Tag: Corruption
Preventing structural destabilization of Serbia
The video above is much more analytical than its cover cartoon and title.
Dušan Janjić writes “I am deeply convinced that the window for a peaceful resolution of Serbia’s crisis is closing, and that timely preventive measures can avoid violence and armed conflict.” With this he conveys a “non-paper” on behalf of the unnamed Ad Hoc Expert Team for Security and Stabilization, which consists of leading experts in the fields of human security, security and defense, constitutional law, the rule of law and judiciary, and international relations.
The team commenced its work on January 15, 2025 as an Ad Hoc mechanism addressing the present state and threats to human security, human rights, and freedoms in the Republic of Serbia. The monitoring findings and recommendations were subsequently released in the Policy Paper “Report on the State and Threats to Human Security, Human Rights, and Freedoms in the Republic of Serbia. Reporting Period: January 15 – March 31, 2025.”
This Non-Paper is intended for domestic and international social, business, political, and other stakeholders whose actions influence the course of the ongoing crisis in Serbia.
The Non-Paper
The document is based on available information regarding the severity of the crisis, the state of security in the country, and political will, preparedness, and capacity of various actors to help preserve peace and stabilize the situation.
A. Serbia Facing Structural Destabilization
Political and social crises, coupled with growing security instability, have come to dominate everyday life in Serbia. The government’s response has included measures reminiscent of a state of emergency and a creeping coup, raising the risk of further escalation.
President Aleksandar Vučić remains one of the most influential actors in this crisis. He has consolidated control over the media, key budgetary and investment decisions, and the management of the Serbian government, particularly its diplomacy, the military, and the police. The president is using this authority to advance the values and interests of a single segment of society and to build the Movement for the Defense of the State. His conduct violates both the letter and the spirit of the Constitution and the Law on the President, which define the president’s primary duty as safeguarding the unity of the state.
Public protests and widespread sentiment challenge the legitimacy of such conduct, raising calls for current president’s resignation or impeachment, and for extraordinary presidential elections. There is an emphasized need to undertake appropriate activities to strengthen political will and reach a political agreement on the conditions for electoral verification of the government.
B. Activities and Mechanism for a Peaceful Exit from the Crisis
B.1 Measures for De-escalating Threats to Human Security
- Independent Expert Commission: Establish a body to monitor and report on social conditions and security trends, and propose measures for de-escalating threats to human security, human rights, and freedoms. The Commission should cooperate with domestic and international experts, institutions, and organizations, supporting the work of an Ad Hoc Mechanism for Facilitating a Peaceful Exit from the Crisis.
- Countering advocacy of intolerance, violence, and extremism: All competent institutions must take lawful measures to suppress advocacy of intolerance, hatred, and extremism; to stop the increase in police violence; and to prevent the abuse of prosecutorial and judicial functions, including misdemeanor courts.
- Role of the President and National Security Council: Adopt measures to stop the increase of police violence and torture. Take measures to dismantle para-police groups and stop their activities and violence —especially those supported by the ruling parties, funded through misuse of public resources or illicit means, supported by the police, and tolerated by parts of the judiciary.
- Role of the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office: Fulfil legal obligations to combat extremist and para-police activities, especially those connected to political parties, public officials, and organized crime.
- Parliamentary and institutional oversight: Activate existing mechanisms for parliamentary and other forms of public oversight over the security and intelligence community in Serbia, especially the police and the Security Intelligence Agency (BIA).
- Assessment of institutions of special public importance: Urgently review whether the key institutions— Constitutional Court, Anti-Corruption Agency, Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection, and Protector of Citizens—are fulfilling their constitutional and legal mandates and effectively contributing to the protection of human security, rights, and freedoms in Serbia.
- National Security Agency: Consider establishing an agency legally designated as one of key actors in upholding the rule of law, responsible for providing critical security and defense information to authorized institutions, countering cyber and communications threats, protecting individuals and facilities, safeguarding the national currency and payment systems, and leading or assisting in investigations into war crimes, terrorism, and politically motivated murders.
- Police reorganization: Create legal and operational conditions to reorganize the police into a single structure with a unified chain of command and management.
B.2 Roundtable on Stabilizing the Situation in Serbia
The Roundtable on Stabilizing the Situation in Serbia is an ad hoc mechanism that enables reaching a political agreement to overcome the current legitimacy crisis and irregularities in the work of the National Assembly of Serbia, Assembly of AP Vojvodina, city and municipality assemblies, as well as local community councils throughout Serbia.
