Tag: Bahrain

Peace picks July 11 – July 15

1) HEARING: Human rights under siege worldwide |  Tuesday, July 12th  |  10:00 AM  |  2172 Rayburn House Office Building | Chairman Royce on the hearing: “Human rights violations are on the rise around the world. In Iran, the courts carry out public amputations and floggings. In Putin’s Russia, journalists are jailed for exposing government corruption and reporting the facts. In failed states like Syria, we’ve seen abhorrent treatment of civilians, including genocide. We’ve even seen backsliding in respect for human rights among established democracies. These are disturbing trends, and this hearing will seek answers on how the U.S. should respond.” Witnesses include: The Honorable Mark P. Lagon, President of Freedom House. Thomas Farr, Ph.D., President of the Religious Freedom Institute. Ms. Amanda Schnetzer, Director of the Human Freedom Initiativeat the George W. Bush Institute. Mr. Mark Bromley, Chair at the Council for Global Equality

2) Economic and Labor Reform in Bahrain |  Wednesday, July 13th  |  12:00 PM  |  Brookings  |  Click HERE to register   |  No country in the Gulf region and perhaps in the broader Arab world has thought about and experimented with reform more than the Kingdom of Bahrain. Indeed, Manama was setting up economic visions of the future long before the trend became popular. However, the country’s reform process faces various challenges, posed by an ongoing political crisis at home and an increasingly turbulent regional environment. Ausamah Abdulla Al Absi, Chief Executive Officer of the Kingdom of Bahrain’s Labour Market Regulatory Authority (LMRA), will join the Atlantic Council to discuss Bahrain’s reform accomplishments and shortcomings and lay out the country’s path toward sustainable development.  In his capacity as head of the LMRA, Mr. Al Absi is responsible for realizing Bahrain’s economic reform plan. Since its inception in 2006, the LMRA has played a crucial role in HRH Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa’s economic reform program. Additionally, the large and vastly important institution oversees the implementation of Bahrain Vision 2030. Speakers include:
Ausamah Abdulla Al Absi, CEO of the Labour Market Regulatory Authority, Kingdom of Bahrain Introduced by: Barry Pavel, Vice President, Arnold Kanter Chair, and Director of the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council. Moderated by: Bilal Y. Saab, Director, Middle East Peace and Security Initiative, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security Atlantic Council.

3) Blasphemy Laws and Censorship by States and Non-State Actors: Examining Global Threats to Freedom of Expression | Thursday, July 14th | 2:00 PM | 2322 Rayburn House Office Building, click HERE for event details | The Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission | The Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission will hold a hearing that will examine blasphemy laws, state censorship, actions by non-state actors, and other threats to freedom of expression around the world. This hearing will examine these issues, while seeking to provide concrete recommendations for how U.S. policy makers can most effectively encourage the protection of freedom of expression around the globe. This hearing will be open to members of Congress, congressional staff, the interested public and the media. The event will be hosted by Joseph R. Pitts, M.C. and Co-Chairman, TLHRC. James P. McGovern, M.C. and Co-Chairman, TLHRC.
Panel I:

David N. Saperstein, Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom, U.S. Department of State
Panel II:

Rev. Thomas J. Reese, S.J., Chairman, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
Panel III:

Ms. Vanessa Tucker, Vice President for Analysis, Freedom House
Ms. Nina Shae, Director, Hudson Institute Center for Religious Freedom
Dr. Karin Karlekar, Director of Free Expression Programs, PEN America
Dr. Courtney C. Radsch, Advocacy Director, Committee to Protect Journalists
Mr. Wael Aleji, Spokesperson, Syrian Network for Human Rights

4) After Fallujah: Security, Governance, and the Next Battle Against ISIS |  Friday, July 15th | 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM  |  Middle East Institute hosted at the Johns Hopkins Kennedy Auditorium |  Click here to register  |  Iraqi forces have expelled the Islamic State (ISIS) from Fallujah, but difficult work lies ahead to retake the territory still under ISIS control, provide security, and rebuild. Restoring government and the rule of law, returning the displaced, and rebuilding homes and infrastructure will be crucial for sustaining the victory. Who will have the power and legitimacy to manage local resources and services? What will it take for civilians to return? Can the Popular Mobilization Forces that played an important role in the liberation of Fallujah be demobilized or absorbed into the army, or will they remain independent power centers? The Middle East Institute (MEI) and the Conflict Management Program at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) are pleased to host Robert S. Ford (MEI), Charles Lister (MEI), Jessica Lewis McFate (Institute for the Study of War), and Douglas Ollivant (New America) for a discussion of these and other questions regarding the aftermath of Fallujah, how ISIS may react in defeat, and the challenges ahead facing the liberation of Mosul.

