Tag: European Union

Falling off the wagon

Posted in Uncategorized - December 16, 2014 - 0 Comment

I am grateful to Davide Denti and Franklin DeVrieze for this tweet on Saturday:

retweeted

no longer supports European perspective for . See footnote in report Peace Implementation Council. Sad.

It is sad, but also good, to have it in writing. Davide adds this:

 

and they had the same objection few weeks ago @ UN on the renewal of EUFOR Althea (abstained)

This is no footnote. It is an important development that has long been in the making. Russia has sometimes in the past vacillated between outright support for specific NATO and EU goals in the Balkans (during Yeltsin’s time Russian troops served under US command in Bosnia) and competition (Russian troops seizing Pristina airport). Most of the time it has stood aside and watched while Washington and Brussels pushed Euro-Atlantic integration. It has now gone over to outright hostility.

This has serious implications, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina but possibly also in Serbia. Moscow, which has annexed Crimea and is seeking to carve out a Republika Srpska-like, semi-sovereign entity in eastern Ukraine, has long coddled and financed Milorad Dodik, supporting his maximalist positions.

Now we can expect the Russians to go further in challenging EU efforts to promote reform, which Brussels is trying to intensify. We should also anticipate that Russia may veto the next renewal of the EUFOR Althea peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, or try to extract a price for not doing so. Moscow is anxious to show it is an indispensable superpower, just like the US. Putin figures the best way to prove that is to block what others want to do.

Dodik will be a willing ally to Moscow. He has no interest in EU-promoted reforms, which would likely lead to transparency and accountability contrary to his interests. I am told that at the working level Republika Srpska officials often do cooperate with the Bosnian government in Sarajevo when it comes to technical issues associated with preparing the country for its European obligations. I have my doubts that will continue.

Serbia’s attitude is more uncertain. Moscow is actively courting Belgrade,which remained loyal to the Russian-sponsored South Stream natural gas pipeline up until the day President Putin killed it, despite EU pressure to conform to Brussels’ antagonism to the project. Russians own a large part of the Serbian energy sector. Military cooperation and religious ties are strong. Belgrade loves to portray itself as “non-aligned,” a notion most Americans will have trouble fathoming in the post-Cold War world. In the Serbian lexicon, it no longer means equidistance between two superpower blocks but rather hostility to NATO and the EU. But the political leadership in Belgrade is at least nominally far more committed to EU accession, which it is now negotiating, than Dodik is.

Few in the US will get worked up about this. The Balkans have returned to oblivion in Washington, where everyone would like to be thinking about the Asia Pacific but many find themselves preoccupied with the Middle East. If Serbia wants to volunteer to serve as a Russian satellite, the issue won’t rise above the Deputy Assistant Secretary level in the State Department, where they are likely to c0nclude that little more than continuing to chant about a Euro-Atlantic future for the Balkans can be done about it. Nor is Brussels likely to get too agitated either. Heightening the prospects for EU enlargement is just not something any major players there want these days.

I don’t have any doubt about whether a European perspective for all the Balkans is a good idea. It is the opportunity of a generation. The other countries of the Balkans see it that way and are preparing accordingly. But Bosnia and Serbia could fall off the wagon, with a push from Moscow. It’s their loss if they do.

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Why coming clean is important

Posted in Uncategorized - December 11, 2014 - 0 Comment

The Middle East Institute published this piece last night under the heading Iran’s Nuclear Secrets Need to be Revealed. It puts me in agreement with hawkish views. But I think there is no escaping the need for Iran to come clean, at least to the IAEA.