Rationale:
- Deep political and social divisions;
- High public distrust in authorities;
- Conflict between the opposition and the government;
- Limited crisis capacity management on both sides;
- Lack of acceptable institutional framework for dialogue;
- Risk of radicalization, parallel institutions, and violent resistance;
- Infiltration of para-state structures and organized crime into state institutions, especially in the security and intelligence sector.
Goals:
- Reach political agreement on conditions for fair and democratic elections;
- Ensure peaceful, democratic resolution of the political and security crisis;
- Establish basic rules and mechanisms to reduce tensions and security risks.
Participants:
- Representatives of protesting citizens, civic initiatives, student, professional, local, and other movements with significant public support;
- Parliamentary political parties.
Moderation:
- Moderator of the Roundtable may be an individual or a collective body, either a Serbian citizen and/or a representative of the international community (the Quint is recommended).
- Moderator selection requires unanimous approval of all participants.
Expected outcome:
- Consensus on creating conditions for free and fair elections, including:
- Integrity of voter register and prevention of biometric and data abuse;
- Independent monitoring of the activities of the Republic Data Center;
- Decision on the electoral system model (majority or proportional);
- Introducing larger number of electoral districts;
- Direct voting procedures and ballot security;
- Balanced regional and minority representation;
- Financing of political parties and campaigns.
Recommendations:
- The National Assembly elected in early elections should serve as a constituent assembly;
- It is necessary to set a specific timeframe for the transitional period. For the president and the constituent assembly, this period should be shorter than the term established by law for those elected in regular elections;
- Reaching an agreement on the schedule for holding extraordinary elections at all levels.
C. Role of the President in Serbia’s Stabilization
Given the serious security challenges facing Serbia and the need to prevent further destabilization, particular focus is on the role of the president, National Security Council, and the security and intelligence community in Serbia.
Public debate frequently raises the question: Who will replace Vučić? This Non-Paper does not answer this question but stresses the need for electoral change of this function and outlines tasks for the president to ensure a peaceful, democratic transfer of power and stabilization in the country.
It is the Responsibility of the President of the Republic of Serbia to:
- Initiate measures to guarantee the property rights of citizens, public and state property, as well as the property of companies and cooperatives, legacies, and more; promote an effective restitution process to return unjustly taken property to its rightful owners.
- Support the creation of an environment fostering business, political, and social cooperation, respect for the rule of law, institutional recovery, and solidarity.
- Encourage dialogue on Serbia’s Reform and Sustainable Development Strategy for the coming decade, involving the businesses community, experts, civil society, and international partners.
- Support opening Serbia to multinational corporations that contribute to sustainable development, while respecting the interests and needs of domestic economy and the public, especially in strategic sectors, such as, food production, water management, mining and processing of rare metals, energy, and human security.
- The Law on the President and other related laws should clearly define the President’s rights, duties, and responsibilities to uphold the Constitution, laws, and strategic documents essential for Serbia’s sustainable development, stability, security, and defense. The President must adhere to these responsibilities when deciding on granting a mandate to form the government, approving laws, and appointing Constitutional Court judges and diplomatic representatives.
- When signing decrees promulgating laws, the President is obliged to provide explanations for the decision to give consent and point out appropriate and necessary amendments to the law and Constitution.
- Contribute to strengthening judicial independence; eliminate the practice of protecting acquired privileges and monopolies; prevent the National Assembly from acting as a “party personnel filter” in the judiciary.
- Provide support to judicial and investigative authorities in combating corruption, organized crime, and terrorism, directly and/or through the National Security Council.
- Initiate comprehensive monitoring, review, and reporting on cooperation with foreign intelligence services; initiate ending the practice of involving BIA and VOA members in prosecutorial teams and overseeing prosecution work; initiate removing VOA’s influence over the War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office.
- In carrying out duties of appointments and awards, the President is obliged to respect and is accountable for the integrity of the individuals being appointed or honored.
- Respects diversity and promotes the integrative policies. Given the importance of interethnic relations for Serbia’s development, stability, and security, and considering the prolonged inactivity of the National Council for National Minorities, the President of the Republic should be legally authorized to chair this Council.