5) How to Defeat Terrorism in Iraq | Wednesday, July 20th | 10:30-12:00| The Institute for World Politics | Click here to RSVP | Sheikh Jamal al-Dhari will share his vision for his country: a political re-crafting of the existing government structure away from sectarianism and towards a new constitution based on Iraqi national citizenship and inclusive of participation from all sectarian communities. HE Sheikh Jamal al-Dhari is the Chairman of the Iraq National Project and President of Peace Ambassadors for Iraq (PAFI). One of the leaders of the al-Zoba tribe in Iraq, he is the nephew of the late Islamic scholar and religious leader. Sheikh Harith al-Dhari Jamal was born in the Abu Ghraib district of Iraq on July 16, 1965. He grew up within the al-Zoba tribe and in the 1970s he attended the Hafsa School. In the 1980s, Jamal was conscripted into the Iraqi Army to fight in the Iran- Iraq War. During his time on the frontline, he fought alongside both Sunni and Shia officers and friends, in the Iraqi Republican Guard. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq by coalition forces, Jamal was a strong proponent of Iraqi nationalism and self-rule. In 2005, he and his family fought against al-Qaeda’s occupation of Iraqi territory and, as a consequence, Jamal lost 70 members of his family in the struggle. In 2014, Jamal helped to establish the nonprofit think tank Peace Ambassadors for Iraq, whose purpose is to advocate for a renewed system of government in Iraq, to determine the best policies to fully eliminate ISIS/Daesh and other terrorist forces from Iraq, and to build international support for an all-inclusive Iraq. Presently, Jamal is working for a renewal in Iraq by forging a non-sectarian and inclusive settlement for all Iraqis.

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Don’t forget Hezbollah

Here is the draft of the State Department dissent message on Syria, on which the New York Times based its coverage yesterday. So far as I can tell the final version is not publicly available, but this draft is polished. The argument is basically that the US has sufficient moral and strategic reason to attack Syrian government forces with stand-off weapons with the goal of getting President Asad to abide by the internationally mandated cessation of hostilities and initiate serious negotiations on a political transition, as required by the Geneva I communique and numerous subsequent international decisions. The dissent memo admits some downsides: a deterioration of relations with Russia and possible “second order” effects.

Those downsides require more consideration. There is no international mandate to attack Syrian government forces. Intervention in this case would in that sense have even less multilateral sanction than the NATO attack on Qaddafi’s forces in Libya, where there was a UN Security Council mandate, albeit one that authorized “all necessary means” to save civilians rather than to change the regime. Asad has not directly attacked the US, even if his reaction to Syria’s internal rebellion has created conditions that are inimical to US interests by attracting extremists and undermining stability in neighboring countries.

The Russia angle is also daunting. Moscow may well react by intensifying its attacks on the opposition forces the US supports, who are already targeted by Russian warplanes. Unilateral US intervention against Syrian government forces would also help Moscow to argue it is doing no worse in Ukraine, where it supports opposition forces behind a thin veil of denials that its forces are directly involved. The US is not ready to respond in kind to Russian escalation in Ukraine, if only because the European allies would not want it. Kiev might be the unintended victim of US escalation in Syria.

Second order effects could also include loss of European, Turkish and Jordanian support, because of an increased refugee flow out of Syria, as well as increased Iranian support for the Houthi rebellion in Yemen, destabilization of Bahrain and Shia militias in Iraq. Greater chaos in Syria could also help ISIS to revive its flagging fortunes and al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra to pursue its fight against the Syrian government.

These downsides are all too real, but so is the current situation: Russia, the Syrian government, Iran and Hezbollah are making mincemeat of the US-supported Syrian opposition while more extremist forces are gaining momentum. President Obama is reluctant to attack sovereign states that have not attacked the US directly without an international mandate of some sort. That is understandable. But doing nothing military to respond to a deteriorating situation is a decision too, one with real and unfortunately burgeoning negative consequences for US interests.

Hezbollah is the way out of this quandary. It is not a state. It is a designated terrorist group that has killed hundreds of Americans, and many others as well. The Americans say they are fighting terrorist groups in Syria. Why not Hezbollah? Its ground forces there have become increasingly important to the Syrian government’s cause. Getting Hezbollah out of the fight would arguably have as much impact on the military balance as strikes on the Syrian army, which is already a declining and demoralized force.

Washington need not start with military action. It could lead with diplomacy, telling Moscow and Tehran that we want Hezbollah to leave Syria tout de suite. If it fails to leave by a date certain, we could then strip it of its immunity and treat it like the other terrorist groups in Syria. Moscow might even welcome such a move, since Hezbollah efforts in Syria strengthen Iran’s hold, not Russia’s.

Tehran would be furious, claiming Hezbollah is in Syria at the request of its legitimate government. Hezbollah would likely try to strike US, Israeli or even Jewish targets in the region or beyond. It has managed in the past to murder Jews as far away as Argentina. Doing so would confirm the thesis that Hezbollah is a terrorist group and redouble the need to act decisively against it.

No suggestions for what to do or not do in Syria are simple. The situation has gotten so fraught that any proposition will have complicated and unpredictable consequences. But the State Department dissenters missed an opportunity to duck some of the President’s objections and strengthen their own argument by focusing on a terrorist group, rather than the regime’s own forces. Don’t forget Hezbollah.

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Uncensored

Iran’s Fars News Agency asked me some good questions. Parts of the interview were included in this article, but parts were also cut, as one might expect. I am publishing here the full text, which I hope will find its way into print also in Iran:

Q: What is your opinion about Iran’s plan to resolve the Syria tension?

A: As I understand Iran’s “plan,” it involves 1) a ceasefire, 2) formation of a national unity government, 3) a rewritten constitution and 4) national elections. This is an outline many can accept, even if some might quarrel with the order.

But “the devil is in the details” we say in English:
1) How does the ceasefire come about? Who monitors and enforces it? What sanctions are there against those who violate it? What if some armed groups refuse to participate in it?
2) Who participates in the national unity government? Does Bashar al Assad step aside or remain as president? How is the security of opposition people participating in a national unity government ensured?
3) Who rewrites the constitution? Within what guidelines? How is a new constitution approved?
4) Who calls elections? Who supervises them? Who ensures a safe and secure environment for the campaign as well as the elections? Who counts the votes?
I suspect there will be many more differences over these questions than over the four-point “plan.”

