Tag: Egypt
All the action is not in the streets
The streets are dangerous in both Egypt and Syria.
In Egypt, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has named a new civilian prime minister and intends to proceed with the first round of parliamentary elections next Tuesday. While there is talk of boycotting among secularists, the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists intend to participate. As the violence of the last week ebbs, Tahrir square has been filling, but odds are that SCAF will have its way and elections will proceed. It is starting to look as if the secularists will be the big losers. Might they have done better to devote more time and energy to organizing their voters and less to occupying Tahrir?
The Arab League has issued an ultimatum to Damascus demanding admission of international observers. Failure to do so will supposedly lead to vigorous travel, trade, investment and other sanctions. The Bashar al Assad regime seems determined to continue its crackdown, which is still killing dozens of demonstrators every day, principally in Homs yesterday. The Arab League, not known for taking decisive action, needs to be ready to make good on its bluff.
Military action in Syria, despite French blague, still seems to me not just far off but nigh on impossible. Moscow is still blocking action in the UN Security Council, the Arab League is not asking for it, the Americans don’t want to think about it, and the Europeans are not going to do it on their own. The best bet for the Syrians is still nonviolent protest, though it may be better to focus on boycotts, general strikes and work stoppages rather than putting large numbers of people in the now very dangerous streets.
Revolution is an emotional business. Often the headiest experiences are in mass rallies. But there are other ways to protest, and the ballot box should not be ignored. All the action is not in the streets.
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Inching forward
President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen has finally signed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) agreement that provides him with immunity in exchange for turning his powers over to Vice President Hadi, who in turn is supposed to form a new government that includes the political opposition and hold new presidential elections within three months. This is good news, even if the protestors in Sanaa don’t like the immunity provision and are vowing that Saleh must be tried. Their unhappiness is understandable, but they are going to have to win some elections to get their way. I trust Saleh won’t hang around if they do. When the postponed parliamentary elections are to be held is not yet clear to me.
Yemen still has a long way to go. It faces continuing political protest, rebellions both in the north and in the south, an active Al Qaeda franchise, severe water shortages, declining oil revenue, endemic poverty and a significant portion of the population addicted to qat. But let us pause to thank Jamal Benomar, the UN envoy who helped negotiate the agreement and its signing, as well as the GCC for managing a difficult process and bringing it finally to fruition. Not to mention the Saudis, the Americans and whoever else deserves some of the credit.
Meanwhile Egypt is in big trouble. Its military government is clearly reaching the end of its useful life span as both Islamists and secularists have taken once again to the streets for the past week to protest its abuses and push for a quicker turnover of authority to civilians. The authorities (it sounds more like the Interior Ministry and not the Defense Ministry to me) responded with clearly excessive police and secret service violence. While some commentators have called as a result for postponement of the November 28 start to parliamentary elections, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is planning to go ahead and possibly to accelerate holding of presidential elections.
I won’t try to second-guess Egyptians on when they should go to the polls. I would only note that the important thing, as son Adam Serwer said to me this morning, is that these be only the first elections and that once the new constitution is in place new elections should be held in a timely way. Secularist Egyptians tremble at the prospect of an Islamist victory, but this is an illiberal sentiment, as Marina Ottaway has underlined. The focus needs to be on putting into place a democratic system, one that can survive any election outcome and offer a next opportunity for those who lose the first polls.
Meanwhile, publication of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (Bassiouni) report on the February/March violence in Bahrain is providing a boost to the protest movement there. King Hamad has acknowledged the excessive use of force and promised prosecutions and reforms. This could represent a major turn in the Sunni monarchy’s attitude, which for months has inclined toward the more repressive, anti-Shia end of the spectrum. In any event, the report finds no Iranian role in the initial protests and thereby removes the monarchy’s main excuse for its hard crackdown.
I don’t know whether to count as progress France’s apparent move towards consideration of military intervention in Syria. Humanitarian corridors and human rights monitors without Damascus’ agreement are nonsense. I am all for asking Bashar al Assad to cooperate in such efforts, knowing full well he is likely to refuse. But there is no way even to begin talking about a non-permissive intervention without triggering more violence. A false Western promise to help Syrians would be a cruel and destructive trick on people who are already suffering far too much. Instead we need to think about how to help them sustain a protest effort that is flagging due to regime repression. Syria still has a long, hard role ahead.
PS: For one version of the Tahrir protesters’ demands from yesterday, see here.
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Countering the counter-revolution
It all seemed elegantly simple 10 months ago: peaceful demonstrators took to the streets and threw out autocrats who had ruled for decades in Tunisia and Egypt.
Now it is far more complicated. In Egypt the army that helped to remove Hosni Mubarak is holding on to power and engaging in pitched urban battles with both Islamist and secular protesters. In Syria, Bashar al Assad is killing dozens a day to preserve his regime. In Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh continues to defy both protesters and army rebels. The UN envoy’s claim today that an agreement has been reached is at best prelude to a negotiation over getting it signed, which has failed several times. In Libya, militias that once fought Muammar Qaddafi have begun to fight each other, defying the leadership of the National Transitional Council and its recently appointed interim prime minister.
