Tag: Al Qaeda
Sometimes at odds, sometimes not
I owe a debt of gratitude for this piece to Dennis Kux, author of The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000, a retired State Department South Asia specialist, and currently a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He writes:
Osama bin Laden died in a fashion that could not have been better from the American standpoint or worse for Pakistan. For Americans, the end to the man who organized 9/11 and other deadly, if less bloody, Al Qaeda operations was like the script of a Hollywood movie. The good guys–the Navy Seals–swoop out of the sky, get their man, suffer no casualties, and return to base. The only hitch, the loss of a helicopter, provides suspense, but is not a game stopper since there is fortunately a back-up chopper available.
The episode brought a sense of closure over the horrors of 9/11. In a victory lap, President Obama symbolically visited Ground Zero in New York City and then flew to Fort Bragg, Kentucky to salute the Navy Seals who performed so flawlessly. The US admittedly carried out the operation inside Pakistan without the knowledge, let alone permission, of the government of Pakistan. Indeed, as CIA Director Leon Panetta told the media, informing the Pakistanis in advance would have risked operational security.
So it was a great day for Uncle Sam. Osama is no more. The master terrorist has gotten his just reward. Furthermore, the present occupant of the White House revealed himself a cool and decisive Clint Eastwood not, as many previously thought, a distant intellectual who had trouble making up his mind.
For Pakistan, the episode was a major disaster. Even Pakistani liberals who applauded the death of bin Laden were embarrassed by way it happened. They were irate that the al Qaeda leader could have been hiding almost next door to their country’s West Point in a city full of military installations and supposedly tight security. If Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency, the ISI, did not know that bin Laden had been in Abbottabad for five years, it was woefully incompetent. If ISI knew who lived in the high-walled compound, it was guilty of hiding the world’s most wanted terrorist.
Either way, it was enormously embarrassing. This observer is skeptical that something as conspicuously different as the bin Laden compound from the rest of the neighborhood would not have attracted the attention of the omnipresent ISI, especially over half a decade. In turn, Pakistan’s security establishment, and a large section of the public, were infuriated by the US’s blatant disregard for their country’s sovereignty and were red-faced that the Americans were able to fly across more than a hundred miles of Pakistani territory undetected by the vaunted air defense system.
Thus, while there was enormous satisfaction and pride in the US, for Pakistan, the response was very conflicted. This was reflected in the stark contrast between President Zardari’s op ed in the May 2 Washington Post applauding the US action and the querulous statement issued the same day by the Foreign Ministry. The latter mentioned bin Laden’s death almost in passing, waxed indignant about the violation of Pakistani sovereignty, and said menacingly that any repetition would shake the relationship between Washington and Islamabad. The Pakistan military leadership issued a similar warning after a meeting of the powerful corps commanders and the army chief General Kayani. The army leadership further announced that US military personnel in Pakistan would be reduced to the “bare minimum.”
Many Pakistanis, while unhappy about the unilateral US action and the violation of sovereignty, directed their ire against the security establishment, alleging that the army and the ISI were guilty of either incompetence or complicity. To counter these charges, pro-military media outlets tried to place the blame on the wobbling civilian government, generally regarded as having little say in national security matters. The opposition Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) predictably joined in the chorus of voices calling for the president and prime minister to resign.
On Monday, Prime Minister Gilani, speaking in the National Assembly, stoutly defended Pakistan’s record. He said that many intelligence agencies failed, not just Pakistan’s, blamed the US for allowing bin Laden to flee into Pakistan, warned that any attack on the countries “strategic assets” (i.e. its nukes) would be answered with a robust riposte, and stated that Lt. General Iqbal (an officer supposedly close to Kayani) would lead an inquiry into the episode. Gilani announced that parliament would meet in camera on May 13 to consider the report. At the same time, the prime minister also stressed the importance of good relations with the US. Someone obviously less concerned about US-Pak ties leaked the name of the CIA station chief to an English-language newspaper considered close to the ISI.
