Tag: Balkans
Happy new year, Balkans!
I seem to have developed the habit of doing a piece for Kosova Sot‘s New Year’s edition. Here is what I sent Magarita Kadriu on December 20:
Friends in Kosovo and the Balkans often ask me what I think about events there. The truth, if I care to tell it, is that people in Washington don’t think much about the Balkans these days. The Council on Foreign Relations recently published a list of 30 conflict prevention challenges for the United States in 2012. None involved the Balkans. I follow events there—mainly from B92’s coverage and many Balkans visitors—but only with peripheral vision. I am far more focused on the Arab spring, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. And this week North Korea.
I am well aware that there are still war and peace issues in the Balkans, especially in Bosnia and in Kosovo. But they are relatively small ones subject to a lot of international monitoring: Milorad Dodik is not going to be able to take Republika Srpska in the direction of independence without a lot pressure being brought to bear against the idea, and Belgrade is not going to be able to formally annex northern Kosovo without suffering substantial consequences.
That does not mean however that the underlying problems can be resolved. Resolution really depends on the Europeans, who have often shown little stomach for using their leverage to good effect. I say that, and yet just yesterday German Chancellor Merkel made it clear, once again, that the European Union will not accept partition of Kosovo (or the persistence of the parallel structures in the north) and expects Belgrade and Pristina to collaborate in finding solutions. Her steadfastness is a great contribution.
I only wish we were seeing the same strong European voice in Bosnia, where Catherine Ashton has been far more tolerant of Dodik’s antics than I would like. This is partly because the Europeans don’t take him seriously. They know he knows there will be no recognition if Republika Srpska makes the mistake of declaring independence. But they underestimate the frustration and annoyance on the Bosniak side of the equation. Bosnia is stagnating, a condition that is not good for peace and security.
That said, I don’t expect dramatic developments in 2012. Pristina and Belgrade need to continue their dialogue and the search for mutually acceptable solutions, which can be found in implementation of the Ahtisaari plan. Bosnia is reaching the end of its financial rope, which may encourage at least formation of the new state government, so long overdue. Much of the rest of the Balkans is enjoying a relatively good holiday season: Croatia is entering the EU, Macedonia won its case in the International Court of Justice against Greece, Montenegro is moving faster than most thought possible towards the EU and NATO.
Serbian President Tadic yesterday acknowledged that neither partition nor restoration of Serbian sovereignty in Kosovo is possible. Now he is talking “dual sovereignty.” I’ll be glad to hear what he means by this—certainly dual citizenship is not only possible but desirable. But I don’t know of any places that enjoy peace and stability without clarity about sovereignty.
Kosovo’s citizens have every right to be frustrated that their sovereignty and independence has not been recognized at the United Nations or by Belgrade. But the best revenge is simply this: govern well, improve the lot of all of Kosovo’s citizens, and enjoy freedom each and every day in 2012.
Ten days later, I don’t have much to add, but my message would be the same to Belgrade and Sarajevo: govern well, improve the lot of your citizens and enjoy freedom each and every day in 2012. The Bosnians have apparently reached agreement in principle on forming their government. So far as I know, everything else is more or less where it was before Christmas. Things move slowly in the Balkans, except when they move fast.
Slow is probably safer right now, but I do hope Serbia will make a decisive turn in 2012 in favor of a European future. Serbian Interior Minister Ivica Dačić gives me some hope this morning with this from B92:
We are going to the EU because of Serbia and only if it is in our interest. Serbia will not be destroyed if it loses Kosovo. That happened in the Serbian history before, that fanaticism about being in love with Europe or masochism that we cannot live without Kosovo or the Republic of Srpska.
Then he dashes my optimism with talk about “demarcation.” Hard to know what that means, but it presumably refers to his partition ambitions. Giving up on partition, both of Kosovo and Bosnia, is absolutely essential if Serbia and the rest of the Balkans is going to thrive.
I’ll be in Belgrade in mid-January and hope to get a feel for how likely that is. Stay tuned to peacefare.net for reports on what I find.
With very best wishes for the New Year to friends of all flavors in the Balkans,
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The end is nigh, again!
I made a bunch of predictions a year ago. Here is how they turned out:
- Iran: the biggest headache of the year to come. If its nuclear program is not slowed or stopped, things are going to get tense. Both Israel and the U.S. have preferred sanctions, covert action and diplomatic pressure to military action. If no agreement is reached on enrichment, that might change by the end of 2011. No Green Revolution, the clerics hang on, using the Revolutionary Guards to defend the revolution (duh). I wasn’t far off on this one. No Green Revolution, no military action yet.