The forces of counter-revolution are alive and well. They should not be underestimated. Many Egyptians crave stability and will support the army. Minorities and businesspeople in Syria continue to support the regime, fearing loss of privilege and protection if it falls. The young men with guns in Yemen and Libya, wanting their slice of power and money, won’t hesitate to defy unelected leadership that is largely unarmed. Things can still go awry in all these places, as they have already in Bahrain, where the monarchy has managed to consolidate its power (with help from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) even as it admits that some of the security forces have used excessive force in dealing with protesters.
What is needed to keep these revolutions on track towards democratic outcomes? It certainly helps to have, as in Tunisia and Libya, a clear roadmap for when parliamentary (or constituent assembly) elections are to held as well as how and when a new constitution is prepared and presidential elections held. Egypt has changed its plans several times. Now even the first round of parliamentary elections scheduled for November 28 is in doubt. Yemen has never had a clear plan, and the opposition Syrian National Council is just now elaborating a program.
But even more critical than a plan is an authority recognized as legitimate by most people who support the revolution. The Egyptian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces lost it legitimacy with many of those who supported the revolution months ago. The Libyan National Transitional Council seems still to have it. The Syrian National Council is still trying to acquire it. Yemen has intended to rely on the existing, constitutional order, with power turned over to the vice president in preparation for elections three months later.
International recognition of an interim authority can help, as it did in Libya, but it cannot substitute for strong roots within the country. This is what makes Bahrain so difficult: the Sunni monarchy there will want to manage a controlled transition to a slightly more constitutional system on its own, without serious input from the country’s Shiite majority. Tomorrow’s publication of an independent commission of inquiry report on the February/March protests there will mark a new phase–the protesters will need to decide quickly whether to restart their efforts in the street or look instead to the negotiating table.
Most important in Bahrain and elsewhere is that protesters need to be certain that they have truly broad popular backing as they press for faster and more complete change. It is not enough to claim to represent the 99%, as Occupy Wall Street does in the U.S. They have to be truly in tune with the 99%, which is difficult when the 99% is split in many different ways, foreign powers are tugging in different directions and autocrats are warning of public disorder. There is no substitute for wise, indigenous leadership that can decide when to go to the streets and when to go to the ballot box.
PS, November 23: Here is the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry report.
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Libya good, Egypt bad, Syria worse
Libyan militia fighters today captured and brought to their Zintan base Saif al Islam, Muammar Qaddafi’s one-time heir apparent. He was trying to escape to Niger. The interim Prime Minister Abdurrahim al-Keib is talking fair trial and trying to prevent Saif from suffering his father’s fate at the hands of his captors. Keeping Saif safe is vital if Libya is to stay on course towards a democratic regime with ample international support.
Libyans will want to try him in Libya, where justice would be a relative thing and result in the capital punishment the country wants and expects. The International Criminal Court (ICC) will try to convince the Libyans to turn Saif over. My own view is that they would be wise to do so, in order to liberate their government from a burden that will be difficult and distracting to discharge. But the decision should be a Libyan one, after they have heard from the ICC.
In Egypt secularists and Islamists took to the streets yesterday in parallel demonstrations that have ended today in a police riot against those who remained at a sit-in in Tahrir square asking for a quick turnover of power to civilians. In a well-timed piece published before today’s events, Marina Ottaway noted the revival of the Mubarak military/secular regime, without Mubarak. Today’s events confirm her view and raise serious doubts about whether Egypt will ever see a truly democratic regime.
While Barbara Slavin is hopeful that the Arab League moves against Syria signal the beginning of the end for Assad regime, arrests and killings continue. The regime seems unperturbed and continues to enjoy Russian and Iranian support. It is stalling on international monitors.
Even without implementation the Arab League agreement seems to be having a salutary effect, if not on Syria at least on investors. As Michelle Dunne noted at the Middle East Institute conference Thursday, the Arab League’s new-found activism is a clear vote of no confidence in Bashar’s capacity to continue in office. That won’t get him to step down, but it will certainly make those thinking about investments in Syria think twice. Turkey has reportedly cancelled plans to explore for oil.
I still think there is a long way to go, however. The protesters need a sustainable strategy. And we (U.S., Arab League, Europeans and just about everybody else, even the Iranians) need to avoid the kind of sectarian strife that almost tore Iraq apart in 2005/6. It would be far better for these purposes if the protesters stay nonviolent. We need to convince Turkey in particular to restrain the Free Syrian Army defectors, whose modest tactical successes in recent days will be forgotten quickly as the real Syrian army does its deadly handiwork.
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The game is changing, but to what?
More than a little difficult to sum up today’s Middle East Institute “game changer” conference in a few words, but here’s a try:
1. Enthusiasm for Arab spring, with lots of uncertainty about both transition and how it will come out in the end. It is still the first five minutes. Economic problems loom.
