Tag: Asia
Still righting the balance
These are my speaking notes for the talk I gave last night at the DC World Affairs Council on my book,
Righting the Balance (Potomac, 2013). I’ve added a bit about Ukraine, which is in part an instance of state weakness. It also illustrates the limited usefulness of conventional military instruments in meeting asymmetrical challenges, a key theme in the book. Click there on the right to order your own copy!
1. It is truly an honor to present here at the World Affairs Council. The 98 World Affairs Councils throughout this country play a key role in generating and sustaining the kind of citizen engagement in foreign policy that I think is so important in today’s increasingly interconnected world.
2. As I am going to say some harsh things about the State Department and USAID, and even suggest they be abolished in favor of a single Foreign Office, I would like to emphasize from the first that I have enormous respect for the Foreign Service and the devotion of its officers to pursuing America’s interests abroad. I feel the same way about the US military.
3. But I don’t think the Foreign Service is well served by the institutions that hire, pay and deploy our diplomats and aid workers. And I don’t think our military should be called upon to make up for civilian deficiencies.
4. My book, Righting the Balance, is aimed at correcting those imbalances. But it does not start there.
5. It starts with the sweep of American history, which has given our military a leading role in America’s foreign affairs since at least the French and Indian war.
6. Americans think of their country as a peaceful one, but in fact we have had troops deployed in conflict zones for more than a quarter of our history—not even counting wars against native Americans and pirates—and every year since the fall of the Berlin Wall.
7. With each of those wars, we improved our technology and expanded our reach, becoming by the end of the 20th century the world’s only remaining superpower.
8. We have a strong, well-exercised military arm for projecting power. It is so strong that it is reaching a point of diminishing returns: every additional dollar buys miniscule improvement.
9. But our civilian capacities are more limited. This was glaringly apparent in Iraq and Afghanistan, where State and AID struggled, and all too often failed, to meet the requirements.
10. It has also been glaringly apparent during the Arab uprisings, which not only caught our diplomats by surprise but left them puzzled about what to do.
11. These failures are more important than ever before. The enemies who cause us problems today are not often states: Saddam Hussein’s Iraq fell quickly, as did the Taliban government in Afghanistan.
12. We won the wars. We lost the peace.
13. The main threats to America today come not from other strong states but from non-state actors who find haven and support in fragile, weak and collapsing states.
14. Even in Ukraine, the Russians are not using the full weight of their armed forces but rather relying on disruption in challenging the legitimacy of Kiev’s government and its control over territory in the east and south.
15. National security, always more than a military mission, now requires conflict prevention and state-building capacities that are sorely lacking in both State and AID. They have scrambled hard to meet the needs in Bosnia, Kosovo, South Sudan, Iraq and Afghanistan, but they are not much better configured than when I arrived in Sarajevo for the first time in November 1994.
16. Some of you will be thinking, that’s OK, because we never want to do this state-building stuff again.
17. It’s not only my colleague Michael Mandelbaum who thinks that way. Each and every president since 1989 has resisted getting involved in other countries’ internal politics, and each one has discovered that it is far easier to go to war and kill enemies than it is to withdraw, leaving behind a collapsed state that will regenerate those enemies.
18. Unless you are willing to fight on forever—even longer than the “long war”—you need to build capable states that protect their citizens reasonably well.
19. We are discovering this today in Yemen, where the drone war appears to have created more terrorists than it has killed. This is one of the main reasons President Obama has avoided military intervention in Syria, but the post-war effort there will still be a major one, even if is not primarily a U.S. responsibility. The same is true in eastern DRC and in Colombia, where peace is threatening to break out after decades of war.
20. America won’t be able to avoid being engaged when North Korea or Cuba collapses. Nor will we stay aloof if nuclear-armed Pakistan starts coming apart. Let’s not even think about Iran. If Ukraine is to be kept whole and independent, it will need a far better state than the one that has performed so badly since the Orange Revolution of 2005.
21. So my view is that we need to prepare for the day, not continue to delude ourselves that we will never do it again.
22. But I would be the first to admit that post-war state-building, a subject I teach at SAIS, is hard and expensive. Anticipation is cheaper and better. We need civilian foreign policy instruments that will take early action to prevent states from collapsing and help initiate reforms.
23. We’ve been reasonably successful at allowing this to happen in much of Latin America and East Asia, where recent decades have seen many countries turn in the direction of democratic transition. Brazil, Chile, South Korea, Indonesia are sterling examples of transitions that the United States allowed, nurtured and encouraged.
24. That’s what we failed to do effectively in the Arab world, with consequences that are now on the front pages every day. We failed to anticipate the revolution in Tunisia. In Libya we failed to help the new regime establish a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence. That failure cost us an ambassador and three of his colleagues and has left Libya adrift.
