Tag: European Union
Slow and imperfect, but still important
Clint Williamson, the American chief prosecutor of the European Union Special Investigative Task Force (SITF) yesterday issued a progress report on its criminal investigation into the allegations contained in Dick Marty’s Council of Europe report, issued in 2010. This is out of the ordinary: prosecutors don’t often announce an intention to indict unnamed individuals, but Clint is leaving his position and seems to have felt a need to report on what has, and has not, been achieved.
Once a special court staffed by internationals is established outside Kosovo, he said, SITF will file indictments against still unnamed senior officials of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) for a campaign of persecution against Serbs, Roma and other minorities as well as fellow Kosovo Albanians, who were intentionally targeted by top levels of the KLA leadership with acts of persecution, including
…unlawful killings, abductions, enforced disappearances, illegal detentions in camps in Kosovo and Albania, sexual violence, other forms of inhumane treatment, forced displacements of individuals from their homes and communities, and desecration and destruction of churches and other religious sites….
Clint also said that there is still insufficient evidence to bring indictments against individuals for murders committed for the purpose of harvesting and trafficking human organs, as alleged in the Marty report. He nevertheless concludes that
…this practice did occur on a very limited scale and that a small number of individuals were killed for the purpose of extracting and trafficking their organs.
While at pains to emphasize his agreement with the Marty report, Clint’s refusal to promise indictments for these offenses is an implicit rejection of some of the allegations made in it, or at least an indication that the standards of proof for indictment could not be met.
Clint also registered his concerns about witness intimidation, which hindered his investigation. He regards it as the greatest single greatest “threat to rule of law in Kosovo and of its progress toward a European future.”
While I assume this is all headline news in Kosovo and Serbia today, none of it is surprising. The campaign of violence against non-Albanians and some Albanians immediately following the 1999 NATO/Yugoslavia war was well known at the time. I warned more than one KLA member in the summer and fall of 1999 that accountability would come some day. Those who wish Kosovo well can only be pleased if individuals are at last to be held responsible. Witness intimidation is also a well-known problem in Kosovo’s tight-knit society, though proving it in court has been difficult.
The allegations of organ trafficking were not well known at the time. I became aware of them a couple years after the war, but I was also aware that Michael Montgomery, the journalist who uncovered them, felt he had insufficient documentation to publish the story, never mind accuse anyone in court. Three years of proper criminal investigation more than ten years after the fact have still failed to assign specific responsibility but have nevertheless ascertained that there were no more than a “handful” of such outrages.
So what does all this prove? Some KLA members committed atrocities. A few included killing people for their organs. Such savagery is disgraceful. The people who do these things also intimidate witnesses. As Clint says,
In the end, this was solely about certain individuals in the KLA leadership using elements of that organization to perpetrate violence in order to obtain political power and personal wealth for themselves, not about their larger cause. And, it is as individuals that they must bear responsibility for their crimes.
Would that it be so. Instead, we’ll be inundated with media reports denouncing Albanians as a group or the KLA as an organization, with replies denouncing Serbs as a group. What the others did will be claimed as justification. The acts of a few will be assumed to reflect the morality of many. Specific individuals will be assumed responsible even though the prosecutor has not yet named anyone. Charges and counter-charges will be mounted for political purposes–to prevent this person or that political party from gaining power. The numbers of deaths involved will be exaggerated.
None of that media circus has anything to do with justice, which is agonizingly slow and disappointingly imperfect. But it is nevertheless important.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Finishing the job in the Balkans
I spoke yesterday on “Finishing the Job in the Balkans” with Dutch Foreign Ministry Europe Director Daphne Bergsma, Carnegie Europe’s Stefan Lehne, European Council on Foreign Affairs Sofia office director Dimitar Bechev and former Netherlands/NATO/EU diplomat Pieter Feith at the Hague Institute for Global Justice, former Macedonia ambassador Nikola Dimitrov presiding. Here are the notes that I prepared for myself, though I confess I departed from them to comment a bit on the International Crisis Group’s final report on the Balkans, along the lines I published yesterday:
1. The organizers of this event did me a great favor in announcing it. They reminded me what I wrote with Soren Jessen-Petersen in the International Herald Tribune:
Only when all the region’s countries are irreversibly on a course toward the E.U. will we be able to celebrate. Likely no more than five more years are required. Until then, we need to keep the Balkans on track, ensuring that Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia remain on the train.
