Tag: European Union
Happy and dull
I did this hangout with RFE’s Gordana Knezevic and Dzenana Halimovic, moderated by Brian Whitmore, Wednesday and forgot to post it:
I also forgot to post this interview with Elton Trota of the Pristina-based Independent Balkans News Agency:
IBNA: How do you assess the negotiation process between Kosovo-Serbia? What are the negative and positive aspects of the talks between Prime Minister Thaci and his Serbian Counterpart, Ivica Daciq?
Serwer: I think the dialogue process has been successful in limited but important ways. I’d like to see it move faster towards what ultimately has to happen: diplomatic recognition and exchange of ambassadors. But Serbia has now accepted the territorial integrity of Kosovo and the applicability of the Kosovo constitution on that whole territory. It has also exchanged liaison officers, under a thin EU cover. Those are steps in the right direction.
IBNA: Is it possible for reconciliation to happen between Balkan nations in the near future, taking into account that it’s a demand that comes from Brussels for good neighboring relations in the region?
Serwer: Reconciliation is different from good neighborly relations. Reconciliation will take a generation, or two. Good neighborly relations are a question of political will. The governing institutions can make that happen whenever they decide to do it.
IBNA: How is Kosovo moving toward the Euro-Atlantic integration? Is this going to be a long journey for the new state?
Serwer: It will be a long journey to the EU, whose requirements are much more elaborate and demanding than NATO’s. Kosovo has the advantage of being able to build its security forces from the ground up to meet NATO requirements. It has already done that for the Kosovo Security Force that exists. It will need to continue in that direction as that is converted into an armed force. Once it has real armed forces, entry into NATO should be quick if Kosovo meets the requirements. The only political obstacle is the non-recognizers, who will need to be convinced that Kosovo in the Alliance is a much better idea than Kosovo outside the Alliance.
IBNA: How is FYR Macedonia moving toward the Euro-Atlantic integration? Will the disputes of this country with its neighboring country make the journey of this country toward EU and NATO accession any longer?
Serwer: The only real hindrance for Macedonia is the “name” dispute with Greece, which is really about Greek and Macedonian identity, not the name. Macedonia’s armed forces have served with distinction in Afghanistan and its governing structures meet NATO requirements, if I understand correctly. I would like to see Macedonia enter NATO sooner rather than later under the interim agreement as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. That won’t be possible for the EU, which is still a long way off in any event.
IBNA: Riots and protests took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the government and the current political class, is the same is expected to happen in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia?
Serwer: I’m not in the riot/protest prediction business, but neither Kosovo nor Macedonia has suffered the stagnation that Bosnia and Herzegovina has suffered for the past eight years or so. Kosovo’s agreement on the north with Belgrade removes one possible source of instability. In Macedonia, I think NATO membership would contribute a good deal to the sense that the country is moving in the right direction. The normal political process in both Kosovo and Macedonia is in much better shape than it is in Bosnia, which is handicapped with a constitution that enshrines nationalists in power and leaves little room for issue-based politics. But the citizens of Kosovo and Macedonia should watch Bosnia with interest, because it is certainly a model to avoid.
IBNA: What will be the fate of northern Kosovo?
Serwer: Northern Kosovo consists of four Serb-majority municipalities that will now govern themselves in many respects, under the overall constitutional framework of the Republic of Kosovo. Its courts and police will be integrated with the system in the rest of Kosovo, and its municipal authorities will participate in an association of Serb municipalities formed under Pristina’s aegis. With any luck, it will prosper a bit more than in the past and become a happy and dull place.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Ukraine liberates itself
Hard to tell precisely what is going on in Ukraine or predict what the outcome will be, but it seems clear enough that President Yanukovich is out after he fled from Kiev yesterday, leaving the city and the presidential palace in opposition hands. Security forces loyal to the president have given control of the capital to security forces backing the opposition. The parliament has removed its speaker, a Yanukovich ally, declared the president unable to perform his duties, freed opposition leader Yulia Tymshenko and called elections for May 25, more than six months earlier than provided for in yesterday’s European Union-brokered agreement.
