Tag: European Union
A potent symbol
Montenegro’s Prime Minister Djukanovic is in DC today (and yesterday) to plump for his country’s NATO membership. His talking points were good (extrapolated from what he said):
- Montenegro has prepared well and meets the membership criteria, even if its population is still more or less evenly divided on the proposition;
- an invitation to NATO at the September Summit in Cardiff will have a positive impact on Balkans regional stability, including by encouraging Bosnia and Serbia to move in the same direction;
- the Alliance needs to send Russia a strong message about its willingness and ability to expand and defend its members in response to the Ukraine crisis.
The trouble of course is that Montenegro is tiny (Google says 621,081). However meritorious its candidacy, it is hard to see Montenegrin membership in NATO as a serious response to Russian malfeasance or even to regional instability.
Cardiff requires a broader vision , with an invitation to Montenegro as one component. How to frame this broader vision is the issue. Here are some possibilities:
- the Alliance could explicitly state its intention to invite, when they are ready, all the remaining Balkans non-members (Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Macedonia in addition to Montenegro) to join;
- the intention could be broadened to all European democracies, including not only the Balkans but also Moldova, Sweden and Finland as well as Ukraine and Georgia;
- it could even include some non-European democracies, like Colombia, which cooperates closely with the Alliance.
3. is a stretch. 2. risks provoking further Russian reaction in what it regards as its “near abroad,” even if much of it has been said before. It would also potentially saddle NATO with members whose defense would be difficult (especially Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia). In this era of constrained resources and retrenchment, the Alliance should be looking for members whose net contributions will be positive, not negative. I’d plunk for 1., which is neither a stretch nor likely to provoke the Russians, who will campaign against NATO membership for Serbia and Bosnia (as they are already doing in Montenegro) but can do little more than that.
The Balkans owe their current democratic institutions to NATO action. Kosovo in particular sees things that way. More than ninety percent of its population supports NATO membership, which isn’t possible right away because the six-year-old country is just now beginning to build its armed forces. The Albanians of Macedonia are likewise heavily in favor of NATO membership, which they regard as a guarantee of Skopje’s continued adherence to democratic norms (and decent treatment of its Albanian citizens). The ethnic Macedonians are not far behind. The only thing that holds Macedonia back is Greek refusal to accept it as an Alliance member. Bulgaria’s echo of Greek objections will fade quickly if Athens changes its mind.
Serbia and Bosnia are more equivocal. NATO bombed Serbs in both countries–notably Bosnia towards the end of the war there and Serbia in the 1999 conflict over Kosovo. Nevertheless, the current leadership in Belgrade seems to be ready to at least start down the path towards NATO. Membership for Montenegro would encourage them to do so. Once Serbia embarks, it will make no sense for the Serbs in Bosnia to hold back, especially as the Serb units of the Bosnian army are reputedly highly professional and won’t want to suffer exclusion from the club.
So far as I am aware, Montenegro and Macedonia are the only fully qualified NATO aspirants at the moment. Macedonia would have to enter as The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, as provided for in a 1995 interim agreement between Athens and Skopje, whose applicability to NATO membership has been confirmed by a decision of the International Court of Justice. The merits of the case aside, getting The FYROM into NATO will require some heavy political lifting by the United States and Germany, which will need to convince Athens to drop its objection.
In addition to stating its intentions, the Alliance should add substance to its vision by advancing each of the Balkans aspirants as far as possible along the path towards membership. What this means for each country would vary, but the clever bureaucrats at NATO headquarters can figure it out. If Sweden or Finland wants to take some additional steps towards membership, that would be icing on the cake.
A substantial Balkans/Scandinavian move towards NATO would shore up the Alliance’s flanks. It would be a serious diplomatic blow to Moscow, one for which it has no ready diplomatic or military response. All the countries involved would be net contributors to the Alliance. The move would help stabilize the Balkans and give Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia hope for the future. It would demonstrate that aggression in Ukraine has real costs and give contemporary substance to traditional US sloganeering about “Europe whole and free.”