So how will this all play out for the US-Pak partnership against terrorism? In Washington, the Obama administration has made clear its belief that a cooperative relationship with Pakistan is important for a satisfactory outcome in the war in Afghanistan. The president chose his words carefully in his lengthy interview with 60 Minutes last Sunday. While not blaming the Pakistani authorities, he pressed for answers regarding the support network that helped bin Laden during his lengthy stay in Abbottabad. Irate Congressmen have called for slashing US aid to Pakistan, but administration supporters have argued that this would hurt, not help, US interests in the region. Washington hopes that a chastened Pakistan will prove more, rather than less, cooperative in the days ahead.
It remains unclear how events will play out in Pakistan. Possibly, the military’s embarrassment will lead to a stronger civilian voice over national security matters. Although the military is more vulnerable now than in many years, it is very uncertain that the wobbly civilian leadership will be able to take advantage of the situation. The jury is also out whether Pakistan will agree to crack down on the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network (seen as useful proxies to defend Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan) and the Lashkar-i-Toiba and related groups that have in the past served as proxies against India. Public pressure by US officials will not sway the Pakistanis, but perhaps private persuasion may prove more effective in the post bin Laden era. Reportedly, Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman John Kerry will be on his way in a few days to try his hand.
Until such a change occurs, the basic contradiction in the US-Pak relationship will continue: specifically that while Pakistan and the US see the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as a common foe, only the US considers the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network and the Lashkar-i-Toiba as enemies. To Islamabad, these groups remain potentially useful instruments to promote Pakistan’s policies in Afghanistan and against India. This kind of strategic disconnect has periodically undermined US-Pakistan alliance relations ever since Dwight D. Eisenhower approved the mutual security agreement with Pakistan in 1954. In 2011, as in the past, US and Pakistani interests and policies in part coincide and in part conflict.
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Slippery slope, moral hazard and tall order
The big questions for me in the aftermath of Osama bin Laden’s death are how it will affect America’s relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as the Arab Spring. I leave it to others to consider the impact on Al Qaeda, its affiliates, and the terrorist enterprise in general, but I have to assume that the already weakened enterprise will suffer some further fragmentation and demoralization, even as it tries (and occasionally succeeds) to exact revenge.
Pakistan has got some explaining to do. It seems likely someone in the Pakistani government knew that Osama bin Laden was hiding out in a garrison town not far from Islamabad. There is no sign they tipped off the Americans, their putative allies. How come? How many other Al Qaeda principles harbored in Pakistan? And if no one in the Pakistani government knew that OBL was there, that would suggest true incompetence, no? So too would failure of the Pakistani government to intervene to block the American operation, if the Americans are telling the truth about not having informed the Pakistanis.
My best guess is that some Pakistanis (army? intelligence service?) knew where bin Laden was hiding. They likely also knew about the American operation, or at least knew something was “going down.” So they both hid him and allowed him to be captured. That sounds like the kind of duplicity we’ve witnessed for years, practiced to our detriment. Glad it was at someone else’s expense this time. The unexcited and even congratulatory reaction of official Pakistan to the news suggests this was the case.
So what do we do now? Is it business as usual with the Pakistanis? Or is it time for a shift toward a more demanding stance? Should we make military assistance conditional on greater cooperation? Surely someone in the Congress will push that idea. The problem is we would then have to be prepared carry out the threat, which would surely reduce military and intelligence cooperation further. That’s a slippery slope. Are we really reduced, as Madeleine Albright suggested on the PBS Newshour this evening, to “working with” the Pakistanis?
Maybe. With OBL out of the way, Al Qaeda is a lot less interesting to the Pakistanis, whose purposes inside Afghanistan might just as well be served by the Taliban without all the international complications OBL necessarily engendered. Besides, they’ve now got lots of homegrown jihadis to throw against India when the need arises. OBL wasn’t so good in that direction anyway.
What about Afghanistan? President Karzai, in his usual uncharitable mood, took the occasion of OBL’s death to suggest that the Americans and their allies have been wasting a lot of time and Afghan lives looking for him inside Afghanistan. Meanwhile, American senators were suggesting that OBL’s death might make it possible to draw down American troops in Afghanistan faster than currently contemplated, leaving Karzai to his fate. Of course the two ideas are compatible: Karzai would like less U.S. military effort, and so would the Americans.
