Tag: China
Security and trade post-election
The Center for Strategic and International Studies November 14 hosted two panels on the midterm elections’ implications for the trans-Atlantic agenda and trade policy. The first featured a discussion with Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT) and the second a conversation between CSIS experts Louis Lauter, Vice President for Congressional and Government Affairs, and William Alan Reinsch, Senior Adviser and Scholl Chair in International Business. Heather A. Conley, Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic and the Director of the Europe Program at CSIS, moderated.
President Trump’s current threat to leave the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty set the tone for the first discussion. Murphy framed the move as consistent with a broader agenda from the anti-institutionalists in the Administration to withdraw from multilateral organizations, with the spotlight on NATO after the President’s threatening comments last summer.
Murphy highlighted that there is a tendency in Congress to separate the President’s actions and statements from the Administration. While the President is launching rhetorical assaults against NATO, under the surface NATO cooperation continues. Many Republican colleagues have favored this approach, creating an atmosphere complacency. Murphy cautioned that the President should be taken at his word. Congress should prevent an executive withdrawal from NATO. The Senator introduced a failed bill back in July that would have required Congressional consent. There might be more interest in the Democratic-controlled House once Congress reconvenes.
Murphy warned that US foreign policy has become too sanctions dependent. There is a need to create and use alternative Congressional foreign policy instruments, a recommendation echoed by Lauter in his recent study on Congressional foreign policy preferences. The Senator recently introduced the European Energy Security and Diversification Act to finance energy infrastructure in Europe as a means to promote independence from Russia. He also pointed to the need to fund fragile democracies in the region.
Trump’s distancing the US from its NATO allies should be seen as part of a general trend towards isolationism and nationalism, in contrast to French President Macron’s vision for multilateralism and internationalism to solve global problems. Trump’s America First message still resonates with large swaths of the country, prompting Murphy to state that until we fix our domestic politics and economy, politicians will be able to sell Trump’s message in regions that have seen losses in jobs such as manufacturing.
While Reinsch pointed out that trade is low on the average voter’s motivations, Murphy underlined the connection between global institutions/alliances and the strength of the American economy and jobs. Trump’s threatening posture towards NATO does not exist in an economic vacuum. Macron has been urging Europe to become more militarily and technologically autonomous, in part by favoring European defense contractors over American ones, in response to Trump’s criticism of NATO. The steel and aluminum tariffs imposed on the EU make the situation worse.
The political divide between skeptics and supporters of liberalized international trade rests more within parties than between them, according to Reinsch and Lauter’s recent studies. Lauter’s study of the pre-election Congress’ foreign policy preferences found that Congress was fairly internationalist, with Reinsch elaborating that trade was less a partisan issue and more a regional one. The coasts tend to be pro-trade while skeptics dominate the Midwest, as demonstrated in the mixed reactions to Trump’s tariffs on the EU.
A post-election survey of incoming Democrats looked at their public statements on the issue. Twenty-four of fifty-five surveyed said nothing about trade following the election. Twenty-one made pro-trade statements, and eight anti-trade statements. While Democrats may hold the USMCA (the NAFTA replacement) hostage for political reasons, Reinsch predicted that the new Congress will include many pro-trade representatives. It is too soon to write a general obituary for trade agreements.
China is the regional challenge that will likely continue to enjoy bipartisan support, evidenced in the reaction to the Administration’s 301 report on China. The question will be how this is handled moving forward in light of Trump’s relationship with the WTO. While he has rejected appointments of new judges for its dispute appellate body and is willing to go beyond the WTO to achieve policy goals, Reinsch emphasized that the Europeans and Japanese want to address concerns over China within the context of the WTO.
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Midterms and foreign policy
I gave a talk this morning at the Italian International Affairs Institute (IAI) on “The 2018 American Midterm Elections: What Do They Signify for the US and for Europe?” Here are my notes for the occasion, which I pretty much used as written:
- It is a pleasure to be back at IAI, which has been kind enough to host my talks many times over the 25 years since I left Rome as Charge’ d’affaires ad interim of the American Embassy.
- Let me start with some basics: the elections are “midterm” because they fall in the middle of a Presidential mandate. They are multiple, that is elections rather than election, because more than one institution is contested: all of the House of Representatives, about one-third of the Senate, and many governorships, state legislatures, and local positions.
- They are also multiple in another sense: even elections for Federal offices in the US are run by the 50 states, not by the Federal government. While all the states elect members of the House from single-member districts with approximately the same population as well as two Senators (no matter what the population of the state), the rules governing who is eligible to vote, design of the ballot, polling procedures, opening times, counting, tabulating, and ultimately deciding the outcome vary quite a bit from state to state and even from county to county.