Q: The UK recently announced that the conflict in Syria will not be resolved unless Russia and Iran use their influence on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to help reach a political solution. What do these signals mean?

A: I’m not sure what the UK meant. It is certainly the consensus in Europe and the US that there is no political solution in Syria if Bashar al Assad insists on staying in power. His opposition won’t stop fighting as long as he is there. Iranian and Russian support enables him to remain. I see no sign that either Moscow or Tehran is prepared to risk losing their influence in a post-Assad Syria, which will surely resent the enormous support they have provided him.

Q: What are Turkey’s roles in Syria and the region? Do you confirm its policy in the Middle East?

A: Turkey has four main interests in Syria: it wants Bashar al Assad gone, it wants Kurds in Iraq and Syria to stop supporting the Kurdish rebellion in Turkey, it wants defeat of the Islamic State, and it wants Syrian refugees to return to Syria. The proposed “safe zone” in northern Syria and the Turkish attacks on the Kurds and Islamic State aim to achieve all four objectives, though success is still a long way off.

Q: We know that Turkey had zero foreign policy sometime and it had gains some achievements but today it has taken distance from that. What were and are their problems?

A: As noted above, it has problems with Bashar al Assad, with the Kurds, with the Islamic State and with refugees.

Q: Why is the west silent on Turkey’s support for Daesh?

A: The West has longed implored Turkey to close its border to Daesh fighters and supplies. They have tightened up a lot since ISIS attacked inside Turkey.

It is a figment of Tehran’s imagination that the West is silent. Or maybe a creation of Iran’s propagandists. One of the things most resented in the West is Iran’s implication that the West is not really opposed to Daesh. Nonsense is the polite word we use for that allegation.

Q: Has the US-led coalition succeeded against Daesh?

A: No, but it has had some successes, taking back about one-quarter of the territory Daesh once controlled, depriving it of some of its revenue and killing quite a few of its commanders.

That one-quarter is mostly Kurdish-populated territory. Taking back Sunni-populated territory, especially in Iraq, is proving far more difficult.

Q: How can Muslim countries across the region led by Iran stand against Daesh?

A: The Sunni Muslim countries of the region don’t want to be led by Iran. They are fighting Daesh, but as part of a Western-led Coalition. Iran is also fighting Daesh, but coordination is difficult so long as Iran fails to distinguish between Daesh and more moderate Syrian fighters. From the Western and I think Arab perspectives, it looks like Iran is fighting to defend Assad for sectarian reasons more than it is fighting Daesh.

Q: Let’s go to Iraq. How do you evaluate the ongoing Iran/ Iraq relation? What about the future?

A: Iran has supported Iraq’s response to Daesh quickly and effectively, fearing Daesh success in Iraq would mean trouble sooner or later also for Iran.
But it has used the opportunity in particular to support Shia militias (Hashd, Popular Mobilization Units). That is a mistake, because it exacerbates sectarian tensions in Iraq and increases the likelihood of a breakup of the Iraqi state that Tehran says it does not want.

It seems to me that a strong but non-threatening and unified Iraq is what Iran should be aiming for. I don’t see it doing that at present. Instead the IRGC is pursuing a less wise policy of arming and otherwise supporting sectarian forces that will make keeping the Iraqi state together very difficult.

Q: What is your opinion about latest Russia military developments and build up in some parts of Europe and the Arctic? I do not mean Ukraine at all.

A: The Russians have legitimate interests in the Arctic. But past experience suggests they will try to bite off more than they can chew. They are already overextended in Ukraine and the Middle East. Putin has strong domestic political support, but he lacks the money and military capacity to sustain his aggressive foreign policy.

Q: And thank you for your participating. Could you please explain about Iran/West relations after the deal?

A: I don’t see Iran/West relations much changed, except for the prospect of much greater trade and investment, especially between Europe and Iran, once sanctions are lifted. But Iranian authorities have reiterated their hostility to the United States, which always gets a lot of coverage here.

Washington doesn’t care much about that but wants Iran to stop threatening Israel’s existence and subverting Gulf neighbors through a highly sectarian policy of supporting Shia forces (sometimes political, sometimes military), especially in Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, Lebanon and Kuwait. Iran and the US share an interest in defeating Daesh, but active cooperation on that requires that Iran stop subversion of American friends and allies in the region. As we know only too well, subversion breeds resentment, not influence.

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Peace picks July 20-24

1. Iran and the Future of the Regional Security and Economic Landscape | Tuesday, July 21st | 9:00 – 12:00 | CNAS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Under the deal, Iran will put significant limitations on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief from the international community. But the details and effects of the agreement are far from simple. Iran’s regional rivals, who are core U.S. partners in the Middle East, are deeply concerned about how the deal will change regional power dynamics. There are also questions about economic competition, particularly in energy markets, in the aftermath of

A 17th Century mihrab from Isfahan, Iran at the Israel Museum.  Israel is particularly worried in the wake of the Iran deal.
A 17th Century mihrab from Isfahan, Iran at the Israel Museum in Jerusalem. Israel is particularly worried in the wake of the Iran deal. PC: Eddie Grove

the nuclear deal.  Keynote address by: Dr. Colin H. Kahl, Deputy Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor to the Vice President. Panelists include: Dr. Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow, CMEP, Brookings, David  Ziegler, Distinguished Fellow and Director, Project on the Middle East Peace Process, WINEP, Melissa Dalton, Fellow and Chief of Staff of the International Security Program, CSIS, Elizabeth Rosenberg, Senior Fellow and Director, Energy, Economics, and Security Program, CNAS, Colin McGinnis, Policy Director, U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Sean Thornton, Senior Counsel, Group Financial Security BNP Paribas, and Caroline Hurndall, Head of Middle East Team, British Embassy.  Moderators include: Ilan Goldenberg, Senior Fellow and Director, Middle East Security Program, CNAS and Zachary Goldman, Executive Director, Center on Law and Security, NYU School of Law and Adjunct Senior Fellow, CNAS.