Montenegro is tiny, but wrapped in the right package it could become a potent symbol of an alliance prepared to pursue its ideals, come what may.
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Libya adrift
Wednesday’s lunchtime assessment of Libya sponsored by the Middle East Institute was one of those rare events: excellent, if gloomy, analysis by Charles Dunne (who moderated), Karim “the light at the end of the tunnel is a train coming this way” Mezran on politics, and militiaman Fred Wehrey on security, followed by an equally excellent but wonderfully judicious set of policy recommendations for the US Government from David Mack.
The facts speak for themselves. Libya has been unable to establish the state’s monopoly on the legitimate means of violence, its parliament has been reduced to an Islamist rump, the elections for its constitution drafting committee saw minimal turnout and election of only 47 out of 60 members, its government was sacked after being unable to prevent export of pirated oil, the population lacks confidence in the institutions and the institutions lack legitimacy. What else could go wrong?
Karim Mezran managed a moment of sunshine with mention of the national dialogue, whose preparatory committee is now traveling around the country holding town hall meetings. It is searching for the missing link: a serious political compact. But its funding for the next phase is not guaranteed. Another ray of sunshine is last summer’s National Democratic Institute poll. Libyans want democracy. They just don’t know how to get there from here.
The obvious barrier is the militias, which were vital to fighting Qaddafi but have now taken on criminal and political roles. Fred Wehrey noted the Catch 22 security dilemma: the militias can’t be gotten rid of because the politicians are afraid doing so will leave them exposed, so other politicians up the ante, which makes the situation worse. The political institutions are bankrupt and state capacity at the national level is lacking. At the local level there are effective social contracts, mainly negotiated by the tribes, but this makes the situation even more complicated. Libya is many problems, not one.
Even the General Purpose Force of up to 28,000 troops now being trained by internationals is a problem. It is intended to protect the government, but politicians, militias and people are all frightened it will be used against them. The initial recruits were not properly vetted, there are problems of regional representation, and a political compact governing its use has not been reached. Many fear that General Sisi’s example in Egypt will be followed in Libya, returning the country to autocracy.
While acknowledging all these issues, David Mack soberly noted that Libya is not a big factor in world energy markets but rather a regional player with potential to become a major oil and gas producer to Europe, replacing Russian gas. Even in the Middle East, Washington is more concerned with the Israel/Palestine negotiations, the war Syria, and Egypt’s revolution gone awry, not to mention Ukraine and other issues farther afield. Libya has the potential to be a Somalia on the Mediterranean, but it can also be a prosperous country with a serious commitment to human rights. It has the resources to rebuild. What it needs is a bit of help getting on the right track.
The US needs to help where it can, David suggested, but keep a low profile and stay out of internal Libyan politics. Leading from behind is not a four letter word. In this situation, it is better to put good ideas through the UN than to offer them up wrapped in an American flag. Libyan backlash against foreign intervention, especially from the US, could be dramatic.
Still, the US has things it can and should offer. David favors private sector assistance, including an Overseas Private Investment Corporation agreement and strong Foreign Commercial Service representation. He also wants to see expanded educational collaboration with US universities, and possibly contractor help in building the Libyan armed forces and police. All this requires consular services in Tripoli for both Americans and Libyans.
David considers some additional options for fuller governmental engagement, especially on the security and counter-terrorism fronts, as well as an option for deferring to the Europeans. These he allows to fall away, leaving US policy largely in the hands of private sector actors for implementation. Some of us familiar with the difficulties of US contractors in other non-permissive environments may have our doubts that this is sufficient, but it is a rare and precious diplomat who so consciously and assiduously seeks to limit commitments to a country he has followed for decades, for our sake as well as theirs.
Libya is adrift. I might opt for one of David’s more forward-leaning options, but only keeping his warnings in mind.