2. That was more than three years ago. Where are the Balkan laggards now?
3. Kosovo, I’m happy to say, is making real progress, due in part to Pieter Feith, who presided over the post-independence transition there. A vigorous EU initiative with German—and off-stage American—support is reintegrating its northern municipalities. It recently ran a decent election with Serb participation. If the government formation process has been slow, that is nothing unusual in parliamentary systems.
4. It is clear enough that Kosovo and Serbia will both someday become EU members if they keep on their current courses—and they’ve pledged not to slow each other down. There are still serious obstacles—perhaps the most important is non-recognition of Kosovo by five EU members—but there is time to overcome them.
5. Macedonia has made some progress, but its human rights situation has seen some backsliding. Sad to say it remains stalled in the EU accession process. The accursed name issue haunts Skopje and Athens.
6. I won’t say much about this: I am a notorious advocate of recognizing people and countries by the names they call themselves. I don’t think modern day Athens has an exclusive claim to the name “Macedonia,” which happens to be attached to 1257 places in the United States. Failure of the Europeans to unite and insist on a resolution of this issue is in my view shameful.
7. But the worse shame is Bosnia. There the US and Europe are at odds.
8. Let me start with the conventional wisdom, which I think is correct: Bosnia is stuck because its constitution ensconced ethnically nationalist political parties in positions of power from which only more nationalist parties are be able to remove them.
9. Dayton ended the war but failed to provide the country with a central governing structure capable of negotiating and implementing the requirements of NATO or European Union membership.
10. This didn’t matter much for the first decade after the war. There were lots of things that needed doing, and NATO and EU memberships were not much of an issue. Using virtually dictatorial powers, the international community force-marched Bosnia away from war.
11. By 2005/6 the constitutional problems were all too evident. A team of Americans tried to start fixing the constitutional problem by facilitating preparation by the Bosnian political parties of constitutional amendments later known as the April package.
12. The package clarified group, individual and minority rights, as well mechanisms for protecting the “vital national interests” of Bosnia’s constituent peoples. It also included reforms to strengthen the government and the powers of the prime minister, reduce the president’s duties, and streamline parliamentary procedures.
13. They failed in parliament to achieve the 2/3 majority required by two votes. The responsibility was clear: one political party that had participated fully in the negotiations blocked passage, in order to ensure its leader election to the presidency.
14. Whatever the faults of the April package, its passage would have opened the way for a different politics in Bosnia, one based more on economic and other interethnic issues and less on ethnic identity.
15. I confess I thought its defeat would only be temporary. I thought for sure the package would be reconsidered the next year and passed.
16. I failed to understand that the moment was not reproducible. Over the past eight years, the situation has deteriorated markedly. Only one constitutional amendment has passed during that period, under intense international pressure, to codify the status of the Brcko District in northeastern Bosnia.
17. Meanwhile, the country has fallen further and further behind most of its neighbors in the regatta for EU membership and now looks likely to end up in last place, with little hope of entering the EU before 2025 or even later.
18. Those who advocate that the High Representative responsible for interpretation of the Dayton agreements be removed and Bosnia’s problems be left to the EU accession process for resolution have little evidence that will work.
19. All the leverage of EU accession did not work to get Bosnians to align their constitution with a decision of the European Court of Human Rights. Nor has it accelerated the adaptation of Bosnia’s court system to European standards.
20. So what is to be done?
21. I think there is no substitute for the Bosnians solving their own problem. They could do worse than return to the April package, fix whatever problems existed in it, and get on with the process of constitutional revision.
22. I also think there are directions that would not be fruitful.
23. Some would like to see even greater group rights and ethnic separation than provided for in the Dayton agreements. That is not in my view a fruitful direction. Apart from its impact on Bosnia, it would have the undesirable effect of encouraging separatism in Ukraine and elsewhere.
24. Others would like to further weaken the central government or allow the entities to negotiate separately their entry into the EU. Those in my view are not fruitful directions.
25. There is a simple test for any proposal for reform in Bosnia: will it make the government in Sarajevo more functional? The corollary question is whether it will accelerate Bosnian entry into NATO and the EU.
