Tag: Balkans
Albanian dignity and values
The mayor of Tirana, Lulzim Basha, stopped by Johns Hopkins/SAIS this morning to do a public presentation, moderated by Mike Haltzel. Still well under 40, he has already served as Public Works, Transport and Telecommunications Minister, Foreign Minister and Interior Minister. Soft-spoken and low key, he nevertheless wasn’t shy about mentioning main achievements in each of these positions: a big jump in foreign and infrastructure investment, NATO membership and the Schengen visa waiver, which allows Albanians to travel visa-free in the European Union.
He also wasn’t shy about saying he thought his predecessor as mayor, Edi Rama, had paid too much attention to national politics (Rama is also head of the Socialist Party) and too little to the citizens of his city. Lulzim says he wants to focus on citizen needs, not national issues.
This above all means the economy, employment, and transparent governance. Municipal expenditures will all be available soon on line. City hall, which at the beginning of his mandate was absorbing 87% of revenue, will by the end of it absorb only 50%, with the rest spent on citizens and services to them. The margin for discretion by city officials is being reduced, so as to limit opportunities for corruption. Tax collection will be improved, the burdens lowered and the tax base expanded. Public/private partnerships and concessions to the private sector will be used to the maximum extent possible. There will be one stop shopping for licenses and permits. The mayor and his staff are meeting regularly with citizens in town hall meetings and individually.
I confess this sounded pretty good to me, but I liked what I heard from Edi Rama too, when he spoke at the U.S. Institute of Peace a few years ago. What do I know about Tirana and its politics? Precious little. I suppose the only way to judge Mayor Basha is to wait a few years and see whether things have improved, or not. I hope they do: Tirana was a pretty wretched place when I first visited in 1997. It had improved dramatically when I was there a few years later, but that’s not saying much: there was a lot of illegal construction. If Lulzim can meet some of the citizens’ demands and improve the quality of life, I suppose he could be mayor for life.
But he won’t be. Prime Minister Sali Berisha is presumably grooming him for bigger and better things (if Berisha doesn’t decide that Lulzim has gotten too big for his britches and needs taking down a peg). So I asked him about national and regional politics: why are we all hearing much more about Greater Albania than at any time I can remember? What does it signify and how does he regard this talk?
Lulzim conceded that there is much more “red and black” nationalist talk than in the past. It started in Kosovo with Albin Kurti. Now politicians in Albania are trying to attract votes by appealing to “Albanian dignity and values,” which would only be fully realizable they claim in a unified Albanian state.
This idea will not, Lulzim thought, gain much traction. Albanian dignity and values are European. Albanians in the Balkans have understood that the deal they got was a good one: a serious Albanian state, Kosovo independence, and equal rights for Albanians in Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. Unification will come within the European Union, not before. That will serve Albanian dignity and values best.
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Serbian nationalism today
I’ve asked Milan Marinković, who lives in Niš, to begin writing on the Balkans for peacefare.net. His name should be familiar to you from some of the perceptive comments he has submitted over recent months. Here is a first piece, to which I’ve contributed a bit as well:
Many in Serbia tend to equate nationalism with patriotism. It would be more accurate to say that they confuse the two.
Patriotism is devotion to a country. A patriot seeks to make it more prosperous, more modern, more stable and secure. In fewer words: into a generally better place to live.
Nationalism regards the nation as a group under permanent threat from others. The group is thus forced to defend itself repeatedly, sometimes against nonexistent or fairly harmless enemies. The most prominent among these “enemies” in Serbia today is none other than Angelina Jolie. Her film on the war in Bosnia, In the Land of Blood and Honey, is regarded as an attack on Serbs and Serbia.
Regardless of who is perceived as the dangerous “anti-Serbian element” at a given time, several political parties readily accept and exploit nationalism. Election campaigns–the parliamentary election is to be held in May–intensify nationalist sentiments. Serbian politicians find it useful in gaining votes to manipulate and exploit fear.
Those who play the nationalist card are not uniform. At least three types of nationalists exist in Serbia: militant, conservative, and moderate.
Militants and conservatives both believe Serbs should avoid integration into the Western world in order to preserve their religion, tradition and customs as vital aspects of national identity and culture. Where they differ is in means. Militants are prepared to use violence.
The best recent example is the violence in Belgrade during the Gay Pride parade in 2010, when several thousand members of ultranationalist groups–including football (soccer) hooligans–rioted for hours, leaving more than a hundred injured policemen, who had been ordered to abstain from using force. Also, in 2008, during demonstrations against Kosovo’s declaration of independence, militant nationalists stormed and set ablaze the U.S. embassy. On a smaller scale, street attacks on LGBT activists, Roma, journalists and others take place on a weekly basis in Serbia, especially in multiethnic Vojvodina in the north.
Conservatives do not publicly advocate the use of violence, though they may sometimes support it tacitly. Former Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica is a conservative nationalist.
Moderate nationalists agree with their conservative counterparts on the importance of national identity and tradition, but believe that Serbia nevertheless needs to be more flexible if it is to achieve its somewhat contradictory goals, which include EU membership. This requires never-ending attempts to strike a balance between East and West, leading to chronic indecision. The two most notable moderate nationalists on Serbia’s political scene today are President Tadić (Democratic Party) and his main political rival, Tomislav Nikolić of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). Some believe that Tadić’s most influential coalition partner, Interior Minister Ivica Dačić, also belongs to this group, though others would regard him as a chameleon who adapts to whatever the environment requires.
What all the nationalist factions have in common is the assumption that Serbia and Serbs, being the largest among former Yugoslav republics and peoples respectively, are destined to dominate the region, either through territorial expansion (the creation of so-called “greater Serbia”) or by more subtle methods. Anything that interferes with this ambition is regarded as a threat.
The last time this idea served as the foundation of Serbia’s national policy, wars left many thousands dead. Armed conflict today is far less likely—the Serbian armed forces are just not up for it, the moderate nationalist politicians don’t want it, and the international community is watching more carefully than in the 1990s. But it is not clear whether a moderately nationalist Serbia will fit a European Union suit tailored to patriots rather than nationalists.
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Nationalism has the edge
A colleague who has spent many years in and around Serbia writes:
You have probably noticed that Serbian politics haven’t changed much…the same old faces, same games, same centuries-old unresolved issue, same silliness, and the same struggle for the country’s soul, i.e., eastern or western orientation.
That is pretty much precisely my impression from a few days in Belgrade. Bosnia, Kosovo, Communists vs. nationalists, Washington vs. Moscow, EU as the only route out of the morass.
As fortune would have it (logistics kept me from two other appointments), I spent today mainly among anti-nationalists, which is admittedly where at least some of my personal sentiments lie. These are the people who defend individual human rights, are unstirred by appeals to ethnic identity and are trying hard to steer the Balkans in a more “civic” and “European” direction.
They are having a really hard time. The Serbian political spectrum has shifted definitively in the nationalist direction, with President Tadic trying hard to outflank his nationalist competion, both inside and outside the governing coalition. Today the government fired anti-nationalist Sreten Ugricic from his position as head of the national library, for signing a statement and speaking out in defense of a Montenegrin colleague. The pretense is that this was done because in defending someone else’s right to free speech–and freedom from physical harm–he really was calling for Tadic’s assassination, which is a stretch even in Belgrade.
But it is indicative of the atmosphere here, which is reminiscent of the Milosevic era for the anti-nationalists. Their calls to government officials go unanswered, the American embassy ignores them and even threatens to cut off funding if they continue to refer war crimes cases to the relevant state prosecutor, their media outlets get no government advertizing and they find themselves in court on ancient and often spurious charges. Of course this makes them ever more insistent and sometimes strident, determined to steer the ship of state in the direction they thought it was pointed after Milosevic fell: towards accountability for past behavior, resolution of the Kosovo and Bosnia dilemmas and quick movement towards the EU.