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I call Macedonia Macedonia
A loyal reader writes: “Mr. Serwer is being quoted as the USA should pressure Greece in regards to fyrom ascension to NATO. I would really appreciate him to post something on his blog so we can discuss it.” This presumably refers to remarks I made by Skype Tuesday to a class on Macedonia at University College ISPE in Pristina. Here are my notes on the name question and NATO for that lecture, which was observed by a Macedonian journalist:
Macedonia’s external problem remains what it has been since independence: Greece’s unwillingness to accept its name.
Let me admit that I am not neutral on this subject. I advocated American recognition of Macedonia by its constitutional name (Republic of Macedonia) well before Washington did it.
I think any country has a right to call itself what it wants, so long as it does not harbor irredentist designs on its neighbors. This applies to the United States of Mexico, and to the US state of New Mexico, as much as it does to Macedonia and Greece.
In fact, Macedonia has already changed its constitution and flag to accommodate Greek concerns.
I am convinced that Macedonia does not have irredentist designs on Greece. Greek preoccupation with this issue is rooted in Athens’ own attitude towards minorities within Greece, as it denies they exist, and concern about Greek identity.
While claiming continuity with ancient Greece, Greek identity is much more clearly rooted in the early 19th century.
But whatever the origins, the result is a pernicious one. Greece’s current prime minister has gone as far as to say that he wants to see the dissolution of Macedonia and the formation of a Greater Albania, rather than accept a solution to the “name” issue.
This would be nothing more than comedic except for one thing: Greece’s attitude on the name issue is blocking Macedonian membership in NATO and holding up its progress towards negotiating EU membership.
The EU has been clever and invented a “high-level dialogue” that in essence substitutes for the EU accession negotiations, which in any event won’t be concluded during this decade.
The NATO issue is more urgent. Albanians in Macedonia regard NATO membership as vital to their own security, a kind of guarantee that the Macedonian state will continue in the direction of treating them properly.
Macedonia has met NATO’s criteria for membership. Its army has even fought under US command in Afghanistan and still protects NATO headquarters there.
I’ve spoken with the Vermont National Guard commander who integrated Macedonian troops with his own fighting in Afghanistan. He told me he relied on them as he would on American troops.
But Greece shows no sign of easing its veto on membership by the time of the next NATO summit in Cardiff, Wales in September.
Washington has unfortunately said that NATO membership for Macedonia depends on its resolving its problems with Greece, a position that essentially turns American leverage over to Athens.
This in my view is a serious mistake, but so far at least I’ve been unable to convince my American colleagues that they should take a more proactive role.
My own preference would be that Washington seek to end the UN mediation, which has produced nothing in almost 20 years of effort, and tell Athens that the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will become a member of NATO in Cardiff, along with Montenegro, in the fall.
At the same time, Brussels should make clear to Skopje that it will need to reach a mutually acceptable accommodation with Greece before it can become an EU member.
Athens can of course still veto Macedonia’s membership in NATO, where decisions are taken by consensus.
But that would be a serious mistake if Brussels and Washington are prepared to press the issue at the highest levels. Cash-strapped Greece is in no position to annoy, much less anger, the Americans, Germans and other Europeans.
Nor is it wise for Greece to continue to ignore the 2011 decision of the International Court of Justice, which found by a 15 to 1 margin that Athens has breached the Interim Accord and rejected its allegations against the Skopje government.
While Greeks continue to claim that the Court failed to adopt any remedies, the decision was clearly a binding one that the ICJ expected Athens to implement. The court in fact has no power to enforce its decisions.
Let me be clear: the Macedonian government, while held not to have violated the Interim Accord, is not entirely without its own responsibility in this matter, especially in recent years.
Prime Minister Gruevski has played to his own constituency by emphasizing connections to ancient Macedonia that are even more far-fetched than those of Prime Minister Samaras, which is saying something.
What we’ve got here are two democratically elected leaders who each feed the beast of ethnic nationalism in ways that are destabilizing and dangerous.