D. Urgent Measures
The Law on the President of the Republic should clearly define, in line with the Constitution and other laws, the criteria for granting amnesty and pardon, along with the President’s accountability for failing to adhere to these criteria.
It is necessary to examine the President’s past actions in relation to sustainable development issues, with an immediate focus on halting the President’s involvement in bodies and institutions that approve major capital investment projects.
It is necessary to ensure adequate infrastructure and human resources to enable effective performance of the President’s public duties. To this end, a review of the legal status and responsibilities of the National Security Council is required, recognizing it as a key body for improving security conditions and guiding the activities of the security and intelligence community.
Members of the National Security Council can only be worthy citizens of Serbia, with proven qualifications and experience in the fields of strategic planning and directing security development in all its aspects.
The Council should be chaired by the President of the Republic and/or the Security Adviser to the Republic of Serbia.
The current Bureau for Coordination of Security Services should be replaced by a Bureau for Coordination of Activities of the Intelligence and Security Community. Its members should be representatives from the National Assembly, the Government of Serbia, and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, European Integration, Internal Affairs, and Defense. The existing Bureau for Coordination of Security Services should be transformed into a Coordinating Body of the Intelligence and Security Community, composed of the heads of security and intelligence agencies.
For the Ad Hoc Team of Experts on Security and Stabilization
Belgrade, August 13, 2025 Dr. Dušan Janjić
Stevenson’s army, October 3
– John Kelly tells the truth about Trump. WaPo analyzes.
– NYT describes evolution of GOP attack Mexico proposals.
-US sees corruption danger in Ukraine.
-WSJ sees Chinese gains in Arctic
– “Black Hawk Down” 30 years ago: Mark Bowden has new document; Andrew Exum sees a lesson learned
-Former GOP congressman has some regrets.
From Politico:
MATH IS HARD: Over the past month, we’ve seen some wildly different numbers about how much total aid Washington is giving Ukraine. The Center for Strategic and International Studies says it’s $135 billion, The Washington Post wrote over the weekend that it’s around $60 billion, POLITICO and others have written that it’s more than $100 billion.
That’s because the smaller number (currently $73 billion in aid) is often cited from the Kiel Institute, which tracks only funds that have been delivered directly to Ukraine, CSIS’ Cancian and the Council on Foreign Relations’ JONATHAN MASTERS told NatSec Daily. Higher estimations show the total Ukraine-related packages requested by the White House, which include funds for American forces, aid to NATO allies and other things that don’t appear in the Kiel database, they said.
“The divergence in dollar figures reported by various outlets likely muddles the debate to an extent, particularly when you’re talking about tens of billions,” Masters said, adding that he prefers the Kiel Institute’s data because it clearly compares U.S. aid to other countries’ assistance.
Neither figure is better or more accurate — it’s a matter of preference: “I think the appropriations total” — the higher figure — “is a better number because it captures all of the U.S. efforts as a result of the war in Ukraine,” he said.
Cancian recommended outlets and think tanks, if they use the larger number, describe it as something like “U.S. efforts as a result of the war in Ukraine” instead of “U.S. aid to Ukraine.” Masters also called on outlets and think tanks to be clearer in defining how they came to a number.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, September 4
– Zelensky fired his defense minister, while military corruption remains a problem.
– NYT says US Navy has too many big ships, partly for political reasons.
– FP suggests UN peacekeeping fuels African coups
-Hill tells how House GOP plans to help Trump — one way is through renewed Holman Rule.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, June 9
– How many wars are we in today? WH releases latest war powers report.
– Watson Institute at Brown criticizes defense spending.
– There’s a fight over sending troops to Haiti. US wants a UN force; author argues against it.
– Corruption leads US to cut aid to Ethiopia.
– Another Discord leak from WaPo: Saudi prince threatened severe economic pain on US
– Effort to label Wagner a terrorist group fails.
– FT has details of Iranian drones to Russia.
– NYT says satellites saw dam explosion.
– Florida man goes to jail for keeping classified documents. No, a different Florida man.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
What the State Department forgot to say
This morning’s Chollet and Escobar pas de deux at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee demonstrated that the Senators who attended really know something about the Balkans. The questioning was pertinent and at times incisive. The responses were less so.
Of course the State Department Counselor and the Deputy Assistant Secretary with responsibility for the Balkans know what to say. They are for EU membership, democracy, sovereignty and territorial integrity. They are against Russian malfeasance, Chinese financing, corruption, and ethnonationalism.