The situation is still perilous. It could easily degenerate into civil war, if security forces in the eastern portion of the country remain loyal to Yanukovich, who is describing the events as a coup. Moscow could make life difficult for any successor government, either by tightening its purse strings or shutting off supplies of natural gas. The European Union and the United States, both of which will be pleased to see the back of Yanukovich, are unlikely to ante up as quickly as President Putin will turn the screws, or as much as Moscow has offered. The situation in Crimea, which is mostly Russian-speaking and transferred to Ukraine only in 1954, could become problematic. Putin could try to hive off the eastern provinces and Crimea. That after all is what he did to the Russian-speaking portions of Georgia when he got the chance, making Abkhazia and South Ossetia into supposedly independent Russian satellites. Not to mention the Trans-Dniester portion of Moldova.
There are deep divisions not only between the ex-president and the opposition, but also within the opposition, which includes right-wing nationalists as well as pro-European liberals. Once the contest with Yanukovich is out of the way, the unity of the opposition can be expected to break down. That is only natural. The question will be whether they work out their disagreements with each other and with pro-Russian Ukrainians in peaceful or violent ways. There are no guarantees on that score, especially as the security forces appear to be choosing sides. What looks today like the happy triumph of relatively peaceful protests over a brutal proto-dictatorship, which killed demonstrators by the score, could look different in a few months.
But for the moment it is certainly tempting to celebrate. It isn’t only the Russian hockey team that has had a bad week or so. Putin’s effort to force all of Ukraine back into Moscow’s sphere of influence looks likely to fail. Its citizens have reasserted their right to choose a European, as opposed to a Russian, future. Its parliament has tried to lay a legal basis for the shift in direction and future decisions on the country’s future. Friends in Brussels and Washington will remain sympathetic if Ukraine chooses a liberal, democratic future.
Some will wonder, if a new election can settle the issues in Ukraine, why can’t that happen also in Syria? The simple answer is that it can, but only when Bashar al Assad joins Yanukovich in Moscow. The notion that a free and fair election can be held any time soon in a country that has never had a competitive election and where ballots are marked with a thumbprint drenched in blood from a pinprick is delusional. Elections will some day play a key role in Syria, but for the moment we’ll have to content ourselves with alleviating the humanitarian suffering, using the UN Security Council resolution that passed today.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
What Ukrainians want
I hope this morning’s news of an agreement between demonstrators and the government pans out, but in any event it is important to stay focused on the legitimate aspirations of ordinary people. This video should help:
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Citizens are the place to start
My friends are in a tizzy about Bosnia. Ed Joseph wants urgent international action. So do Bodo Weber and Kurt Bassuener. All fear that Bosnia’s social unrest in recent days may degenerate into ethnic conflict. They want the United States and the European Union to step in with clear ideas for reform and strict conditionality to force their adoption.
I am a bit more cautious. I agree entirely with Bodo and Kurt that the current situation is in part the result of bankrupt and ineffective EU policies. I agree with them and Ed that a different approach is required, including stronger American diplomatic engagement and strengthening of Europe’s military presence. But I am suspicious of the notion that the right formula to untie the Bosnian knot can be devised in Washington and Brussels. We tried that at Dayton. It worked to end the war, but not to make Bosnia a functional state.
We need to hear more from the Bosnians, who are busily organizing themselves into plenums that will formulate grassroots demands for reform. Tim Judah describes what is going on: Read more
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Small states and the power of pragmatism
Kosovo Foreign Minister Enver Hoxhaj has kindly provided a copy of his remarks prepared for SAIS last week. They seem to me to merit publication in their entirety. I’ll of course be glad to publish the remarks of others as well on the dialogue process between Pristina and Belgrade.