2. Women and Countering Violent Extremism: Strengthening Policy Responses and Ensuring Inclusivity Tuesday, July 21st | 9:30-12:30 | USIP | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Women worldwide suffer disproportionately from violent extremism and conflict. Women’s key roles in society put them in ideal positions to prevent extremist violence. Yet, 15 years after the United Nations Security Council vowed to reverse the broad exclusion of women from leadership in security and peacebuilding, they

Women in the bazaar in Istaravshan, Tajikistan. Women remain heavily marginalized in Tajik society.  PC: Eddie Grove
Women in the bazaar in Istaravshan, Tajikistan. Women remain heavily marginalized in Tajik society. PC: Eddie Grove

remain marginalized. On July 21 at USIP, experts from civil society, the United Nations, academia, and the U.S. government will discuss ways to include women in efforts to counter violent extremism. The debate will directly inform U.S. government officials preparing for major international conferences on these issues this fall. The U.N. Security Council recognized in 2000 (in its Resolution 1325) that we need women to help lead in global efforts at resolving violent conflict. Several current wars and conflicts underscore how the recent surge in violent extremism has given new urgency both to protecting women and including them in solutions. The U.N. secretary general’s special representative on sexual violence, Zainab Bangura, will discuss that imperative, having recently visited Syria and Iraq. Speakers include: Zainab Hawa Bangura, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Ambassador Anwarul K. Chowdhury, Former Under-Secretary-General and High Representative of the UN, Timothy B. Curry, Deputy Director, Counterterrorism Policy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Eric G. Postel, Associate Administrator, USAID, Robert Berschinski, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Carla Koppell, Chief Strategy Officer, USAID, Nancy Lindborg, President, USIP, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, President, Women in International Security, Susan Hayward, Director, Religion and Peacebuilding, Governance, Law and Society, USIP, and Jacqueline O’Neill, Director, Institute for Inclusive Security. Moderator: Kathleen Kuehnast, Director, Gender and Peacebuilding, USIP.

3. Islamic extremism, reformism, and the war on terror | Tuesday, July 21st | 10:00 – 12:00 | AEI | REGISTER TO ATTEND | President Barack Obama has said that the Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL, Daesh) and other extremist groups do not represent true Islam. The extremists, however, dispute this.

The 15th Century Timurid Kok Gonbaz Madrasa in Istaravshan, Tajikistan. PC: Eddie Grove
The 15th Century Timurid Kok Gonbaz Madrasa in Istaravshan, Tajikistan. PC: Eddie Grove

This leads to a basic question: What role, if any, does Islam play in fomenting terrorism? As extremist forces increasingly sow destruction, how should policymakers respond? How prevalent are moderates, and how serious are regional calls for a “reformation” within Islam? What role, if any, can the US play to encourage reform? How do anti-Islamic polemics undercut reform? Panelists include: Jennifer Bryson, Zephyr Institute, Shadi Hamid, Brookings Institution, Abbas Kadhim, Institute of Shia Studies, Zainab Al-Suwaij, American Islamic Congress, Husain Haqqani, Hudson Institute and Former Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, and Mohamed Younis, Gallup. Moderators include: Michael Rubin, AEI and Danielle Pletka, AEI.

 

4. Negotiating the Gulf: How a Nuclear Deal Would Redefine GCC-Iran Relations | Tuesday, July 21st | 12:00-2:00 | The Arab Gulf States Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | As a nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 was recently finalized, few in the international community have more at stake than Iran’s Arab neighbors across the Gulf. Will the agreement usher in a new era of detente in the Middle East? Will Iran emerge as a more responsible partner, not just to the West but also to

The 13th-14th Century Bahla Fort in Oman. Oman played a key role in bringing Iran and the P5+1 together at the negotiating table.
The 13th-14th Century Bahla Fort in Oman. Oman played a key role in bringing Iran and the P5+1 together at the negotiating table. PC: Eddie Grove

regional powers? Can Iran and the GCC states begin to identify areas of cooperation to bring about more stability and security to the region? Will  the agreement truly prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, or does the Middle East stand on the brink of another, particularly dangerous, arms race? Speakers include: Suzanne DiMaggio, senior fellow and the director of the Iran Initiative at New America, Jamal Khashoggi, Saudi journalist, columnist, author, and general manager of the upcoming Al Arab News Channel, Nadim Shehadi, director of the Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies, Fletcher School, Tufts University, Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar, fellow, Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy and, assistant professor, Department of International Affairs, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University.