It’s what they don’t say
It’s what they don’t say that really counts, starting from the premise: “Europe whole and free.” This 90s US foreign policy slogan is inapplicable today and for the forseeable future. Europe is not going to be whole and free any time soon. We’ll have to accept a line somewhere. That’s what the war in Ukraine is about: will Kyiv be on the Western side of the line, or will all or part of Ukraine be forced into a subserviant relationship with Russia?
While the Americans are trying to attract it with all the carrots they can think of, Belgrade has chosen definitively in recent years to move towards Moscow and Beijing. There is no sign of anything but rhetorical interest in EU membership. Progress in the EU accession process has ground to a halt. The political system in Serbia has veered towards autocracy. President Vucic and his minions, who include virtually the entire media landscape in Serbia, mouth ambitions to retake Kosovo (or part of it) and use the worst ethnic slurs available against Albanians. There really is nothing comparable happening in Kosovo.
As for the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue, Escobar claimed the February and March agreements on normalization are legally binding and being implemented, but when confronted with examples of President Vucic’s refusal to implement specific provisions he and Chollet retreated to bothsiderism. That was also their response on corruption in Belgrade as well. “We find it everywhere in the Balkans.” In recent memory, I can’t name a US official who has referred explicitly to the many and gross manifestations of organized crime and corruption in Serbia.
Chollet and Escobar were enthusiastic about the proposed Association of Serb Majority Municipalities (ASMM), claiming it would enable Serbs to integrate more into Kosovo and would have to be consistent with the Kosovo constitution. They ignored the Serb proposal for the ASMM, which is unequivocally intended to create an autonomous Serb entity, like Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, inside Kosovo, complete with executive powers. They were also enthusiastic for Serbia’s Open Balkans initiative, provided that it treats all the countries participating equally. They forgot to mention that Kosovo has not even been invited to Open Balkans because Belgrade doesn’t want to address it properly in the invitation.
Poor Bosnia
Bosnia suffered the worst from State Department amnesia. Yes, the officials said, the Bosnia constitution would need changes, in accordance with decisions by the EU and the Venice Commission. They forgot to mention that one of those decisions, by the European Court of Human Rights, was taken 14 years ago. The US gave up long ago on pressing for its implementation.
They liked the decisions of the HiRep that enabled formation of the government in the Bosnian Federation, but forgot to mention that one of them changed the way votes were counted after they were cast. The other was taken to iron out problems the first had created. The net result was to ensure that two ethnonationalist parties could rule in the Federation. Only one ethnonationalist party was dissastified with these decisions, Escobar claimed. He forgot to mention that that party and other dissenters just might represent more than a majority of the voters. Never mind the disgraceful act of changing the way votes are counted after they are cast.
The rest
I trust Macedonians won’t be too pleased to hear from Escobar that in order to join the EU they will have to change their constitution to mention their Bulgarian minority, which he failed to say numbers a few thousand (certainly less than 1% of the population). Nor will the Albanians in Serbia be pleased to hear that their numbers–almost certainly equal to or greater than the number of Serbs in northern Kosovo (and far more than the Bulgarians in Macedonia)–don’t merit mention of an Association of Albanian Majority Municipalities inside Serbia. Never mind Albanian seats in the Serbian parliament, to match the guaranteed Serb seats in the Kosovo parliament.
Escobar will be winging off to Podgorica for the Montenegrin presidential inauguration Saturday. No one bothered to mention that we owe the oderly and so far nonviolent change of power there to its current President, Milo Djukanovic, whom American and European diplomats have spent years deploring for alleged (but still unproven) corruption. The new President, Jakov Milatović, avows a pro-European stance but has more than warm relations with President Vucic in Belgrade. A lot will depend on June 11 parliamentary elections. I hope they are conducted as freely and fairly as those under Djukanovic.
Stevenson’s army, March 1
– USAID has guidance to fight corruption. More from New Yorker re Ukraine..
– USD(P) explains opposition to F16s.
– NYT explains CHIPS Act. WSJ’s Greg Ip sets background.
– GZEro has graphic on aid to Ukraine.
– NYT explains Russia’s failing tank tactics.
– NYT says Netanyahu is losing his grip.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
– House committee reports a batch of China bills.
– WaPo dings Haley for misleading statements about foreign aid.
– Writer urges expansion of House.