Tag: Egypt
Syria is in good company in the Arab League
The Arab League decided yesterday in Cairo to readmit Syria. The League had suspended Syria’s membership in response to its violent crackdown on demonstrators in March 2011. President Assad will presumably attend the May 19 Summit in Riyadh. This comes on top of several bilateral normalization moves, including by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
Conditions aren’t likely to be fulfilled
The readmission is supposedly conditional. Though I’ve been unable to find the official statement, press reports suggest the conditions include allowing humanitarian assistance and return of refugees, clamping down on Syria’s burgeoning Captagon drug exports, and the beginnings of a political process called for in UN Security Council resolution 2254.
I’ll be surprised if much of that comes to pass. Assad could and should have done all those things long ago. Preventing humanitarian assistance, blocking return of refugees, financing his regime with drug smuggling, and blocking any transition are all part of his strategy. Readmission to the Arab League is unlikely to change his behavior, which aims at restoration of his personal authority on the entire territory of Syria.
Fighting abates but conflict continues
That is still far off. The mostly Islamist remains of Syria’s opposition control parts of northwestern Syria while Turkish troops control several border areas, where they have pushed hostile Kurdish forces farther east and south. Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces control a large part of the east, with support from the U.S. Damascus requires Iranian and Russian support to maintain sometimes minimal control over the west and south. Israel continues to bomb Syria pretty much at will, to move Iranians and their proxies away from its border and to block military supplies to Hizbollah in Lebanon.
None of these conflicts is settled, but fighting has abated from his heights. None of the forces involved has the will and the wherewithal to change the current situation. Assad no doubt hopes that normalization with the Arab world will solve his economic problems and enable him to mount the effort required to regain more territory. He may negotiate to regain territory from Turkey in exchange for promises to clamp down on the Kurds. He’ll wait out the Americans, who aren’t likely to want to remain in Syria much longer.
Autocracy restored
If Assad is successful in restoring his autocracy, he won’t be alone in the Middle East. It is a long time since the Arab Spring of 2011. Tunisia’s fledgling democracy is gone, as is Egypt’s. Bahrain’s democratic movement was snuffed out early. Yemen’s and Libya’s “springs” degenerated into civil war. Sudan is headed in the same direction. Iraq has suffered repeated upheavals, though its American-imposed anocracy has also shown some resilience. Saudi Arabia has undertaken economic and social reforms, but driven entirely by its autocratic Crown Prince. The UAE remains an absolute monarchy.
Only in Morocco and Qatar have a few modest reforms survived in more or less stable and relatively open political environments. They are both monarchies with a modicum of political participation. Though Qatar allows nothing that resembles political parties, there is limited room for freedom of expression. Morocco is a livelier political scene, but the monarchy remains dominant whenever it counts.
America has already adjusted
The Biden Administration has already adjusted. It is treating democratic values as tertiary issues with any Middle Eastern country with a claim to good relations with the US. There is no more talk of Saudi Arabia as a rogue state. Washington is silent on the restorations of autocracy in Egypt, Tunisia, and Bahrain. The Americans want to see negotiated solutions in Yemen, Libya, and Sudan. Those are more likely to restore autocracy, or something like Iraq’s power-sharing anocracy, than any sort of recognizable democratic rule.
The Americans are not joining the Syria normalization parade. They are not blocking it either. Washington no doubt figures the conditions are better than nothing. We’ll have to wait and see if that is true.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, April 19
– Discord docs say Egypt paused on arms to Russia after US pressure.
– Tucker Carlson used altered docs.
– Russia claimed only 1% of faked profiles caught.
– Saudis & UAE buy Russian oil.
– US will sell F16 equipment to Turkey
– Ukraine war changed IMF.
–China is retaliating against US companies
– Politico lists likely contenders for top military jobs.
– Bob Gates says US needs to be much better at strategic communications.
– Researchers say partisan media works.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, April 11
– Politico reports on the GOP push to attack Mexico.
– Politico profiles Elbridge Colby, the anti-neocon.
-Economist sees US-China competition in Indian Ocean
– Blowback from intell leaks: South Korea. Lots of places.
– WaPo says Egypt planned to sell arms to Russia
-Amy Zegart assesses US intelligence challenges.
Bloomberg opinion is behind a paywall, but look at these recent points.
Let Bloomberg Opinion columnist Minxin Pei — with assistance from Bloomberg’s editorial board — calibrate your concerns. The perception of China’s increasing power tends to exceed the reality of it. Here are five reasons that is true.
- China’s military strength is overhyped: “For all its talk about the decline of the West and rise of the East, China remains a significantly weaker power than the US on practically all fronts. What China sees as unfair practices — including US surveillance operations in international airspace and waters near the Chinese coast — are merely a manifestation of the exercise of US power in its rivalry with a weaker adversary.”
- On top of that, Minxin says, China talks a big game on national ambitions but can’t follow through: “In case after case, leaders in Beijing have identified top national priorities and lavished them with support. And time after time, this ‘whole-of-nation’ effort, meant to mobilize the talent and resources of a giant country, has led only to waste, graft and failure.”
- Bloomberg’s editorial board says Washington frets about China’s financial leverage over the US, but that’s also overhyped: “Less than 2% of US foreign direct investment is held in China, and US venture-capital companies have invested only about $60 billion in Chinese startups since 2010, compared with $1.3 trillion in the US.”
- The China-Russia alliance is also less than it seems, Minxin writes, adding that influence doesn’t equal leverage: “The meagerness of the economic deals signed during Xi Jingping’s visit to Moscow — which glaringly omitted the second gas pipeline from Russia to China — indicates that China is not ready to go all in, at least for now. This portends trouble” for any alliance between the two nations.