5. Russian Expansion – A Reality or Fiction: A Conversation with Elmar Brok | Tuesday, July 21st | 12:30-1:30 | German Marshall Fund | REGISTER TO ATTEND | With the Minsk II ceasefire in eastern Ukraine looking increasingly shaky, Europe risks a frozen conflict for years to come. However, is Russian President Vladimir Putin finished in Ukraine? Can the United States and Europe expect more aggression from the Kremlin or is consolidation Russia’s strategy now? What do the future of Russian relations with the European Union and Germany look like and what role do sanctions play in this calculation? Elmar Brok, chairman of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, will answer these questions and provide analysis of U.S.-European views toward Ukraine and Russia. GMF, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and the European Parliament Liaison Office are pleased to jointly host this conversation.

6. Saudi Arabia’s Scholarship Program: Generating a “Tipping Point”? | Tuesday, July 21st | 1:oo | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Westerners most commonly associate the Kingdom with oil, religious conservatism, and a deeply unstable region. Our panelists will challenge such conventional perceptions by examining the seismic economic, social, and governmental changes underway, many of which evidently result in part from the deliberate Saudi government investment in its human capital. The panel will present the thesis that, having sent over 200,000 Saudi youth abroad in the past ten years with the King Abdullah Scholarship Program, the Kingdom is already experiencing powerfully transformative economic and social advances. Ambassador Francis Ricciardone, Atlantic Council Vice President and Director of the Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, will moderate the discussion. Hariri Center Associate Director Ms. Stefanie Hausheer Ali will present key data and analysis on the scholarship program’s origins and size as well as its costs and benefits from her case study for the King Salman Center for Innovative Government. Dr. Rajika Bhandari, Deputy Vice President of the Institute of International Education (IIE) and Director of IIE’s Center for Academic Mobility Research and Impact, will discuss the Saudi scholarship program within the context of other international scholarship programs and the types of impacts such programs can have. Ms. Samar Alawami, an American University graduate of the scholarship program and researcher at the King Salman Center for Innovative Government, will discuss how the scholarship is impacting her generation. Ambassador James Smith, President of C&M International, will reflect on the changes in Saudi Arabia he witnessed during his tenure as US Ambassador from 2009 to 2013.

7. Rebuilding Afghanistan: Transparency & Accountability in America’s Longest War | Tuesday, July 21st | 6:30 pm – 8:30 pm | PS21 | REGISTER TO ATTEND | As the longest running and one of the most expensive wars in U.S. history winds down, just where did the money go? PS21 is delighted to present a discussion with the man looking into that very question, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction John F. Sopko, and Just Security. Speakers include: John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, and Andy Wright, Founding Editor, Just Security

8. Nigeria: A Conversation with President Muhammadu Buhari | Wednesday, Jul 22nd | 9:45 – 11:15 | Located at USIP but sponsored by NDI | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Please read: Important information for guests attending public events at USIP.  In a milestone for Nigeria and multi-party democracy in Africa, Muhammadu Buhari was elected president in March, becoming the first opposition candidate to unseat an elected Nigerian president through the ballot box. Following a vigorous political campaign period, Nigerians successfully managed a relatively peaceful electoral process and government transition. As the new government begins its mandate, political, economic and security pressures remain intense, including the escalating insurgency of Boko Haram and unresolved conflicts across the country. President Buhari’s remarks at USIP will come on the last of his three days in Washington, following his July 20 meeting with President Obama. All guests should arrive no later than 9:45 am to pass through security. Doors to the event will close promptly at 10:00 am.

9. Arbitrary Justice in Saudi Arabia: How Activists Have Organized against Due Process Violations | Wednesday, July 23rd | 11:30 – 1:00 | Located at Open Society Foundations but sponsored by Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in Bahrain and Amnesty International | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB) and Amnesty International are cosponsoring an event to shed light on the absence of Rule of Law in Saudi Arabia. The discussion will outline the specific deficiencies within the Saudi criminal justice system that lead to the

Manama, Bahrain. The event is co-sponsored by Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in Bahrain and Amnesty International. PC: Eddie Grove
Manama, Bahrain. The event is co-sponsored by Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in Bahrain and Amnesty International. PC: Eddie Grove

commission of human rights violations, including judges’ lack of independence, practices of arbitrary and incommunicado detention, and a catch-all anti-terrorism law. Discussion will then turn to highlighting the cases of those activists, including members of the Saudi Civil and Political Rights Association (ACPRA) and human rights lawyer Waleed Abu al-Khair, who have sacrificed their independence to raise awareness of human rights abuses and bring reforms to this system. Panelists include: Abdulaziz Alhussan, Visiting Scholar at Indiana University’s Center for Constitutional Democracy and former attorney for several ACPRA members, Hala al-Dosari, Saudi activist and women’s health researcher, Sunjeev Bery, Director of MENA Advocacy at Amnesty International USA, and R. James Suzano, Acting Director of Advocacy at ADHRB.

10. On Knife’s Edge: The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s Impact on Violence Against Civilians | Wednesday, July 23rd | 12:00-1:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The post-Cold War era has witnessed horrific violence against non-combatants. In the Bosnian War alone, tens of thousands of civilians died. The founders of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)—and then of the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC)—hoped these courts might curb such atrocities. However, we still know very little about their actual impact. This talk will draw on the ICTY’s experience as the first wartime international criminal tribunal to provide insight into how and when these institutions might affect violence against civilians.  Speakers include: Jacqueline McAllister, Title VII Research Scholar, Ph.D., Northwestern University, Assistant Professor, Kenyon College and John R. Lampe, Senior Scholar Professor Emeritus, Department of History, University of Maryland, College Park.