- Pakistan: it isn’t getting better and it could well get worse. The security forces don’t like the way the civilians aren’t handling things, and the civilians are in perpetual crisis. Look for increased internal tension, but no Army takeover, and some success in American efforts to get more action against AQ and the Taliban inside Pakistan. Judging from a report in the New York Times, we may not always be pleased with the methods the Pakistanis use. It got worse, as suggested. No I did not anticipate the killing of Osama bin Laden, or the increased tensions with the U.S., but otherwise I had at least some of it right: growing internal tension, no Army takeover, some American success.
- North Korea: no migraine, but pesky nonetheless, and South Korea is a lot less quiescent than it used to be. Pretty good odds on some sort of military action during the year, but the South and the Americans will try to avoid the nightmare of a devastating artillery barrage against Seoul. I did not predict the death of Kim Jong Il, but otherwise I got it right. There was military action during the year, but no artillery barrage against Seoul.
- Afghanistan: sure there will be military progress, enough to allow at least a minimal withdrawal from a handful of provinces by July. But it is hard to see how Karzai becomes much more legitimate or effective. There is a lot of heavy lifting to do before provincial government is improved, but by the end of the year we might see some serious progress in that direction, again in a handful of provinces. This is pretty much on the mark.
- Iraq: no one expects much good of this government, which is large, unwieldy and fragmented. But just for this reason, I expect Maliki to get away with continuing to govern more or less on his own, relying on different parts of his awkward coalition on different issues. The big unknown: can Baghdad settle, or finesse, the disputes over territory with Erbil (Kurdistan)? I did not anticipate the break between Maliki and Iraqiyya, but I pegged Maliki’s intentions correctly. The Arab/Kurdish disputes are still unsettled.
- Palestine/Israel (no meaning in the order–I try to alternate): Palestine gets more recognitions, Israel builds more settlements, the Americans offer a detailed settlement, both sides resist but agree to go to high level talks where the Americans try to impose. That fails and Israel continues in the direction of establishing a one-state solution with Arabs as second class citizens. My secular Zionist ancestors turn in their graves. Wrong so far as I know about the Americans offering a detailed settlement, even if Obama’s “land swaps” went a few inches in that direction. Right about failure and Israel’s unfortunate direction.
- Egypt: trouble. Succession plans founder as the legitimacy of the parliament is challenged in the streets and courts. Mubarak hangs on, but the uncertainties grow. Pretty good for late December, though I was happily wrong about Mubarak hanging on.
- Haiti: Not clear whether the presidential runoff will be held January 16, but things are going to improve, at least until next summer’s hurricanes. Just for that reason there will be more instability as Haitians begin to tussle over the improvements. Presidential election was held and things have improved. Haiti has been calmer than anticipated. Good news.
- Al Qaeda: the franchise model is working well, so no need to recentralize. They will keep on trying for a score in the U.S. and will likely succeed at some, I hope non-spectacular, level. Happy to be wrong here too: they did not succeed, but they did try several times. And they did not recentralize.
- Yemen/Somalia: Yemen is on the brink and will likely go over it, if not in 2011 soon thereafter. Somalia will start back from hell, with increasing stability in some regions and continuing conflict in others. Yemen has pretty much gone over the brink, and parts of Somalia are on their way back. Pretty much on the mark.
- Sudan: the independence referendum passes. Khartoum and Juba reach enough of an agreement on outstanding issues to allow implementation in July, but border problems (including Abyei) and South/South violence grow into a real threat. Darfur deteriorates as the rebels emulate the South and Khartoum takes its frustrations out on the poor souls. Close to the mark, though Darfur has not deteriorated as much as I anticipated, yet.
- Lebanon: the Special Tribunal finally delivers its indictments. Everyone yawns and stretches, having agreed to ignore them. Four indictments were delivered against Hizbollah officials. I was also right about yawning and stretching.
- Syria: Damascus finally realizes that it is time to reach an agreement with Israel. The Israelis decide to go ahead with it, thus relieving pressure to stop settlements and deal seriously with the Palestinians. Dead wrong on both counts.
- Ivory Coast: the French finally find the first class tickets for Gbagbo and his entourage, who go to some place that does not recognize the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (no, not the U.S.!). The French and UN settled it by force of arms instead of the first-class ticket. Not cheaper, but less long-term trouble.