25. In Egypt, we’ve been inconstant, supporting whoever gains power. The result, as I observed during the constitutional referendum in January, is a restoration of the military autocracy, with voters intimidated into staying home rather than voting against the new constitution and human rights advocates imprisoned along with the Muslim Brotherhood leadership.
26. In Syria, we failed to support moderates, only to see them displaced and replaced by extremists. The result is a daily catastrophe of truly genocidal dimensions.
27. The specific areas I describe as lacking in today’s State and AID are these:
• Mobilizing early, preventive action
• Reforming security services
• Promoting democracy
• Countering violent extremism
• Encouraging citizen and cultural diplomacy
28. These are all efforts at the periphery of traditional diplomacy, and I readily admit that the last three are better done mainly outside government while the first two are more inherently governmental.
29. But I don’t think we can get them done with our current institutions, which were designed for different purposes in other eras. Inertia and legacy are too strong.
30. The State Department, originally the Department of the State, is now a conventional foreign ministry with a 19th century architecture: most Foreign Service personnel serve abroad in static embassies and other missions servicing agencies of the US government other than the State Department. Legacy and inertia, not current needs, dictate where it has people stationed and a good deal of what they are doing.
31. USAID was founded with a poverty alleviation and economic development mission to help fight the Cold War. Few of us still think that US government programs can fix poverty at home, much less overseas.
32. There have been a lot of proposals for reform. Let’s recall Condoleezza Rice’s transformational diplomacy and Hillary Clinton’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, now being reprised. None of these efforts have gained more than temporary traction.
33. What we need to do is conduct what scientists call a thought experiment: knowing what we do about the challenges we now face, what kind foreign policy instruments do we need?
34. The answer is nothing like what we’ve got.
35. My book doesn’t offer a detailed design, but it does suggest that we need a single Foreign Office with a national security focus as well as a much-enhanced nongovernmental effort, operated at arms’ length from officialdom but with much greater Congressional funding than it has today.
36. I am not however prepared to propose, as so many have before me, that this new Foreign Office be funded by passing up an F22 or two. I think State and AID have the resources needed, but unfortunately tied up in those elephantine embassies supporting other US government agencies.
37. Shrinking these dramatically would provide the funds for a much sleeker and more effective Foreign Office, including a corps of several thousand people able and willing to deploy, with or without US troops, to difficult environments to take on the hard work of conflict prevention and state-building where required.
38. What we need is a far more agile, anticipatory and mobile Foreign Service, one built for a world in which virtually everyone will soon be connected to worldwide communications at reasonable cost and ordinary citizens, including you, count for much more than ever before in world history.
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Booooogus
The Administration and its surrogates are trying hard to assure all concerned that its pivot to the Asia Pacific will not reduce attention to the Middle East. They are also trying to minimize the impact of Vladimir Putin’s Ukraine maneuvers. Meanwhile Bashar al Asad intends to hold an “election” June 3 and photographs have confirmed the Russian origin of supposed pro-Russian demonstrators in Ukraine. Presidents may try to set their own agenda, but circumstances in the world don’t always comply.
The prospect of an election in Syria under current circumstances is bozotic. While Asad will no doubt find some supposed “opposition” figure to contest him, the whole thing will be what the car guys call “booooogus.” A good part of the Syrian population is living in areas outside government control, one-third or more of the population is displaced or refugees, violence threatens even more, and election observation is impossible. Unfree and unfair is the best that could be said about an election occurring under these conditions.
The protesters taking over government buildings in eastern and southern Ukraine are no less bogus. Russia inspires, equips and leads them to disrupt Kiev’s efforts to exert control. Most may be Ukrainians, but that makes little difference. For the Russian foreign minister to complain about Kiev’s failure to rein them in adds insult to injury. Provoking unrest and then complaining about is downright evil.
The question is what the United States can and should do about such reprobate behavior.
In Syria, only an effort to rebalance the battlefield will have a serious impact at this point. That is apparently happening, with the shipment of anti-tank weapons to a selected few trained members of the opposition. Hesitancy and reluctance still characterize the effort more than boldness and resolution. Even with greater resolve, arming will not suffice. There are other requirements: strengthening the opposition politically by connecting the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) with the fighters on the ground, enabling the SOC-connected administrations to govern more effectively in liberated areas, and convincing the Iranians that their assistance to Asad is damaging to their regional ambitions.
I wouldn’t waste any more breath on the Russians, who appear to have decided to support Asad to the bitter end. Iranians I heard from recently show much more concern about the damage being done in Syria, not least because sectarian warfare and the growing strength of Sunni extremists are seen as real threats in Tehran. Asad’s use of chemical weapons and the increasingly serious attrition of Hizbollah forces also give Iran pause. Tehran has more to worry about if Asad falls without a political arrangement for what comes next than Moscow does.