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Peace picks July 6-10

1. A Conversation with French Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian| Monday, July 6th | 4:00 | German Marshall Fund | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) invites you to a conversation with French Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian. The focus of the discussion will center on France’s defense priorities, as well as the future of U.S.-French cooperation in meeting the spectrum of challenges currently facing Europe and the United States. Jean-Yves Le Drian is the French minister of defense. He was appointed in 2012, serving in this position through two governments. Le Drian has overseen French intervention in Mali in

View from the infamous Tour Montparnasse.
View from the infamous Tour Montparnasse.

2013, France’s Operation Barkhane in the Sahel, a counter terrorism mission conducted in partnership with Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Niger, and operation Chammal in support of the Iraqi forces again Daesh. As minister of defense, Le Drian also directed the publication of the French White Book on Defense and National Security in 2-13. Prior to this, Le Drian was the president of the Brittany Regional Council from 2004 to 2012. Until 2007, Le Drian was deputy of Morbihan to the National Assembly, having first been elected in 1978. In this position, he sat on the National Defense Committee. Previously, Le Drian held the position of mayor of Lorient from 1981-1998, during which time he also served as France’s secretary of state of the sea.

2. EnCourage Pt. II: Voices From the Middle East| Tuesday, July 7th | 9:00 | Johns Hopkins SAIS – Nitze Building | REGISTER TO ATTEND | After a successful EnCourage conference in Jerusalem this year, New Story Leadership (NSL) returns to Washington with our 2015 Team of five Israeli and five Palestinian students aged 20 – 32 to host EnCourage Pt. II: Voices from the Middle East in partnership with the Johns Hopkins University Conflict Management Program. This second EnCourage conference comes at time when the conversation about Israel and Palestine has been

The extremely diverse market in Ramla, Israel.
The diverse market of Ramla, Israel.

dominated by hopelessness. In the face of stalemate, NSL has reached out to young activists in Israel and Palestine to tell stories of courage and hope for the Middle East. The conference will include keynote speeches by four NSL Team members, a panel discussion, and a question-and-answer session between the Team, academic panel, and the audience. Keynote speakers include:  Abeer Shehadeh, University of Haifa, Israel, Shay Ater, Tel Aviv University, Israel, Mohammad Al-Hroub, Al Quds University, Palestine, and Yaara Elazari, Integrated Program for the Hebrew University and the Jerusalem Academy for Music and Dance, Israel. Panelists include: Professor Marc Gopin, James H. Laue Professor of Religion, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution, and the Director of the Center on Religion, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution, George Mason University, Professor Stef Woods, American Studies Program, American University, Dr. Manana Gnolidze-Swanson, George Mason University, and Dr. Boaz Atzili, Director of the SIS Doctoral Program, American University.  Additional panelists TBA!

3. The New Containment: Changing America’s Approach to Middle East Security| Tuesday, July 7th | 12:00-1:30 | Atlantic Council| REGISTER TO ATTEND | Securing the Middle East after an Iran nuclear deal is the region and the world’s next big challenge. The United States and its allies have engaged in tireless diplomacy with Iran over the past few years to produce an agreement that would limit Tehran’s nuclear program for the next decade and a half.  But the hard work does not stop here, and in fact, it may have just begun. To protect the deal and take full advantage of its potential benefits – which include the drastic reduction of the risk of nuclear weapons proliferating in the region – the United States needs a comprehensive strategy for regional security in the Middle East. After all, the ultimate prize and broader objective is and has always been to secure and stabilize the region, and a nuclear deal with Iran – as strategically significant as it is – is only one piece of the Middle East security puzzle.  Please join the Atlantic Council for a launch of a report by Brent Scowcroft Center Senior Fellow for Middle East Security Bilal Saab entitled The New Containment: Changing America’s Approach to Middle East Security and a debate on the future role of the United States in the Middle East following a nuclear deal with Iran. Additional speakers include: Barry Posen, Director, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Richard Haass, President, Council on Foreign Relations. Moderated by: Barbara Starr, Pentagon Correspondent CNN

4. Two Unforeseen Wars: A Military Analysis of the Conflict in Ukraine and the Campaign against ISIS | Tuesday, July 7th | 2:00-3:00 | International Institute for Strategic Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The unexpected Russian occupation of Crimea, the subsequent insurgency in eastern Ukraine and the rapid conquest of much of northern and western Iraq by ISIS were all strategic shocks. But there is now enough reporting on the conflicts to allow a preliminary analysis of their military contours, including the similarities and differences between the two wars. Brigadier Ben Barry will present the military dynamics of both the Ukrainian conflict and the ISIS insurgency, while examining the emerging military lessons of the conflicts and the military challenges that the pose for the US, NATO and their allies.  Speakers include: Ben Barry, Senior Fellow for Land Warfare, IISS and Samuel Charap, Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia, IISS.

5. The Iran Negotiations: Is this Really the End Game? |Wednesday, July 8th | 11:00-12:15 | Wilson Center |REGISTER TO ATTEND | Despite the uncertainties, the United States and Iran seem to be in the final stages of what promises to be a comprehensive accord on the nuclear issue.  Join us as analysts and observers of Iran, Middle Eastern politics, and U.S. foreign policy assess the state of the current negotiations, the implications of an accord and the consequences for the region without one. Speakers include: Robert S. Litwak, Vice President for Scholars and Academic Relations and Director, International Security Studies, Aaron David Miller, Vice President for New Initiatives and Distinguished Scholar; Historian, analyst, negotiator, and former advisor to Republican and Democratic Secretaries of State on Arab-Israeli negotiations, 1978-2003, Jane Harman, Director, President and CEO, Wilson Center, Henri J. Barkey, Director, Middle East Program, Danielle Pletka, Senior Vice President for Foreign Policy Studies, AEI and former Senate Committee on Foreign Relations senior professional staff member, Robin Wright, USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Scholar; Journalist and Author/Editor of eight books, most recently editor of “The Islamists Are Coming: Who They Really Are.”