- Zimbabwe: Mugabe is pressing for quick adoption of his new constitution and elections in 2011, catching the opposition off balance. If he succeeds, the place continues to go to hell in a handbasket. If he fails, it will still be some time before it heads in the other direction. He failed and the predicted delay ensued.
- Balkans: Bosnians still stuck on constitutional reform, but Kosovo gets a visa waiver from the EU despite ongoing investigations of organ trafficking. Right on Bosnia, wrong on Kosovo.
I’m content with the year’s predictions, even if I got some things wrong. Of course I also missed a lot of interesting developments (revolutions in Tunisia, Libya and Syria, for example). But you wouldn’t have believed me if I had predicted those things, would you? Tomorrow I’ll discuss 2012.
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Half the world
The goal of this National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security is as simple as it is profound: to empower half the world’s population as equal partners in preventing conflict and building peace in countries threatened and affected by war, violence, and insecurity. Achieving this goal is critical to our national and global security.
Those are the opening lines of the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security unveiled yesterday at Georgetown University by Secretary of State Clinton. My friends at Inclusive Security asked me if I would blog on it–I hope they won’t be too disappointed in the results.
The plan is impeccably right-minded: it makes engagement and protection of women central to U.S. policy, complements existing efforts, establishes inclusion as the norm, emphasizes coordination and declares U.S. agencies accountable for implementing the plan. Nothing wrong with any of that.
The problem is that women are not often the problem. Only in rare instances do they join armed groups, chase civilians from their homes, rape and pillage or commit other war crimes. Men do most of these things, and men generally order these things done. When the time comes to make peace, the people you need at the negotiating table are the ones who control the ones with the guns.
The people you should want at the negotiating table are the ones without guns: victims, male or female, who have a stake in ending war and building peace. But only rarely are they brought in, mainly because the guys with guns don’t want them there. In my time working on the Bosnian Federation in the 1990s, I can’t recall an occasion on which a woman was in the room during a negotiation as a representative of one of the “formerly warring parties.” But neither was there ever a man in the room who hadn’t been a belligerent, who just wanted a normal life, who thought the safety and security of his family was more important than ethnic identity. Constituents for peace are a threat to belligerents, who want all the cards in their own hands, not in someone else’s.
This does not explain why women aren’t used as mediators. Of the current State Department special envoys and representatives who report directly to Hillary Clinton, only four of twenty-one are women, if I am counting correctly. Seven of the ten who do not report directly to the Secretary are women. Certainly these are higher numbers of women than at times in the past, but that 4/21 is not exactly smashing the glass ceiling. The UN, which naturally reflects not only American values, has never used a woman as a chief mediator, according to the report.
While I would be the last to quarrel with the need to protect women from sexual and gender-based violence during and after conflict, as well as their right to resources during recovery from violence, it is in the conflict prevention section that I think the report says some really interesting things. Let me quote at some length:
…gender-specific migration patterns or precipitous changes in the status or treatment of women and girls may serve as signals of broader vulnerability to the onset or escalation of conflict or atrocities. This focus will help to ensure that conflict prevention efforts are responsive to sexual and gender-based violence and other forms of violence affecting women and girls, and that our approaches are informed by differences in the experiences of men and women, girls and boys. Further, we will seek to better leverage women’s networks and organizations in activities aimed at arresting armed conflict or preventing spirals of violence.
Finally, the United States understands that successful conflict prevention efforts must rest on key investments in women’s economic empowerment, education, and health. A growing body of evidence shows that empowering women and reducing gender gaps in health, education, labor markets, and other areas is associated with lower poverty, higher economic growth, greater agricultural productivity, better nutrition and education of children, and other outcomes vital to the success of communities.
I’m not sure I am completely comfortable with the notion that women and girls are the canaries in the coal mine, but the notion that women’s employment, health and education, often viewed as the softer side of peacebuilding, are in fact central to the enterprise is one that I think has real validity. If Afghanistan has any chance at all of coming out all right from the last decade of hellish conflict, it is because of what has been done on health and education, two of the relative success stories in an otherwise bleak picture. Education is one of the failed sectors in Bosnia, where its segregation has helped to sustain ethnic nationalists in power. The role of women in North Korea, where they are increasingly responsible for providing livelihoods from small gardens, is likely to be fundamental.
We won’t really know if this “action plan” is effective for another year, or perhaps two or three. It is probably too much to hope that the forcefulness and clarity of purpose with which it was prepared will blow away the barriers that have stood for so long. But if it enables America to tap more of its own talent as well as draw on constituencies for peace in conflict-prone countries, it will have served a useful purpose.
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Macedonia and Greece, again
Longstanding friend and now deputy prime minister for european integration of Macedonia Teuta Arifi stopped by SAIS this morning for a chat. That naturally set me thinking about Skopje’s problems again. It is hard to find anyone in Washington who remembers, but Macedonia was for years a source of considerable anxiety here, because of its potential to create the conditions for a generalized war in the Balkans, including between NATO members Greece and Turkey. This was why the United States, in an inspired moment of coercive diplomacy, issued in December 1992 the “Christmas warning” to Slobodan Milosevic to lay off Macedonia. The UN deployed its one and only explicitly “preventive” peacekeeping mission, UNPREDEP, there in 1995.
Considering its potential for precipitating difficulty, Macedonia has been remarkably successful in extracting itself from dicey situations. As the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia dissolved, it became independent in September 1991 without war, a fate Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia did not escape. It weathered Milosevic’s expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Albanians from Kosovo in 1999. In 2001, it suffered a near breakdown into civil war as Albanian insurgents presented a military challenge. That ended with the Ohrid agreement, whose implementation has gone a long way to consolidating the Macedonian state and ensuring equality among its citizens.
One problem has proven insoluble: Greece objects to Macedonia calling itself Macedonia. Many years of UN mediation have failed to resolve the problem, though some claim the differences have narrowed. Macedonia is called The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (The FYROM) in the UN General Assembly. In 1995, Greece and The FYROM signed an interim agreement allowing that name to be used for membership in other international organizations. Earlier this month, the International Court of Justice found Greece in violation of the accord, in particular when it blocked The FYROM’s entry into NATO at the Bucharest Summit in 2008.
That should have settled the matter, but it has not, yet. Greece hasn’t budged. Its former ambassador in Washington has suggested publicly that Athens should renounce the interim accord rather than fulfill its provisions. Skopje says it is offering to meet any time, any where to discuss the name issue.
I am biased on this question. I believe countries and people have a right to call themselves what they want. The notion that Macedonia’s preference for that name implies territorial designs on Greece is risible. It does however reflect a claim to cultural and historical affinity with Alexander the Great, a monumental statue of whom may or may not now grace Skopje, even if ethnic Macedonians are mainly of Slavic descent. The Slavs were late comers to the Balkans, entering about a millenium after Alexander.
Why would an American, other than one of Greek, Macedonian or Albanian heritage, care about all this? The main reason is that Greece’s veto of Macedonia’s entry into NATO is holding up the expansion of euroatlantic institutions. With the important exception of Croatia’s accession to the EU now scheduled for July 1, 2013, NATO and EU expansion are stalled. Keeping that process moving is vital to maintaining peace and stability in the Balkans. The FYROM’s entry into NATO at the Summit in Chicago next spring, along with Montenegro, would reassure the region and help nudge Serbia in the euroatlantic direction, even if it never decides to join NATO.
So what should Greece do? Be gracious. You lost in court. You’ve got far bigger problems with the euro and your economy. Unload this one. Go back to the negotiating table and hammer out a solution. Or step aside and allow The FYROM (and Montenegro) to enter NATO in Chicago. The technocratic government in Athens may not have the political mandate to do this, but neither does it run the sorts of risks that a more political government would face.
I’ll be surprised, but delighted, if my advice is taken.
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What does Kosovo’s president represent?
Kosovo President Atifete Jahjaga’s speech today at SAIS was what I had hoped. She was forward-looking, even while reviewing the sad history of oppression from 1989 until the NATO intervention in 1999. She was clear about Kosovo’s status as a sovereign and independent state, even if it has not achieved universal recognition and membership in international organizations. She was hopeful about Kosovo’s European aspirations, while recognizing the many challenges that have to be faced, including normalization of relations with Serbia through the EU-sponsored dialogue. She was forceful about Kosovo’s territorial integrity, while emphasizing the rights of the Serbian community under the Ahtisaari plan. She underlined the importance of reintegration of the northern muncipalities, but called for an economic development plan encompassing south Mitrovica as well.
