Tag: Balkans
Time for Athens to export stability
I spent a good part of yesterday on one of my least favorite topics: the name of the country whose capital is Skopje.
I started it with yesterday’s post. The NATOniks on Twitter then told me how out of it I was to think that the Alliance could spare the seconds needed to admit Skopje as a member. After all, it has a hefty agenda: Afghanistan, where it will decide what has already been decided, and smart defense, where it will decide something that will not be implemented. Enlargement, they said, is just not part of the narrative. They also suggested nothing, absolutely nothing, would change Greece’s veto of Macedonian membership.
What about a phone call from the President of the United States asking Athens to stand down in his hometown of Chicago at the NATO Summit there this weekend? It would be The FYROM* entering NATO, not “Macedonia,” in accordance with a 1995 agreement the parties to this “name” dispute signed (and Greece violated, according to the International Court of Justice, when it blocked The FYROM’s entry to NATO at the last summit in Bucharest). Athens, after all, might find it useful to build up some credits in Washington.
One of my Twitter friends suggested yesterday that Greece had won the ICJ case because the court declined to order Greece not to repeat what it had done in Bucharest. Here I need only cite what the Court said, citing a previous decision:
“[a]s a general rule, there is no reason to suppose that a State whose act or conduct has been declared wrongful by the Court will repeat that act or conduct in the future, since its good faith must be presumed”
Misreading this as suggesting the ICJ did not find Greece in the wrong is beyond my ability.
By the end of the day, I was having a perfectly reasonable conversation with Greeks interested in resolving the issue, and seemingly willing to think about The FYROM membership in NATO, if only that does not entail postponing a solution to the name issue forever. That is a reasonable concern, one that could be met by taking the issue to arbitration if it is not solved within a specified time frame. I imagine there are half dozen other solutions that people brainier than I am will think up. It is important also to note that Greece can block Macedonia’s process of gaining membership in the EU at any stage, so it will not have given up all its leverage if it allows The FYROM into NATO.
Greece today is in an uncomfortable position. It is in clear violation of an ICJ decision and is exporting instability to its neighbors and friends. It is going to be really hard to prevent the export of economic instability, since the electorate is rejecting austerity and causing real problems for the Euro and the European Union that will ripple far and wide. Check out your 401k today to see what I mean.
But the export of political instability is avoidable. Ethnic tension in Macedonia is on the increase, in part due to failure to get into NATO. This is a treasured goal of its Albanian population, one of whose political leaders told me last summer that it was vital to his ability to contain and counter growing pan-Albanian sentiment. Pan-Albanianism is also growing in Kosovo, where Belgrade makes no secret of its desire to partition the North, so that it can hold on to the largest single concentration of Serbs in Kosovo (even if most of them live farther south).
Partition in Macedonia and Kosovo would lead quickly and irrevocably to partition in Bosnia, and guess where else? Cyprus. Thus, Greece’s resistance to Macedonian membership in NATO and refusal to recognize Kosovo are politicies that risk undermining one of Athens’ most cherished goals: reunification of Cyprus.
The first law of holes is to stop digging. Athens has a real stake in the unity and territorial integrity of The FYROM, Kosovo, Bosnia and Cyprus. Greece should quietly reverse its position and allow The FYROM into NATO at Chicago, provided it gets a firm commitment to resolve the name issue within a defined time frame. That would clear one problem and gain Athens a good deal of credit. Then I’ll want to talk with Greek friends about recognizing Kosovo, which would remove still another issue that risks precipitating partition in Cyprus.
It is time for Athens to export stability.
*The FYROM, for the uninitiated, is “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” the name by which the country entered the United Nations and many other organizations soon after independence.
PS: I thought you all would enjoy this reaction from one of my Twitter followers: “Greece is and always was a lighthouse of stability in the region. NATO member, EC member, EU zone member and u claim instability?”
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Chicago holds a key to the Balkans
Soren Jessen-Petersen* and I drafted this piece as an op/ed but it didn’t sell. Sign of our times–the Balkans are not a priority in Washington, or even in Chicago. So we are posting it here, in advance of the NATO Summit next weekend.
The Balkans are superficially peaceful this spring. Serbia held elections May 6, having happily achieved the envied status of a candidate for European Union (EU) membership earlier this spring, as has Montenegro. Croatia is scheduled to enter the EU next year. After a long hiatus under a caretaker government, Bosnia is enjoying a moment of relative comity among its notoriously fractious Croats, Serbs and Muslims. This fall, Kosovo will complete its four and a half-year tutelage under an “international civilian representative” who supervised its independence.