26. The April package would have done that. I think it is time to return to it and get the difficult job of constitutional reform started.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace picks July 14-18
1. Ending Wars to Build Peace: Conflict Termination Workshop Monday, July 14 | 8:30 am – 1:00 pm United States Institute of Peace; 2301 Constitution Ave NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Designing a conflict termination strategy is an essential but often overlooked component of warfighting. Improperly planned or incorrectly implemented, a failure to effectively terminate a conflict will leave open the original issues that brought on the war and likely create the conditions for future conflict. The U.S. Institute of Peace, U.S. Military Academy’s Center for the Study of Civil-Military Operations and RAND Corporation invite you to an event featuring notable experts sharing their observations and concerns about the issue of war termination, its planning, transition and challenges. SPEAKERS: Gideon Rose, Author, How Wars End, Amb. Jim Jeffery, Former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Hon. James Kunder, Former Deputy Administrator, USAID, Lt General Mark Milley, Commander, U.S. Army III Corps, and Dr. Rick Brennan Senior Political Scientist, RAND.
2. Ukraine: The Maidan and Beyond Monday, July 14 | 12:00 pm – 2:00 pm National Endowment for Democracy;1025 F Street NW, Suite 800, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The forthcoming July 2014 issue of the Journal of Democracy will feature a cluster of eight articles on Ukraine. Please join NDI as four of the contributors elaborate on the subjects discussed in their articles. Serhiy Kudelia analyzes the evolution of Ukraine’s political system during the past four years and why it led to the downfall of President Viktor Yanukovych. Lucan Way assesses the role that civil society played in bringing down Yanukovych and the challenges that it will now face. Anders Aslund examines the “endemic corruption” that has long plagued Ukraine and goes on to suggest how the new government can rebuild the country’s economy. Finally, Nadia Diuk considers the longer-term significance of the Maidan Revolution.
3. Doing Business in Burma: Human Rights Risks and Reporting Requirements Tuesday, July 15 | 8:15 am – 10:00 am Center for Human Rights & Humanitarian Law; 500 8th St. NW, Washington D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND In 2012, the U.S. lifted economic sanctions on resource-rich Burma, sanctions that had been in place for over a decade. American businesses are required to publicly report to the State Department on the potential human rights, environmental, and political impacts of their investments if they exceed $500,000. Some of the questions that will be addressed: How can the Reporting Requirements guide companies and their attorneys in assessing and managing the risks that accompany new investment in Burma? Why is the information contained in the reports valuable to the State Department and other organizations? SPEAKERS: Amy Lehr, Attorney, Foley Hoag LLP, Jason Pielemeier, Esq., U.S. Department of State/DRL, Genevieve Taft, Global Manager of Workplace Rights, Coca-Cola, and Jennifer Quigley, Executive Director, U.S. Campaign for Burma.
4. New Story Leadership for the Middle East Congressional Forum Tuesday, July 15 | 10:00 am – 2:00 pm New Story Leadership; Cannon House Office Building, 200-299 New Jersey Ave SE, Washington D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND New Story Leadership for the Middle East is presents their class of 2014, featuring presentations from young Israeli and Palestinian leaders who are living, working, and learning together this summer in Washington, DC. Young voices throughout the world have decisively spoken up for change, demanding new leadership, greater freedom, and the right to choose their own futures. Now a new generation of Israelis and Palestinians wants to engage you in an emerging conversation by sharing their stories and their hopes for peace.
5. For the Least of These: A Biblical Answer to Poverty Tuesday, June 15 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm Heritage Foundation;214 Massachusetts Ave NE, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND While much progress has been made toward poverty alleviation, many well-intentioned efforts have led Christians to actions that are not only ineffective, but leave the most vulnerable in a worse situation than before. Is there a better answer? Combining biblical exegesis with proven economic principles, For the Least of These: A Biblical Answer to Poverty equips Christians with both a solid biblical and economic understanding of how best to care for the poor and foster sustainable economic development. With contributions from fourteen leading Christian economists, theologians, historians, and practitioners, For the Least of These presents the case for why markets and trade are the world’s best hope for alleviating poverty. SPEAKERS: Dr. Anne Bradley, Dr. Art Lindsley, Michael Craven, and Derrick Morgan.