The newest feature on the anti-nationalist landscape is the Preokret (turn-around, maybe U-turn) coalition, which has managed to put Ceda Jovanovic’s Liberal Party, Vuk Draskovic’s Serbian Renewal Movement, Zarko Korac’s Social Democratic Union and some nongovernmental organizations into a pro-European coalition:
All of us, all citizens who have struggled in good faith for a European Serbia…are embittered because of our numerous lost opportunities. We are especially dismayed with the unnecessary and dangerous turn of a pro-European government towards anti-European hysteria and a strategy that logs barricades at two border crossings in northern Kosovo, which could become the barrier to gaining the status of candidate nation and a date to begin negotiations for Serbia’s accession to the European Union.
This is not hyperbole, but it isn’t popular in Serbia these days either. Those who say it over and over–like Preokret and Petar Lukovic at the anti-nationalist, regionally focused internet portal e-Novine–can expect harassment, accusations of malfeasance, and attacks in the increasingly government-influenced popular press.
I no doubt will get notes from friends criticizing me from associating with Petar Lukovic, allowing my picture to run on his site and agreeing to mention my visit to e-Novine here on peacefare.net, which I happily do (I trust the Serbian secret services will report it anyway). The test of a democratic society is not whether it tolerates well-mannered dissent, but whether it can allow the more strident but intelligent sort to test its mettle on the sinews of the state. e-Novine‘s style is not mine, but that’s just the point.
My last visit today was to the indomitable Natasa Kandic. I will carry back to Washington the Humanitarian Law Centre’s Kosovo Memory Book 1998-2000 and addendum documenting “each person killed during the Kosovo conflict because of his her nationality.” This is a work of extraordinary dedication and commitment, one that lends a firm foundation to her effort to create a regional reconciliation commission (RECOM)
to create an accurate, objective and official record of war crimes and other serious violations of human rights; to recognize the victims and their suffering; and to prevent the recurrence of such crimes.
Who could be opposed to that, you ask? It is not so much open opposition. You’ll find lots of people to rain praise on the idea, and few who will criticize it. But there are others who do not answer phone calls, or make arrangements for high-level meetings, or otherwise fail to help make this important idea into a reality. And why should they? Nationalism has the edge today. Keeping the wounds open serves some people better than closing them.
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What does Serbia want?
There is nothing new in this post: only an explication of President Tadic’s recent “four-point” plan for resolving Kosovo-related issues, given to me in Belgrade orally by someone in a position to know the thinking inside the Serbian government. There are other explications out there.
First, the “red lines”:
- no recognition of Kosovo as an independent state.
- no partition, because of international community opposition.
Then, the “comprehensive solution” of more important, but non-technical issues Serbia is trying to interest the Americans and Europeans in pursuing:
1. For north Kosovo, no less right to govern themselves than they have now.
2. For the Serb enclaves south of the Ibar river, full implementation of their rights under the Ahtisaari plan.
3. Resolution through an agreed mechanism of rights to private property and socially owned enterprises.
4. An international mechanism to guarantee protection of the Serbian cultural heritage in Kosovo, in particular the church properties.
This came to me with relevant commentary. Belgrade is not looking for return of displaced people and refugees to their pre-war homes. It anticipates that most people who recover property will sell it to the majority group in the area in which the property happens to sit. The current Serb officials in municipalities south of the Ibar river Belgrade regards as illegitimate crooks, which is pretty much the same way it regards Albanians who occupy positions in the Pristina institutions, but with that special disdain for those of your own kind who go over to an enemy. Belgrade would like the municipal governments in the enclaves reconstituted more to its liking.
The last of the four issues–an international mechanism for protection of sacred properties–is directly related to Serb identity and the most important of the four items for Belgrade. If there is flexibility on that, Belgrade can give more on the other three. Belgrade does not regard the current Belgrade/Pristina talks as the right forum for talks on these issues. It wants to talk more directly to those with the authority to implement solutions. They irony of that was not lost on me.
Asked what was in the plan for Pristina, I was told that the Albanians could hope that settling these issues would encourage more investment and resulting employment.
