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When will Macedonia enter the EU?

I of course have no idea, but I did this interview for the Macedonian daily Vecer, which published it yesterday.  Maybe it sheds some light on the question, if not the answer:

Q.  After the European Council did not adopt the Commission’s recommendation to begin negotiations with Macedonia last year, you recommended that “the bicycle must move, so as not to fall,” warning that the enlargement process may be terminated if it is slow. Again, Macedonia, for the fifth time had a recommendation for starting accession negotiations with the EU. Do you expect that the Council in December will finally accept it and will grant Macedonia a date?

A.  No, not unless there is a solution of the “name” problem.  Greece seems determined to continue to block a date without that.  But the High Level Accession Dialogue (HLAD) seems to be providing an alternate route that can take Macedonia a long way forward in the process.  That’s a good thing. 

Q.  Your position that Macedonia should begin negotiations under the interim reference from 1995 is well known, a solution that is acceptable for Macedonia, inoffensive for Greece and Bulgaria and supported by the Hague verdict, but Athens does not comply. Is it possible that Athens and Sofia change something in their perceptions before December and accept this solution as a compromise? Read more

Berlin in the Balkans

I’ve been distracted from the Balkans for more than a week, while traveling in France and New York.  I was also distracted for a week before that by events in Syria.  What do I find as I turn back to my favorite trouble spot?

Precious little real trouble.  President Nikolic is congratulating himself on Serbia’s courageous leadership, while receiving plaudits from the American Ambassador.  The Serbian Orthodox Church and other stalwarts of the Kosovo saga are urging Serbs to vote in the upcoming local elections. Serbia is expecting to start EU accession negotiations early next year.

It’s not that there is no trouble at all.  There was the murder of an EU official last month, still unsolved to my knowledge.  There was the bombing today of a moderate Serb politician’s apartment in North Mitrovica.  Prime Minister Dacic still thinks it unreasonable for a Serbian citizen to say he might like the same treatment Serbs are getting Kosovo.

But the needle has moved.  It now points clearly towards Serbia’s future EU prospects and away from its historical claims.  I don’t expect Belgrade to forget about the Serbs in Kosovo, or its strong cultural and religious ties to its former province, but it clearly no longer wants to be held hostage by them.  That, in my book, is progress.

I wish I could say as much for the other remaining legacy issues in the Balkans.  Athens and Skopje still seem far from resolution of the “name” issue, which prevents Macedonia from joining NATO or getting a date to start EU accession talks.  This is one of those disputes that revolve around issues that look pretty small to those not involved but in fact arouse passions because they challenge identities.  I’d like to see Macedonia enter NATO as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as provided by the interim accord, but that won’t suffice for European Union membership.

Bosnia is the real nub.  Its first census since before the war (1991), which is supposed to end today, has seemed at times to threaten stability, and some recounting will be needed, but it is also an opportunity for Bosnians to define who they think they are.  The campaigns urging people to put themselves in this or that category carry much more political weight in Bosnia than they do in many other countries.  If the “other” category were to reach its advocates’ fondest dreams and beat out the least numerous of the “constituent peoples” (presumably the Croats) that could have profound political implications.  By the same token, if more than 50% of the country identifies as Bosniak, that too could have a big impact.  Even small adjustments from the pre-war distribution may be viewed as redefining the basis for Bosnia’s polity.

I continue to think that only a decisive European intervention, fully backed by the Americans, will resolve the Macedonia’s name problem and Bosnia’s identity problem.  I wish it weren’t thus.  Skopje and Athens should be able to recognize the greater good in coming to terms on an issue that is holding up Macedonia’s Euroatlantic integration and threatening to destabilize its interethnic relations, as the Albanians care a good deal less about the name issue than do Macedonians.

Likewise Bosnia should be able to resolve its own problems, if only to because there is no longer serious will or means to fight it out.  But the international community is partly responsible for the mess, as it pressed the Dayton solution and made it hard to change.  A bit of tough love from Germany would make a big difference in Bosnia, especially if coordinated closely with the Croatians and the Americans.  Wishy washy coaxing from the EU bureaucracy is all too clearly not going to be sufficient.

The world has much bigger problems than the Balkans these days.  Germany, while burdened with Europe’s financial crisis, is not playing much of a role outside the EU, unless you count its formidable exports.  Chancellor Merkel worked her magic in Kosovo and Serbia, where the progress is very largely due to her vigorous intervention against the “parallel structures” in North Mitrovica.  More Berlin leadership in the Balkans is not too much to ask.

PS:  I wish I’d known about Bosnia’s qualification for the World Cup when I wrote this piece.  Here’s Sarajevo in celebration (no it was nothing like this during the war), courtesy of @TransferSources: