Tag: European Union
NATO on the spot
NATO presidents and prime ministers meet next Thursday and Friday in Cardiff, Wales for their biannual summit. It was supposed to focus on the withdrawal from Afghanistan, which is already well-advanced. But that will be overshadowed now by the Russian invasion of southeastern Ukraine.
Some are still calling it a “stealth” invasion. Hardly. Russian personnel, tanks, artillery and other equipment are crossing the border and have taken the southeastern town of Novoazovsk. The fact that the troops don’t wear insignia makes them no less Russian. They could drive north from there to reinforce the rebel-held towns of Donestk and Luhansk or west to the important Ukrainian port of Mariulpol, which appears to be what they are doing.
NATO is under no obligation to defend Ukraine. It did little military to react during the Cold War to Soviet interventions in its then satellites Hungary and Czechoslovakia. But that is nothing to be proud of, even if it all worked out in the end. Both countries took advantage of the fall of the Berlin Wall to move as rapidly as they could into NATO and the European Union (EU). Those who take the long view may want to suggest that Putin’s incursion into Ukraine is nothing but folly. It will surely drive Ukraine into the arms of NATO and the EU.
It may also do harm to Putin’s standing at home. The Crimea annexation is proving difficult and expensive. Russians are beginning to notice the funerals of Russians killed in the Ukraine fighting. There are likely to be more. Moscow will discourage the media from reporting on these and encourage a drumbeat of alleged abuses against the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine, but sooner or later the truth is likely to come out.
How NATO reacts will be important. Both its European and North American members have strengthened sanctions in reaction to Russian behavior in Ukraine. The rebel downing of Malaysia Air 17 with a Russian-supplied missile over Ukraine caused the latest turning of the screws. Moscow appears to be responding with cyber attacks on US and maybe other banks.
NATO has to decide whether to up the ante. Ideas on what to do are few and far between: start supplying lethal equipment to Kiev and deploy more NATO forces to allies who have borders with Russia. That’s thin gruel. The equipment won’t have any immediate effect on Ukrainian military capabilities and Putin will laugh off NATO deployments in the Baltics and Poland. He doesn’t plan to attack them.
Another turn of the sanctions screw, this time against Russian banks and other financial institutions, is another serious possibility. President Obama has to worry about whether that or othe moves will cause the Russians to fall off the P5+1 wagon (permanent five UN Security Council members plus Germany) that is trying to negotiate an end to Iranian nuclear weapons ambitions. But the Russians have good reasons of their own not to want Iran to get nuclear weapons. It would be a big strategic mistake for them to undermine the current negotiating effort.
The NATO summit would do well in any event to denounce the invasion of Ukraine in explicit and stentorian tones, making it clear that Russian annexation of territory taken by force, including Crimea, will never be recognized by the Alliance. It would be a serious mistake to let Crimea go unmentioned, as that would only suggest to Putin that he can get away with more territorial conquest. The United States took a principled position of this sort on the Baltic states during the Cold War, when there seemed little to no likelihood they would ever be anything but Soviet prisoners. That worked out well when the Soviet Union fell apart.
There are other things to consider that aren’t discussed in polite company in public. The US will want to help Ukraine with intelligence. It may also want to consider stirring trouble inside Russia, though that particular type of covert action has a very mixed record, at best. If Moscow has in fact conducted cyber attacks against Western banks, response in kind will need to be considered. Another possibility is to reply to the Russian invasion of Ukraine with vigorous military action not only against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) inside Syria but also against Bashar al Asad’s regime, which Russia supports.
NATO is on the spot. It hasn’t got a lot of good options. But it needs to react if it wants to stop Putin from going further.
PS: Vox.com provides video evidence:
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Bombing is not sufficient
To bomb or not to bomb was yesterday’s question. Now most of Washington is agreeing that to stop the Islamic State bombing is necessary. The questions currently asked concern how much, whether to do it in Syria as well as Iraq, the intelligence requirements and how many American boots needed on the ground, even if not in combat.
Bombing may well be necessary to stop extremist advances, but it is certainly not sufficient to roll back or defeat the Islamic State. If you think the United States is at risk from the IS, you will want to do more than bomb. Quite a few people are proposing just that, though the numbers of troops they are suggesting necessary (10-15,000) seems extraordinarily low given our past experience in Iraq. Presumably they are counting on the Kurdish peshmerga and the 300,000 or so Iraqi troops the Americans think are still reasonably well organized and motivated. How could that go wrong?