This “beggar thy ally” approach on both sides does not bode well for continuing anything like the current level of effort in Afghanistan, where the Taliban are proving resilient and resurgent. I confess to temptation: maybe we should try withdrawing faster than had been anticipated, making it clear to Karzai that we are in part responding to his pressure. He pushes us out because he has been pretty sure we wouldn’t take him up on it. If he thought we might, he would be getting his act together faster.
This is what is called “moral hazard.” Leon Panetta, about to become Defense Secretary, was big on the idea of giving the Iraqis a quick time line for U.S. withdrawal when he served on the Iraq Study Group (I’m not breaking confidence–he said so publicly on many occasions). I wonder if he might adopt the same posture on Afghanistan. Of course David Petraeus, whether in his current job or his future one, is likely to be on the other side of that argument.
As for the Arab Spring, it seems to me that OBL’s death should reduce the fear some have of Al Qaeda exploitation of the demonstrations and weaken the argument that we need autocrats to repress international terrorists. Those arguments have not gained much traction with me these past few months, but I hope those who believe them will reexamine the situation and come to the obvious conclusion: the faster we can help get something like democratic regimes up and running in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria the better off we will be. I wish I could say the same about Bahrain, but it seems to have fallen hostage to the regional sectarian standoff. We’ve already got what most would consider a tall order.
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Let’s not make mistakes now
Relief, even pleasure, I understand, but there is a real risk of drawing incorrect conclusions from the killing of Osama bin Laden. Here are just of few of the mistakes that I already see being made:
- Triumphalism. This is not an American triumph of historic proportions. It is the culmination of 10 years of assiduous intelligence work that proves how really difficult it is to find an individual, though once you’ve found him killing is relatively easy.
- Justice. I might regard his death as just, but this is not justice, as the President claimed. Justice requires a process, even in a case as apparently justified as this one.
- Victory in the war on terror. Obviously there is the real potential for terror to continue and even escalate. Just as important: terror is a means, like military force. Victory is when ends triumph, not means: democracy over totalitarianism, for example. “War on terror” is the wrong framing, as we say in the conflict management business.
- Pakistan was cooperating with al Qaeda, or on the contrary deserves credit. We can’t be sure of either, yet. But they certainly have some explaining to do, since bin Laden was “hiding” near Islamabad in a military-oriented community. President Obama suggested that their intelligence cooperation was helpful, but it is not clear what that means.
- Pakistan did or did not know about the operation. I find that it hard to believe that Pakistan did not know, but if they didn’t it tells us something about their military and intelligence capabilities. More than likely they were told something was happening and to keep out of the way, but they may not have been told exactly what.
My son, Adam Serwer at the American Prospect, reminds on Twitter that I predicted some time ago that bin Laden would not be found in a cave, or in a hole like Saddam Hussein, but rather in a luxury villa. I got that right.
Now it is important to restrain ourselves and treat this event as the death of a mass murderer whose minions continue to threaten Muslims and non-Muslims alike. We need to stay grounded and figure out, better than we have for the past ten years, what will reduce the risks we face. Maybe it is less war–on terror, or in Iraq and Afghanistan–and more assiduous intelligence work. Let’s not make mistakes now.
PS: I’d like to agree with Lawrence Wright, who says “Democracy and civil society are the cure for the chronic misery of Muslim countries that has fed the rise of Islamic extremism.” But the fact is that Pakistan has quite a bit of democracy and civil society. Islamic extremism, which once had little purchase there, is definitely on the rise. Certainly it is true that the Arab Spring offers an alternative narrative to young Muslims, but societies in transition to democracy are notoriously prone to war and other pathologies. I don’t think we can disband the special forces and rely on civil society to restrain extremism.
PPS: Far worse is Jennifer Rubin, whose celebratory triumphalism and crediting of harsh interrogation techniques (with no evidence) seems calculated to appeal to her public’s worst instincts while offending the rest of the world as much as possible. I needn’t even mention her crediting of George W. Bush, whose efforts she says were far more important than you know whose.