But there are still serious problems that need to be resolved and little sign of progress. The 49 per cent of Bosnian territory that Serbs govern is without the plurality of its population that was non-Serb before the war. Its independence-seeking president makes no secret of his resistance to their return and disdain for the government in Sarajevo. He has succeeded in getting the EU to deal directly with him and his minions on many issues that need to be resolved before Bosnia can even become a candidate for membership.
Kosovo may be independent, but the government in Pristina has no control over the northern 11% of its territory, where the Serb population refuses to accept the substantial autonomy it would be permitted under the internationally negotiated “final status” settlement for Kosovo.
Perhaps the most delicate of today’s Balkans problems lies in Macedonia, whose population is about one-quarter ethnic Albanian. Small-scale violence between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians has been all too frequent this spring. Both groups are nervously watching northern Kosovo, fearing that partition there could lead to heightened ethnic conflict throughout the Balkans and beyond. Partition could ensue not only in Macedonia but also in Bosnia and Cyprus.
Then there is Chicago. There is strong support in Macedonia for NATO membership, which could occur at the NATO Summit May 20-21 in the windy city. But Greece objects to Macedonia using that name, which Athens would like to reserve for itself, claiming that Skopje’s use of it signifies designs on Greek territory as well as history and culture.
Macedonia has completed all the requirements for NATO membership, which include meeting political and economic criteria as well as putting the military under civilian control. Macedonian soldiers have served with Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan, where they were embedded in fighting units with the Vermont National Guard. The American who commanded the Macedonians in Afghanistan says they were up to U.S. military standards and carried their portion of the burden well.
But Greece will not agree to NATO membership for Macedonia, or a date to begin negotiating its EU membership, unless it changes its name. Athens has even refused to allow Macedonian NATO membership under the name used for UN membership (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, or The FYROM), despite a 1995 agreement to do so.
This Greek resistance is creating a strong reaction in Macedonia, where the exasperated prime minister benefits politically from defying Athens by renaming the airport after Alexander the Great and putting a statue of him in downtown Skopje.
The International Court of Justice, in a resounding victory for Skopje, decided in December that Athens acted illegally in blocking membership in NATO at the last Summit. It would be wrong for this injustice to be repeated in Chicago.
NATO and the EU are the two strong poles of attraction that keep the Balkans on the path towards a democratic and prosperous future. In order to find the political will to proceed with difficult reforms, Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Montenegro need to see the prospect of NATO and EU membership as real. Macedonia’s entry into NATO at Chicago and Croatia’s entry next year into the EU are the best current opportunities to demonstrate that the region’s aspirations can be fulfilled, solidifying a still fragile peace.
*Daniel Serwer, an American, and Soren Jessen-Petersen, a Dane, teach at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. They have both worked on and in the Balkans for more than 15 years.
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Who is Ivica Dačić?
Milan Marinkovic writes from Niš:
Perhaps Serbia still does not know who is going to be its next president, but I think it knows very well who will be the prime minister
said Serbian incumbent interior minister and the leader of the Socialist party (SPS) Ivica Dačić at his first press conference after preliminary results of Serbian parliamentary elections were announced. He has even hinted he might also keep the powerful interior ministry portfolio while also taking the prime ministry.
While it came in third, the number of seats SPS has won in Parliament makes Dačić the kingmaker in postelection negotiations over the formation of the next government. Unless the two bigger parties – Democrats (DS) of President Boris Tadić and Progressives (SNS) of Tomislav Nikolić – decide to join forces despite their bitter rivalry, SPS cannot be avoided in any combination that reaches a majority in Parliament. That’s why Dačić is so confident.
According to the latest news, the puzzle seems to be already solved. Officials from Tadić’s DS and Dačić’s SPS told the media that they have reached agreement. Tadić, who faces a presidential runoff May 20, enigmatically confirmed that he knew who would be the next prime minister, refusing to reveal the name.
Increasing Dačić’s prospects of assuming the post is the fact that Boris Tadić needs his support if he is to defeat Tomislav Nikolić in the second round of the presidential race. What remains unknown is which party will be the third coalition partner. The potential candidates are the United Regions of Serbia (URS), which participated in the outgoing government, and the opposition Liberal democratic party (LDP). If Dačić is going to have the final word, he will probably opt for URS.