6. The Madrid 3/11 Bombings, Jihadist Networks in Spain, and the Evolution of Terrorism in Western Europe Tuesday, June 15 | 2:00 pm – 3:50 pm Brooking Institute; 4801 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Ten years after the terror attacks in Madrid, Professor Fernando Reinares, a senior analyst within Elcano Royal Institute, has published a definitive account of the attacks. Reinares provides evidence showing that the decision to attack Spain was made in December 2001 in Pakistan by Moroccan Amer Azizim and that the Madrid bombing network began its formation more than one year before the start of the Iraq war. Spain battles the challenge of jihadist radicalization and recruitment networks that are sending fighters to join the wars in Syria and elsewhere. On July 15, the Intelligence Project at Brookings will host Professor Reinares for a discussion on his book’s revelations, the empirical data on the evolution of jihadism in Spain and the future of terrorism in Western Europe.
7. Forgotten, but Not Gone: The Continuing Threat of Boko Haram Tuesday, June 15 | 2:00 pm – 3:00 pm International Institute for Strategic Studies; 2121 K Street NW, Suite 801, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The furor of the #BringBackOurGirls movement has faded rapidly and Boko Haram’s insurgency, now in its fourth year, has again been largely forgotten by the international media, despite the fact that violence has continued in the form of mass killings, attacks in the capital, Abuja, and new abductions. Virginia Comolli will be discussing the implications of Boko Haram’s insurgency for Nigeria, repercussions for other West African countries and the role of non-African partners in dealing with the security challenges the group presents. Comolli is the Research Fellow running the newly established IISS Security and Development Programme.
8. Petrocaribe, Central America, and the Caribbean: Who Will Subsidize the Future? Wednesday, July 16 | 8:30 am – 10:30 am Atlantic Council of the United States; 1030 15th St. NW, 12th Floor, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND US Vice President Joe Biden used his recent trip to Latin America to announce a new initiative to promote energy security in the Caribbean. Is it enough? Join the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center for a timely discussion on the future of Petrocaribe. The huge Venezuelan oil subsidy enters its tenth year, and continues to provide Caracas with political support from its closest neighbors – but at what cost to the region? Given Venezuela’s economic demise, will Petrocaribe continue delivering into the future? Now is the moment to examine energy alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America. This event will launch the Atlantic Council’s new report, Uncertain Energy: The Caribbean’s Gamble with Venezuela, authored by Arsht Center Senior Nonresident Energy Fellow David L. Goldwyn and his associate, Cory R. Gill.
9. The Resurgence of the Taliban Wednesday, June 16 | 10:30 am – 12:00 pm Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND In autumn 2001, U.S. and NATO troops were deployed to Afghanistan to unseat Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers. Yet, despite a more than decade-long attempt to eradicate them, the Taliban has endured—regrouping and reestablishing themselves as a significant insurgent movement. Hassan Abbas, author of The Taliban Revival: Violence and Extremism on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier, will examine how the Taliban not only survived but adapted to regain power and political advantage. Carnegie’s Frederic Grare will moderate.
10. Citizens, Subjects, and Slackers: Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian Attitudes Toward Paying Taxes Wednesday, June 16 | 3:30 pm – 5:00 pm Woodrow Wilson Center; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Marc Berenson’s unique surveys of Poles, Russians, and Ukrainians, conducted from 2004 to 2012 regarding their attitudes towards paying taxes, illustrate that Polish citizens express a far greater willingness and support for paying taxes than Russian citizens, who, in turn, are more willing taxpayers than Ukrainian citizens. Unlike Poles, whose compliance is related to their trust in the state, and Russians, whose compliance is related to their fear of the state, Ukrainians, showing the lowest support for tax obedience, have reacted to state efforts to increase compliance with less fear and little trust. This suggests that post-transition governments must find ways to create and build up levels of trust on the part of citizens in their state, but that bridging the exceptionally high and long-held levels of distrust in the Ukrainian state will remain an extreme challenge for those seeking a new rule-of-law Ukraine. Kennan Institute Global Fellow, Amb. Kenneth Yalowitz, will provide discussion.