PPPS: For those, like me, who did not wait up for the official announcement last night:
PPPPS: See also http://yfrog.com/gzlctaoj
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The world beyond Egypt
I’ve been so caught up in Egypt for 10 days, and Tunisia before that, I’m feeling the need for one of those quickie updates, so here goes (even if there is relatively little progress to report):
- Iran: P5+1 Ankara meeting at the end of January went badly, some say because Ahmedinejad did not take advantage of what the Americans were offering. I don’t think we’ve heard the last of it.
- Pakistan: Messy (that’s what I call it when a President has to call for a roundtable conference), but no big crisis.
- North Korea: Quiescent for the moment, but mil/mil talks have stalled.
- Afghanistan: Lots of reports of military progress from David Petraeus, and some sign that the Taliban may be looking for negotiations, or at least that is how I interpret their putting out the word that they might break with Al Qaeda.
- Iraq: some Arab/Kurdish progress that will allow oil to flow north. My friend Reidar Visser doesn’t think that’s good, but I do.
- Israel/Palestine: Biggest news has been the Palestine papers, widely interpreted to suggest Palestinian weakness, ineptitude or both. I think they show the Israelis overplaying their hand to no good purpose.
- Egypt: Trouble. This is what I said at the end of the year: “succession plans founder as the legitimacy of the parliament is challenged in the streets and courts. Mubarak hangs on, but the uncertainties grow.” Did I get it right? All but that part about the courts anyway.
- Haiti: Presidential runoff postponed to March 20. President Preval’s favorite will not be on the ballot; former first lady Mirlande Manigat will face singer Michel Martelly.
- Al Qaeda: No news is good news.
- Yemen/Somalia: Yemen’s President Saleh has so far proved immune to Egyptian flu, but itmay not last forever. Parliament in Somalia has extended its own mandate for three more years, dismaying the paymasters in Washington and other capitals. Nice democracy lesson.
- Sudan: The independence referendum passed, as predicted (no genius in that). Lots of outstanding issues under negotiation. President Bashir is behaving himself, some say because of the carrots Washington has offered. In my experience indictment has that effect on most people.
- Lebanon: Indictments delivered, not published, yet.
- Syria: President Bashar al Assad is doing even better than Bashir of Yemen. No demonstrations materialized at all.
- Ivory Coast: Gbagbo and his entourage are still waiting for their first-class plane tickets. African Union is factfinding, in preparation for mediation. Could this be any slower?
- Zimbabwe: Mugabe continues to defy, sponsors riot in Harare. No real progress on implementation of powersharing agreement with the opposition.
- Balkans: Bosnia stuck on constitutional reform, Kosovo/Serbia dialogue blocked by government formation in Pristina, Macedonia still hung up on the “name” issue. See a pattern here? Some people just recycle their old problems.
- Tunisia: At last some place where there is progress: the former ruling party has been shuttered. Don’t hold your breath for that to happen in Egypt!
PS: on Algeria, see this interesting piece.
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Dominoes anyone?
The metaphorical game in international relations is often chess, or escalation, or maybe just the adjectival “great” game. But these days we seem to be playing that old standby, dominoes, more than anything else: will Iran getting nuclear weapons lead to others getting them? will Tunisia’s revolt spread? will North Korea’s erratic behavior precipitate in one way or another refugee flows into China that Beijing will want to prevent?
As Stephen Walt points out, revolutions don’t usually spread like wildfire. The demonstration effect of what happens in Tunisia may be strong, but it is uncertain what the outcome is and therefore what events there will “demonstrate.” I still wouldn’t call it a revolution, since the prior regime is very much in place, not only in the salubrious sense that the constitution is being implemented but in the less salubrious sense that the old guard remains in key offices. Only the President and his coterie are gone. Tunisia is looking for the moment more like a palace or military coup in response to popular uprising than like a real revolution. I can imagine that being imitated in more than one Arab country.