Even if Dačić fails in his aspiration to the premiership, he has every reason to celebrate. Since the previous election four years ago he has managed to become the second most influential politician in the country, having doubled both his own and the party’s popularity. The two stronger parties – DS and SNS – won higher percentages of votes than SPS but came in well below their own – and most analysts’ – expectations. Ivica Dačić thus appears to be the one who best understands what the average voter wants to hear.
What could the policy of a government he heads look like?
In a recent statement, Dačić said he would remain committed to the process of European integration but stressed that he was not going to accept any foreign ultimatums, no matter if they come from Brussels, Washington or Moscow. “I only listen to Serbian people,” Dačić concluded.
When it comes to Kosovo, Dačić will prove assertive, as he continues to insist that partition would be the best solution, disregarding potentially adverse consequences of such an idea and international opposition to it. But Dačić is a prudent pragmatist who knows his (and his country’s) limits, so it is unlikely he would dare to cross the line and seize the northern part of Kosovo. He is just as unlikely to agree to put it under Pristina’s sovereignty.
Probably the same pragmatism will moderate his behavior towards Bosnia. Dačić often makes provocative remarks suggesting independence for its Serb-controlled half, Republika Srpska. The situation in Bosnia is troublesome enough even without sniping from Belgrade.
Altogether, the way Serbia has so far dealt with the these issues should not be expected to undergo any notable shifts, at least in the short term. Apart from Dačić’s contentious rheoric, the country’s foreign policy will basically remain as ambigous as it already is.
Currently more challenging for Serbian government is the question of what it intends to do in the coming months to solve the problems it is facing at home. Prominent economists are warning that Serbia, among other things, must urgently undertake a stringent fiscal reform with emphasis on budget cuts if it wants to escape the Greek scenario. The incumbent government has been delaying reform for fear of popular unrest. The likely composition of the incoming government suggests that procrastination will persist. But there is a catch-22: the existing state of the economy is such that popular unrest could prove inevitable anyway
The failure to reform the security sector has contributed to the failure of reforms in other areas, since many factions within the apparatus that served as the backbone of Slobodan Milošević’s regime have never been disbanded. Once an important figure of Milošević’s inner circle, Ivica Dačić could be an ideal person to carry out security sector reform, but his electoral constituency is rooted partly in the security services. It might well be in his interest that the old guard in security services remains intact. His inclination as interior minister has been more in the direction of centralization than serious reform.
Reports are now emerging from a Hungarian party in Vojvodina (an autonomous province in northern Serbia) and from Nikolic about election irregularities. This is the first time since the fall of Milošević that serious accusations of election theft have been lodged. It will be interesting to see how they are resolved.
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A bad election trifecta
There were three elections today conducted in the shadow of Europe’s austerity measures and impending recession: France, Greece and Serbia. All three saw good showings by anti-austerity, less pro-European forces. The outcomes of the first two will reduce further the role Europe plays in world affairs, at least for the next few years. The third suggested that Serbia will continue in its current policies, which are nominally pro-European but still export insecurity, in particular to Bosnia and Kosovo.
In France and Greece, opponents of German-style austerity had a good day. Francois Hollande’s victory over Nicolas Sarkozy guarantees a tug of war between Paris and Berlin. The parliamentary election outcome in Greece is not so clear yet–it will be several days before it is decided who will head the governing coalition and which parties will participate. But the good showing of smaller, anti-austerity parties of the left and right in the Greek parliamentary elections guarantees continuing uncertainty about whether Greece will implement the tough austerity required to obtain International Monetary Fund money. The bankers are worried.
The anti-austerity advocates in both Greece and France may well be correct that growth is Europe’s real need, rather than fiscal retrenchment. But Germany remains adamant about austerity, so the election results ensure continuing quarrels and painful adjustments inside the euro zone, which is already headed into recession.
So long as Europe remains focused on its own internal problems, it can play only a limited role in the rest of the world. The Americans will be fortunate if the Europeans manage to maintain any significant number of troops in Afghanistan into 2014. The prospects for enlargement beyond Croatia, which is supposed to gain membership in the European Union next year, are dim. Europe’s role in the Arab awakenings is already minimal. In Asia and the Middle East, it has condemned itself to a predominantly commercial role, though it leads the nuclear talks with Iran.