Expert American opinion on the outcome of last month’s nuclear negotiations with Iran is sharply divided. Those who want Iran to give up all enrichment technology are relieved that a “bad” deal was averted. Pressure is building in Congress, especially but not exclusively among Republicans, for new sanctions.[1] Some would like to see Congress authorize the use of military force.[2] Others think an interim arrangement limiting Iranian enrichment (the November 2013 “Joint Plan of Action,”[3] which took effect January 20, 2014) is good enough for now and certainly better than no limits.[4] They resist the idea of new sanctions and hope for an agreement by the new July 2015 deadline that will provide as much as a year’s warning of any Iranian moves to produce the material needed for a nuclear weapon.[5]

Both perspectives focus on the overt Iranian nuclear program, which is monitored and safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under provisions of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). But no country since the IAEA was founded in 1957 has used an overt program or safeguarded material to obtain nuclear weapons. Nuclear powers India, Pakistan, and Israel never signed the NPT. North Korea signed but withdrew before testing a nuclear weapon, using material produced clandestinely. South Africa developed and tested nuclear weapons clandestinely before it became an NPT signatory in 1991, when it gave them up. Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan had many Soviet nuclear weapons on their territory but transferred them out and joined the NPT in the 1990s, after the Soviet Union collapsed.

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that clandestine and non-safeguarded nuclear programs are a much greater risk for proliferation than the ones the IAEA monitors.

Iran is an NPT signatory. Its safeguarded facilities are in compliance with its NPT obligations. It is also in compliance with the Joint Plan of Action. But Iran has not implemented all resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors or the UN Security Council, nor has it implemented the Additional Protocol that permits short-notice inspections of suspect locations. The IAEA’s bottom line is ominous:

The Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.[6]

The question of covert facilities is said to preoccupy some American negotiators, but the negotiations have focused on Iran’s overt, safeguarded program.[7]

The clandestine route to a nuclear weapon is far more likely. The IAEA has asked Tehran to explain research efforts that IAEA scientists associate with nuclear weapons research, including initiation of high explosives (to compress fissionable material) and neutron transport calculations (required to initiate a chain reaction).[8] Tehran has not yet provided a satisfactory response to these inquiries or access to facilities where unsafeguarded activities may have taken place in the past. American intelligence agencies have said publicly that they believe this weapons-related research ended more than a decade ago.[9] But earlier efforts that betrayed “possible military dimensions” remain a source of profound distrust of Iranian intentions, not only in the United States but also in Israel and elsewhere.

Iranians are quick to respond that the Supreme Leader has issued a fatwa against production or use of nuclear weapons. This can be “secularized,” meaning it can be issued as legislation.[10] They also emphasize that Iran would be far less secure if it obtained nuclear weapons but in the process triggered Saudi, Egyptian, or other efforts to match the prize. Far better, some say in private, to gain the underlying technology but stop short of weaponizing, which is an expensive process of not only producing the weapons but also making them compact enough to be mounted on missiles and launched. [11]

Americans concerned about an Iranian clandestine nuclear program want Tehran to “come clean” about its past activities.[12] This is what Muammar Qaddafi did in 2003, when he opened up Libya’s clandestine (but still rudimentary) nuclear program to intense American scrutiny and removal. It is difficult to picture Iran doing as much as that. But it could, and should, go much further than it has so far in answering frankly the IAEA’s pointed questions about its past weapons-related research and development.

The United States can hope that the current negotiations on Iran’s overt nuclear program will put a year between any decision to get nuclear weapons and the result, in exchange for some measure of sanctions relief. It has to aim to do at least that well on the clandestine side as well. This will mean not only Iranian implementation of the Additional Protocol that allows surprise inspections, but also a clear and comprehensive account of past weapons-related nuclear research and development.


[1] Geoff Dyer, “Republicans Push for New Iran Sanctions,” Financial Times, November 25, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/70385cdc-74c3-11e4-a418-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3KrkTEhJA.

[2] Eric Edelman, Dennis Ross and Ray Takeyh, “A Nuclear Deal with Iran Will Require the West to Reevaluate its Presumptions,” The Washington Post, December 4, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-nuclear-deal-with-iran-will-require-the-west-to-reevaluate-its-presumptions/2014/12/04/b58748a2-7b30-11e4-b821-503cc7efed9e_story.html.

[4] Paul Pillar, “What Really Matters about Extension of the Iran Negotiations,” The National Interest, November 24, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/what-really-matters-about-extension-the-iran-negotiations-11732.

