participants noted that any political solution has to be open to all citizens. A political solution requires an Afghan state that balances the center and periphery and meets the bottom line goals of the neighbors and the major international powers. It is not going to be easy to solve this equation.
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Security in ungoverned spaces
Earlier this year I enjoyed a day talking about North Africa, including the Sahel, an area that is now attracting more attention than is healthy for its inhabitants. The focus is largely military. I did not publish my presentation, as it was available only in barebones form. It still however seems germane and some of you may find it useful. So here is the outline of what I said at an undisclosed location:
Security in Ungoverned Spaces: Options
0. Doing nothing is an option
- No international airports
- Threat is mostly local
- Going after it can make it worse
1. Conventional and unconventional military means
- Yemen analogy: local conventional forces trained and equipped by U.S. with U.S. drones and special forces acting more or less in coordination
- Can kill, can’t govern: leaves vacuum as at Zinjibar, filled by Ansar al Sharia, problems of compensation, may create more terrorists than it kills
- Creates moral hazard with government, which has to keep terrorism alive to get aid
- Also gives regime trained and equipped units with which to protect itself
- Risks use of U.S. assets against regime enemies, false intelligence
- Mistakes increase local support for terrorists
2. Policing
- No evidence uniformed police would be well received in remote communities
- Corruption rife
- Less than 50 per cent trust in Algeria: what might it be in Sahel?
- Detention facilities a big problem: no point in arresting them if you have no decent place to put them
3. Community/tribal approaches
- Difficult to know who is who, what is what
- Same moral hazard in a different direction (tribal chiefs)
- Rented, not bought?
- Provide justice?
4. Development assistance
- Youth bulge, unemployment are the real problems
- Need jobs, especially agriculture
- Income not rising with expectations
- Per capita PPP 2011: Algeria 7200 Morocco 5100
- Undernourishment, poverty, especially farther south
- Role of women can be supported
5. Negotiated settlements: precedents, good and bad, in Iraq, Afghanistan
6. Regional cooperation in one or more of the above areas: ECOWAS, African Union
7. Caveat: beware too much security, too little rule of law
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More talk, less eloquence, a bit of chicanery
The UN General Assembly, the ultimate talk shop, is providing a lot of opportunity this week to take the world’s pulse. Yesterday it was Egyptian President Morsy and Iranian President Ahmadinejad. Today it was Palestinian President Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu Someone at the UN has good scheduling sense.
Ahmedinejad ended his peroration with this Messianic vision for the return of the Mahdi and Jesus Christ:
-The arrival of the Ultimate Savior will mark a new beginning, a rebirth and a resurrection. It will be the beginning of peace, lasting security and genuine life.
-His arrival will be the end of oppression, immorality, poverty, discrimination and the beginning of justice, love and empathy.
-He will come and he will cut through ignorance, superstition, prejudice by opening the gates of science and knowledge. He will establish a world brimful of prudence and he will prepare the ground for the collective, active and constructive participation of all in the global management.
-He will come to grant kindness, hope, freedom and dignity to all humanity as a girl.
-He will come so mankind will taste the pleasure of being human and being in the company of other humans.
-He will come so that hands will be joined, hearts will be filled with love and thoughts will be purified to be at service of security, welfare and happiness for all.
-He will come to return all children of Adam irrespective of their skin colors to their innate origin after a long history of separation and division linking them to eternal happiness.
Our brothers and sisters in Palestine must also taste the fruits of freedom and dignity. It is shameful that the free world accepts, regardless of the justifications provided, that a member of the international community continues to deny the rights of a nation that has been longing for decades for independence. It is also disgraceful that settlement activities continue on the territories of these people, along with the delay in implementing the decisions of international legitimacy.
I say it loudly to those wondering about our position vis-a-vis the international agreements and conventions that we have previously adhered to: we are committed to what we have signed on. We also support the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and are determined to pursue all efforts side by side with them until they regain their rights.
The obscenities recently released as part of an organized campaign against Islamic sanctities is unacceptable and requires a firm stand. We have a responsibility in this international gathering to study how we can protect the world from instability and hatred. Egypt respects freedom of expression.
One that is not used to incite hatred against anyone. One that is not directed towards one specific religion or culture.
A freedom of expression that tackles extremism and violence. Not the freedom of expression that deepens ignorance and disregards others. But we also stand firmly against the use of violence in expressing objection to these obscenities.
Settlement activities embody the core of the policy of colonial military occupation of the land of the Palestinian people and all of the brutality of aggression and racial discrimination against our people that this policy entails. This policy, which constitutes a breach of international humanitarian law and United Nations resolutions, is the primary cause for the failure of the peace process, the collapse of dozens of opportunities, and the burial of the great hopes that arose from the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993 between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel to achieve a just peace that would begin a new era for our region.