Small States and the Power of Pragmatism: Kosovo’s Approach to the Dialogue with Serbia
ENVER HOXHAJ
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo
A small state like Kosovo is obliged to think how to define its role in international affairs and how to conduct its foreign affairs in a way it can advance its vital interests. For small states that have limited military, economic, and demographic resources, it is essential to adapt a smart and pragmatic foreign policy. Being smart for small states means undertaking actions that increase the likelihood for success, utilize the available resources and capacities. In this context, pragmatism means a combination of realist and practical approaches to foreign affairs with strategic reliance on idealism. Pragmatism is not about being strong or weak, but it is about taking the right decisions in right time. Pragmatism is to adapt but maintain strategic vision and policy coherence. It is about making short-term compromises for long-term triumphs. It is about getting what you want, while also addressing other parties concerns. The current dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia under the EU facilitation is a quintessential example of the pragmatic and smart approach of a small state like Kosovo. The normalization dialogue has been considered historic and a breakthrough achievement. It has been considered a success of EU foreign policy, and a merit of constructive approach of both Kosovo and Serbia.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Pragmatic Kosovo!
I enjoyed a conversation at SAIS yesterday with two of Kosovo’s finest: Deputy Prime Minister Slobodan Petrovic and Foreign Minister Enver Hoxhaj. Slobodan has led Serb participation in Kosovo’s government for the past three years, holding also the portfolio for local governance. Enver, a political science professor, has participated in many of the international negotiations that Kosovo has undergone over the past twenty years.
The watchword was “pragmatic.” Both speakers are clear about their goals. Slobodan wants improvement in the lives of Serbs who live in Kosovo. Enver wants the Kosovo state to have a well-recognized place in the international community. They have worked together to achieve these goals, but both are ready to compromise along the way, so long as things keep moving in the right direction.
Enver thinks normalization of relations between Pristina and Belgrade means eventual mutual recognition and exchange of ambassadors, but for the moment Kosovo has taken what it could get: an April agreement that recognized its constitution should govern in all of Kosovo and exchange of liaison officers located in the respective capitals’ European Union missions. Belgrade won’t accept Kosovo passports, but it has accepted its identity cards. The other “technical” agreements are also steps in the right direction.
Slobodan thinks the municipal elections held for the first time under Pristina’s authority in Serb-majority northern Kosovo were far from perfect: intimidation and even assassination determined the outcome, which favored a Belgrade-sponsored Serb list. But Petrovic’s Liberals got more votes than ever before and captured what seats they could. The international community should have taken a stronger stand against irregularities and supported those who have been committed to the political process. Next time, he hopes.
In the foreign minister’s view, Kosovo faces some difficult issues in 2014. It wants to get into NATO’s Partnership for Peace but needs to overcome resistance from the Alliance’s non-recognizing members. Kosovo also needs to decide the size, composition label for its security forces. It has passed the halfway mark in gaining recognitions from members of the UN General Assembly and hopes to make it to the two-thirds mark, but it will still face a veto by Russia in the Security Council. Kosovo hosts too many international missions. The UN has been superfluous for some time; the OSCE is overstaffed and undertasked.
The EU rule of law mission is still necessary to handle sensitive cases like that of the recently arrested mayoral candidate Oliver Ivanovic, but the deputy foreign minister thought it important that the remaining cases of this sort be settled expeditiously. In his view, 2014 will be important for the fall parliamentary elections. A gentleman’s agreement to maintain reserved seats for Serbs and other minorities, which were to be phased out after two election cycles, should be respected, not abrogated.
Asked whether the Pristina/Belgrade agreement and recent election results might presage “Bosnia-ization” of Kosovo into two ethnically identified entities, both Slobodan and Enver think not. The already functioning Serb municipalities south of the Ibar will not want to give up what they’ve gained. The northern municipalities are beginning to see clearly that they will gain from operating under Pristina’s authority, as they will retain a good deal of local control as well as substantial resources. If the agreement is implemented in good faith as written and the EU remains the guarantor, the risks are minimal.
I remember a time when I could not have imagined such a conversation. Enver reminded our audience that the war was fought between the Serbian state and the Albanian population of Kosovo. That may be true, but there were long periods when it seemed you could count on one hand the number of Albanians and Serbs willing to have a civilized conversation with each other. Now more than a handful are using democratic institutions to govern together. I know the challenges are still great, but pragmatic can go a long way with time.
RSS - Posts