With respect to Iran and nuclear weapons, Johan Bergenas argues his case against the dominoes falling well, but unfortunately the argument against a nuclear Iran remains strong even without the worst case scenario, as he acknowledges. While diplomats, spooks and geeks (or maybe I should say spoogeeks?) in the U.S. and Israel are chuckling over Stuxnet’s damage to Iranian centrifuges, the problem remains as great as always. We just have more time to find, or not to find, a solution. I’m no fan of Hillary Mann and Flynt Leverett’s triumphalist version of today’s Iran, but I also don’t buy Tehran Bureau’s defeatist version. President Ahmedinejad still looks pretty strong, having managed his personnel challenges to the Supreme Leader as well as his economic reforms and their political impact better than many expected.
China’s willingness to save our bacon with North Korea is but one of the Washington myths that Mort Abramowitz pooh-poohs, suggesting that if we had a clearer and more consistent policy of our own we might be better off than relying on Beijing to do the right thing. In any event, the Chinese seem to be finding the discomfort that North Korea causes “not unwelcome,” as the diplomats say, and they fear more refugee flows arising from the regime change Washington might like than anything else.
So dominoes don’t look like such a good game, and in my experience they are not, being a Vietnam generation fogy. That said, I feel reasonably certain that our weak response to North Korea’s nuclear testing has in fact encouraged the Iranians to move ahead to acquiring whatever technology they think they need to become at least a virtual nuclear power. Did we ever deprive Brazil of its technology after it forswore nuclear weapons and signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco? Or South Africa?
That is the thing about dominoes. When they fall, the consequences are often irreversible, and the directions they fall in unpredictable. I hope that the outcome of last week’s events in Tunisia is not only democratic but relatively liberal and Western-oriented. Many of us–I include myself–will regret the cheering we did from the sidelines if Al Qaeda in the Maghreb finds haven in North Africa, where its recruiting efforts are already strong.
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The end is nigh…
Not really, but 2010 is coming to a close. Never easy to look ahead a year, but let me give it a try. It’ll make for a nice mea culpa post a year from now. And if I cherry pick a bit maybe I’ll be able to claim clairvoyance!
- Iran: the biggest headache of the year to come. If its nuclear program is not slowed or stopped, things are going to get tense. Both Israel and the U.S. have preferred sanctions, covert action and diplomatic pressure to military action. If no agreement is reached on enrichment, that might change by the end of 2011. No Green Revolution, the clerics hang on, using the Revolutionary Guards to defend the revolution (duh).
- Pakistan: it isn’t getting better and it could well get worse. The security forces don’t like the way the civilians aren’t handling things, and the civilians are in perpetual crisis. Look for increased internal tension, but no Army takeover, and some success in American efforts to get more action against AQ and the Taliban inside Pakistan. Judging from a report in the New York Times, we may not always be pleased with the methods the Pakistanis use.
- North Korea: no migraine, but pesky nonetheless, and South Korea is a lot less quiescent than it used to be. Pretty good odds on some sort of military action during the year, but the South and the Americans will try to avoid the nightmare of a devastating artillery barrage against Seoul.
- Afghanistan: sure there will be military progress, enough to allow at least a minimal withdrawal from a handful of provinces by July. But it is hard to see how Karzai becomes much more legitimate or effective. There is a lot of heavy lifting to do before provincial government is improved, but by the end of the year we might see some serious progress in that direction, again in a handful of provinces.
- Iraq: no one expects much good of this government, which is large, unwieldy and fragmented. But just for this reason, I expect Maliki to get away with continuing to govern more or less on his own, relying on different parts of his awkward coalition on different issues. The big unknown: can Baghdad settle, or finesse, the disputes over territory with Erbil (Kurdistan)?
- Palestine/Israel (no meaning in the order–I try to alternate): Palestine gets more recognitions, Israel builds more settlements, the Americans offer a detailed settlement, both sides resist but agree to go to high level talks where the Americans try to impose. That fails and Israel continues in the direction of establishing a one-state solution with Arabs as second class citizens. My secular Zionist ancestors turn in their graves.