He backed this up with one of the more eloquent statements of the day:
The time has come for our men, women and children to live normal lives, for them to be able to sleep without waiting for the worst that the next day will bring; for mothers to be assured that their children will return home without fear of suffering killing, arrest or humiliation; for students to be able to go to their schools and universities without checkpoints obstructing them. The time has come for sick people to be able to reach hospitals normally, and for our farmers to be able to take care of their good land without fear of the occupation seizing the land and its water, which the wall prevents access to, or fear of the settlers, for whom settlements are being built on our land and who are uprooting and burning the olive trees that have existed for hundreds of years. The time has come for the thousands of prisoners to be released from the prisons to return to their families and their children to become a part of building their homeland, for the freedom of which they have sacrificed.
Netanyahu, usually more eloquent than Abbas, was less on this occasion:
To understand what the world would be like with a nuclear-armed Iran, just imagine the world with a nuclear-armed Al-Qaeda.
It makes no difference whether these lethal weapons are in the hands of the world’s most dangerous terrorist regime or the world’s most dangerous terrorist organization. They’re both fired by the same hatred; they’re both driven by the same lust for violence.
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A really bad day
The Muslim world has had a busy Friday trashing U.S. embassies and killing Muslims. The latest death toll I’ve seen is seven, but who knows.
The day was a losing proposition all around. The United States suffered serious damage not only to its embassies but to its international standing. Muslims lost people and respect in the West, where no doubt anti-Muslim extremists will take action against mosques and argue that the day proves that Islam is not a peaceful religion. Al Qaeda got to display its flag amid at least the appearance of popular support.
The Arab awakening took an ugly turn that will reinforce skepticism about it worldwide. Syrians might be the biggest losers in the long term: those who are on the fence about intervention there will not want to risk creating yet another opportunity for extremism. Not that it is better to ignore the homicidal maniac who runs that country, but it is certainly easier than doing anything about him. My Twitter feed is full of Arab commentary about the stupidity of protesting a dumb movie when Bashar al Asad is killing thousands, but that entirely justified sentiment won’t change the import of a truly ugly day.
Ironically but not surprisingly, the one place where dignity prevailed was Libya, where it all started. The president of Libya’s parliament, in essence the chief of state, laid a wreath at the American embassy in honor of the Americans killed in Benghazi. Libyans know perfectly well that the Americans and NATO saved them from the worst depredations of Muammar Qaddafi. Except for the Qaddafi supporters, they are overwhelmingly grateful and friendly. That was amply apparent at the Atlantic Council’s event on Libya yesterday, when the Libyan ambassador (and every other Libyan who spoke) made affection for slain Ambassador Chris Stevens amply evident.
I am afraid the lesson of the day is one we already know: transitions to democracy take time and resources. Our effort to get off cheap and easy in Libya is not working out well. We need to be thinking about how we can help Tripoli gain control of the armed groups on Libyan territory and help the Libyans achieve a measure of reconciliation with those who supported the Qaddafi regime. We also need to work with the Libyans to bring the murderers to justice.
Egypt’s President Morsi has finally come around to recognizing that his hesitancy about blocking the violence was a big mistake. I have some sympathy with those who would use massive U.S. assistance to Egypt–debt forgiveness, military aid and development assistance totalling more than $3 billion–as leverage. There is no way the American public is going to support continuing it unless Cairo starts singing a friendlier tune and reining in extremism, not only in Cairo but also in Sinai. Tunisia is next in line for tough love, though the government’s behavior there has generally been better than in Egypt.
Yemen is a more complicated case. We get lots of support and freedom of action in our war against Al Qaeda in Yemen. No one will want to put that at risk. At the same time, we need to be paying a whole lot more attention to Yemen’s deeper problems: poor governance, underdevelopment, and water shortages. They are what make the country a haven for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
Mitt Romney and his acolytes may want to pretend that all these problems can be solved if only the American president is shows resolve and therefore the United States is respected. But as Joe Cirincione pointed out in a tweet, the two worst Muslim terrorist attacks on the United States occurred under Presidents Reagan and Bush. The Romneyites presumably don’t think they lacked resolve, which is something best reserved for top priority conflicts with other states. And those rare moments when you think you know where Osama bin Laden is hiding.
I can well understand Americans who want to turn their backs on the Muslim world and walk away. But that will not work. It will come back to haunt us, as terrorism, oil supply disruption, massive emigration, mass atrocity or in some other expensive and unmanageable form. Muslims, in particular Arabs, are going through a gigantic political transformation, one whose echoes will reverberate for decades. We need to try to help them through the cataclysm to a better place, for them and for us.
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