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Good news and bad

It is good news that Jerry Gallucci has taken up the challenge of seriously assessing the Ahtisaari plan provisions for north Kosovo.  This is a first:  a hard look at what it contains and how, from a northern Kosovo Serb perspective, it falls short or requires additional clarification.  I don’t mean by this that I agree with what Jerry says, especially on the courts, applicable law and some other matters, but his is definitely a step forward. And well-crafted to boot.  Please read before reacting.  But by all means react:  it would be a good idea for one or more of the capable think-tanks in Pristina to react point by point.

Gallucci couches his suggestions for improvements (from the north Kosovo Serb perspective still) in terms of implementation plans, rather than “Ahtisaari plus” or other formulations calculated to excite immediate rejection in Pristina.  That is also good.  But he continues to want “status neutrality.”  He thinks Belgrade can refuse to accept Kosovo as sovereign and independent but gain all the substantial benefits that the Ahtisaari plan offers (and then some).

That’s the bad news.  The ongoing quarrel over collection of customs at the north Kosovo border crossings with Serbia should by now have convinced everyone that lack of clarity about sovereignty and borders is a bad idea.  I don’t know any two countries with a border that is not agreed and demarcated who have good relations.  Belgrade and Pristina are not going to be an exception to the rule.

I fully accept that Belgrade will never bilaterally recognize Kosovo–the politicians there have repeated this line so often they can’t back up.  Fortunately, they don’t need to.  They just need to ask the Russians to stop blocking UN General Assembly membership for Kosovo, which requires a positive recommendation from the UN Security Council.

Eighty-five states have now recognized Kosovo.  It will not be long before the recognizers outnumber the non-recognizers in the General Assembly, which could then move to make Kosovo a non-member state (the status Palestine is now seeking).  Even within the EU, more than one of the non-recognizers may reconsider as governments there change.

Admission to the UNGA as a nonmember state won’t do much more for Kosovo than it will do for the Palestinians.  It would be far better for Pristina and Belgrade to reach a real agreement, not only on how the Ahtisaari plan is to be implemented but also on status, which would then allow Serbia to pursue its ambition of EU membership without the ball and chain called Kosovo attached to its ankle.

Gallucci gives some reason for optimism on the status question, which is really two questions:

1) who are the properly constituted, democratic authorities in Kosovo?

2) are they sovereign and independent?

He goes so far as to say, “North Kosovo remains part of Kosovo, and that Kosovo’s territorial and political integrity be maintained.”  His discussion of the Ahtisaari plan implementation includes participation by the north Kosovo Serbs in the Pristina institutions, which at least answers the first question definitively.

Here’s some more good news:  the IMF says Kosovo’s policies are broadly on track, 2012 growth will be 4% and inflation is moderating.  It is ironic of course that this corner of the euro zone is avoiding the problems bedeviling the bigger boys.  My advice to Pristina:  governing well is the best revenge.

Crooks, fools and optimists

Discussions of Bosnia tend to rehash a relatively few themes:  how the Dayton agreements are flawed, whether the High Representative is still needed, how Bosnians should be preparing the country for European Union membership, what threats of violence and war remain.

Those issues came up at yesterday’s discussion of the Bosnian economy at SAIS’s Center for Transatlantic Relations) with the State Department’s Jennifer Brush, Sarajevo beer magnate Mujo Selimović, the World Bank’s Marco Mantovanelli, former Republika Srpska Finance Minister Svetlana Cenić and Bosnian diaspora entrepreneur Edin Saračević. But the discussion, chaired by Mike Haltzel, focused mainly on the economy and how to fix it.

The bad news.  The panel agreed that international funding of the public sector in Bosnia suffers large losses to government corruption.  Bosnia is not a good place to start a business, or stay in one. There is a real, even if small, risk of serious violence that would disrupt the economy (including repayment of loans, which some debtors would welcome) and partition the country.

The good news.  But the country has a good pre-war business history, when several Bosnian companies became world-class competitors.  And there are ample opportunities in post-war Bosnia to get a good return on investment:  hydro power, organic food production, information technology. The labor force learns quickly and thoroughly.  The well-educated, successful diaspora can be helpful–some may return, others may help with international marketing of Bosnian good and services.  Few of them care much about ethnic divisions.

Foreign investors are looking for stability, which NATO membership would certify, and improved local institutions, in particular for rule of law.  Political divisiveness and lack of a unified economic space are drags on the economy.

What Bosnia needs is to shift from an economic model based on internationally financed domestic consumption to one based on investment and private sector exports. International budget support to the various levels of Bosnian government is no longer appropriate, unless there is a serious risk of systemic failure.  The international financial institutions (IFIs) should be shifting to private sector loans, leaving the governments to obtain financing from taxpayers and focusing IFI efforts on export-oriented entrepreneurs. They in turn will mobilize ordinary Bosnians, who are tired of the “techno-beat” of ethnic identity (Serb, Croat, Muslim, Serb, Croat, Muslim) and interested in pursuing jobs and improved living conditions.

It was suggested that Bosnia divides people among crooks, fools and optimists.  I don’t count myself a crook and I am certainly not an optimist, so I guess I must be a fool.  But if I were in charge I would shut off the tap of money flowing from the internationals to Bosnian governments and get it moving in the private sector direction.  Let the governments get their money from taxes, and suffer the accountability that follows from that.

Patriotism, not treason

I surprised a Kosovar visitor this morning with an idea I thought I had published long ago but now can’t find on peacefare:  Pristina should be represented in Belgrade.  So if I have already mentioned it, please excuse the repetition.

If not, here is my thinking.

I would never want to negotiate with a foreign state in whose capital I am not represented.  Why?  Because it is important to understand the political dynamics there.  Even if we are the direst of enemies, there will be a range of political views, with some leaning more in directions I might find useful than others. Having a representative there will help me to understand at least this much:  how not to strengthen my enemies.  I might even find some allies, especially if I couch my desires in the right terms.

Take Belgrade, for example.  Most of the Serbian political spectrum is rock solid in public in wanting sovereignty over Kosovo.  There are some who openly disavow that goal, but many more who realize it is not compatible with Serbia’s own ambitions to join the European Union.  It is in part a matter of priorities:  Serbia has limited resources (especially financial) and needs to limit its commitments.  That is why it concurred in Kosovo joining the IMF and World Bank, enabling Serbia to get out from under the obligation to pay some arrears.  There are today lots of people in Belgrade who would like more transparency and accountability for Serbia’s subsidies to Serbs in Kosovo.  Which is what Pristina should want too.  So screaming foul about the subsidies is likely not going to be as effective as calling for transparency and accountability, an objective at least some in Belgrade share.

But would Belgrade agree to Kosovo representation?  I don’t know.  But I do know that Serbia maintains state institutions inside Kosovo.  Reciprocity is the heart of state-to-state relations:  if Kosovo regards itself as sovereign and independent, it should ask for representation inside Serbia.

Of course Serbia may say “no,” since it does not regard Kosovo as sovereign and independent.  Pristina can’t evict the Serbian institutions, because they are located in the Belgrade-controlled north.  A better course would be to accept an unofficial office in Belgrade, one opened by a Kosovar nongovernmental organization.  The head would need to be an Albanian who speaks native Serbian and can appear publicly and informally as a spokesman and defender of the Kosovo institutions, just as the Serbian institutions in north Kosovo do for Belgrade.

Belgrade might want that non-office office to be located outside the capital.  That’s fine:  it should then be in the Albanian-majority Presevo valley.  Belgrade won’t like that, but if it refuses, it embarrasses itself.

The real problem with this idea is not Belgrade’s attitude–which we don’t know yet–but rather the Albanians.  I am reliably told that it would be hard to find someone to go to Belgrade, since that would be regarded as treasonous.  This is of course absurd:  representing your country in a hostile capital is patriotism, not treason.