- Egypt: trouble. Succession plans founder as the legitimacy of the parliament is challenged in the streets and courts. Mubarak hangs on, but the uncertainties grow.
- Haiti: Not clear whether the presidential runoff will be held January 16, but things are going to improve, at least until next summer’s hurricanes. Just for that reason there will be more instability as Haitians begin to tussle over the improvements.
- Al Qaeda: the franchise model is working well, so no need to recentralize. They will keep on trying for a score in the U.S. and will likely succeed at some, I hope non-spectacular, level.
- Yemen/Somalia: Yemen is on the brink and will likely go over it, if not in 2011 soon thereafter. Somalia will start back from hell, with increasing stability in some regions and continuing conflict in others.
- Sudan: the independence referendum passes. Khartoum and Juba reach enough of an agreement on outstanding issues to allow implementation in July, but border problems (including Abyei) and South/South violence grow into a real threat. Darfur deteriorates as the rebels emulate the South and Khartoum takes its frustrations out on the poor souls.
- Lebanon: the Special Tribunal finally delivers its indictments. Everyone yawns and stretches, having agreed to ignore them.
- Syria: Damascus finally realizes that it is time to reach an agreement with Israel. The Israelis decide to go ahead with it, thus relieving pressure to stop settlements and deal seriously with the Palestinians.
- Ivory Coast: the French finally find the first class tickets for Gbagbo and his entourage, who go to some place that does not recognize the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (no, not the U.S.!).
- Zimbabwe: Mugabe is pressing for quick adoption of his new constitution and elections in 2011, catching the opposition off balance. If he succeeds, the place continues to go to hell in a handbasket. If he fails, it will still be some time before it heads in the other direction.
- Balkans: Bosnians still stuck on constitutional reform, but Kosovo gets a visa waiver from the EU despite ongoing investigations of organ trafficking.
If the year turns out this way, it won’t be disastrous, just a bumpy downhill slide. Hard to see it getting much better than that, but I could have made it much worse:
- Iran: weaponizes and deploys nukes.
- Pakistan: finally admits it can’t find two of its weapons, which have likely fallen into AQ hands.
- North Korea: goes bananas in response to some provocation, launches artillery barrage on Seoul.
- Afghanistan: spring Taliban offensive sweeps away Coalition-installed local institutions; Kandahar falls.
- Iraq: Kurds and Arabs fight, without a clear outcome.
- Israel/Palestine: Israel attacks Hizbollah in Lebanon, third intifada begins with Hamas suicide bombings inside Israel.
- Egypt: Muslim Brotherhood challenges Mubarak in the streets, prevents orderly succession process.
- Haiti: hurricanes, food riots, political strife, reconstruction blocked.
- Al Qaeda: big hit inside the U.S., thousands die.
- Yemen/Somalia: both go south, with AQ establishing itself firmly on both sides of the Bab al Mandab.
- Sudan: post-referendum negotiations fail, fighting on North/South border, chaos in Southern Sudan.
- Lebanon: Hizbollah reacts with violence to the Special Tribunal indictments, taking over large parts of Lebanon. Hizbollah/Israel war wrecks havoc.
- Syria: succeeds in surreptitiously building nuclear facilities on commission from Iran, Israeli effort to destroy them fails.
- Ivory Coast: Gbagbo tries to hold on to office, imitating Mugabe’s successful effort. Ouattara plays ball and accepts the prime ministry, pressured by internationals who don’t want to do what is necessary to airlift Gbagbo out of there. A real opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of international solidarity is squandered.
- Zimbabwe: Mugabe succeeds, Tsvangirai is out, state in virtual collapse.
- Balkans: the EU unwisely begins implementing the acquis communitaire in Republika Srpska due to delays in formation of a national Bosnian government, investigations in Kosovo drag on and make progress towards the visa waiver and other EU goodies impossible.
There are of course other places where we might see bad things happen: Venezuela, Burma, Nigeria, Kyrgyzstan, Saudi Arabia, Russia–but I’ll leave the imagining to you.
Happy New Year!
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