11. Fixing the US Department of Veterans Affairs: Prospects for Reform Thursday, June 17 | 10:00 am – 11:30 am American Enterprise Institute; 1150 17th Street, NW, Washington D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Recent scandals at medical centers for veterans have trained a spotlight on longstanding inefficiencies within the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). In the case of the VA’s disability system, a nearly century-old approach to wounded veterans still prevails. The widespread consensus is that the problem goes much deeper than falsified waiting lists and delayed access to care, and necessitates a global overhaul. What would a renewed vision of veteran care look like, and how should we clarify the objectives of the VA’s disability system? In the interim, what short-term reforms are practical? Join AEI as House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs Chairman Jeff Miller presents a blueprint for reform, followed by a discussion with experts in health care, disability, and public administration. Other speakers include Michael H. McLendon, Joseph Antos, Richard V. Burkhauser, Peter Schuck, and Sally Satel.
12. Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate Over US Military Strategy in Asia with Professor Aaron Friedberg Thursday, June 17 | 2:00 pm – 3:00 pm IISS; 2121 K Street NW, Suite 801, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND China’s military build-up, particularly the expansion of its long-range nuclear forces and its development of ‘anti-access/area-denial’ (A2/AD) capabilities, poses a serious threat to both the American position in East Asia and the security of other regional powers. The growth of these forces challenges Washington’s ability, and perhaps its willingness, to project power into the region. This could call American security guarantees into question, eventually undermining the United States’ place as the dominant Asia-Pacific power. Left unchecked, perceived shifts in the regional military balance away from the US and its allies towards China could also raise the risks of miscalculation and deterrence failure. Professor Aaron Friedberg of Prince University will be launching his new Adelphi series book, Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate Over US Military Strategy in Asia.” He will be joined by discussant Elbridge Colby, the Robert M. Gates Fellow at the Center for New American Security.
13. Putting Military Personnel Costs in Context: Analysis by AEI and BPC Friday, July 18 | 9:00 am – 10:00 am Russell Senate Office Building; Constitution Avenue and 1st Street, NE, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND According to a new study by the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the per capita cost of military personnel on active duty increased by 42 percent over the last decade. Overall, growth in cost was much faster than growth in the number of people serving. AEI and BPC invite you to a conversation about the cost trends impacting America’s professional volunteer force and their implications for the future. SPEAKERS: Linda Bilmes, Charlie Houy, Scott Lilly, Ann Sauer, and Charles Wald.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Independence is overrated
I’m late with this post, but so be it. Independence is overrated. Here’s why I say so.
Consider American independence. Declared July 4, 1776. Then seven years of war with Britain, renewed for a couple of more in 1812. Followed by a vast westward land grab against Native American resistance and a four-year Civil War that set records for fraticidal homicide.
Think America is uniquely violent? Try Sudan: almost 40 years of civil war, independence in 2011, then civil war within South Sudan starting last year. Or Kosovo: declared independence the first time around in 1992, war in the late 1990s, independence finally in 2008, still trying to establish full sovereignty over its territory and full recognition by the international community.
The downsides of independence are particularly relevant at the moment. Scotland will vote on independence September 18. If it passes, it won’t precipitate war, but it will cause a major headache for the European Union. Catalonia would like to follow suit, but Spain’s constitution does not provide for a referendum. The Catalans may proceed anyway, creating another major headache for the EU.
If either of these referenda pass, it will make a referendum in Kurdistan, which is guaranteed to pass, all the more likely. Parts of eastern Ukraine already held referenda earlier this year, but they were ambiguous and no independence has resulted. Instead, Kiev is making progress in reclaiming territory. If ever eastern Ukraine were to succeed in seceding, Transnistria, a breakaway province of Moldova, would follow.
South Ossetia and Abhazia, both breakaway bits of Georgia, have already declared independence, but recognition has been hard to come by. They are far from independent, but no longer governed as part of Georgia.
The point is not that independence is a mistake. Certainly the United States was not going to remain forever a British colony. Serbia did nothing for nine years after the war with NATO to make unity attractive to Kosovars. Sudan behaved pretty much the same way towards South Sudan. Independence for Pristina and Juba was the best remaining option, not the worst.