- And the Saudi deal was significant, but the US remains firmly in control: “Those lamenting America’s apparent loss of influence in the Middle East should know that this is one of the costs of focusing US attention and resources on the competition with China — and it’s one the US can afford to pay.”
Bonus China Reading:
- US Must Still Fight for Taiwan’s Hearts and Minds: Nisid Hajari
- US ‘Guardrails’ With China Are Shaky at Best: Hal Brands
- The US, UK and Australia Send China a Message: James Stavridis
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Nukes could make things worse
Today the journal Survival: Global Politics and Strategy published a paper on “Assessing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East.” I prepared it with two talented MEI research assistants, Aya Khan and Zuha Noor.
I have been concerned with nuclear issues since even before my professional career. My first participation in public protests was against fallout from nuclear weapons tests in the late 1950s and early 1960s. I wrote my doctoral thesis at Princeton on the history of radiation protection. When I joined the State Department in 1977, it was as a science and technology specialist. I spent seven years abroad as a Science Attache’ and Counselor in the US embassies in Rome and Brasilia. My main concern was Italian and Brazilian transfers to Iraq, as well as the possible military goals of the Brazilian nuclear program. I’ve visited many nuclear labs, reprocessing facilities, and power plants.
Nonproliferation in the Middle East
One of the interesting questions about the Middle East is why there has been little proliferation there in recent decades, despite the presence in the region of Israel’s nuclear weapons. Part of the answer is that Israel destroyed facilities in Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007) that might have allowed those countries to develop nuclear weapons. Libya, under American pressure, abandoned its nuclear program (2003). But why haven’t the heavier weights in the region, namely Turkey and Saudi Arabia, gone the nuclear route along with Iran?
This is an especially pertinent question right now, as Tehran approaches the nuclear threshold, at which it will have enough highly enriched uranium to build one or more nuclear weapons. The answer is at least in part that until recently Turkiye and Saudi Arabia have been largely content to rely on US security guarantees. Turkiye is a NATO member and has US nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. Saudi Arabia has until recently regarded the US as a reliable security partner. Ankara and Riyadh complain loudly about Israeli nuclear weapons, but so far as we know they have not tried to reply with nuclear weapons programs of their own.
Things are changing
But the strategic environment is changing for both of those countries. Turkiye and the US are trapped in frictions over Ankara’s purchase of Russian air defenses, the American reaction to (and alleged role in) the 2016 attempted coup, and Turkiye’s hostility to the Kurds who are allied with the Americans in Syria. Saudi Arabia resents the American failure to react strongly to the 2019 Iranian attack on its oil production facilities. Nor did it like President Biden’s criticism of Saudi human rights abuses and American efforts to lower oil prices. Security guarantees that once seemed ironclad are now doubtful.
At the same time, Russia and China are making inroads in the Middle East. Moscow has collaborated with Saudi Arabia in maintaining oil prices the Americans think too high. China is importing a lot of Saudi oil and offering to build nuclear power reactors in the Kingdom. Beijing has also mediated an agreement to restore diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran. Rosatom is building nuclear reactors in Turkiye. Russia and China both have good reasons to fear nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. But is not clear that they will be as exigent on that score as the Americans.
Rosatom is also building power reactors in Egypt.
Leadership matters
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and President Erdogan have both said that if Iran gets nuclear weapons their countries will follow suit. It is not clear whether deeds have followed those words. Saudi Arabia’s technological capabilities in that direction may be limited. It only recently started up its first research reactor and is thought to be seeking US nuclear power reactors, which come with strong nonproliferation constraints. But we really don’t know. The Kingdom is opaque in that direction. The Turks are likely farther advanced, as they have had research reactors for many years. But there is no public evidence of enrichment or reprocessing research in Turkiye.
Egypt’s President Sisi has said his country doesn’t need to have nuclear weapons to achieve great power status. But what will he do if Turkiye or Saudi Arabia acquire nuclear weapons? And what will his successor do in that case?
Prevention is better than cure
My colleagues and I argue in our piece that prevention is better than cure. We need to be monitoring the nuclear capabilities of possible nuclear proliferators assiduously as well as building a regional security architecture that discourages nuclear weapons. We will also need to collaborate with Europe, Russia, and China in ensuring that other Middle Eastern states don’t follow Israel and Iran down the nuclear path. The Middle East is already a mess. Nuclear weapons would make things worse.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s aramy, October 19
– Sen. Leahy gets cut in Egypt aid.
– Senate likely to add $10 Billion for Taiwan.
– WaPo has more on retired officers working for foreign countries, this time UAE.
– GOP leader McCarthy says no blank check for Ukraine aid.
– NYT reports men missing from Moscow.
– I have some comments about new book on GOP.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, September 15
– SFRC reports Taiwan bill. More from The Hill.
– Senators push terrorism designation on Russia.
– Members criticize new Egypt aid.
– Administration set up Afghan aid bypassing Taliban.
– Uncertain schedule for NDAA.
Charlie wrote later:
[I have grandparent duty most Fridays, so let me upload some extra items now]
– WaPo report on Xi & Putin comments.
– More Senate staff will get top clearances.
– Biden’s Asia trade program IPEF gets some movement. Here’s CRS background.
– In addition to Taiwan bill [text here], SFRC yesterday reported what it calls a State Dept Authorization bill. Since it’s 68 pages long and covers a lot of territory, it could be the first significant such measure in 20 years [though flimsy bills with that title have been enacted since.]
– Beware: there is a faction among GOP candidates who have a scary view of civilian control of the military. For example.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
RSS - Posts