6. Hearing: Implications of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran | Thursday, July 9th | 10:00-1:00 | Rayburn House Office Building | Chairman Royce on the hearing: “As we anticipate a congressional review of the Administration’s possible nuclear agreement with Iran, we’ll be looking to see how the Administration has done on Congress’ red lines.  Did we get anywhere, anytime inspections?  Full Iranian transparency regarding its past nuclear activities? No large-scale, immediate sanctions relief; but guaranteed, workable sanctions snap-backs? Meaningful restraints on Iran’s nuclear program that last decades?  This hearing will be the first in a series the Committee will hold should the Administration strike what might be one of the most significant agreements in decades.  As I have said, no deal is far better than a bad deal.” Witnesses include: The Honorable Stephen G. Rademaker, Foreign Policy Project Advisor, Bipartisan Policy Center, (Former Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control & Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State), Michael Doran, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Michael Makovsky, Ph.D., Chief Executive Officer, JINSA Germunder Center Iran Task Force.

7. Middle East Energy: Beyond an Iran Nuclear Deal |Thursday, July 9th | 10:30-12:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Iran hopes that the pending nuclear framework agreement will lead to much needed foreign investment in its oil and gas sector. Insofar as eased sanctions permit, billions of dollars will be needed to reverse production declines and re-establish production growth. How realistic are Iran’s aspirations to attract such investment, and what increased production and exports can be reasonably expected over the near to medium term? In turn, what will be the impact

View of Manama from Bahrain Fort.  How will Bahrain, with a Sunni monarchy and a Shiite majority, react to Iranian moves?
View of Manama from Bahrain Fort. How will Bahrain, with a Sunni monarchy and a Shiite majority, react to Iranian moves?

of increased Iranian exports on its neighbors, notably Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and their desire to secure a larger share of the global market? How will the Saudis and other Gulf monarchies react to Iranian moves? What are the implications of changes in Saudi national and energy leadership and of Kurdish moves to produce and export separately from Baghdad? What is the effect of these regional changes on the global energy balance? Energy experts will explore these issues in this eighth event in the Wilson Center’s Regional and Global Energy Series. Speakers include: David L. Goldwyn, President, Goldwyn Global Strategies LLC, David Gordon, Senior Advisor, Eurasia Group, Julia Nanay, Principal, Energy Ventures LLC, Jean-Francois Seznec, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council. Moderator: Jan H. Kalicki, Wilson Center Public Policy Fellow and Energy Lead.

8. The Iran Deal and its Consequences | Thursday, July 9th | 2:00-3:30 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) are expected to reach a ground-breaking comprehensive nuclear agreement by the end of June or shortly thereafter. The panelists will analyze the agreement in terms of its impact on nonproliferation, regional dynamics, US-Iran relations, and trade and investment in Iran. They will also discuss the potential obstacles to implementation both in Iran and in the United States.  Panelists include: Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, Arms Control Association, Kenneth Katzman, Middle East SpecialistCongressional Research Service, Clifford Kupchan, Chairman, Eurasia Group, John Limbert, Professor of Middle Eastern Studies, US Naval Academy.  Moderated by: Barbara Slavin, Senior Fellow, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council.

9. Washington D.C. Launch: Report of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance | Thursday, July 9th | 2:00-3:30 | Stimson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In the face of growing mass violence in fragile states, the threat of runaway climate change, and fears of devastating cross-border economic shocks and cyber attacks, the world needs a new kind of leadership, combined with new tools, networks, and institutions. The Hague Institute for Global Justice and the Stimson Center, in collaboration with the One Earth Future Foundation and UN Foundation, invite you to the Washington, D.C. launch of Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance, the new report of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance. The report offers a vision for just security, to ensure that neither justice nor security imperatives are neglected by critical international policy debates in 2015 and beyond. It further presents a bold, yet practical action plan for innovating global governance, and ways to mobilize diverse actors to advance reform to better respond to 21st century threats, challenges, and opportunities.  Co-chair of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance Madeleine K. Albright and Commissioner Jane Holl Lute will discuss the report.

10. A View from the Frontlines of Islamist Insurgency: Perspectives on Terrorism in the Middle East and South Asia | Friday, July 10th | 12:00-1:30 | Heritage Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | What do ISIS’s rise in Iraq and Syria and Iran’s new-found power and growing sphere of influence in the region portend for the broader Middle East? What is being done to counter Islamist

Azraq, Jordan: Iraq this way, Saudi Arabia that way.  Can Jordan withstand both internal and external extremist threats?
Azraq, Jordan: Iraq this way, Saudi Arabia that way. Can Jordan withstand both internal and external extremist threats?

extremist forces in the region and what is the current state of play? How do the current regional dynamics impact the threat from al-Qaeda, especially in Afghanistan and Pakistan? Join us at The Heritage Foundation as a panel of experts discuss the evolving regional dynamics and trends pertaining to the threat of Islamist extremism and share with us various perspectives on the struggle against the threat. Speakers include: Sara Carter, Senior Reporter, American Media Institute, Sebastian Gorka, Ph.D., Major General Matthew C. Horner Distinguished Chair of Military Theory, Marine Corps University, and Katherine Zimmerman, Research Fellow, American Enterprise Institute.