It is difficult to regard this “four-point” plan as explicated here as representing much progress, except that it essentially reduces Belgrade’s “wants” from restoration of sovereignty over all of Kosovo to something more manageable, without however promising Serbian acceptance of Kosovo’s status as a sovereign state. Certainly the attitude towards the Pristina institutions and the municipal governments in the Serb enclaves is one not likely to induce a warm response. Nor are the Americans and Europeans likely to be thrilled with the attitude toward the Pristina/Belgrade talks, from which Belgrade would like to escape.
That said, there is much here a negotiator could work with. Some sort of international mechanism guaranteeing Serb church properties in Kosovo is not out of the question. A mechanism for settlement of property disputes was always in the cards. If Belgrade is willing to instruct its loyalists to vote in the next Kosovo elections, I suppose some of the municipal governments it regards as illegitimate may be swept away, or in any event modified. The Ahtisaari plan has ample provision for self-government in the Serb municipalities.
The Ahtisaari plan is in fact the heart of the matter. It considered all four of the issues the Serbian government is now emphasizing. A hard look at what is in the plan on these issues and how it might be implemented is in order, both in Belgrade and in Pristina. And the day will come when direct talks between responsible officials may be necessary.
This brings us back to the recognition question. Belgrade can expect implementation of any agreement on the four points it raises only by a sovereign government, one it recognizes as legitimate. This is implicit of course in the Belgrade/Pristina talks, but it is still denied explicitly in Belgrade, which has painted itself into a corner by stating repeatedly and loudly that it will never recognize Kosovo as sovereign and independent (as required by its post-Milosevic constitution). It does not have to. It can simply allow General Assembly membership, which Moscow blocks in the Security Council with a veto bought with a sale of Serbian energy assets to the Russians at bargain basement prices. Any principled Russian position on the issue disappeared with Moscow’s recognitions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the break-away provinces in Georgia.
The related question of Kosovo’s identification in regional talks, prominent in the B92 report cited above, was not mentioned to me. If Belgrade’s demand is that it be consistent with UN Security Council resolution 1244, I see no problem with that: the International Court of Justice has decided that declaration of a sovereign and independent Kosovo was not inconsistent with 1244. But of course that is not what Belgrade is asking: it will want Kosovo’s identification to be “status-neutral,” an interpretation of 1244 that the ICJ, the United States and other recognizing countries do not agree with. Even most of the non-recognizing EU countries understand that Kosovo will have to be dealt with on a basis that does not remind it constantly that they have not recognized it.
Belgrade is today feigning disinterest in EU candidacy, claiming that real benefits only come from getting a date for accession talks to begin and that in any event the reform process required for EU candidacy will continue. But of course this flurry of interest in redefining the agenda comes directly from Angela Merkel’s clarity last summer about what Serbia needed to do to get EU candidacy, in particular her insistence that Serbian parallel institutions in the north be dissolved.
However turgid and byzantine the four points and the related commentary get, the real prize here is the EU, for both Serbia and Kosovo. Belgrade can hope for EU membership, if it prepares at the current pace or better and the stars align well, before 2020, maybe even by 2018. Kosovo cannot. If Belgrade doesn’t mind being put on the same EU time schedule as Kosovo, which would vastly slow its progress but simplify many issues, so be it. That likely is not want Serbia wants, but it may well be what it ends up getting.
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It’s about the future, not the past
I’ve had a full day in Belgrade. Let’s see if I can make some sense of what I’ve heard about the subject of the day: confronting the past, what’s next?
Not everyone in the region will agree, but I think Serbia is doing a good job of holding at least some individuals responsible for some past crimes. Certainly when it comes to prosecuting their own citizens, they have done reasonably well in numerical terms, with many dozens of indictments. It is quite clear that this effort is limited: few cases involve high-ranking officials and there is a vigorous push to avoid state responsibility, in particular at the International Court of Justice. But within these limits, Bruno Vekaric, the Serbian deputy war crimes prosecutor, makes a good case for an energetic and professional effort being made under less than ideal political conditions.