2. Tunisia could be a hopeful bellwether: good electoral process, moderate Islamist victory, clear roadmap.
3. Libya shaky, with militias the big immediate problem but the constitutional framework provides a clear roadmap ahead, if they can stick with it.
4. But Egypt is the big prize. Things there are not going well: security shaky, military holding on, electoral process too complicated, liberals fragmented, Muslim Brotherhood strong, economy weak.
5. Revolution likely to succeed sooner or later in Syria, but possible high cost (civil war) and high payoff (depriving Iran of an important ally). Arab League moves do make a difference.
6. Also like to succeed in Bahrain and Yemen, but cost may also be high there.
7. Little hope to revive the Israel/Palestine peace process before the U.S. presidential elections, though Dan Kurtzer argued strongly for a bold U.S. initiative to define parameters.
8. Iran is gaining in Iraq and Afghanistan, but losing in Syria and the Arab world generally, as Turkey and smaller Arab monarchies gain but Saudis do not.
9. Israel, facing many uncertainties, hopes for preservation of the status quo but navigates when need be.
10. Lots of change, but overall outcome not yet clear.
These are obviously only my impressionistic highlights. I’ll be glad if others chime in.
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Water, food, oil, gas: many problems, or one?
Last week, the Transatlantic Academy gathered a plethora of academics and policy makers to discuss the global competition for natural resources. Among several pressing issues, the panel placed particular emphasis on the interaction between different resources and the political and economic outcomes emerging from that “nexus.”
Particularly in the raw materials industry, resources are used in abundance to extract others, or in some cases to create new ones. Water is used to extract oil and gas. These three resources are used to raise corn, which itself is used to produce ethanol. And all the aforementioned resources are used to extract minerals. The web is obviously larger, but even this small picture illustrates what scholars and policy makers have come to label a “nexus of resources.”
In a world where resources are scarce, this interconnectivity presents problems for the global economy and creates political complications. Spikes in oil or food prices have ripple effects, and for this reason it is no longer appropriate to analyze resource markets in isolation. A nexus-driven approach must now be the standard.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the market for food, particularly agricultural goods. As the situation stands today, food production rates must increase dramatically to keep pace with projected population growth and dietary changes related to the rise of the middle class. And yet, for years, as Julie Howard from USAID points out, large fluctuations in food prices failed to capture the attention of policy makers as important political events. Only with the onset of the 2008-09 price spikes did governments begin to truly appreciate the impact of food security on international and intra-state politics.
Numerous factors account for the recent spikes in food prices, but several reports emphasize the role of the biofuels industry in particular. Paul Faeth, a fellow at CNA Corporation, points out that the amount of corn available for consumption compared to that used for ethanol production has decreased by 15% in the last ten years. Increasing demand for corn in the U.S. ethanol industry has contributed to global food shortages, and a recent UN report tacitly implicates this practice in the price spikes many associate with uprisings in the Arab world. Leaving the efficacy of biofuels aside, Howard insists this reality nonetheless begs for the elevation of food security to a higher rung on governments’ list of international assistance priorities.
Food security is also closely related to water supplies. Especially in arid regions such as the Middle East and North Africa, heavy agricultural irrigation can create what Andrew Martin of the New York Times called a twisted “quandary, as [countries] are forced to choose between growing more crops to feed an expanding population or preserving their already scant supply of water.” As a result, MENA countries have become dependent on food imports, exposing citizens to cruel scenarios in the event of sudden global food price increases.
Another high usage area for water is in oil and gas extraction. With the recent developments in fracking technology used in the shale gas industry, water footprints are expanding. The issue here, as Robert Kleinberg of Schlumberger-Doll points out, isn’t waste necessarily, since 100% of the water taken out of the ground after fracking can be sanitized and reused, although Kleinberg does mention that only 1/3 of water put in the ground is actually recoverable.
But as far as water waste goes, the natural gas industry pales in comparison to agriculture. The real problems with fracking are the environmental hazards associated with the process of extraction. Trucks spewing emissions transport water to extraction sites, which themselves suffer surface erosion. And, fracking leaves highly saline and often radioactive water in the ground, which can cycle into farm irrigation systems and other water supplies. For these reasons, as both Faeth and Kleinberg seem to accept, the astronomical potential of natural gas as a profitable and clean(er) fossil fuel must be harnessed to a regulatory scheme that requires producers to meet environmental standards, or else pay for the negative externalities.
Though I missed the final session on the geopolitics of energy, I can imagine that Faeth and Kleinberg also recognize shale’s strategic potential given the large reserves in the U.S. They seem to agree that energy independence is less important that efficiency, but domestic natural gas production could address both these issues.
Strategic considerations also abound when it comes to food security and regime stability in the Arab world. For all the concern about ethnic and sectarian tensions in MENA—undoubtedly fundamental sources of conflict in the region—perhaps Mathew Burrows from the National Intelligence Council is correct to argue that resource scarcity could be the deciding factor, tipping these frictions in the wrong direction.
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