Tag: China
“Maximum pressure”
Mohammed Ataie published this interview with me in the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA):
- Today, President Rouhani declared that the remaining signatories to the nuclear agreement–the United Kingdom, France, Germany, China and Russia –had 60 days to implement their promises to protect Iran’s oil and banking sectors from US sanctions. How do you see Rouhani’s carful statement which reiterated Tehran’s continued commitment to the JCPOA and NPT?
A: Rouhani is trying hard to avoid taking the blame for the collapse of the JCPOA and to project an image of reasonableness, in particular to Europe, Russia, and China.
2. President Rouhani said that if the Europeans fail to compensate for the unilateral American sanctions, in 60 days Iran will end the limits on the enrichment of uranium. Do you think that within this period the European signatories to the nuclear agreement would take practical steps to counter Trump administration’s unilateral sanctions?
A: I doubt there is much the Europeans can do. Their companies are not willing to buck the US sanctions, because there is so much more business for them to do in the US than in Iran.
3. The European Union has vowed to counter Trump’s renewed sanctions on Iran, including by means of a new law to shield European companies from punitive measures. Do you think that France, Germany and Britain have done enough in the past 12 months to save the agreement?
A: They’ve done what they can, but more slowly than required. It is virtually impossible to shield the European companies from punitive US measures if those companies want to do business with and in the US.Reuters has quoted French officials that the EU would impose sanctions on Iran if Tehran announces actions concerning the JCPOA.
4. How do you see this French position in the context of the EU powers’ inaction to protect Iran’s economic interests against the US unilateral sanctions?
A: The French are warning that Tehran could drive the Europeans back into the arms of the US. Iran is trying to signal moderation in its response to the sanctions, while insisting on getting the benefits promised in the deal. It is not an easy road to go down, not least because of criticism from those inside Iran who would be happy to restart the nuclear program.
5. President Trump claims that the JCPOA is not able to prevent Iran from developing a military nuclear program. Do you think that his maximum pressure policy would prevent Iran from developing a military nuclear program?
A: The maximum pressure policy is far more likely to give Iran incentives to restart the nuclear program and proceed as rapidly as possible to acquire all the technology needed for building nuclear weapons. Of course the sanctions limit the availability of financial resources to Tehran, but top priority programs will always get the resources they need. The result will be further weakening of the Iranian economy, but little impact on the nuclear and missile programs or Iran’s interventions in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Those programs will get priority, not least because the sanctions strengthen the political position of hardliners in Tehran.
I would add that the Trump Administration is begging for talks with Iran. So far, Tehran is signalling that it is unwilling unless and until the US rejoins the JCPOA. I don’t really see that happening, as Trump has boxed himself in, but some kind of secret communication is possible, and perhaps even likely.
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Confusion and distrust
The Trump Administration is in a remarkable period of serial failures. Denuclearization of North Korea is going nowhere. Displacement of Venezuelan President Maduro has stalled. The tariff contest with China is escalating. Even the President’s sudden shift to backing Libyan strongman Haftar’s assault on Tripoli seems to have fizzled.
The domestic front is no better: Trump is stonewalling the House of Representatives but must know that eventually the courts will order most of what the Democratic majority is requesting be done. Special Counsel Mueller himself will eventually testify and be asked whether his documentation of obstruction of justice by the President would have led to indictment for any other perpetrator. A dozen or so other investigations continue, both by prosecutors and the House. These will include counter-intelligence investigations, which Mueller did not pursue, with enormous potential to embarrass the President and his close advisers.
The result is utter confusion in US foreign policy. Secretary of State Pompeo today postponed a meeting with President Putin and is stopping instead in Brussels to crash a meeting the UK, Germany, and France had convened to talk about how to preserve the Iran nuclear deal. This is happening on the same day that President Trump is meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán, whose anti-democratic maneuvers have made him unwelcome in London, Berlin, and Paris.