The point is that even the best option is not without difficulties. Clean breaks like Slovakia’s with the Czech Republic are the exception to the rule. While de-colonialization after World War II was absolutely necessary and desirable (for the sake of the nother countries as well as their colonies), it rarely produced the glorious results its advocates advertised. And it sometimes produced mass atrocities on a prodigious scale, as in the partition and independence of India and Pakistan, not to mention the continuing conflict in the Middle East arising from Palestine’s partition and Israel’s independence.
I enjoy July 4 as much as the next American. But it had very different implications for Thomas Jefferson, who was able to keep his slaves far longer than would have been the case had America been ruled from London, and his fellow signer of the declaration John Adams, who had to accept the “peculiar institution” in order to ensure independence. They both died on July 4, 1826, satisfied I suppose that the first 50 years of the republic were worthy of their revolution but unaware of the accounting on slavery still to come.
We celebrate independence with fireworks, drink and flag-waving patriotism. But we ignore all the complications. There are usually a lot of them. Independence is overrated. More on that later, as I consider the case of Kurdistan.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Belgrade asks, Hashim Thaci answers
Petrit Selimi, Kosovo Deputy Foreign Minister, asked me to publish in English this Danas interview with Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaci, which is appearing today in Serbian. I do this with the proviso that I would of course publish similar material either from the Prime Minister’s political competitors in Kosovo or from the authorities in Belgrade.
Danas: How are the talks unfolding of your party on the creation of the government and who are you talking to? Is there a chance of the wide coalition between PDK, LDK and AAK?
HT: Let me first say that these were fully democratic elections, organized for the first time in the entire territory of the republic, including north. All parties accepted the results and PDK won the elections with a very comfortable margin. We are now waiting for the final certification of MP seats and the constitution of Kosovo parliament. After these necessary lega steps are taken, we expect for the President to grant us the mandate for negotiating a coalition and creation of the new government. We are open to discuss with all parties that are keen on moving ahead with economic program, job-creation and european integration.
Danas: In case you are not leading the government, you think the dialogue with Serbia will stop?
HT: As clear winners of elections, we expect to lead the government in the next 4 years. The issue of mandate is now before the Constitutional Court, and we will respect any decision of the court. Whatever format of the government takes place, dialogue with neighbors is a essential condition of European integrations. Kosovo managed to establish clear border with Serbia and there is no doubt that Serbia had to accept the constitutional and legal framework of Kosovo as the only legal one in north of Kosovo. This is a one-way street that will continue to be the spine of establishing normal relations in Balkans. Me as a Prime Minister and any future Prime Minister in years to come will follow the european track that is conditional on continuing with the dialogue.
Danas: What message would Kosovo send if Ramush Haradinaj, a former head of a criminal clan and a commander of KLA, would become a PM?
HT: Leaders of political parties of Kosovo are democratically elected leaders and not criminals. KLA was one of the most successful guerrilla armies in modern european history and as the leader of KLA I am very proud that we have achieved the freedom through fighting the evil regime of Slobodan Milosevic.
Danas: What positions in the government will Serbs take?
HT: Serbian minority has a constitutional role as a guaranteed place in the government of Republic of Kosovo. The exact nature of their involvement in next government will be negotiated after the results are certified.
Danas: What would be the main aims of a new government, if you do become a PM?
HT: The main focus of my government will be jobs, jobs and jobs. Everything else is a derivative of our plan to start a New Mission of economic development. Our first mission was to become free from the bad regime of Serbia, our second mission was to declare independence and establish internationally recognized position and the new mission will be to fast forward the economic development based on solid results of our work in previous years. We built 1500 km of roads and highways in last 7 years, we build 140 schools and we had average GDP growth of 4.5% in last 6 years. This is a very good basis to continue with our reforms and job-creation efforts.
Danas: In what way would your government work on improving the safety of Serb community and return of the Serbs?
Serbian community is safe in the new, independent Kosovo. Statistically, you are safer as a Serb in Prishtina than in Belgrade. We must ensure that we implement the dialogue so the situation is normalized. People need normality to feel safe and people need normality to move on with their lives. We will work together to ensure confidence in our country, though we should not forget that Kosovo was under genocidal threat only 15 years ago. We are still digging bodies hidden in Serbia and we need to close the painful chapters so we can move to fully normal relations which will be of benefit for Albanians, Serbs, Turks, Bosniaks, Romas, Jews and all the other Kosovars.