But the military manpower question is not the only one. The first question that will arise in any areas liberated from the IS is who will govern? Who will have power? What will their relationship be to Damascus or Baghdad? How will they obtain resources, how will they provide services, how will they administer justice? The Sunni populations of Iraq (where they are a majority in the areas now held by IS) and of Syria (where they are the majority in the country as a whole) will not want to accept prime minister-designate Haider al Abadi (much less Nouri al Maliki, who is still a caretaker PM) or President Asad, respectively.
Bombing may solve one problem, but it opens a host of others. This is, of course, why President Obama has tried to avoid it. He heeds Colin Powell’s warning: you break it, you own it. The governance question should not be regarded as mission creep, or leap. It is an essential part of any mission that rolls back or defeats the IS. Without a clear plan for how it is to be accomplished, bombing risks making things worse–perhaps much worse–rather than better.
Sadly, the United States is not much better equipped or trained to handle the governance question–and the associated economic and social questions–than it was on the even of the Afghanistan war, 12 years ago. Yes, there is today an office of civilian stability operations in the State Department, but it can quickly deploy only dozens of people. Its budget has been cut and its bureaucratic rank demoted since its establishment during George W. Bush’s first term. Its financial and staff resources are nowhere near what will be required in Syria and Iraq if bombing of the IS leads to its withdrawal or defeat.
The international community–UN, European Union, NATO, Arab League, Organization of the Islamic Conference, World Bank, International Monetary Fund–are likewise a bit better at post-war transition than they were, but their successes lie in the Balkans in the 1990s, not in the Middle East in the 2010s. They have gained little traction in Libya, which needs them, and only marginally more in Yemen, where failure could still be imminent. Syria and Iraq are several times larger and more complex than any international statebuilding effort in recent times, except for Afghanistan, which is not looking good.
Even just the immediate humanitarian issues associated with the wars in Syria and Iraq are proving too complex and too big for the highly capable and practiced international mechanisms that deal with them. They are stretched to their limits. We don’t have the capacity to deal with millions of refugees and displaced Iraqis and Syrians for years on end, on top of major crises in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and ebola in West Africa.
President Obama has tried hard to avoid the statebuilding challenges that inevitably follow successful military operations. He wanted to do his nationbuilding at home. We need it, and not just in Ferguson, Missouri, where citizens clearly don’t think the local police exercise their authority legitimately. But international challenges are also real. Failing to meet them could give the Islamic State openings that we will come to regret.
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Peace picks August 18-22
A quiet mid-summer week in DC:
- Symbolic Nation-Building in Croatia from the Homeland War to EU Membership Tuesday, August 19 | 12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Woodrow Wilson Center, Fifth Floor; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Drawing on a recently published Strategies of Symbolic Nation-Building in Southeast Europe, Vjeran Pavlakovic will analyze the nation and state building strategies of the Croatian elite since the country attained independence, following the Homeland War, 1991-1995. In his presentation, Pavlakovic will focus on the role of contested narratives and commemorative practices related to the wars of the 20th century in the political arena.
- History Impedes Future Progress in Northeast Asia Tuesday, August 19 | 2:00 pm – 5:30 pm Heritage Foundation; 214 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The US and its allies face growing security threats in Asia from North Korea and China. Given these challenges, it is critical that trilateral US-Japan-South Korea relations remain strong. Yet Tokyo-Seoul relations are strained due to a difficult legacy of historical problems. What are the challenges to reconciliation and what steps can Japan and South Korea take? What role should Washington play to redirect attention toward common allied objectives?
- Africa Development Forum Event: A Discussion with YALI Fellows Tuesday, August 19 | 4:00 pm – 5:30 pm Barbaricum; 819 7th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Through the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) Fellowship Program, 500 of the continent’s most promising young leaders followed a six week academic program at some 20 US colleges and universities. Selected YALI fellows are remaining in the US after their program to participate in internships in the public, private and non-profit sectors. Please join the Africa and the Youth in Development Work Groups for a lively discussion with several of the YALI fellows on their Fellowship experience to date, their thoughts on its impact on US-Africa Relations, and their expectations when they return to their home country.
- The Ukraine Crisis and Russia’s Place in the International Order Wednesday, August 20th | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND For over two decades, the US and Europe have been trying to integrate Russia into the international order. This post-Cold War strategy yielded some success, but has now come crashing down over following Russia’s aggressive turn and the ensuing crisis over Ukraine. Brookings will host a discussion on what Russia’s foreign policy turn means for the international order and for U.S. foreign policy. Thomas Wright, fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy (IOS), will moderate a conversation with Brookings President Strobe Talbott, Senior Fellow Clifford Gaddy of Brookings’ Center on the US and Europe (CUSE) and Susan Glasser, editor at Politico Magazine.