There is a real risk that they have unleashed sentiments that will be difficult to put back in Pandora’s box, which is an appropriate label given the context.
Neither Greece nor Macedonia can cause the kind of military damage that Milosevic’s Serbia did, but they can certainly cause political instability, especially if their dispute unleashes a third ethnic nationalism: the Albanian one.
I inserted as well a few remarks based on my experience in Italy, where I met only one person (in 10 years of living there) who claimed descent from the ancient Romans. Italians know that the Romans were conquered by various “barbarians”–Goths, Vandals, and the like–so that modern-day Italians are thoroughly mixed genetically. Rome at one point had a population of only 85,000 people (at the peak of the Empire and today it has more like 3 million). How could any but a handful of Italians claim genetic descent from ancient Rome? How much better, or worse, is the Greek claim to descent from the ancient Greeks?
Even in the US we claim descent from Greco-Roman culture. Washington DC was designed to be the “New Rome.” Such claims deprive Italy and Greece of nothing. Pride in one’s heritage should mean pride in seeing others attach themselves to it.
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Ukraine isn’t over
With the G7 countries issuing a strongly worded statement yesterday against Russia’s annexation of Ukraine, optimists will want to go back to worrying about Malaysia Airlines flight 370. That would be a mistake. Despite President Putin’s disavowals, there is still serious risk to Ukraine from a Russian push into its southern provinces, perhaps as far as the Russian-occupied Transnistria area of Moldova:
Why? Let me count the gains to Moscow:
- Crimea would no longer be cut off from Russia proper.
- The southern provinces of Ukraine are home to heavy industries that cater in part to Russia’s military.
- Having annexed Crimea, pro-Russian political forces are unlikely in the future to win any national elections in Ukraine, so “protection” of Russian speakers requires their incorporation into Russia.
- Ukraine would be reduced to a landlocked remnant with little prospect of being more than a burden to the European Union and the United States.
- Rump Ukraine will find it necessary to make its peace with natural gas supplying Russia.
If thinking along these lines predominates in Moscow, it is hard to imagine anything the EU and US could or would do to prevent a Russian military move. The Ukrainian army is in no position to resist. Washington and Brussels imagine that Ukrainians would mount an insurgency against Russian occupation. That could be a sanguinary affair that could last a decade or more.
It is not easy to come up with reasonable policy options. Deployment of observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which is already in progress, is a good idea. But if Putin decides to move, they will stand by to document how many tanks and armed personnel carriers have entered and where they are located.
Military options are out. Though the credibility of the Alliance is at stake, NATO has no obligation and few means with which to defend Ukraine, even though it is a member of Partnership for Peace. The Alliance will have its hands full protecting its Baltic and other easternmost neighbors. It may be able to provide some intelligence and logistical support to Ukraine, but that’s about it.
Thoughts fly to the money Kiev owes Moscow. Does it really have to pay its debts if Russia invades? Probably not, but it would then have to worry about where to find natural gas for heating next winter. There is no quick alternative available, so far as I know.
The ruble and the Russian stock market are already down, but that is likely to be a temporary response with no substantial long-term impact. Only if the EU and US come up with sanctions that really bite Russian banks hard is Moscow likely to pay attention. That’s unlikely, as the Europeans export too much to Russia and depend too much on Russian gas to get serious about financial sanctions anytime soon.
It looks as if we are in for a long-term response to the annexation of Crimea and whatever other parts of Ukraine Putin goes after. We’ve been in this situation before. We had no really good policy response to the Soviet occupation of the Baltics at the end of World War II, of Hungary in 1956 or of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Nor have we done anything substantial about South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which declared independence from Georgia in 2008.
What we had going for us during the Cold War was strategic patience. In the 1950s, I was taught in junior high school that the Baltics were “captive nations.” It seemed quixotic at the time to imagine that they would ever be free. But they were liberated at the end of the Cold War and have since become NATO and EU members.