Plucked from a successful career in the Kosovo police, President Jahjaga is quickly establishing herself as a symbol of Kosovo’s youthful aspirations. She is trying hard to represent all of Kosovo’s ethnic communities, not just the majority Albanians, and to stay above the political fray. She embodies commitment to rule of law–her entire career prior to becoming president was spent in law school and the much-respected police service. And though she did not mention it today, she symbolizes the aspirations of Kosovo’s women for a stronger role in a society in which male politicians dominate.
What more could I have asked for? In response to my opening question about pursuing criminals responsible for crime against Serbs south of the Ibar, she emphasized mainly Pristina’s inability to get the full benefit of cooperation with international police organizations, of which Kosovo is not yet a member. I might have liked to hear something more about encouraging all citizens to protect their neighbors and support the authorities in maintaining law and order.
She was clear about protection of minority communities, but a colleague noted that he would have liked to hear more about how all the ethnic groups of Kosovo share a common history and culture. The beautiful Serb monasteries of Kosovo should be a source of pride to Albanians as well as to Serbs. The maintenance of separate, and conflicting, historical narratives is a serious obstacle to reconciliation in Kosovo, as it is elsewhere in the Balkans.
Asked whether she would come to Belgrade to meet President Tadic, she responded she would go anywhere to meet anyone so long as it was clearly understood that she is the president of a sovereign and independent state. That is not likely to happen soon, since Serbia will have elections next spring. But the time will come. If Jahjaga is still president when it does, Kosovo will be well represented.
A few minutes in the “green” room before the talk with President Atifete Jahjaga and Minister for European Integration Vlora Çitaku (that’s Ambassador Avni Spahiu hiding behind me):
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Governing well is the best revenge
I was asked to speak on a panel this afternoon (2-3 pm) about the evolution of democracy in the Balkans at the AID Democracy and Governance conference at George Washington University. Here are my instructions from the organizers, and the notes I plan to use, though I confess I often depart from them:
Balkans Democracy
GWU, 12 December 2011
Organizers’ instructions: We will be looking for your views on the common challenges and opportunities for democratization within your designated sub-region. What have been the obstacles or inhibitors of democratization? To what extent does the ‘neighborhood’ itself influence possibilities for political liberalization? What are realistic goals and/or scenarios for improvement on democracy and governance in the near to medium term? Are there region-specific approaches that should be considered? What might assistance efforts and democracy, human rights and governance programs do to address key challenges in this sub-region?
1. Looked at in a 20-year time frame, democracy in the Balkans has to be judged as a success.
2. In 1991, Slovenia and Croatia were at war, Bosnia was close, Serbia was a somewhat liberal autocracy, Montenegro and Kosovo were under Milosevic’s thumb, Macedonia was shaky, Albania was just emerging from a miserable dictatorship, Romania and Bulgaria were not much better off.
3. Let me count the ways things have improved: four of these countries are EU members or about to be, five are members of NATO (two more are qualified).
4. Two use the Euro, at least two others have their own currency pegged to the Euro.
5. Only Serbia, Kosovo and Bosnia remain in a kind of uncertain transition phase, even if Albania, Romania and Bulgaria continue to have problems meeting European expectations.
6. How did this happen? The big obstacles to democracy disappeared: Tudjman succumbed to natural causes, Milosevic to an election, Ceausescu to execution, the Bulgarian communist regime to a series of see-saw elections.
7. The neighborhood was unquestionably a big influence: Slovenia set out with determination to become an EU member, European and American assistance to Montenegro had a big influence inside Serbia, international intervention worked somewhat well in Bosnia and Kosovo, the Christmas warning and UNPREDEP gave Macedonia the breathing space it needed, Italian assistance saved Albania more than once.
8. Above all: the prospect of membership in NATO and the EU, while sometimes too weak to overcome domestic political strife, has proven a magnet that never entirely stops working, even if it at times seems inadequate.
9. The remaining problems can be solved: Bosnia needs constitutional reform, Serbia needs to acknowledge the loss of Kosovo, Kosovo needs treat its Serbs and other minorities well and reintegrate the north in a cooperative effort with Belgrade.
10. There is no reason why all those who want to be NATO members should not be within five years.
11. For the EU, it will take longer: Montenegro in less than 5 years, Serbia and Albania in 5-10 years, Kosovo in 15 and Bosnia in 10 years from whenever it fixes its constitution.
12. The best assistance efforts can do now is to support civil society, in particular watchdog functions.
13. However long it takes, whatever the obstacles and disappointments, governing well is the best revenge.
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