[5] See Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars event, “Iran Nuclear Extension: Key to Deal or an Empty Room?” December 1, 2014, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/iran-nuclear-extension-key-to-deal-or-empty-room.

[6] “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director General, IAEA, November 7, 2014, http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/gov-2014-58.pdf, paragraph 66.

[7] David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “In Iran Talks, U.S. Seeks to Prevent a Covert Weapon,” New York Times, November 22, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/23/world/middleeast/in-iran-talks-us-seeks-to-prevent-a-covert-weapon.html.

[8] “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement.”

[9] James Risen and Mark Mazzetti, “U.S. Agencies See No Move by Iran to Build a Bomb,” New York Times, February 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/world/middleeast/us-agencies-see-no-move-by-iran-to-build-a-bomb.html?_r=0.

[10] Seyed Hossein Mousavian, “7 Reasons Not to Worry about Iran’s Enrichment Capacity,” Al Monitor, November 4, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/11/iran-nuclear-enrichment-uranium-iaea-fatwa-sanctions.html.

[11] Anthony H. Cordesman, “Assessing a Deal or Non-Deal with Iran,” CSIS, November 20, 2014, http://csis.org/files/publication/141119_Assessing_an_Iran_Deal_or_Non-Deal.pdf.

[12] David Albright and Bruno Tertrais, “Making Iran Come Clean about Its Nukes,” Wall Street Journal, May 14, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304081804579559630836775474.

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Peace Picks December 1-5

Posted in Uncategorized - November 30, 2014 - 0 Comment
  1. The Battle for Eastern Ukraine | Monday, December 1st | 12:00 – 1:00 | Heritage Foundation | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The battle for the future of Ukraine rages on. Despite a ceasefire negotiated in Minsk in September, in Donetsk and Luhansk in Eastern Ukraine, separatists supported by Russia continue to fight Ukrainian forces. Recently, the Russian military has again directly intervened across the border in support of the rebels. Recent elections in the two regions, won by Russian supported candidates, were described by Ukrainian President Poroshenko as a “farce.” As winter approaches, Ukrainians will be dependent for heat on Russian energy supplies, at rapidly escalating prices. What are the Obama administration, the European Union and NATO doing to support Ukraine’s national and territorial integrity? What does the winter hold for Ukrainians? The speakers are Luke Coffey, a Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, Peter Doran, Director of Research at the Center for European Policy Analysis, and Mykola “Nikolay” Vorobiov, a Ukrainian Journalist and Blogger.Helle C. Dale will moderate.
  2. Jerusalem in Crisis? A Conversation with Danny Seidemann | Monday, December 1st |  12:00 – 1:10 | Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Are we on the verge of another sustained Israeli-Palestinian confrontation along the lines of 1987-1992 or 2000-2004? Why has Jerusalem become the focus of the current tensions and violence, and what if anything can be done about it? A conversation with  Danny Seidemann, leading expert on geopolitical Jerusalem and moderated by Aaron David Miller, Vice President for New Initiatives and Distinguished Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center.
  3. Breakthrough or Extension: Implications for US and European Relations with Iran | Tuesday, December 2nd | 10:00|  Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Expectations are rising that Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany  will reach an agreement on key elements of a comprehensive nuclear agreement trading long-term curbs on Iran’s nuclear program for phased relief of economic sanctions. A breakthrough could significantly improve the chances for US and European cooperation with Iran in dealing with other regional challenges, particularly the rise of the group calling itself the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, and could also motivate Western businesses to sign new deals with Iran. Speakers will discuss the implications of a deal or a possible extension of negotiations for both political and economic relations with Iran. They will also comment on  the possible ramifications of the midterm election results for an agreement with Iran and what impact it may have on the easing of sanctions. On the panel are Clifford Kupchan , Chairman of the Eurasia Group, Cornelius Adebahr, Associate for the Europe Program at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Erich Ferrari, Attorney at Law at Ferrari & Associates P.C., and moderated by Barbara Slavin, Senior Fellow in the South Asia Center at Atlantic Council.
  4. The Outcome of the Iran Talks and the Next Steps | Wednesday, December 3rd | 9:30 – 11:00 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Negotiators from the P5+1 and Iran are racing toward a comprehensive agreement on Iran’s nuclear program by the November 24 deadline. Many issues, such as establishing a formula that verifiably limits Iran’s uranium-enrichment capacity, are still to be solved, but both sides of the negotiating table have stressed the need to reach an agreement. A briefing with George Perkovich, Karim Sadjadpour, Daryl Kimball, and Elizabeth Rosenberg on the outcome of the negotiations and next steps. Kelsey Davenport will moderate.
  5. Ebola: The Intersection of Cultural, Historical, and Political Dynamics in West Africa | Wednesday, December 3rd | 12:30 – 2:00 | Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies | Michael McGovern, associate professor of anthropology at the University of Michigan, will discuss this topic.
  6. American Views of U.S. Foreign Policy: Public Opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict | Friday, December 5th | 10:00 – 11:30 |  After the collapse of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations earlier this year and the devastating violence of this summer’s Gaza war, tensions between Israelis and Palestinians are on the rise. Voices on both sides of the conflict question the United States’ traditional role as shepherd of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, and Americans seem increasingly skeptical about their government’s engagements in the Middle East.It’s crucial to look beyond this skepticism to specifics. How much importance do Americans attach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and to reaching a resolution? How do different communities in the United States—Democrats, Republicans, minorities, youth, older Americans—vary in their attitudes toward Israelis and Palestinians? Beyond the question of who is more “at fault” in the conflict, what kind of future for Israel and the Palestinians do Americans think the United States should support? The speakers are Shibley Telhami, Nonresident Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution, and William A. Galston, Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution. The moderator will be Tamara Cofman Wittes,  Director for the Center for Middle East Policy.
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Grand coalition

Posted in Uncategorized - November 25, 2014 - 1 Comment

Kosovo daily Tribuna is publishing this interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Petrit Selimi, on the occasion of the formation of a “grand coalition” involving the country’s two largest political parties. This follows five months of stalemate since the June parliamentary election. peacefare.net would be happy to publish comments or replies from those opposed to the grand coalition.

Tribuna:  The coalition agreement was signed between the two political parties PDK and LDK, ending the political stalemate. Immediately after the signing, there was a debate on whether Isa Mustafa is mandated to form the new government? What is the format of the new agreement?

Selimi:  The important thing is that an agreement of a great political reconciliation between the two main political parties of Kosovo was reached. It was not easy for either side and neither party has won maximum of the requirements but on the other hand, this coalition is not against anyone but pro-economic development, pro-European integration and pro-good governance. The exact architecture of senior positions will be determined by the working groups in the coming days, but it is clear that there are three vacancies: the position of the Assembly Speaker, the Prime Minister and the President after President Jahjaga’s term ends. This triangle will define the roles of the leaders of the two parties. More important is that together with the minorities, this government will have a stable majority close to 90 MPs and as such it represents an enormous potential for the completion of many economic and political priorities.

Tribuna:  How come that Prime Minister Thaci managed to enter a coalition? For a long time it seemed that entire opposition is united against PDK and Thaci? Does this new coalition now have support of Kosovo Serbs?

Selimi:  Well, PDK was a clear winner of national elections and was about to start the creation of institutions, when opposition united in an agreement to stop PDK from third mandate. But this blockade had problems. Firstly, this post-election agreement was not constitutional as Kosovo Constitution guarantees the Speaker of the Parliament to the winning party. Secondly, the opposition agreement also failed to provide guarantees of continuing the dialogue in Brussels, which is one of the most important tasks that awaits the future government of Kosovo.

So, we found ourselves in a stalemate where one party won the elections and had the legal right to initiate creation of institutions but the other parties refused to talk to PDK for 5 months. In the end, rationality prevailed and compromise solution was found between two biggest parties in Kosovo which are now in a grand coalition, just like in Germany. This coalition consists of parties that both support dialogue, privatization and economic reforms, fight against corruption and organized crime. It’s a good coalition as it ensures that both LDK, with origin from Rugova’s pacifist policies and PDK, which is led by the pragmatic and pro-European Hashim Thaci who led guerilla movement, are now together. This is a very good news for internal cohesion of Kosovo as well as for the process of reconciliation between Kosovars of Albanian and Serbian origin.

Tribuna:  There is still distrust in the respective parties against this agreement. Political analysts call it immoral while in LDK there are voices that do not support this coalition?

Selimi: This election cycle and the political stalemate have proven that many so-called analysts are partisans with subjective agendas. It is natural that PDK and LDK have people who are critical of the agreement because both parties are massive and have a variety of voices within. It is important that the absolute majority of the General Councils of PDK and LDK supported the coalition and the principles that would move the country forward. This coalition and this new government have a broad popular support, a strong international support and a democratic mandate for tough reforms. As far as morals and politics, I think this coalition and the new agreement are much more moral and easily understood than the failed agreement of VLAN, where something called Balkan “inat” and personal attacks were driving force behind the failed agreement. This being said, we are neither imams nor priests but politicians who should work to achieve our programmatic objectives.

Tribuna:  However, you agree that PDK should thank LDK for its political life extension and a new term gained?

Selimi: Both parties have to thank each other for the vision and courage. It was not easy to stretch the hand to another for the good of the country, but if Kosovo can talk to former foes in Serbia it is clear that the talks between the Albanian parties should be fundamentally easier and more pragmatic. If we look at the human resources of both parties, it seems like FC Barcelona is joining Real Madrid and maybe to someone the political league of Kosovo will become boring with the absence of large opposition block, but I think it is a powerful message for Kosovo to have such a super-team for the good of country and the international competition for development, recognition and integration into EU and NATO.

Tribuna:  Now you have the Serbian List controlled by Vucic. Vetevendosje (Self-Determination) has accused you that you will be subordinate to this List and their demands for autonomy?

Selimi:  The opposite is true that only the PDK-LDK coalition has guaranteed that the government will not be held hostage by minority parties or Albanian nationalists who refuse dialogue and consequently the European path. But I do not agree that we should see politics as a process of hijacks. We should be glad that the Serbian List is participating in the institutions and respecting the Constitution and that it has ended the mental blockade that lasted for 15 years to integrate into our society. I absolutely think that PDK and LDK can and will find a common ground with the Serbian List for the good of all citizens in Kosovo. For years we have sought integration of northern Kosovo institutions and this is being achieved.

Tribuna:  What are the priorities of the new government?

Selimi:  They are clear: to adopt a package of legislation that will probably require constitutional changes such as the Special Court for war crimes, then the law on fighters abroad, final decisions on the visa liberalization roadmap, the budget and some other laws such as the Armed Forces of Kosovo. With this parliamentary majority we can work on electoral reforms and address some shortcomings of the Constitution that have been identified in recent months. But I believe that the citizens of Kosovo have a priority out of all priorities such as the economy and the creation of new jobs, and this should be the main objective. The bottom line of the privatizations of Brezovica, Power Plant “Kosova e Re” and several other projects could have been some immediate steps to bring confidence in the economy of Kosovo. This coalition provides optimism and offers guarantees that the processes of market economy will have a stable majority in the parliament and not repeat the failure such as in the case of the privatization of PTK last year.

Tribuna:  Do you know how has LDK made such a dramatic turn? Was it the decisive role of the US Embassy?

Selimi:  I do not think that LDK has made a dramatic turn, but I am not the party’s spokesperson. They have always emphasized that they are institutionalists and this agreement is as such – it provides guarantees for stable institutions. Nor do I think the US Embassy had any direct or indirect role, but it is clear that all our allies support an agreement that produces progressive governance. This government is a native product of a native agreement between Kosovo parties and that’s why I think that Western governments will warmly welcome the new government when voted into parliament.

Tribuna:  When will the new government be voted? Why haven’t you convened the parliamentary session yet?

Selimi:  The parliamentary session will be convened in a few days when the working groups define programmatic priorities and allocation of senior positions. We waited nearly six months. It is important that we do not make mistakes in a rush. Kosovo will have a functional government, an approved budget and a clear government program during 2014 so that next year we enter with clear objectives.

Tribuna:  You are rumored to be one of the people who have worked on the election campaign of the “PDK – New Mission.” Is the promise of the creation of 200,000 new jobs realizable or is there anything from the program that can be realized?

Selimi:  No electoral promise is empty, but they are based on numbers and empirical data and projections. Politics is the art of the possible – a cliché perhaps but that shows that we should aim for optimum realization. Neither President Obama nor President Hollande nor Chancellor Merkel nor Prime Minister Cameron have realized even close to 100% of their electoral promises, but voters know how close we can get and whether there is justification for eventual failures. People voted us because our campaign looked like a glass half full – with the shortcomings and failures but also have touched the lives of hundreds of thousands of citizens. Therefore, we received the vote of confidence and now together with LDK we will invest in this electoral capital to realize the optimum of the promises.

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Peace Picks November 24-28

Posted in Uncategorized - November 24, 2014 - 0 Comment
  1. The Future of the Kurds in the Middle East | Monday November 24th | 12:00 – 2:00 | Rethink Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The threat of ISIS and the Kobane crisis have led to interesting developments in the region. Turkish government declared that it gives Peshmerga forces a passage to Kobane as a response to Washington’s approval of arms transfers to PYD. For the first time, White House publicly stated that PYD is different from PKK, and thus, not considered as a terrorist group by the United States. Recently, PYD and Syrian Kurdish parties reached a settlement in Dohuk in the presence of KRG President Massoud Barzani, reminiscent of the Erbil agreement two years ago. Will the United States support an autonomous Kurdish region in Syria? Is Dohuk agreement going to be effective under the pressure of ISIS threat? What is the stance of Turkish government toward PYD’s future? The speakers are Michael Gunter, a professor of political science at Tennessee Technological University and has authored 11 books on Kurds in the Middle East, Vera Eccarius-Kelly, a professor of Comparative Politics and Associate Dean at Siena College and is the author of The Militant Kurds: A Dual Strategy for Freedom, and Sezin Oney, a columnist for Taraf daily in Turkey. The moderator is Mustafa Gurbuz, a fellow at Rethink Institute and a policy fellow at Center for Global Policy at George Mason University.
  2. Jihadist Movements in Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq: Inevitable Rise or Policy Failure? | Monday November 24th | 3:30 – 5:00 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The growth of jihadist movements in the Middle East has fueled regional instability and captured global attention. Adam Baczko, Gilles Dorronsoro, and Arthur Quesnay will address their emergence in Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq. Based on extensive fieldwork, they will assess the failure of U.S. policy to anticipate current developments and suggest new orientations. They will analyze the similarities and differences between the Taliban and the Islamic State regarding military strategy, governance, and engagement with Western countries, as well as compare the respective levels of sectarian violence in Iraq and Syria with Afghanistan. Frederic Wehrey will serve as a discussant, and Frederic Grare will moderate.
  3. Iran-P5+1 Nuclear Negotiations: the Road Ahead | Tuesday November 25th | 10:30 – 12:00 | Brookings Institution | REGISTER TO ATTEND | A year of negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 partners based on the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), adopted in Geneva in November 2013, has produced significant progress, but a comprehensive deal has so far proved elusive. With important differences reportedly remaining but with the parties actively engaged in the run-up to the JPOA’s current deadline of November 24, the outcome of the current phase of negotiations is uncertain—although the parties may well be headed for another extension. Brookings will host a panel discussion to evaluate where the negotiations stand, to consider prospects for the period ahead and to discuss how the U.S. Congress, key Iranian audiences and other interested parties may react in the current situation. The speakers are Gary Samore, Executive Director of Research at The Belfer Center, Harvard University, David Albright, Founder and President of the Institute for Science and International Security and Edward Levine, National Advisory Board Member at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. The moderator is Robert Einhorn, Senior Fellow at Brookings.
  4. Corruption, Constitutionalism & Control: Implications of the 4th Plenum for China and U.S.-China Relations | Tuesday November 25th | 3:00 – 4:30 | Woodrow Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The recently concluded 4th Plenum of China’s 18th Communist Party Congress focused on “governing the nation in accordance with law.” Reforms described in plenum documents seek to strengthen the institutional bases for economic and social reforms laid out at the 2013 plenum, and to build trust in the Communist Party’s ability to behave righteously and govern justly. Standards of righteousness and justice, however, like the meaning of “in accordance with law” and the status of the constitution, remain vague. The pace and direction of legal reform and the scope and methods of anti-corruption efforts, moreover, remain the sole province of the CCP, within which General Secretary Xi Jinping now exercises a singular influence. How will China’s attempts to rectify the Party and strengthen the legal foundations of its governance shape the nation during Xi’s tenure, and how should American leaders, corporations, and other institutions analyze and respond to Xi’s reform program? The speakers are Donald C. Clarke, Research Professor of Law at The George Washington University Law School and Andrew Wedeman, Professor in the Department of Political Science at Georgia State University.
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End the Iranian occupation of Syria