Pompeo will be pitching hostility to Iran, based on the presumption that it is responsible for attacks on tankers over the weekend off the coast of Fujairah, one of the (United Arab) Emirates located outside the Gulf of Hormuz. Tehran has denounced the attacks, which may or may not indicate something. The perpetrators are unknown. While concerned about the attacks, the Europeans will want the US to tone down the hostility towards Iran, with which they want to maintain the nuclear deal from which the US has withdrawn.
Germany is likely to be particularly annoyed with the Americans, not least because Pompeo last week canceled at the last minute a scheduled meeting with Chancellor Merkel in order to go to Iraq, where he failed to convince Baghdad to join the sanctions against Iran. She has become the strongest defender of liberal democracy and the rules-based international order that President Trump has so noisily and carelessly abandoned, while at the same time displeasing the US Administration by continuing the Nord Stream 2 natural gas deal with Russia.
In diplomacy, holding on to your friends is important. Washington under Trump has elected not to accommodate the more powerful Europeans and Iraq but rather to support the would-be autocrats in Hungary and Poland, as well as the Brexiteers in the UK and the Greater Israel campaigners who also advocate war with Iran. All of this was completely unnecessary, since it would have been possible to pursue additional agreements with Iran on regional and other issues without exiting the nuclear deal.
The Administration has thrown away the friends it needs and acquired a few it does not. It has lost the key Europeans and has nothing whatsoever to show for it. It has gotten nowhere with Putin, despite the President’s obsequious fawning. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which are both crying foul about the tanker attacks, are unreliable. They have been known to purvey fake news in the past (especially in initiating their conflict with Qatar), so might they be doing so again?
The result is monumental confusion and distrust. America’s friends are offended. Her enemies are encouraged. Elections have consequences.
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It’s all about him
Rarely has an Administration compiled a clearer record of losing than this one is doing right now:
- President Trump’s best friend Kim Jong-un is busily launching short-range missiles while the US holds the door open for negotiations.
- The push to replace Venezuelan President Maduro with Interim President Guaido has stalled after several attempts.
- The “maximum pressure” policy on Iran is pushing Tehran towards restarting part of its nuclear program while alienating America’s European allies.
- The “Deal of the Century” between Palestinians and Israelis is stillborn.
- The tariff war with China is escalating.
The Administration knows only one negotiating tactic: squeezing hard to cause pain, while offering economic benefits if only the adversary will give in. Other peoples’ national pride, interests, and values are not taken into account. It is just assumed that “they” are just like us and want all the same things, mainly nice hotels.
That’s not how diplomacy works. To change an adversary’s behavior, you have to consider not your own value function but theirs. Kim Jong-un doesn’t want foreign investment or economic benefits he cannot control. Maduro isn’t interested in leaving Venezuela, even if the Americans leave him an escape route to Cuba. Iran has withstood sanctions before and will do so again. The Palestinians won’t take money instead of a state. Chinese President Xi Jinping isn’t going to weaken the Communist Party’s grip on the economy to please Donald Trump.
Of course Donald Trump will never admit defeat on any of these issues. Whatever happens, he’ll announce victory, exaggerating his own prowess and role. It really doesn’t matter what the truth of the matter is. After lots of sound and fury, Trump readily settles for half a loaf or less, as he did on the “renegotiation” of the North American Free Trade Agreement. His primary concern is not getting a good deal for America but rather ensuring that he looks strong to his domestic constituency and can count on them to go to the polls. It’s not about America. It’s all about him.
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Peace Picks April 8-12
1. From war to peace: the Balkans, Middle East and Ukraine| Wednesday, April 10, 2019 | 12:30am- 2:30| The Middle East Institute | 1319 18th St. NW, Washington D.C. 20036| Register Here |
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a book talk with MEI Scholar Daniel Serwer, the director of John Hopkins SAIS’s conflict management and American foreign policy programs and the author ofFrom War to Peace: the Balkans, the Middle East and Ukraine.
In his book, Serwer explores how lessons learned from peacebuilding initiatives in the Balkans in the 1990s can be applied to conflicts in the Middle East. Serwer draws comparisons between the sectarian, ethnic, and religious divides of the Balkans in the 1990s and similar tensions in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. He also explores the impact of policies such as conflict prevention, engagement of neighbors, the establishment of safe zones, partition, decentralization, and power sharing arrangements, and how they can be effectively utilized, or not, in the Middle East.
Speakers
Daniel Serwer, , author
Scholar, MEI; director, Conflict Management and American Foreign Policy program, John Hopkins SAIS
Randa Slim, discussant
Senior fellow and director of Conflict Resolution and Track II Dialogues program, MEI
Paul Salem, moderator, President, MEI
2. Youth: the missing peace | Tursday, April 11, 2019 | 10:00am – 12:00pm | United States Institute for Peacr | 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037| Register Here|
Join USIP and the Global Coalition on Youth, Peace and Security for an interactive, intergenerational conversation with the study’s lead author, Graeme Simpson, as well as youth and peacebuilding experts and young peacebuilders from around the world.
The event will look at the two-year evidence gathering process—which engaged more than 4,000 young people around the world and has been heralded as “possibly the most participatory process ever undertaken by the U.N.”—to draw out key lessons and recommendations regarding what works in the field of youth, peace and security, and what prevents youth’s meaningful inclusion in peace and security efforts. The conversation will also look forward, with an eye toward sustaining UNSCR 2250’s momentum and cementing our commitment to the role of youth people in preventing conflict and contributing to sustainable peace.
Speakers
Nancy Lindborg, welcoming remarks,
President, U.S. Institute of Peace
Aubrey Cox, Program Officer, Youth, U.S. Institute of Peace
Giannina Raffo, Youth Peace Leader, Venezuela
Graeme Simpson, Lead Author of the Progress Study and Director, Interpeace USA
Noella Richard, moderator, Youth Team Leader, United Nations Development Program
Saji Prelis, closing remarks
Director of Children & Youth Programs, Search for Common Ground
3. Will Sisi be Egypt president for life | Monday, April 8, 2019 | 2:30pm – 4:00pm | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace| 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, DC 20036-2103| Register Here|
The Egyptian parliament is in the process of finalizing amendments to the 2014 constitution that would allow President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to stay in office for twenty years, increase military control of politics, and end judicial independence. U.S. President Donald Trump has invited Sisi to Washington for a visit prior to a public referendum on the proposed amendments.
Please join the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Project on Middle East Democracy for a discussion of the ramifications of the amendments and Sisi’s visit for the future of Egypt, the U.S.-Egypt relationship, and for regional peace.
Speakers:
MOATAZ EL FEGIERY, general coordinator for the Egyptian Human Rights Forum.
MAI EL-SADANY, legal and judicial director for the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy.
MICHELE DUNNE, Director and senior fellow of the Carnegie Middle East Program.
SUSAN B. GLASSER, staff writer at the New Yorker.
4. The Taiwan Relations Act at Forty and U.S.-Taiwan Relations| Tuesday, April 9, 2019 | 8:30 am – 5:00pm | Center for Strategic and International Study | 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036| Register Here|
The Taiwan Relations Act, enacted by the United States Congress in April 1979, authorized continued “commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan” in the wake of the U.S. decision to establish diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China. By authorizing the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and other provisions, the TRA created a framework for relations between the U.S. and Taiwan which has enabled their partnership and friendship to thrive in the absence of diplomatic relations.
In observance of the 40th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act, this daylong public conference will feature analysis of the creation and implementation of the TRA, and how it continues to guide U.S.-Taiwan relations and interaction among Taiwan, China, and the United States.
This conference is co-hosted by CSIS, the Brookings Institution, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
8:35am Opening Remarks
John Hamre (President and CEO, CSIS)
8:45am Welcome Speech
Stanley Kao (Representative, Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States) (Introduced by Bonnie Glaser)
8:55am Speaker Introduction
Richard Armitage (President, Armitage International and CSIS Trustee)
9:00am VTC Speech and Q&A
Her Excellency President Tsai Ing-wen of the Republic of China (Taiwan)
Q&A Moderator: Michael Green (Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair, CSIS / Director of Asian Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service)
9:45am Coffee Break
10:00am Panel One: Looking Back on U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1979
Moderator: Richard Bush (Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution)
Panelist 1: The TRA and the U.S. One-China Policy
Stephen Young (Former Director, American Institute in Taiwan)
Panelist 2: Cross-Strait Relations and U.S.-Taiwan Relations
Steven Goldstein (Associate, Harvard Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies)
Panelist 3: The Evolution of the U.S.-Taiwan Security Partnership
Shirley Kan (Former Specialist in Asian Security Affairs, Congressional Research Service)
11:15am Coffee Break
11:30am Speech and Q&A
Legislator Bi-khim Hsiao (Legislative Yuan)
(Introduced by Bonnie Glaser)
12:15pm Keynote Remarks
Representative Gerald Connolly (D-Virginia)
(Introduced by Richard Bush)
1:00pm Lunch
1:30pm Panel Two: Taiwan’s Strategic Environment Today
Moderator: Bonnie Glaser (Senior Adviser for Asia and Director of the China Power Project, CSIS)
Panelist 1: Taiwan’s Changing Security Environment
Michael Chase (Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation)
Panelist 2: How Taiwan Should Ensure Economic Competitiveness
Eric Altbach (Senior Vice President, Albright Stonebridge Group)
Panelist 3: Taiwan’s Options Regarding China
Susan Thornton (Former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs)
Panelist 4: U.S.-Taiwan Economic Ties
Da-nien Daniel Liu (Director of the Regional Development Study Center, Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research)
2:45pm Panel Three: The Next Forty Years
Moderator: Abraham Denmark (Director of the Asia Program, Wilson Center)
Panelist 1: The TRA’s Continuing Relevance to U.S. Policy
Robert Sutter (Professor of Practice of International Affairs, George Washington University)
Panelist 2: China’s Strategies Toward Taiwan and Taiwan/U.S. Responses
Ryan Hass (David M. Rubenstein Fellow – Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution)
Panelist 3: Taiwan’s Future Sources of Strength and Weakness
Jacques deLisle (Professor of Law & Political Science, University of Pennsylvania)
4:00pm Coffee Break
4:15pm Speech and Q&A
W. Patrick Murphy (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of State Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs)
(Introduced by Abraham Denmark)
5:00pm Conference End
5. China’s Influence Activities: Implications for the US-Taiwan Relationship| Monday, April 8, 2019 | 4:00pm-5:15| The Atlantic Council | 1030 15th St NW, Washington, DC 20005| Register Here |
Last week, a bipartisan group of senators introduced the Taiwan Assurance Act, which reaffirms the US commitment to Taiwan forty years after the signing of the Taiwan Relations Act. As China exerts increasing pressure against Taiwan’s position in the region, Taiwan’s leaders have sought greater support from the United States. Given US interests in the Indo-Pacific, what diplomatic, economic, and security steps should the United States take to signal support for Taiwan as a democratic partner in the region? What opportunities and challenges do the United States and Taiwan face moving forward? Where do US-Taiwan relations fit into the broader strategic picture?
KEYNOTE REMARKS BY
H.E. Bi-khim Hsiao, Legislator, Legislative Yuan, Taiwan
FEATURING
Mr. Ian Easton, Research Fellow Project 2049 Institute
Mr. Michael Mazza, Visiting Fellow, Foreign & Defense Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute
Mr. Barry Pavel, Senior Vice President, Arnold Kanter Chair, and Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
6. SSANSE Project: Symposium on Russia and China’s Political Interference Activities in NATO Small States| Monday, April 8, 2019 | 8:45 am – 12:15pm | The Wilson Center | 1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW Washington, DC 20004-3027| Register Here |
For both Russia and China, foreign political interference activities are a useful and cost-effective method of foreign policy. In Russia it is theorized as “smart power”, while China still uses the Soviet-era term “united front work”. The activities of Russia and China go well beyond accepted norms of public diplomacy and are having a corrupting and corrosive effect on many societies. This half-day symposium focuses on Russia and China’s Political Interference Activities in NATO Small States. The world is seeing a return of both “might is right” politics and spheres of influence. As history has shown, the weakness of small states in a time of rising security threats can undermine the security of larger powers. The Symposium examines case studies of some representative small NATO states experiencing Russia and China’s political interference activities, the patterns of interference to look for, and discusses what is to be done.
Speakers:
Neringa Bladaitė, University of Vilnius
Anne-Marie Brady, Wilson Center/University of Canterbury
Donald J. Jensen, Center for European Policy Analysis
Ryan Knight, Georgetown University
Martin Hála, Charles University
Margarita Šešelgytė, University of Vilnius
Khamza Sharifzoda, Georgetown University
Mark Stokes, 2049 Project
Alan Tidwell, Georgetown University
Baldur Thorhallson, University of Iceland
Moderator: Abe Denmark, Asia Program, Wilson Center
AGENDA:
8:45am – Panel One
Donald J. Jensen: Assessing Contemporary Russian Interference Activities
Anne-Marie Brady: Magic Weapons? An Overview of CCP Interference Activities
Mark Stokes: Huawei and One Thousand Talents: China’s military links and technology transfer activities
Ryan Knight: Russia’s use of the Orthodox Church in Small NATO states
Alan Tidwell: Active Measures: Lessons Learned from the Past
10:10am – Morning tea
10:30am – Panel Two
Martin Hála: The CCP’s Magic Weapons at work in the Czech Republic
Khamza Sharifzoda: Armenia’s Struggle: Escaping the Kremlin
Baldur Thorhallson: Iceland’s engagements with Russia and China
Neringa Bladaite: Russia’s Political Interference Activities in Latvia
Margarita Šešelgytė: Russia and China’s Political Interference Activities and Lithuania
The Small States and the New Security Environment (SSANSE) Project is funded by NATO-SPS
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Pompeo midway to failure
Secretary Pompeo in testimony todaycited the Administration’s foreign policy priorities:
- Countering Russia and China,
- Denuclearization of North Korea,
- Venezuela,
- Iran,
- and supporting allies and partners.
So how are they doing?
The only serious effort to counter Russia has come from the Congress, which has levied several layers of sanctions on Moscow for interference in the 2016 US election, and from the State Department, for Moscow’s murder of a defector in the United Kingdom. President Trump has still not said an unkind word about President Putin and continues to cite him as more reliable than the American intelligence community, without acknowledging Russian electoral interference.
On China, the Administration has been walking on eggshells, since it needs Beijing’s cooperation both on North Korea and on trade. There is little to no sign of a serious strategy to contain or compete with China (in anything but trade). China continues its buildup of military bases in the South China Sea, where it has also escalated its challenges to US naval vessels.
The North Korea talks are at a standstill after the failure in February of the second Kim/Trump summit in Vietnam. Trump is demanding immediate denuclearization in one step while the Pyongyang has maintained its vague commitment to a phased process whose endpoint is unclear. All those promises of Trump-like hotels are not going to convince Kim Jong-un that he should abandon his regime’s only real guarantee: its nuclear arsenal and ballistic missiles.
Venezuela is grinding to a stalemate, with the Russians deploying troops there and no sign of the military defections required to seat President Guaido’ in President Maduro’s chair. A US military intervention would have to be massive and long-term. Nothing short of that seems to be working. Venezuelans are voting with their feet by leaving the country, but that does not help bring down Maduro.
Sanctions on Iran have so far had little visible impact, other than giving the Europeans an incentive to find a way to continue to expand trade with Tehran. China and Russia will also find the ways and means. The Iranian economy is a mess, not only because of sanctions. The Administration hopes to compel the Iranians back to the negotiating table or to precipitate regime change. Neither outcome is visible on the horizon. In the meanwhile, hardliners have gained strength and continue to pursue regional interventions.