 

 

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Why critics of the nuclear deal are wrong

Max Fisher offers Mike Doran a platform for his case against the nuclear deal with Iran. Here are ten ways in which Mike is mistaken:

1. MD: Detente is the strategic goal, and arms control is the means to achieve it.

President Obama has made it clear he would welcome a broader detente with Iran, but he has also made it clear the nuclear deal has to be judged on its own merits. I don’t see any evidence that he is prevaricating, but if that is Mike’s claim he should produce the support.

2. MD: I don’t think it [preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon] is achievable without a significant coercive component. I think this is one of the most faulty assumptions of the administration.

Trouble is, the Obama Administration does not make that faulty assumption. It has done much more than any prior administration to increase the sanctions pressure on Iran, far more than the Administration for which Mike worked.

3. MD: [The Iranians] want sanctions relief and they’re going to get it, and they see that they’re going to get it, and they will stick with this process as long as they get direct, immediate, and very desirable benefits from it.

That is precisely the point of the negotiations: to provide sanctions relief provided Tehran gives up its nuclear weapons ambitions for at least ten years and moves itself back from a “breakout” of two or three months to a “breakout” time of a year. This is not an argument against the deal. It’s an argument for it.

4. MD: In fact, the starting point is that the Iranians want hegemony in the region, and they’re reading American policy with respect to their regional aspirations. The goal of Iran’s nuclear weapons program is not to defend against the United States or Israel — it’s to advance its regional agenda.

That’s right, and it is also a very good reason for halting Iran before it gets nuclear weapons. Again: a very good argument for the deal.

5. MD: I’m in favor of a vigorous containment program across the board, and I’m also in favor of a policy that says we have all options on the table and we mean it. The president says all options are on the table, but he doesn’t actually mean it, and I think we should mean it.

This confidence that his opponents know better than what the president says is laughable. The debate over destroying the Iranian nuclear program has clarified the limited gains it would provide: only two or three years of setback and an enormous incentive for Iran to redouble its efforts. But the notion that showing resolution by sabre-rattling would improve the prospects for a good deal is simply wrong.

6. MD: For a time the Iranians certainly believed all options were on the table. They abandoned their weaponization program, or they put it on hold, in 2003. Well, what happened in 2003? The United States went into Iraq, and I think they were probably very concerned at that point about all options being on the table.

The Iranians were concerned then about an American invasion, which is no longer a viable threat no matter who is president. But they spent the rest of the Bush Administration building and spinning thousands of more centrifuges, a fact Mike conveniently forgets.

7. MD: The very process of the negotiation is destroying the sanctions regime we established, which is the greatest nonmilitary instrument we have for coercing them. 

This is laughable. The process of negotiation is absolutely vital to building and maintaining the multilateral sanctions regime. Without negotiations, the Europeans, Russians and Chinese would not be on board for sanctions.

8. MD: Iran’s status in the international community is going to be greatly improved, and then there’s going to be an international commercial lobby and a diplomatic-military lobby, which includes the Chinese and the Russians, in favor of the new order in which Iran is a citizen in good standing in the international community that they can do business with.

This is true, but misleading. That “international commercial lobby” already exists. If no agreement is reached, the sanctions are mincemeat. The notion that we can continue to hold on to them indefinitely is nonsense.

9. MD: The key question in that regard is, “When did he start to see Iran as a partner in Iraq?”

When the whole question of the status of forces agreement in Iraq was alive in 2010, [former CIA Director and Secretary of Defense Leon] Panetta and [Secretary of State] Hillary Clinton and David Petraeus and everybody are saying, “Keep forces on the ground in Iraq,” and the president had a different inclination. Well, if the United States is not going to be directly involved in Iraq, then who is going to protect our interests and protect stability in Iraq? And I think that, although he’s never admitted this, he assumed the Iranians would play that role for him.

I would say it was the Bush invasion of Iraq that gave Iran its big opening in Iraq. But leaving that aside: George W. Bush, not Barack Hussein Obama, negotiated the agreement for the complete withdrawal of American troops from Iraq. It was signed before he left office. What Mike is talking about here is an attempt to renegotiate that agreement, which the Obama Administration did pursue. But the Iraqis weren’t willing to give the US juridiction over its troops in Iraq and we weren’t willing to stay without it.

10. MD: If the Iranian regime — and I do believe they are rational — were truly put before the choice, if Ali Khamenei was put before a choice of “Your nuclear program or absolutely crippling, debilitating economic sanctions,” he would think twice. I think if he were put before a choice of “Your nuclear program or severe military strikes,” he would think twice.

So how do you get those crippling economic sanctions, whichc have to be multilateral, if you are not also negotiating with Iran? Absolutely no realistic proposal.

Here at last, the true agenda: get us into war with Iran, but note no mention of the only temporary setback to the Iranian nuclear program (and consequently the need to intervene repeatedly every couple of years), no mention of the likelihood the Iranians would redouble the efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, no consideration of the impact on the world economy, or secondary consequences (relations with China, Russia, the Europeans, Iranian responses in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria, maybe also Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE).

Here is the kicker: if you really want to go to war with Iran, you’ll be much better off doing it because they violated an agreement than just doing it. So a nuclear deal is a good idea if that is your objective as well.

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