- The Border Crisis and the New Politics of Immigration Thursday, August 21 | 11:00 am – 12:30 pm Heritage Foundation; 214 Massachusetts Ave., NE, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The crisis at our southern border is intensifying. President Obama’s failure to faithfully administer our immigration laws has handcuffed our border agents, jeopardizing the lives of those we entrust to maintain security and stability in the area. Just as troubling is the unprecedented wave of unaccompanied minors crossing the border from El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. Unfortunately administrative amnesty and talk of comprehensive immigration reform have only escalated the situation. So, what steps should we take to alleviate this crisis?
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The politics of Gaza reconstruction
Both the New York Times and the Washington Post feature articles this morning on the destruction in Gaza and the need for physical reconstruction. Houses, mosques and factories are destroyed, infrastructure damaged, people displaced, the economy upended, the society traumatized. Close to 1900 people died and many times that number were injured.
Current estimates put the reconstruction bill at $6 billion. If the past is prologue, even that amount won’t restore Gaza to its pre-war state, which was already miserable due to two previous wars with Israel and seven years of embargo.
The physical conditions are not, however, the main obstacle to Gaza’s reconstruction. The big issue will be who is responsible for it, Hamas or the Palestinian Authority (PA), and what conditions will govern it. The Europeans are already proposing that the PA be in charge and that reconstruction be conditional on Hamas’ demilitarization. Their proposal is said to include:
Preventing the armament and strengthening of Hamas and the rest of the terror organizations in Gaza.
Rehabilitating the Gaza Strip in cooperation with the international community and the Palestinian Authority and enabling the transfer of humanitarian aid.
Setting up an international mechanism to prevent the entry of prohibited materials to the Strip and ensuring that materials such as cement and iron do not reach the terror organizations but are used only to rehabilitate Gaza.
Returning the Palestinian Authority and President Mahmoud Abbas to the Gaza Strip.
The possibility of returning the European Union’s Border Assistance Mission to the Rafah border crossing alongside the Palestinian presidential guard.
I have my doubts that anything like this can be accomplished, as it would depend on Hamas pretty much admitting defeat as well as accepting PA authority and continued international monitoring. It would also require the Europeans to re-enter Gaza. The language sounds more like an Israeli proposal to me than a European one.
From even before the end of the war, the Israelis have been tying reconstruction to demilitarization and reestablishment of PA authority in Gaza. The Egyptians will agree, as the current military-backed regime in Cairo despises Hamas and wants it defanged. Egypt’s Saudi and United Arab Emirates (UAE) backers are also likely to agree, because Hamas is a Muslim Brotherhood organization that rival Qatar supports. The question is whether the Saudis and the UAE will put their deep pockets at the service of Egypt’s and Israel’s efforts to do even more political damage to Hamas in the post-war period than was done during the war.
Another key question concerns the people of Gaza. Will they rally around Hamas, or will their pre-war souring on Hamas’ ineffective governance continue? Will the PA, not known for either speed or effectiveness, be able to take advantage of the situation to at least establish itself and its unity government as a serious player in Gaza, able and willing to provide humanitarian and reconstruction planning and assistance?
There are important political questions on the Israeli side of the equation as well. Israeli protests of the Palestinian unity government have faded in recent weeks. Has Prime Minister Netanyahu come to the realization that the unity government strengthens those in Palestine who are most willing to collaborate with Israel on security questions? Can he reverse his ill-conceived opposition to a technocratic institution that nudges Hamas in the right direction?
The question of accountability will also be important for Israel. There were a lot of Israeli strikes on civilian concentrations, including UN schools and other shelters, during this month-long Operation Protective Edge. Israel claims that it does its best to avoid civilians. Now it has to demonstrate that by seriously investigating and publishing detailed accounts of why it hit targets in which civilians were killed. Illegal targeting, if any, needs to be punished.
Post-war reconstruction is not only a physical activity. It is a political one as well.
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The tides of war
In Gaza the tide of war seems to be receding, though a ceasefire still seems far off. Israel seems to prefer unilateral withdrawal to an agreement that would necessarily involve Hamas. In Ukraine, Russia’s eastern strongholds of Donestsk and Luhansk are preparing for siege. Russian President Putin may well need to invade if he is to save his proxies from an increasingly effective Ukrainian army.
In Iraq, the Islamic State (IS) continues to consolidate its gains and make modest progress against not only the Iraqi army but also against the Kurdish peshmerga. But in Syria, the IS has suffered setbacks. The Western-supported Syrian Opposition Coalition is losing ground to both the regime and IS but hopes to install its next government, to be named soon, inside Syria.
A definitive end to any of these wars seems far off. Each of the contestants–half non-state actors–has enough outside support to prevent defeat, even if none of them appears strong enough to achieve anything close to victory. Bashar al Asad is no more likely to govern all of Syria in the future than Nouri al Maliki is likely to govern all of Iraq. The Islamic State has taken large but largely empty portions of eastern Syria and western Iraq, but it is unlikely to take Baghdad or Damascus. Ukraine may re-establish its authority in Donbas, but only if Russia allows it to happen. Israel won’t reoccupy Gaza, but will instead try to get the Palestinian Authority to play a major role there in the post-war period.
Contemporary warfare is no longer about victory and defeat of clashing armed forces in the classic sense but rather about degrees of control over the civilian population. It is “war amongst the people,” in the phrase UK General Rupert Smith coined. Civilians are not bystanders, collateral damage is not collateral, military objectives are political. A definitive end to war of this sort is unlikely, absent definitive international intervention. The best that can be hoped for is a political settlement that channels conflict into nonviolent directions, at least for a time. We did better than that in the Balkans, but only because Europe and the United States were not only willing to intervene militarily but also insert tens of thousands of troops to stabilize the situation.
The tides of war may be receding a bit now in Ukraine and Middle East, but the respite isn’t likely to last. War amongst the people gives the people a lot of reason to resent the enemy and little reason to reconcile. Non-state actors may melt away but survive to fight another day. Unless states make a conscious and concerted effort to resolve fundamental political issues, they are likely to find themselves fighting non-state actors over and over, as Israel has done with Hamas and Hizbollah. IS’s current explosion in Iraq is not its first. Its antecedents were behind the 2006/7 insurgency that the Americans successfully overcame with the cooperation of Sunni tribes. But that success did not lead to a broad political settlement.
The search for such a settlement is what leads to calls for “national dialogue.” Yemen’s was thought to be relatively successful, though implementation is proving difficult. Libya is trying to launch one, but violence in both Tripoli and Benghazi has made it not only difficult but dangerous. The international intervention many Libyans would like is unlikely. The restored Egyptian autocracy is uninterested in national dialogue. It is forging ahead without trying to return its Islamist and liberal opponents to a political role. Israel doesn’t want Hamas included in the Palestinian Authority government. Nor does Kiev want the separatist leaders incorporated back into its polity.
The tides of war may be receding for the moment, but the odds are they will return, perhaps stronger than ever.
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Sanctions are a long game
This week the European Union and United States imposed new sanctions on Russia in response to its continuing support to rebels in eastern Ukraine, including provision of a missile system that allegedly brought down Malaysia Air flight 17 last month. Most commentary asks whether the sanctions will force Russian President Putin to change course. Few anticipate that they will. Some think the sanctions will make him double down. There is evidence of Russian shelling across the border into Ukraine as well as flows of Russian armaments and personnel to the rebels.
Sanctions rarely have an immediate effect. Yes, they may raise the costs of a policy, but Putin wouldn’t be pursuing the course he is on in Ukraine if he didn’t think it vital to his own, or Russia’s, interests. The sanctions may lessen his support, in particular from the oligarchs who control major sectors of Russia’s economy, but Putin is riding so high and is so fully in control that a dip in his popularity is unlikely to have much impact on his thinking. His goal is to re-establish Russia as a world contender, which means he has to worry (a lot) about what any loss would mean for future engagement vis-a-vis the US.
I know of little evidence that the impact of sanctions is maximal when they are imposed. It accumulates with the passage of time. Even if the effectiveness of sanctions declines, the economic impact is cumulative. So the Russians may shrug off energy and banking sanctions today, but in two or three years may be anxious to get rid of them.
There is ample anecdata to support the notion that negotiating an end to sanctions is what brings substantial results. That is what we are seeing right now with Iran: the draconian sanctions had little impact when they were imposed, but they weakened the country’s hardliners and several years later sanctions relief is something Tehran is prepared to pay for (though we don’t yet know how much).
That attitude came about partly as the result of a change of government. Few think President Ahmedinejad, were he still in power, would be negotiating limits on Iran’s nuclear program. Iranians elected President Rouhani in hopes of improving the country’s economic condition, which requires sanctions relief. He can’t deliver on the economy, which was his main campaign promise, without a nuclear deal that brings sanctions relief.
It is unlikely Putin will change his mind on Ukraine, even if some of his supporters would like him to do so. Today’s chat with President Obama, in which he Putin is said to have acknowledged the risks of escalation, signifies little. He will up the ante as far as he thinks he needs to go to ensure victory, all the while denying involvement. Sanctions are a long game. Their significance will likely await Putin’s successor, or perhaps even his successor plus one. In the meanwhile, Ukraine will have to try to win on the battlefield.
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