Support for allies and partners is a lot easier than dealing with adversaries, but the Trump Administration has been selective about it. The ultranationalists who govern Hungary and Poland and the Brexiteers in the UK get Trump’s blessing. France, Germany and the European Union get kicked hard. Israel gets endorsement of whatever it wants (so far, recognition of Jerusalem as its capital and of the annexation of the Golan Heights, not to mention a green light for killing Gaza demonstrators), leaving crumbs for the Palestinians. Saudi Arabia gets American top cover for Mohammed bin Salman against charges that he was implicated in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi.
To add insult to injury, Pompeo said this about the State Department, whose budget the President has proposed to cut back by 23%:
And I take it as a personal mission to make sure that our world-class diplomatic personnel have the resources they need to execute America’s diplomacy in the 21st century.
Trump’s cuts target especially the State Department’s cooperation with the military in stabilizing conflict situations like Syria and Afghanistan, which is a required prelude to the withdrawals he has rashly announced.
I suppose I need to give Pompeo an incomplete rather than an F, since it is possible the next 22 months will provide better results than the last 26. Real diplomacy does take time. But there is precious little sign of real diplomacy on the priorities Pompeo identifies.
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Right move, wrong reasons
President Trump’s walking away from his summit with Kim Jong-un has won praise from many, including Democrats and me. Trump was unwilling to give Kim the sanctions relief he wanted for the limits Kim was willing to accept on North Korea’s nuclear program. All eminently reasonable. Certainly Kim was offering far less than what the Iranians agreed to, in a deal Trump condemned and from which he withdrew.
But there is a problem. Trump is still thinking he can get Kim to give up all his nuclear weapons, in exchange for economic benefits, especially foreign investment. Neither proposition is credible.
Nuclear weapons are Kim’s guarantee of regime survival. That’s why the US intelligence community has been doubting he would ever give them up. South Korea and the US need to be extra cautious in dealing with him so long as Kim has the capability of using them. Precisely what Kim was offering is unclear, but it definitely was not the surrender of all his nuclear capabilities. He hasn’t even provided the inventory of his nuclear infrastructure required to begin a serious conversation.
Just as important: Kim has no interest in opening the Hermit Kingdom to the kind of foreign investment Trump has been offering. He doesn’t want Trump-style hotels, American tourists, or sharply increased standards of living for the North Korean worker. His is a totalitarian regime that demands loyalty above all, not economic development or free media. His visit with the Vietnamese after the Hanoi summit signaled his real interest: maintaining his personal monopoly on politics while allowing limited private enterprise. It’s the Chinese model, more or less, of authoritarian capitalism, but without foreign direct investment.
The US needs to keep Kim’s goals in mind as it gets ready for another try at an agreement. He has his red lines. While Kim still holds absolute power in North Korea, we are not going to get the complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization (CVID in the trade) we ultimately seek. At best we’ll get some limits on future production of nuclear weapons and missiles in exchange for limited sanctions relief, in the context of a process that has more far-reaching goals.
Even that may be more than we can hope for unless the sanctions regime is restored to its previous strength and tightened further. That would require Chinese and Russian cooperation that has been evaporating. Beijing isn’t going to get back on board until the tariff war is ended. Trump will soon be accepting much less than he hoped for on that front. Moscow is a tougher case: Putin will want a price for any enhanced cooperation on North Korea. Relief from sanctions on Russia will surely be on the table in that negotiation, but the Congress stands in the way of the loosening Trump would like to provide to Putin.
I doubt though that Trump will be looking any time soon for an agreement on the North Korean nuclear program. More likely he’ll hope that we forget Pyongyang has nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them to the US. He hyped that threat when he thought doing so could give him an easy win. Now that Kim is happy with the domestic and international legitimacy he achieved by meeting twice with the President of the United States, it will be much more difficult to achieve any agreement. Trump made the right move but for the wrong reasons. Kim outplayed him.
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