Posted in Uncategorized - November 20, 2014 - 2 Comments

Last week, the Middle East Institute hosted Faoud Hamdan, Founder and Executive Director, Rule of Law Foundation and the head of Naame Shaam, a project dedicated to researching Iran’s role in the Syrian conflict. Since its launch early this year, the organization has been involved in a number of initiatives such as a peaceful protests in European cities where Iranian officials and ministers have conducted meetings, an open letter to the Syrian opposition, as well as producing in-depth reports and analysis on Iran’s military and economic role in fuelling the war in Syria.

One of their most in-depth reports, “Iran in Syria: From an Ally of the Regime to an Occupying Force,” provides

numerous examples and case studies of human rights violations, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Syria by Iranian controlled militias and forces.

This report finds Iranian involvement in the ‘crisis cell’ assassination in July 2012 in which 6 of Bashar al-Assad’s highest-ranking members were killed. In addition, the report claims the Ghouta chemical massacre near Damascus in August 2013 involved the Iranians.

The Naame Shaam report also concludes that Iran is an occupying force in Syria. It presents legal arguments for addressing the war in Syria as an “international conflict that involves a foreign occupation…as defined by the 1907 Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.”  Other key findings in the report suggest that the influence of the Iranian regime will endure past the fall of Assad due to “Iranian-backed and controlled militias fighting on behalf of the Syrian regime, including Hezbollah Lebanon and various Iraqi Shiah militia.”

The question remains of the rational for Iran’s heavy involvement in Syria. Naame Shaam asseses that there motivation is driven

first and foremost by the strategic interests of the Iranian regime in keeping shipments flowing to Hezbollah in Lebanon via Syria, so as to keep Hezbollah a strong deterrent against any attack on Iran’s military nuclear program.

According to the report, the Iranian regime has also been providing the Syrian regime with “financial loans and credit lines worth billions of dollars.” Without Iran’s military and financial support, Naame Shaam claims the Assad regime would already have collapsed.

The Naame Shaam conclusions are far reaching:

  1. Iran should be held responsible for “complicity in war crimes and crimes against humanity”
  2. No lifting of economic sanctions
  3. No extension of nuclear negotiations

In addition, the United States and the European Union

  1. should “demand that the Iranian regime orders Hezbollah Lebanon to disband and integrate into the Lebanese army”
  2. work to end the conflict in Syria by supporting moderate Syrian rebels
  3. should give the Iranian regime a “clear ultimatum” to pull “Sepah Pasdaran, Hezbollah Lebanon and other foot soldiers out of Syria.”
  4. put forth a UN Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII “imposing safe and unhindered humanitarian access to conflict zones and people in need throughout Syria.”

In case of a veto by China and Russia, the US and EU as well as their allies should “act unilaterally by securing areas held by the moderate Syrian opposition, imposing no-fly zones.”

Naame Shaam wants the international community to halt the role of Iranian influence and occupation inside Syria.

The full report is available here.

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