In Serbia, ethnically nationalist parties performed well. The presidential outcome will be decided in a run off two weeks hence. Moderate nationalist President Tadic did not do particularly well but seems have edged out his rival Tomislav Nikolic, who in the past has bested Tadic in the first round. Whoever wins, Belgrade seems determined to continue its quixotic effort to prepare for membership in the European Union even while laying claim to Kosovo, whose independence is recognized by 22 EU members, and supporting Serb separatism in Bosnia. The leader of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, campaigned openly for Tadic. These policies are incompatible, but only a few marginal figures in Serbian politics are willing to say what is obvious: Kosovo is lost and a united (but decentralized) Bosnia is in Serbia’s interest. Partition would mean the creation of a rump, radicalized Islamic state on Serbia’s border.
So what we can look forward to is a weaker Europe less willing to enlarge or play an expanded role in world affairs generally. The Balkans will be left increasingly to their own devices, which have repeatedly proved not only inadequate but also dangerous. Washington, preoccupied with other matters, will occasionally weigh in to restrain its friends–especially the Kosovars and the Bosniaks–from making big mistakes, but otherwise it will try to leave matters to a Europe that doesn’t really care if the Balkan road to the EU is a slow one.
Maybe we’ll muddle through. Maybe not. But the election trifecta means that the European Union and its attractiveness to non-members is weak and growing weaker. That’s not good.
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Third place counts
Milan Marinković weighs in from Niš on the upcoming elections in Serbia:
Both presidential and parliamentary elections in Serbia are scheduled for May 6 and the campaign is well under way. An abundance of unrealistic promises and the absence of concrete ideas dominate most actors’ pre-electoral rhetoric.
The campaign is basically negative. The point is not to convince voters of the candidate’s quality or ability, but to portray a rival as an even bigger evil. This tactic is most notably being used by President Boris Tadić and his Democratic Party (DS) against their major opponents – Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and its leader Tomislav Nikolić.
A key difference from the previous campaigns is that neither Kosovo nor the EU is a focal point. This time the emphasis is on economic issues, with much demagoguery about job creation and the need for more social justice. Tomislav Nikolić and his SNS are looking to take advantage of massive dissapointment in the current government’s poor results in economic policy. President Tadić, for his part, still can rely on favoritism from the influential mainstream media, controlled by his closest aides.
Opinion polls show that Tadić is more popular than his party. A primary reason he decided to hold presidential elections concurrently with those for Parliament is to improve the party’s prospects in the race.
While DS and SNS, as two biggest parties, will compete for the single highest percentage of votes, the actual winner of the elections will be the smaller one that finishes third. The logic is simple: unless Tadić and Nikolić decide to ally with each other, no government can be formed without support from the third.
This postelection prospect puts the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) of Interior Minister Ivica Dačić in an ideal position. As an experienced politician and the indispensable coalition partner in the current government to Boris Tadić, Dačić has prudently utilized four years in office to significantly increase his and his party’s popularity.
Many analysts estimate that Dačić is going to demand the premiership in exchange for participation of his party in the next government. The composition of the future ruling coalition largely depends on which of the two big parties’ leaderships will be more willing to acquiesce to Dačić’s growing political ambitions.
A potential problem for Boris Tadić is that SPS alone might no longer remain a sufficient coalition partner should SNS defeat his party in the parliamentary elections by too large a margin. Such an outcome would force Tadić to find an additional ally. The Liberal-democratic party (LDP) seems most likely to fill the void. A government that includes LDP would be expected to be more dedicated to the Eurointegration process and the accomplishment of necessary systemic reforms, given the party’s indisputably pro-Western orientation.
For SNS, the party of Tadić’s main rival Tomislav Nikolić, victory in the parliamentary elections is almost assured. But a victory does not guarantee that the party will be able to form the government. More important for SNS is how convincing that victory is going to be. The more seats in Parliament SNS manages to secure, the fewer small parties’ appetites it will need to satisfy during possible postelection negotiations. As in the case of a government led by DS, Dačić’s SPS would presumably remain an inevitable coalition member.
The least probable outcome, albeit possible, is that Nikolić’s SNS and Tadić’s DS create the so-called “big coalition.” This might happen if smaller parties demand too much in the bargaining over coalition formation.
The big coalition would be at the same time a big unknown. While optimists believe that an overwhelming parliamentary majority such a government would enjoy could facilitate the resolution of many pressing issues, pessimists fear that concentration of so much power in the hands of two strongest parties will only further undermine the already fragile democracy in Serbia. Both may well prove right.
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Fragility to possible stability
I spoke today at the World Bank on “Kosovo in 2012: Prospects for Turning Fragility into Long-Term Stability.” Here are the speaking notes I used.
1. Let me start by offering my bottom line: Kosovo, four years after independence, is still a work in progress but has decent prospects for long-term stability:
- The country has institutions: its government, parliament, constitutional court and municipalities are all functional and surprisingly vigorous on occasion.
- It has a vibrant civil society, including a press ranked by Reporters Without Borders as having “noticeable problems,” like those of all its neighbors.
- Freedom House gives Kosovo “partly free” rankings for civil liberties and political rights, on a par with some of its neighbors and lagging others.
- The last IMF mission in March concluded that fiscal targets were met and important progress in financial sector reform was made, while possible benefits for war veterans and political prisoners have been delayed, which I imagine is what the IMF preferred.
2. There are nevertheless very real problems.
- Kosovo suffers from endemic corruption, perceived as worse (though only marginally) than its neighbors according to Transparency International.
- Unemployment, underemployment and isolation of its very young and still rapidly growing population pose serious stability questions.
- Kosovo lags in moving towards the EU, due to its own lack of preparation, EU hesitation and resistance of the five members of the EU that have not recognized Kosovo.
- Belgrade has prevented Pristina from establishing its authority in the 3.5 northern municipalities, where majority Serb populations reject Kosovo’s sovereignty.
- Serbia likewise rejects Kosovo’s sovereignty and independence, has blocked entry into the UN and hindered bilateral recognitions. They have nevertheless reached 89, a stone’s throw from the tipping point of 100.
- Kosovo has no means to protect itself even for a few days from a hostile Serbia, if Belgrade is prepared to use force.
3. The immediate threats to Kosovo’s stability boil down to two:
- The conflict in the north, which has repeatedly come close to the boiling point in recent months, both due to Serb demonstrations to block Pristina border controls and Albanian demonstrations to block Serbian traffic into Kosovo.
- The growing sense of isolation in Kosovo and increasing pan-Albanian political appeals, not only in Kosovo but also in Albania and Macedonia.
4. What is to be done?
- Accelerate Kosovo’s approach to the EU: Kosovo should get a road map of what it needs to do to qualify for visa liberalization. Nothing would take more steam out of pan-Albanianism than freeing up young Kosovars to visit and study in the EU. The feasibility study for a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU should be completed by the end of the year, with negotiation of the SAA following on quickly.
- Begin the process of establishing Pristina’s authority in the north: Kosovo Serbs who are also Serbian citizens should have the opportunity to vote in Serbia’s May 6 presidential and parliamentary elections but not municipal elections in north Kosovo, which are a violation of UNSC resolution 1244. The EU-sponsored Belgrade/Pristina talks should discuss reintegration of the north through the Ahtisaari plan, supplemented by implementation mechanisms, including elements of President Tadic’s four-point plan.
- Improve Kosovo’s own ability to handle security: With completion of Kosovo’s part in implementing the Ahtisaari plan by the end of this year, supervision of independence by the International Civilian Office is expected to end. Kosovo will then be entitled to its own security force, which will need to be configured to meet a reasonable array of national security risks and enable an eventual NATO withdrawal, even if NATO will remain essential to guaranteeing Kosovo’s security until Belgrade fully accepts its independence and sovereignty by allowing it into the UN General Assembly.
5. That leaves corruption.
- I am at a loss. The opposite of corruption is not anti-corruption but good governance.
- Small family-focused societies have particular difficulty with nepotism, conflict of interest, witness protection and central government imposition of rule of law.
- Internationals may be able to help Kosovo by providing some independent, private-sector oversight and design of mechanisms to combat corruption.
- But my sense is that Kosovo also needs a more courageous and independent judiciary, in particular at the lower court levels.
- Still, there is no substitute for citizens demanding transparency and accountability.
- That’s as true in the District of Columbia as it is in Pristina or Belgrade.
6. I return to my bottom line.
- Kosovo is an imperfect but functioning state.
- Pieter Feith intends to close the International Civilian Office well before the end of this year, with all of Pristina’s obligations under the Ahtisaari plan fulfilled.
- That will leave the remaining issues—in particular the north—to the EU and the OSCE.
- This is a rare occasion: an international mission that closes its doors having worked itself out of a job. Let’s celebrate!
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