We have wanted to believe that the ideological contest that gave us strategic patience is gone. Unfortunately, a new one appears to be taking its place. Autocrats like Putin are not relying any longer on state-controlled economies. They are not even pretending to read Marx or Engels. They are enjoying the fruits of at least partly free economies, under the control of their favored oligarchs. We may need even more patience than in the four decades or so of the Cold War in order to see the backs of Putin and his like.
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Grading assistance to Ukraine
Larry Summers, not my favorite public persona but a savvy economist to be sure, offers sage advice on aid for Ukraine. But he fails to consider how we are likely to measure up to his “lessons for the design of support programs,” so here are my guesstimates (the proposals in bold are his, the rest is mine):
1. Immediate impact is essential. While Congress has acted quickly to approve $1 billion in loan guarantees and the European Union has in principle approved $15 billion, the International Monetary Fund has not yet acted. Odds are it will take time, not only for the IMF to extract reform promises from Ukraine but also for the bureaucratic arrangements to be made by the EU and US. And the total amount is likely to fall far short of the $35 billion Ukraine says it needs.
2. Avoid “Potemkin money.” I wonder if loan guarantees fall in the category of Potemkin money, as I imagine it is difficult to know how much new money they make available. Perhaps a reader or two who are expert can enlighten me. EU money is rarely quick in my experience. IMF money is real but takes time to get approved. Months rather than weeks before they write a check. Potemkin-like in the meanwhile.
3. Be realistic about debts. Summers wants us to consider rescheduling or restructuring, which is something often done after a revolution (but never quick–it often takes years). Relief from official and private sector debt is often in the 35-60% range. Uniquely Iraq got 80% off its official debt at the Paris Club. Post-Communist Poland got 40% off. But of course much of Ukraine’s debt is owed to Russia, which is unlikely to be cooperative in any effort to reduce, reschedule or restructure. The usual consensus is not likely to be available, unless we strike a deal with Moscow that is likely to be inimical to Ukraine’s interest in Crimea.
4. Honest management is as important as prudent policy. We don’t want the Ukrainians stealing the money we send them, and we should want to recover as much as possible from past abuse. Lots of luck on the latter. Yanukovich and his cronies will have squirreled away a lot of money in difficult to trace places. Some of Ukraine’s wealthy tycoons are prominent supporters of the post-Yanukovich regime. It will not be easy to prevent problems in the future either, as Ukraine clearly lacks the mechanisms required for serious transparency and accountability. Sure we should insist, but it will take legislation and courage to put them in place. Recovery of ill-gotten gains takes years, as does establishment of institutions designed to prevent theft.
5. Countries need to pursue broad polices in a way that benefits Ukraine. There is a pretty good chance the Obama administration will do the right things on the IMF and on energy policy by building the Keystone pipeline and approving natural gas exports. Europe is also likely to do at least some of the right things: continue to pay for the gas it receives through Ukraine, so long as the Russians continue to send it, and help Ukraine develop alternative energy sources for its own use, reducing its dependency on Russia.
The big problems are with immediacy and impact. Ukraine needs a lot of money quickly, much faster than it will get honest management or debt reduction. Washington and Brussels look likely to have won the tug of war for Kiev and any other parts of Ukraine that remain attached to it. They need to do everything they can to avoid financial implosion of their prize.
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Everything uncertain, except the winner
After less than two years, Serbia is about to hold new parliamentary elections March 16. Even though the voting is just a week away, most people show little interest in the campaign, but turnout is still expected to be relatively high. The upcoming election is unique in that it is not about who will win, as the winner is already known. It is the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) of Aleksandar Vučić, the incumbent first deputy prime minister.
The election race is rather for Vučić’s junior coalition partner in the government. It won’t necessarily be the winner of the second place. It can be any party that will manage to meet the threshold (5% of all voters who participate in voting, including invalid ballots) and thus enter the parliament.