- Quite a few of our states have trouble getting it all done, especially when the margins are narrow. There are still a few seats undecided.
- Nevertheless, the general shape of the outcome is clear: Democrats have won control of the House of Representatives; Republicans have maintained control of the Senate, widening their margin by a couple of seats.
- What does this mean for the future, especially for American foreign policy and relations with Europe, including Italy?
- First thing to understand is that the election was not about foreign policy. The two biggest issues were health insurance for Democrats and immigration for Republicans. Trade, national security, nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, the Middle East, Iran, China, Russia and all the other issues IAI and I care about were virtually absent from the pre-electoral discourse.
- It was vigorous and led to a high turnout by American standards: about 50% of registered voters. That will sound very low to you, but it is not low in the US, where about 60% turn out for presidential elections and midterms generally draw about 40%.
- There are many reasons for this. Americans move frequently and die pretty much at the rate of everyone else. There is no national procedure for updating registration lists, and virtually no one unregisters when they move out of a community to another one. So some of the low turnout is a statistical artefact.
- The resulting anomalies have led to Republican claims that there is a great deal of fraudulent Democratic voting in US elections. There is no evidence for that. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrates concerted efforts by Republicans in many states to suppress voting by their opponents with ID requirements, closing polling places, and other tricks of the trade.
- The higher turnout this time around occurred among both Democrats and Republicans, but the Democrats have more to gain because their relatively young voter population normally turns out much less than the older Republican voter population.
- What looked like a modest shift the day after the election turned into a considerable Blue Wave as more results are finalized. The shifts from the last midterms in 2014 are notable:
under 30, +11D to +35D
women, +4 to +19
Latinos, +26 to +40
Asians, -1 to +54
college grads, -3 to +20
independents, -12 to +12
single, +13 to +24
not white evangelical, +12 to +34
- Rural areas voted heavily for Republicans. Suburbs, which have generally leaned Republican, turned bluer this time, mainly because of the votes of college-educated women.
- In short: Americans are divided, perhaps more than they have been since World War II.
- On one side, we have a modest, but bigger than normal for midterms, recovery of the Obama coalition, despite a House of Representatives gerrymandered in favor of Republicans and a Senate “map” that incidentally favored Republicans.
- Some high-profile progressives like Beto O’Rourke—a challenger for Ted Cruz’s Senate seat in Texas—and Andrew Gillum—the black Democrat who ran for governor of Florida—lost, but their showings were respectable enough to make them serious future candidates.
- On the other side, we’ve got a Trump-dominated Republican party, which will be more radical than in his first two years. Many of the relative moderates are not returning to Congress. The Republicans there will be whiter, more male, and more rural than before.
- The big winners in this election were those who want America divided and immobilized. That includes Presidents Putin and Xi. America will be consumed for most of the next two years with the 2020 presidential election. The Mueller investigation and oversight hearings will increase the noise and divisiveness, perhaps even to the point of impeachment.
- The Democrats, who are mostly moderates, have limited powers to influence foreign policy. Their main lever of power will be oversight: the power to convene House hearings and subpoena witnesses. The Senate will continue to rubber stamp Trump’s nomination of judges and ambassadors.
- That said there has been considerable agreement in the current Congress between Democrats and Republicans on maintaining the foreign affairs budget and toughening up against China, Russia, and North Korea. There are disagreements on the Iran nuclear deal, which Democrats favor, and on the defense budget, which Republicans traditionally favor.
- In the Middle East, we are likely to see a continued US effort in eastern Syria, some effort at rapprochement with Turkey, and Congressional pressure to stop the war in Yemen as well as sanction Saudi Arabia for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. The Administration will resist that pressure but may give in on Yemen, which would bring Washington into closer alignment with most Europeans.
- It remains to be seen whether the consensus in favor of funding defense, development and diplomacy that existed in Congress since 2016 will be maintained. The Administration itself has signaled an intention to cut defense. Many newly elected Republicans will want to cut development and diplomacy. Democrats will defend both, but compromises should be expected. There is nothing popular about the foreign affairs budget in the US, though most Americans do favor continuing commitments abroad.
- On NATO and the EU, I don’t think much will change. Trump has made it clear he thinks little of NATO and less of the EU. The Congress and the American people are more favorable to both and will try to insist on maintenance of the Alliance. Trump’s hostility to the EU will, however, find some resonance among protectionist Democrats and Republicans. The steel and aluminum tariffs seem destined to stay, at least for now.
- Macron and Merkel notwithstanding, there are of course many in Europe who are sympathetic to their own version of Trump’s nationalism: make Italy, Hungary, Poland, or Denmark great again by blocking immigration, protecting domestic industries, rallying anti-minority sentiment, and undermining the rule of law. Berlusconi after all was an Italian invention.
- I’m afraid the only thing that will sober some of Trump’s American supporters will be a major economic downturn, and even then they may prefer to blame it on someone other than the incumbent, most likely minorities, immigrants, Europeans, and terrorists.
- That said, I think we have passed the moment I would call “peak Trump.” Even without a recession, most Americans—3 million more of whom voted for Hillary in 2016 and haven’t approved of Trump since—are now fed up. Unlike 2016, that majority has spread into red suburbs and states and mobilized more effectively. Democrats won the popular vote for Congress by about 7%. That could be a landslide in a presidential election.
- Trump has a difficult road ahead. But that should be little comfort. If I had to guess, his fall might be at least as painful as his rise. He will resist accountability and transparency to the last.
- Europe has a tremendously important role to play during the next two years. Merkel and Macron have already done great work in maintaining the vision of a united and liberal Europe. So long as Germany and France remain on that line, I can hope the rest of Europe and the US will eventually find their way back from ethnic nationalism.
- But they and those of you who agree with that vision are going to have to do much more. Here are a few concrete suggestions:
• The NATO allies really do need to meet the 2% goal by 2024. Failing to keep on the tracks plays directly into Trump’s malicious hands. If they do so by joining together to form Macron’s European army, I have no objection.
• A negotiated resolution of the trade dispute is highly desirable. Even better would be returning to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which offered big economic benefits.
• The US and Europe need to hang together on Russia and China or hang separately as Ben Franklin said to his fellow revolutionaries. US gas supplies should help on the Russian front.
• On Iran, I see no hope of a US/EU accommodation so long as the US stays out of the nuclear deal. But I don’t really see how it can re-enter under this president. Some issues will have to wait for 2021, when discussing a follow-on deal will be needed anyway.
• On Syria, prospects are better. The US and Europe seem to be on the same wavelength in withholding reconstruction aid until there is a credible and irreversible political transition under way. That is the way to succeed, but pressures on Europe will be great.
• On Libya, the Americans are hoping Italy and France will work together to end the civil war and put the country back on a sustainable path.
- There are lots of other issues, but the overall strategy should be this: hang together where possible, help each other out, and hope to get to 2021 in good enough shape to return to the trajectory most of us would prefer: a Euro-Atlantic community whole and free, though wiser and better, from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
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Peace Picks November 12 – 18
- Defending Sovereignty and Information Space | Tuesday, November 13 | 11:30 am – 1 pm | Atlantic Council |
1030 15th Street, NW, 12th Floor Washington, DC 20005 | Register Here
How should one respond to the many interlocking elements that make up this tool of statecraft in order to reinforce the resiliency of our societies and technology and how to use all levers of national power to contain the negative effects of Russian activities?
Russia has been exploiting agents of influence and information space to sway public opinion and mislead government actors. In the wake of the 2016 US Presidential election, the United States was forced to come to terms with Russian interference in American democratic institutions and the sudden throwback to many Russian Cold War-era hybrid tactics. Nevertheless, the Republic of Estonia, along with other European allies, have been well aware of these tactics and have been working to counter the resurgence of Russian activities.
As hybrid warfare has benefited immensely from the digital age, the United States and its European allies and partners urgently need to comprehend the tasks, purposes, and organization of these tactics in order to reinforce societal and technological resilience to face unprecedented levels of state-sponsored influence and interference campaigns.
A conversation with:
Ambassador Victoria Nuland
Former Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Eurasian Affairs,
US Department of State;
Chief Executive Officer
Center for a New American Security
Dr. Thomas Rid
Professor of Strategic Studies,
School of Advanced International Studies
Johns Hopkins University
General Riho Terras
Commander
Estonian Defense Forces
Moderated by:
H.E. Jonatan Vseviov
Ambassador
Embassy of Estonia to the United States
2. Promoting American Leadership in 5G Technology | Tuesday, November 13 | 12 pm – 1:30 pm | Hudson Institute | 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20004 | Register Here
Hudson Institute will host an event to discuss how the U.S. can maintain a competitive edge in the development of 5G technology and the future of global telecommunications. Panelists include former Federal Communications Commissioner and Hudson Senior Fellow Harold Furchtgott-Roth; CEO of global telecommunications company Rivada Networks Declan Ganley; and former Deputy Chief of Staff to President George W. Bush Karl Rove.
Chinese technology has played a growing role in the global 5G network, with over 58 countries agreeing to use Chinese hardware in their future networks. As it emerges over the next decade, 5G promises to vastly increase the speed and responsiveness of wireless networks. While the rollout of 5G will demand billions of dollars, the companies and countries investing now will have a strong say in not only how 5G transmits information, but how others are able to access the system. The discussion will be moderated by Hudson Senior Fellow Arthur Herman.
Speakers
Harold Furchtgott-Roth Speaker
Former Federal Communications Commissioner and Senior Fellow and Director, Center for the Economics of the Internet, Hudson Institute
Declan Ganley Speaker
CEO, Rivada Networks
Karl Rove Speaker
Former Deputy Chief of Staff to President George W. Bush.
Arthur Herman (Moderator) Speaker
Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
3. The Midterm Elections’ Implications for the Transatlantic Agenda | Wednesday, November 14 | 12:15 pm – 1:30 pm | CSIS | 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
The CSIS Europe Program is delighted to host a conversation with U.S. Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT), Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation. With the conclusion of the U.S. midterm elections, we will discuss what the future holds for U.S. policy toward NATO and European security, Russia, the Western Balkans, as well as the U.S.-EU trade relationship from a Congressional perspective. Following Senator Murphy’s remarks, CSIS experts will assess the impact that the new Congress will have on foreign and national security policy, and discuss the issues they will be keeping their eyes on in the 116th Congress.
Featuring:
U.S. Senator Chris Murphy (D – CT),
Ranking Member, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation
CSIS Experts
Heather A. Conley,
Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic; and Director, Europe Program
William Alan Reinsch,
Senior Adviser and Scholl Chair in International Business
Louis Lauter,
Vice President for Congressional and Government Affairs
4. Indo-Pacific Currents: Emerging Partnerships, Rivalries, and Strategic Realities across Asia | Thursday, November 15 | 10 am – 11:30 am | The Stimson Center | 1211 Connecticut Ave NW, 8th Floor Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
The Indo-Pacific region, a key focus of the Trump administration’s foreign policy agenda, is undergoing significant political and strategic realignments with the return to great power competition. India’s role in the region is central to these developments, both in its emerging partnerships with nations like Japan and the United States and in its deepening rivalry with neighboring China. How are these dynamics likely to play out, and what are their broader strategic implications? Please join the Stimson Center for a panel discussion addressing views from across Asia on the political and security impacts of intra-regional cooperation and competition. Our panelists, Manoj Joshi, Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, Brett Lambert, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy, U.S. Department of Defense, Yun Sun, Co-Director of the Stimson Center’s East Asia Program, and Yuki Tatsumi, Co-Director of the Stimson Center’s East Asia Program, will offer comments. Sameer Lalwani, Director of the Stimson Center’s South Asia Program, will convene our meeting, and Elizabeth Threlkeld, South Asia Program Deputy Director, will moderate the discussion.
The Asia Strategy Initiative (ASI) is a joint effort by Stimson’s East, Southeast, and South Asia Program to feature regional perspectives on the shifting strategic dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region. By introducing expert analysis, ASI seeks to facilitate dialogues and develop pragmatic solutions for strategic, political, and economic challenges that the region faces.
5. Decentralization and Centralization: The Future of Governance in Syria | Thursday, November 15 | 12:30 pm – 2 pm | New America | 740 15th St NW #900 Washington, DC 20005 | Register Here
What is the state of governance in the various zones in Syria? Is a pre-2011 hyper centralized governance structure conducive to the peace process? How can a Syria-tailored decentralization model help the peace process? In its latest book publication, Centralization and Decentralization in Syria: The Concept and Practice, Omran Center for Strategic Studies examines Syria’s current forms of governance and how experiences on the ground, in the various zones of influence, converge or diverge from the concepts of centralization and decentralization.
To discuss the book and its findings, New America and Omran present Dr. Ammar Kahf, Executive Director and co-founder of the Omran Center who earned his Ph.D. in Political Science and Islamic Studies at the University of California Los Angeles and previously served as the Chief of Staff to the Secretary General of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces from 2012 to 2013, and Mr. Yaser Tabbara, Esq., co-founder and board member of the Omran Center, and a former Senior Advisor to the Syrian Interim Government Prime Minister in 2013. Further remarks will be provided by Mona Yacoubian, Senior Adviser for Syria, Middle East, and North Africa at the United States Institute of Peace and former Deputy Assistant Administrator in the Middle East Bureau at USAID from 2014-2017 where she had responsibility for Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon.
Participants:
Ammar Kahf, @ammarkahf
Executive Director, Omran Center for Strategic Studies
Yaser Tabbara, @abulyas
Co-Founder and Board Member, Omran Center for Strategic Studies
Mona Yacoubian, @myacoubian
Senior Adviser, United States Institute of Peace
Moderator:
Peter Bergen, @peterbergencnn
Vice President, New America
6. Russian Nuclear Strategy After the Cold War | Friday, November 16 | 10 am – 11:30 am | CSIS | 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
Please join us for a discussion of the external and internal drivers of change in post-Cold War Russian nuclear strategy. Dr. Kristin Ven Bruusgaard will argue that current Russian strategy is reducing the emphasis on nuclear weapons and oriented primarily toward deterring rather than fighting nuclear war. Improved conventional military capabilities are reducing Russia’s need to use nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional inferiority, and the most influential actors formulating nuclear strategy in Russia now argue for enhancing conventional and non-conventional tools to influence the course of conflict.
This event is made possible through generous support from Carnegie Corporation of New York.
FEATURING:
Kristen Ven Bruusgaard,
MacArthur Postdoctoral Fellow, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford
Olga Olika (discussant),
Senior Advisor and Director, Russia and Eurasia Program, CSIS
Michael Kofman (moderator),
Senior Research Scientist, Russia Studies Program, CNA
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A serious choice
This seems good for election day:
Best guesses are a Democratic win in the House, Republicans retaining the Senate. But if 2016 taught us anything it is not to depend on polling. Polls are heavily dependent on assumptions about turnout, which are particularly difficult this time around. There are lots of indications that more people will vote than usual in midterm elections.
What difference will it make? In foreign policy, the President has free rein. He can pretty much do as he likes, unless legislation constrains him. That is unlikely if the Democrats control only the House, not the Senate.
But there are some issues on which sentiment among both Republicans and Democrats in Congress is different from the White House’s inclinations. Support for NATO and understanding of the European Union, opposition to Russian malfeasance worldwide, sympathy for refugees, doubts about the Yemen war and North Korea, interest in bringing US troops home from Afghanistan and the Middle East, and support for open societies and free economies are all more evident in Congress than in the Administration. If they use their oversight responsibilities well, House Democrats could make common cause on at least some of these issues with like-minded Republicans. That would strengthen the professionals inside government and might lead to some modest course corrections.
But on other issues Democratic control of the House is unlikely to make much difference. They would have preferred that the US stay in the Iran nuclear deal, but they aren’t going to speak up, for fear of being tagged as pro-Iranian, against the renewed sanctions the Administration has imposed. Nor will Democrats strongly oppose tariffs, which some of the party’s traditional support base likes. Certainly China has few sympathizers among Democrats. Support for Israel among Democrats is strong, making it unlikely there will be strong dissent from Trump’s heavy lean against the Palestinians. The areas of bipartisan agreement on foreign policy are not as wide as once they were, but there are still some in which Trump can rely on the House Democrats to be uncritical.
Apart from the specific foreign policy issues, the significance of this midterm election lies in the choice of what kind of America its citizens want. In his pursuit of making America great again, President Trump has tried hard to sharpen the lines of difference between Democrats and Republicans, to appeal to racists, anti-Semites, and xenophobes, and to frighten Americans into voting for incumbents. They include people whose ideal is an America that treats dictators as friends, closes itself off from much of the world, treats even allies as threats, and arms itself to deal with a world in which no norms are the norm. The Democrats, while focusing mainly on domestic issues like education and health care, are projecting a more open and optimistic vision of an America more engaged diplomatically and ready to maintain and expand international norms and commitments.
This is a serious choice. Go vote.
PS: A friend sent this:
I write this on the verge of the 2018 by elections in the United States. I implore you to make this a repudiation of the divisive and anti-democratic tendencies of Trump. As many of you might know, I served 25 years in the US Army defending the Constitution that Trump flouts almost on a daily basis. His rants against the media reveals his distaste for the 1st Amendment (freedom of press and expression). His desire to repeal the 14th Amendment with an executive order shows his lack of knowledge about how Amendments evolve. His political theatre of sending US troops to the border area suggests he does not understand that they cannot engage in law and order enforcement as forbidden by the posse comitatus act of Congress. Most importantly, he has the instincts of a dictator and employs many of the same tactics as used by President Orban who has become an authoritarian leader of Hungary that has attained his power by turning segments of the nation against one another, racism and control of the press and justice system. With 16 years serving with the UN in Former Yugoslavia, I have witnessed first hand how such divisiveness and artificially induced hate of the “other” can destroy a nation.
Vote and repudiate Trump and his enablers.
PPS: Another friend sent this:
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Peace Picks: October 29 – November 4
- What Really Works to Prevent Election Violence? | Monday, October 29 | 9:30 am – 11:30 am | United States Institute of Peace | 2301 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20037 | Register Here
One in five elections worldwide is marred by violence—from burned ballot boxes to violent suppression of peaceful rallies, to assassinations of candidates. A USIP study of programs to prevent violence suggests focusing on improving the administration and policing of elections. The study, of elections in Kenya and Liberia, found no evidence that programs of voter consultation or peace messaging were effective there. Join USIP to discuss this important new report.
Governments and international organizations invest in many programs—youth engagement, election observation, police training, and civic education—to help poorly governed states or developing democracies hold credible elections. USIP’s new report, “What Works in Preventing Election Violence,” is a piece of the evidence needed to learn which programs work and which do not. Elections experts from Kenya, Liberia and leading U.S. pro-democracy institutions will review the findings of this report against their own experiences. Take part in the conversation on Twitter with #ElectingPeace.
Speakers
Pat Merloe
Senior Associate and Director for Election Programs, NDI
John Tomaszewski
Africa Director, IRI
Joshua Changwony
Deputy Executive Secretary, Constitution and Reform Education Consortium (CRECO, Kenya)
Oscar Bloh
Chairman, Elections Coordination Committee (ECC, Liberia)
Inken von Borzyskowski
Assistant Professor, Florida State University
Jonas Claes, facilitator
Senior Program Officer, Center for Applied Conflict Transformation, USIP
Debra Liang-Fenton, facilitator
Senior Program Officer, Center for Applied Conflict Transformation, USIP
2. Thinking Strategically About Human Rights Challenges in Negotiations with North Korea | Monday, October 29 | 10 am – 11 am | Heritage Foundation | 214 Massachusetts Ave NE Washington, DC 20002 | Register Here
Prior to the summit between President Trump and Kim Jong-un, the international community underscored the need to raise human rights concerns in negotiations with North Korea. Despite President Trump’s focus on North Korea’s human rights challenges at the State of the Union and notable meetings with North Korean refugees, human rights were seemingly left out of the conversation in Singapore. Since that time, the U.S. government has said little on human rights issues and reports from South Korea indicate that human rights are not a priority there either. The prospect of a second summit between Trump and Kim is an opportunity where the administration can and should express concerns over Kim Jong-un’s egregious human rights track record. Join us for a conversation on how and why raising human rights issues advances U.S. national security objectives.
Featuring
Jung Pak, Ph.D.
Senior Fellow and SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies, Brookings Institution
Greg Scarlatoiu
Executive Director, The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea
Dan Aum
Director of the Washington, D.C. Office , National Bureau for Asian Research
Hosted by:
Olivia Enos
Policy Analyst, Asian Studies Center
3. Unraveling the Web: Dismantling Transnational Organized Crime Networks in the Americas | Tuesday, October 30 | 1 pm – 3:35 pm | American Enterprise Institute, Cohosted by Federalist Society | 1789 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
The United States and its neighbors face an ever-evolving threat of transnational organized crime. Last year, AEI released a tactical report on how US policymakers and law enforcement can target this threat. The Trump administration has been proactive in confronting threat networks close to home in the Americas. However, there is much more work to be done to dismantle criminal syndicates. How can policymakers bolster regional security cooperation, help local economies affected by these groups, and ensure US agencies have the resources they need for this fight?
Join AEI and the Federalist Society for a discussion on the Trump administration’s options in the fight against transnational organized crime in the Americas. Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing Marshall Billingslea will deliver opening remarks, followed by panel discussions.
Agenda
12:45 PM
Registration
1:00 PM
Opening remarks:
Marshall Billingslea, US Treasury Department
1:35 PM
Q&A
1:45 PM
Panel discussion I
Participants:
Douglas Farah, IBI Consultants
Emanuele Ottolenghi, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Celina Realuyo, National Defense University
Moderator:
Roger F. Noriega, AEI
2:20 PM
Q&A
2:30 PM
Break
2:35 PM
Panel discussion II
Participants:
William Brownfield, US Department of State (former)
Clay R. Fuller, AEI
Patrick Hovakimian, Department of Justice
Welby Leaman, Walmart
Moderator:
James Dunlop, Jones Day
3:25 PM
Q&A
3:35 PM
Adjournment
4. The Protection of Civilians in U.S. Partnered Operations | Tuesday, October 30 | 3 pm – 4:30 pm | Center for Strategic and International Studies in partnership with the Center for Civilians in Conflict and InterAction| 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington DC 20036 | Register Here
Join us for the report launch of “The Protection of Civilians in U.S. Partnered Operations,” a joint initiative between the CSIS International Security Program, the Center for Civilians in Conflict, and InterAction. The event agenda is as follows:
Agenda
3:00 PM – 3:10 PM: Briefing: Report Findings
- Daniel R. Mahanty, Director of the U.S. Program, Center for Civilians in Conflict
- Jenny McAvoy, Director of Protection, InterAction
3:10 PM – 4:30 PM: Moderated Discussion: Protection of Civilians in U.S. Partnered Operations
- Charles “Cob” Blaha, Director, Office of Security and Human Rights, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State
- Alexandra Boivin, Head of Regional Delegation for the United States and Canada, International Committee of the Red Cross
- Amanda Catanzano, Senior Director, International Programs Policy and Advocacy, International Rescue Committee
- Mark Swayne, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense
- Moderator: Melissa Dalton, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, International Security Program, and Director, Cooperative Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies
5. The China Debate: Are US and Chinese long-term interests fundamentally incompatible? | Tuesday, October 30 | 3:30 pm – 5 pm | Brookings Institution, Cohosted by Yale Law School | 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
The first two years of Donald Trump’s presidency have coincided with an intensification in competition between the United States and China. Across nearly every facet of the relationship—trade, investment, technological innovation, military dialogue, academic exchange, relations with Taiwan, the South China Sea—tensions have risen and cooperation has waned. To some observers, the more competitive nature of U.S.-China relations was long in the making; to others, it is the outgrowth of recent decisions made by leaders in Washington and Beijing.
On Tuesday, October 30, Evan Osnos will moderate a public debate about the future of U.S.-China relations. Two teams of distinguished experts will examine whether or not U.S. and Chinese interests are “fundamentally incompatible,” as a recent survey by Foreign Affairs posed. Both sides will consider areas where U.S. and Chinese vital interests converge and diverge, whether each country’s national ambitions are reconcilable with the other’s goals, how the United States can best manage great power competition with China, and how domestic politics factor in within each country.
Moderator:
Evan OsnosP
Nonresident Fellow – Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center
Team Yes:
Evan Medeiros
Penner Family Chair in Asian Studies – Georgetown University
Thomas Wright
Director – Center on the United States and Europe, Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Project on International Order and Strategy
Team No:
David M. Lampton
Hyman Professor and Direcotr of China Studies Emeritus – Johns Hopkins University SAIS
Susan A. Thornton
Senior Fellow – Paul Tsai China Center, Yale Law School, Former Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs – U.S. Department of State
6. Saving Democracy: The Constitutional Dimension | Thursday, November 1 | 9 am – 10:15 am | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, DC 20036 | Register Here
With global democracy facing serious doubts about its basic health and longevity, comparative studies of safeguards and threats to democracy are multiplying. University of Chicago law professor Tom Ginsburg will join Carnegie’s Thomas Carothers to discuss the constitutional dimensions of democratic decay and survival.
In a new book, How to Save a Constitutional Democracy, Ginsburg and Aziz Z. Huq analyze lessons from around the world about how constitutions sometimes help and sometimes hurt democracy, including a hard comparative look at the U.S. Constitution and its role in America’s democratic troubles. In this session, Ginsburg will present the main findings of their study, including proposals for legal and constitutional measures that can help reduce the risk of democratic backsliding in both the United States and younger democracies around the world.
TOM GINSBURG
Tom Ginsburg is Leo Spitz professor of international law, Ludwig and Hilde Wolf research scholar, and professor of political science at the University of Chicago
THOMAS CAROTHERS
Thomas Carothers is senior vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In that capacity he oversees all of the research programs at Carnegie. He also directs the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program.
7. Course Change or Full Speed Ahead? Post-Midterm U.S. Foreign Policy’s Impact on Indo-Pacific | Friday, November 2 | 11 am – 12 pm | Stimson Center | 1211 Connecticut Avenue, NW, 8th Floor, Washington DC. 20036 | Register Here
The United States midterm elections may determine whether U.S. foreign policy changes course in 2019 or holds steady. Under the Trump administration, the U.S. foreign policy agenda has undergone some changes, rarely mentioning U.S. values and at times displaying disconnect between rhetoric and policy implementation. Particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, where the Trump administration has discussed disengagement and international cooperation by turns, post-election U.S. foreign policy will impact how current shifts in the security environment play out. After the midterms, will Congress forge a new consensus on how foreign policy should be conducted? Or if there is no course change, what will be the potential consequences for future presidents’ foreign policy agenda? Join Stimson and the Canon Institute for Global Studies for a seminar to discuss these questions, as well as how U.S. foreign policy looks from the outside, and what impact it will have on the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
Featuring:
DEREK MITCHELL, President, National Democratic Institute (NDI) Ambassador
KUNI MIYAKE, Research Director for Foreign and National Security Affairs, Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS)
DANIEL TWINING, President, International Republican Institute (IRI)
YUKI TATSUMI, Co-Director, East Asia Program, Stimson (moderator)
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Iran’s offensive defense
The International Institute for Strategic Studies hosted a panel of experts on Iran’s Regional Posture October 11. The panel consisted of Dina Esfandiary, fellow at the Century Foundation, Ambassador Barbara A. Leaf, former ambassador to the United Arab Emirates and visiting fellow at the Washington Institute, and Ali Vaez, Iran Project Director of the International Crisis Group.
Panelists revisited the nature and role of Iran today, dissecting Iran’s motivations, threats, and constraints, beyond traditional perspectives that privilege analyses based on American interests. With ethno-sectarian conflicts raging in Syria and Yemen as well as a tense political transition in Iraq, the Saudi-led Gulf states and Iran, the region’s major actors, have been embroiled in a competition of political and strategic influence.
But is it that simple? Esfandiary sought to move beyond polarity. She pointed out that Iran is not simply vying for power, but seeks to preserve its territorial integrity against Western and Gulf nations it views as aggressive. As a main center of Shi’a Islam, Iran sees itself as entitled to regional influence. Esfandiary elaborated that while religion was a foreign policy driver for the post-Revolution state’s early years, the Iranian government now leans towards nationalism as a better way to unify the nation’s people and frame its foreign policy endeavors. Elaborating on this point, Leaf said that Iran’s posture should be understood as an offensive defense, a response to the US presence and support of both the Israelis and the Saudis, which it sees as a threats to its territorial integrity and legitimate involvement in Arab affairs.
Iraq, Esfandiary said, is Iran’s highest regional priority. Tehran seeks a central government in Baghdad aligned with its interests. However, with the election of Barham Salih as Iraq’s new President, and his selection of Adel Abdul Mahdi as Prime Minister, many analysts have signaled a turn in Iraq away from the rigid ethno-sectarian politics that have dominated the post-invasion landscape. With many Iraqis disillusioned by dysfunctional governance resulting from proxy politics, Iran’s ability to sway the new government’s formation and the future of the nation’s politics are limited. Esfandiary further identified the Syrian civil conflict as Iran’s second priority, and the conflict in Yemen as its last priority, questioning whether Iran has a long-term strategic goal in Yemen at all. Leaf agreed, with Iraq as Iran’s greatest concern given the election year.
Invoking Iran’s Hezbollah model, Leaf listed the three major instruments in Iran’s toolbox:
- Creating and directing splintered proxy groups, preferably local actors, to shape civil conflicts as Tehran sees fit. In particular, supporting and directing Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq.
- Increasing its defense and intelligence architecture in Syria, part of its corridor to Israel and the Mediterranean.
- Exploiting disordered Arab states with sizeable Shi’a minorities.
Vaez added Iran’s nuclear program as another instrument of the state’s offensive defense strategy in the region: a deterrent to nuclear Israel and the aggressive Gulf states, all supported by the US.
Underscoring the constraints of current containment policies, Vaez underlined that Trump was misguided in withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal. While the goal is to deprive Iran of resources through sanctions, Iran’s regional proxy operations are not strongly correlated to sanctions, citing 2011 as a year in which Iran was able to expand its proxy operations while under increased pressure from multilateral sanctions.
With another round of harsher sanctions going into effect on November 4, Vaez fears that in the unlikely scenario of effective sanctions, Iran’s political system and elite will welcome a crisis, whipping up nationalist sentiment and acting in a less risk-averse manner throughout the region. Leaf, who submitted testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Subcomittee on Terrorism, Non-Proliferation, and Trade in support of sanctions, brought up this fear in encouraging the committee to avoid mistiming sanctions, lest they strengthen Iranian nationalism.
For Esfandiary, the Gulf Arab states’ insistence that Iran pull out as a precondition for negotiations is one of the biggest constraints in reducing conflicts in Yemen and Syria. She argued that Yemen could have been ideal for negotiations with Iran, which has made it clear it is willing to negotiate. Leaf echoed this sentiment, stating that while the fractured Gulf states have tried to bring the Houthis to the negotiating table via Oman, only Tehran can succeed. Iran has been reckless in supporting the Houthis, rapidly transferring military training and technology to them. But the Houthis are independent, often operating against Iranian wishes as in their capture of both Sa’ana and Aden. Their relationship to Iran is very different from that of Hezbollah or other proxies. Further recklessness on the part of the Houthis, such as attacks on commercial ships, could be problematic for Iran.
All three panelists agreed that Iran’s image in the international sphere has improved significantly, regardless of its proxy activities. Esfandiary
and Vaez both pointed to the European Union’s effort to bypass US sanctions as well as the ICJ ruling in favor of Iran as indicators of a recovering international image. Despite the negative domestic impact of the war in Syria and Iraqi resistance to Iranian meddling, Iran appears uninterested in negotiating with the US in any capacity. Tehran instead is emphasizing its relationships with the EU, China, and Russia. Beijing and Moscow are especially important and have a higher level of familiarity with the Iranian economy than their Western counterparts.
Ultimately, Vaez warned of the need for a more inclusive security and intelligence architecture in the Middle East. The region needs a long-term strategy to escape the asymmetry and escalating armament in the region.
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