The problem is that this laudable effort, rather than leading on to a broader effort at accountability, is being accepted as a substitute: the state and society are being let off the hook. This is understandable. Both the Bosnian and Kosovo wars ended in negotiated outcomes in which Milosevic snatched a kind of semi-victory from the jaws of certain military defeat. The Serbian state is the same state as the one that fought those wars, even if its constitution has been changed. The society has gone through no general catharsis, even if there have been moments (like the broadcasting several years ago of the Scorpion paramilitary war crimes) that one appeared possible. Fundamental issues from both wars remain open: the borders of Serbia with Kosovo are in Belgrade’s view still unsettled; Belgrade and Banja Luka are still testing the limits of the Dayton formula for their relations, pushing the envelope as far towards de facto independence for Republika Srpska as the international community will permit.
As Sreten Ugricic pointed out in the opening session of today’s conference, denial of defeat implies there is no need to assign responsibility at the state level. The focus on judicial proceedings, laudable as it may be, dominates public discourse on the past and allows the broader society to ignore the obvious facts: Milosevic had widespread support, as did the wars. Leaders are unwilling to open these issues, as they see no electoral benefit in doing so. The result, Nenad Dimitrijevic suggested, is a moral vacuum at the social level, even while individuals are being found legally guilty. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has little impact on the society, which has redefined establishment of Republika Srpska (RS) as liberation of the Serbs in Bosnia, not so much denying as ignoring criminal acts against Bosniaks and Croats even while those acts are being prosecuted by ICTY or in Serbian courts.
There was some tussling in the discussion today about the importance of anti-Fascist discourse, with some advocating it and some seeing it as dated and unsuitable. I confess I find this aspect of discussions throughout former Yugoslavia–discussions of fascism, nationalism and communism–difficult to track and almost unfathomable. People here live with this legacy and I guess it is helpful that they discuss it, but as a typically ahistorical American (with a Ph.D. in history) I am puzzled by its survival into the 21st century.
My bottom line: I see Serbia not so much burdened by the past as it is by the future: fearing the definitive loss of Kosovo and reintegration of the Serbs into Bosnia, the Serbian state and society join in trying to prevent these outcomes. They find willing accomplices in Milorad Dodik, the Serbs of RS and the Serbs of northern Kosovo, even though all of them know that they may eventually be abandonned to their respective fates.
This is not a pretty picture, but it is not a uniformly bleak one either. I for one am glad to know that there are prosecutors working hard to bring what cases they can (and may). The holding of a discussion of this sort at the national library in the shadow of the biggest orthodox church in Christendom (so my driver told me on the way in from the airport) is remarkable. I only hope that in the morning I don’t discover that Sreten Ugricic, who made a great deal of sense in his presentation today, has been fired as the library’s director. That was the rumor today.
I won’t even try to recount the reason why, since it would take another 737 words, but the Interior Minister will I hope realize that putting someone in prison (or firing them) for defending some else’s freedom of speech is unworthy, even if you don’t like what the other guy said. If you don’t understand that cryptic version, blame me for not being able to render a typically complicated Balkans story–it involves a Montenegrin and explosives in Bosnia–into comprehensible terms. You’ll be able to read all about it in the novel Ugricic would no doubt write in prison. I wouldn’t risk that, Mr. Interior Minister!
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NATO and the Western Balkans
Here is the testimony I gave today at the U.S. Helsinki Commission, via Skype from Belgrade:
Helsinki Commission
“The Western Balkans and the 2012 NATO Summit”
Testimony by Professor Daniel Serwer, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
January 18, 2012
Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you on a subject close to my heart and brain: NATO and the Western Balkans.
NATO entered the Balkans in 1993, with the no-fly zone over Bosnia. It was an important moment. Until then, Yugoslavia had been considered outside the NATO area, a concept that lost relevance as the Alliance moved from thinking of itself as a defensive pact against the Soviet Union to an alliance protecting European and American security from risks arising anywhere in the world.
Two decades later, the Western Balkans are entering NATO. Slovenia (2004), Croatia (2009) and Albania (2009) have already made the strategic choice of aligning their defense efforts with NATO. They also contribute to Alliance efforts in Afghanistan and Kosovo, taking on burdens at least proportional to their size and economic weight. They enable us to devote American personnel to other priority missions, both NATO and non-NATO.