In Ukraine, the United States can do little more than insist on implementation of last week’s agreement to deescalate. If this includes requiring the demonstrators in Kiev’s Maidan to disperse, as quid pro quo for an end to the occupation of government buildings in the south and east, so be it. The key thing is to create the conditions for a decent election at the end of May, or soon thereafter, to legitimize a government in Kiev with democratic blessing. The demonstrators in the east and south will try to prevent that, not least because the Russian annexation of Crimea has eliminated any chance the country’s Russophiles can win it. They will be condemned to the opposition. Their best hope for them to avoid such an election is to make Ukraine as chaotic as Syria.
Russia is relying on bogus protestors in Ukraine and a bogus election in Syria. The best response right now would be a decent election in Ukraine and more serious support to a more unified opposition in Syria. Neither will repair all the harm that has been done in both places, but the President’s prospects for convincing allies in Asia this week and next that they can rely on Washington depends on what he achieves in the places he would like to leave behind.
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Semper fi
Antoine Huss, a master’s student at SAIS, offers this account of Marine Commandant General James F. Amos on “Military Positioning in a Time of Transition,” an event at Carnegie yesterday (video above): Read more
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The Cory Remsburg metaphor
The President’s State of the Union speech last night broke little new ground on foreign policy. He is pleased to be finishing two wars and will resist getting the United States involved in other open-ended conflicts. He may leave a few troops in Afghanistan to train Afghans and attack terrorists. Al Qaeda central is largely defeated but its franchises are spreading in Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and Mali. He will limit the use of drones, reform surveillance policies and get us off a permanent war footing. He wants to close Guantanamo, as always, and fix immigration, as always.
He will use diplomacy, especially in trying to block Iran verifiably from obtaining a nuclear weapons and in resolving the Israel/Palestine conflict, but also in destroying Syria’s chemical weapons capability. He will support the moderate Syrian opposition. He will veto new Iran sanctions in order to give diplomacy a chance to work, maintain the alliance with Europe, support democracy in Ukraine, development in Africa, and trade and investment across the Pacific. America is exceptional both because of what it does and because of its ideals.
The President didn’t mention Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, Russia or Japan. He skipped North Korea too. His mother must have taught him that when you don’t have anything nice to say you shouldn’t say anything at all. Those countries might merit mention, but all have in one way or another been doing things that we prefer they not do. He mentioned China, but only as an economic rival, not a military one. He skipped the pivot to Asia as well as Latin America. For my Balkans readers: you are not even on his screen. Read more
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The 2013 vintage in the peace vineyard
2013 has been a so-so vintage in the peace vineyard.
The Balkans saw improved relations between Serbia and Kosovo, progress by both towards the European Union and Croatian membership. Albania managed a peaceful alternation in power. But Bosnia and Macedonia remain enmired in long-running constitutional and nominal difficulties, respectively. Slovenia, already a NATO and EU member, ran into financial problems, as did Cyprus. Turkey‘s long-serving and still politically dominant prime minister managed to get himself into trouble over a shopping center and corruption.
The former Soviet space has likewise seen contradictory developments: Moldova‘s courageous push towards the EU, Ukraine‘s ongoing, nonviolent rebellion against tighter ties to Russia, and terrorist challenges to the Sochi Winter Olympics. Read more
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The end is nigh, once again
2013 is ending with a lot of doom and gloom:
- South Sudan, the world’s newest state, is suffering bloodletting between political rivals, who coincide with its two largest tribes (Dinka and Nuer).
- The Central African Republic is imploding in an orgy of Christian/Muslim violence.
- North Korea is risking internal strife as its latest Kim exerts his authority by purging and executing his formally powerful uncle.
- China is challenging Japan and South Korea in the the East China Sea.
- Syria is in chaos, spelling catastrophe for most of its population and serious strains for all its neighbors.
- Nuclear negotiations with Iran seem slow, if not stalled.
- Egypt‘s military is repressing not only the Muslim Brotherhood but also secular human rights advocates.
- Israel and Palestine still seem far from agreement on the two-state solution most agree is their best bet.
- Afghanistan‘s President Karzai is refusing to sign the long-sought security agreement with the United States, putting at risk continued presence of US troops even as the Taliban seem to be strengthening in the countryside, and capital and people are fleeing Kabul.
- Al Qaeda is recovering as a franchised operation (especially in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and North Africa), even as its headquarters in Pakistan has been devastated.
- Ukraine is turning eastward, despite the thousands of brave protesters in Kiev’s streets.
The Economist topped off the gloom this week by suggesting that the current international situation resembles the one that preceded World War I: a declining world power (then Great Britain, now the US) unable to ensure global security and a rising challenger (then Germany now China). Read more
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