Danas: What are your expectations from the next phases of dialogue in Brussels?
HT: In the end of the entire process, we will have a full recognition of reality including independent Kosovo as essential part of Balkan architecture. I have no doubt whatsoever that we are moving towards that direction.
Danas: Do you think that your statement that “setting up of the Peace Park is a shameful act of a new barricade”, helped subsequent troubles in Kosovo Mitrovica?
HT: Let me repeat it again, establishment of a new barricade in the middle of the bridge is a shameful act. It will not be accepted by EU, it will not be accepted by all citizens of Mitrovica, both south and north – because people are tired of divisions, they want good economy and cooperation. I expect the barricades, even i they are called “peace parks” to be lifted so people can move freely. I urge the leaders of municipal communities to think of how to solve their local problems, and not to increase the problems. We will be firm. No parks, or sport courts, or gardens, can be built in the middle of highways or bridges, neither in Prishtina, nor in Belgrade, neither in New York or Mitrovica. This so-called park makes mockery of peace efforts. But we must not fall pray of provocations of those that are trying to delay implementation of Brussels Agreement. It’s even more important is that we focus on establishing Kosovo court in north and that we enable full integration of this part in our legal system.
Danas: You expect stabilization of situation in north?
HT: Sometimes it seems that scenes you see on TV are dramatic. But life of the ordinary people is less dramatic and is focused on how to earn salary, how to fight corruption, how to move freely. Situation in Mitrovica is moving towards resolution. Mitrovica Serbs now have legal representatives instead os parallel Serbian structures and within democratic context we will further cement the progress we achieved in last year.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
A good election, now work to be done
It seems safe to say now that Prime Minister Hashim Thaci’s PDK has won Kosovo’s Sunday parliamentary election, with close to 31% of the vote. Second place LDK was closer than some anticipated at almost 26%, but the big news was that the “Self-Determination” movement led by Albin Kurti beat out Ramush Haradinaj’s AAK, 13.5% to 9.6%. Overall turnout was low at about 42%. The Serb List garnered 4.2%, after a Belgrade push for Serbs in Kosovo to vote.
My friends who wished for a major shift in political power will be disappointed. My friends in the PDK are celebrating, even if the margin was narrower than some imagined.
My fondest wish was apparently realized: under the watchful eyes of a lot of Kosovo observers, the election appears to have been clean. I am told the biggest problems were attempts to influence voters within the restricted area near polling stations, problems with the voters’ list, and family-influenced voting. I have not heard complaints of ballot-box stuffing, intimidation or other wholesale cheating. Complaints were similar in Serb and Albanian areas.
There are lots of mathematical possibilities for Thaci to gain a majority. With minorities, any of the top Albanian parties might do as a partner. While Thaci has told many people he would prefer to retire from the prime ministry, I and a lot of other people will be surprised if he actually does it. His party has found him to be the absolutely necessary glue to hold things together. They won’t want him throwing in the towel after a respectable, if narrower than hoped for, victory.
The big issues facing Thaci or any other prime minister for the next four years will be economic. Kosovo needs much more investment (foreign and domestic) to create jobs for its still rapidly growing and young population. Some would like to focus on government-controlled investment, using funds held so far abroad. A wise course would be to improve conditions for private investment, both domestic and international. This will not be easy: Kosovo holds an unenviable 86th position in the World Bank’s ease of doing business ranking, admittedly ahead of Serbia and Albania but well behind neighboring Macedonia and Montenegro. The perception of corruption is a big hindrance to investment. Kosovo manages only 111th in the Transparency International ranking.
But whatever Kosovo’s problems, a decent election is a good foundation. Kosovo knows its ultimate goals: membership in NATO and the EU. Now it has to decide how to make tangible progress in that direction during the next four years. The country is a long way from where it was at independence six years ago, but it is still much farther than that from its ultimate goals.
PS: a late thought: all that NGO energy that went into election monitoring needs now to turn to accountaility and transparency of government actions. There is work to be done for everyone.
RSS - Posts