Slovenia, Croatia and Albania have also benefited from their efforts to reform their security services, professionalize and reorganize them to meet NATO standards. These are countries that have made a profound commitment to democratic norms, even if they still sometimes struggle to meet them.
Five more countries of the Western Balkans remain outside NATO. It is time to open the door and allow two of them to begin to enter: Macedonia and Montenegro.
Macedonia has done yeoman’s work completing its membership action plan. Just ten years ago, ethnic war racked the country. The conflict ended with agreement to reform its state institutions, including the security services. The Macedonians took advantage of the opportunity to professionalize their security forces to meet NATO standards.
I spoke Friday with Brigadier General William Roy, whose Vermont National Guard brigade deployed for six months in 2010 to Afghanistan with Macedonian troops. He reports in an email: “By all accounts they performed their mission to the desired standard. They were involved in a number of tactical engagements with enemy forces while integrated with my companies. Most impressive has been the development of their NCO Corps; a key to having a well trained and disciplined force.”
While I might wish Skopje would spend less money on tributes to Alexander the Great, the only thing keeping Macedonia from NATO membership today is the dispute with Greece over the country’s name, which prevented it from receiving an invitation at the Bucharest Summit in 2008. Since then, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has found that Greece violated its interim accord with the government in Skopje when it blocked membership at Bucharest.
May is the time to correct the injustice done at Bucharest. Chicago is the place. The NATO Summit should issue an invitation for membership to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, or to Macedonia by whatever name Skopje and Athens may agree on. The United States should make it clear to Greece that repeating the mistake of Bucharest is not acceptable, as the ICJ has already said.
With the door to NATO open at Chicago, I would also urge that Montenegro be given a clear signal that it, too, will get an invitation once it completes its Membership Action Plan. We should not close the door to a country that has been willing to join us in Afghanistan and contributes to UN operations in Somalia and Liberia.
Three more Western Balkans countries would still remain outside NATO: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo. None is ready for an invitation. Bosnia has failed to meet the international community requirement that it resolve defense property issues. It should get that done before Chicago so it can embark on the membership process. Kosovo, which will want to join NATO as quickly as possible, is just beginning to think about the nature and shape of its future security forces. The United States should help Kosovo establish forces that can meet its legitimate security interests within the NATO context, enabling the eventual withdrawal of NATO’s Kosovo force (KFOR).
Serbia has not indicated it wishes to join NATO, due to popular distaste for an Alliance that bombed the country in 1999 and played a crucial role in removing Kosovo from Milosevic regime oppression. Nevertheless, Serbia has participated in Partnership for Peace.* The NATO door should stay open. The choice of joining or not should be Belgrade’s.
The odds of Serbia joining NATO would be significantly increased if Macedonia and especially Montenegro were to make clear progress toward membership in Chicago. NATO members would then eventually surround Serbia, making the decision to join geographically and strategically compelling.
With a decision to join NATO, Belgrade would have to make other difficult decisions: about both Bosnia and Kosovo. Good neighborly relations are a prerequisite for NATO, as they are for the EU. But EU membership is still far off. Serbia could, if it wanted, join NATO much faster, but it will need to demonstrate unequivocally respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all its neighbors.
NATO membership is not a panacea. I do not believe allowing Bosnia early entry, as some advocate, would be wise. But real progress on membership for Macedonia and Montenegro at Chicago would impart a sense of momentum to the Western Balkans that is lacking today. With Europe immersed in a financial crisis, only Croatia can hope for EU membership within the next few years. The others will have to wait until Europe has its financial house in order.
Many current members have found NATO provides relief from the historic baggage of past wars, ethnic conflicts and mass atrocities. Joining an alliance to make the world safer for democratic societies is a noble cause. It is a good idea to extend an invitation to Macedonia at Chicago and make welcoming noises to Montenegro. The door should remain open for the others to enter when they are ready and willing. NATO expansion into the Balkans serves U.S. interests not only in that region but wherever NATO or U.S. forces deploy in the future.
*My original text said Serbia had deployed troops to Afghanistan. Ivan Vejvoda pointed out that this is not correct. I’ve omitted the error here, but thought you should know: even paragons make mistakes. I’m not sure how I acquired that one.
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