Prime Minister Dačić’s Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) is currently the second in terms of popular support according to most relevant opinion polls. The former ruling Democratic Party (DS), now led by former Belgrade Mayor Đilas, and former President Tadić’s new party are struggling for the third place. The contest seems to be extremely tight (in some polls Tadić has a little more votes, in others Đilas). And in addition to Dačić, Tadić and Đilas’ parties, it is only the Liberal-democratic Party and Vojislav Koštunica’s nationalist Democratic Party of Serbia that are expected to win some seats in parliament, though barely exceeding the threshold.
According to opinion polls, Vučić’s popularity is so high that his party might even win an absolute majority, so he might not need a partner at all. Unless Vučić intends to change the constitution, which will require approval by two thirds of MPs.
While there is no doubt as to who will lead the government, everything else is uncertain.The campaign is full of populist messages and unrealistic promises. Interestingly, Kosovo and other “big national topics” have been rarely mentioned, except by minor nationalist and Russophile parties. The focus is almost entirely on the economy. All candidates agree on the need for deep structural reform, but differ on the type of measures and methodology of implementation. Some, including Vučić, are proposing a shift toward a more liberal, market-oriented model. Others, like Prime minister Dačić, are calling for even more state intervention.
Top priorities for whoever is in power after the elections will be rationalization and reorganization of an oversized public sector and creation of a more attractive environment for direct long-term investment. The outgoing government has taken some steps in that direction, but that’s a small part of what has to be done if Serbia is to avoid financial collapse.
Vučić’s frequently repeated insistence that he will not give up on sweeping economic reforms, however painful they are, has not degraded his popularity thus far. The secret of Vučić’s success lies in his bold action against high-level corruption and organized crime. Delivering on his promises, Vučić has revived at least a portion of people’s lost hope. That’s an encouraging sign.
The problem is, however, that people tend to support changes only so long as their personal lives remain unaffected. The main challenge to the next government will be how to mitigate social consequences of reforms, especially in the early stages of implementation. This will require extraordinary effort, but it is the price that has to be paid for lack of courage and decisiveness on the part of previous administrations.
And what about the opposition? Once powerful, the DS is in steep decline and a deep crisis of identity after suffering defeat in the 2012 elections. It is no longer even the second strongest political force, pushed out of that position by Dačić’s SPS. The latest in a series of blows came when former Serbian president and DS leader Boris Tadić left the party and formed his own following a period of heavy infighting with his successor at the party’s helm, Dragan Đilas. Both DS and Tadić’s new party should be happy if each of them gets between 5 and 10 percent of votes.
DS is desperate to attract parts of the electorate that are bitterly opposed to Aleksandar Vučić. High party official Borko Stefanović recently went so far as to warn that Vučić’s victory is likely to lead to the “Ukrainian scenario” in Serbia, but his statement immediately backfired on his party’s rating. The strategy of DS in the campaign basically boils down to claiming they are the only party that is not going to form a post-election coalition with Vučić’s “Progressives.” Unfortunately for DS, Vučić obviously has no intention of calling them into a coalition, either.
Meanwhile, the Democrats and other critics of Vučić have been accusing him of establishing a “soft dictatorship.” Their fear is that Vučić’s nearly unprecedented popular support, coupled with too much power in his hands, could seriously undermine the already fragile democracy Serbia has achieved. But there is little difference between Vučić and most of his predecessors when it comes to authoritarian tendencies. Not to mention that the reforms awaiting the next government will require a firm hand on the tiller.
After all, it is not bad for a country to have a highly popular mainstream politician at a time when many countries, including a number of developed Western democracies, are experiencing a crisis of representation and democratic legitimacy, with extremist parties and fringe movements gaining ground. But that’s another story.
Vis-a-vis European integration, Belgrade will look to trade any progress in normalization of relations with Kosovo for concessions from Brussels on various chapters of accession talks. Such an approach carries a clear risk. If Brussels demonstrates too much leniency, Serbia could be allowed to proceed without satisfying all the criteria, particularly in areas such as human rights, media freedoms and the rule of law. They will demand a lot of attention in the years ahead.
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