Tag: European Union

Will benefits of Geneva II outweigh its costs?

Yesterday’s Friends of Syria Statement from the UK chair tries to clarify the attitudes of leading supporters of the Syrian opposition in light of the Islamic Front’s recent moves to claim exclusive leadership of the military effort.  This threatens to leave out in the cold both the Supreme Military Council, a CIA-backed funnel for support to armed moderates, and its political leadership, in what is now being called the National Coalition.

The overriding concern of the Friends of Syria is who will be at the table for the January 22 co-sponsored Geneva II conference on the conflict and whether they will be able to speak authoritatively for the armed opposition.  Any hope of success requires that the Islamic Front, or at least part of it, join the National Coalition at the negotiating table.  The statement reiterates the opposition’s most important demand, on which both Islamists and secularists are agreed:

We reaffirmed that the aim of Geneva II was to implement a negotiated solution on the basis of the Geneva communiqué, by establishing a Transitional Governing Body with full executive powers agreed by mutual consent. This is the only way to end the conflict. Assad will have no role in Syria, as his regime is the main source of terror and extremism in Syria.

But the Friends of Syria rightly leave the door open to Islamist participation in Geneva, so long as they operate under the political authority of the National Coalition: Read more

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Time for one person, one vote?

Q:  Is the US stepping in Bosnia again with the aim to fix it? [Assistant Secretary of State] Victoria Nuland recently talked ab0ut it.

A:  I’ve heard a lot of rumbling, but I have not heard a clear plan. The only kind of plan that will work is one that mobilizes at least a few of the Europeans as well. See With Europeans, not without them | peacefare.net.

Q:  How do you see attempts to implement Sejdic – Finci verdict?

A:  I’m a simple guy. The first solution I think of is one president, no ethnic or territorial restrictions. As there will always be more than one Bosniak candidate, in order to win, there would be a strong incentive to assemble a cross-ethnic coalition. That would be good. What’s wrong with that? If you don’t like it, try one president and two vice presidents, elected as a package. No ethnic or territorial restrictions. Two rounds of voting. Or elect the president in parliament if you prefer.

Q:  The negotiations with the EU representatives are going for sometime. Is it going nowhere? Read more

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With Europeans, not without them

Kati Marton, Dick Holbrooke’s wife, called yesterday for revivified American diplomacy aimed at preventing Bosnia from flying apart.  She is right to be worried.  But calls for engagement need something substantial to back them up.  That was her husband’s great virtue:  he was able to push all the levers of American power in the same direction at the same time, marrying power to engagement.

It is hard to know what that would mean today.  The military lever, as Ms Marton acknowledges, is simply not available.  American economic leverage in Bosnia is minimal.  Our aid is mis-directed, trade is negligible, and investment is nonexistent. Our oversized embassy–it has many times the staff it had during the war, when I was its most frequent visitor–sponsors biotechnology seminars, boasts a donation of $533,000 for of anti-smuggling equipment and is still featuring the last ambassador’s July 4 farewell its website.  Last year’s embassy effort to produce reform in the Bosnian Federation–the 51% of the country in which power is shared principally between Croats and Muslims–has come to nothing.

Nor is it clear why Bosnia should be an American responsibility.  The fact is the United States never had vital national security interests in Bosnia.  What it had was a dominant geopolitical position–the 90s were the unipolar moment–and very few challengers.  Washington could, if it felt like it, devote its military, diplomatic and economic weight to ending the genocidal realities of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.  It no longer has that luxury.  It faces similar atrocities in Syria but has chosen to focus its attention on chemical weapons that have killed relatively few but represent a serious threat to a valued international norm.  Other priorities–the Iranian nuclear program, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, China’s military challenge in the Pacific and America’s own economic ailments–take priority.

Kati Marton discounts Europe’s role in Bosnia, misidentifying the “High Representative” as its agent.  Though an Austrian who knows a great deal about Bosnia, he is the agent of both the Americans and the Europeans.  The European Union representative is someone else.  The EU has a lot of what America lacks:  aid, trade and investment as well as good reason to be concerned, since renewed instability in Bosnia would bring increased refugee flows and substantial financial burdens.

The only way for Washington to be effective in Bosnia today is with the Europeans, not without them.  But most of Europe is indifferent and unconcerned.  The most directly interested are Croatia, which shares a long border with Bosnia and is now the EU’s 28th member, and Germany, which played an important role supporting US efforts in the 1990s and now wields the biggest stick in Europe.  Chancellor Angela Merkel showed what she could do with a bit of clarity and a few choice words in Kosovo, where she has compelled Serbia to accept the validity of Kosovo’s constitutional framework on its entire territory. 

Washington, Zagreb and Berlin are the winning formula.  If you want to get something done today in Bosnia, Zagreb is vital to delivering the Bosnian Croats.  Berlin has clout with both the Croats and the Bosnian Serbs (largely through Belgrade).  And the Americans, as in the past, need to deliver the Bosniaks (those are the people Western newspapers call Bosnian Muslims).  A concerted Croatian/German/American initiative would drag the entire EU in the right direction and prove irresistible to all the Bosnians.

But even that won’t work unless we find serious allies within Bosnia.  They have proved elusive.  Milorad Dodik, once the darling of the West, has embraced vigorous Serb nationalism and is now the most serious threat to Bosnia’s unity.  Zlatko Lagumdzija, who once aimed at creating a cross-ethnic coalition, has failed.  Croats who would prefer a more united Bosnia that could move quickly towards EU membership just don’t have enough votes.

This is where strategic patience comes in.  Washington, Zagreb and Berlin should make it clear what they want the Bosnians to do.  They should prepare a short list—three to five reasonable items focused mainly on constitutional reform would be my preference—and then be prepared to await the Bosnian response, cutting American and EU assistance regularly if there is none. The Americans should shrink their embassy in Sarajevo dramatically.  The Europeans should get rid of their bilateral embassies altogether, relying on the EU representative to speak with a single voice. 

What about the 26 other members of the EU?  A few of them like the UK and the Netherlands, will back a well-crafted tripartite initiative.  The rest really cannot be helpful in this situation.  They should stand aside, as all but Germany did at Dayton, and let the key players use their clout.  They will be rewarded by saving on embassies in Sarajevo and by enjoying the spectacle of others doing the heavy lifting.  Their finance ministries will be grateful.   

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The other shoe

I just caught wind this morning of the right-wing angst about the State Department’s decision to move the US Embassy to the Vatican into the same complex with the US Embassy to Italy, albeit with a separate entrance.  Maybe the perspective of a former deputy chief of mission (DCM) and charge’ d’affaires at the embassy to Italy will enlighten, or more likely stir up even more protest.

I was DCM at the embassy to Italy 1990-93.  The embassy to the Vatican had a separate ambassador, DCM, political officers and premises then, but it got its administrative services from the much larger and well-established embassy to Italy.  The natural state of the relationship between the two embassies (as well as the mission to the UN organizations in Rome) was mildly contentious.  The ambassador to the Vatican often felt ill-served and disrespected.  He competed for Washington’s attention.  The physical separation made things worse, not better, as it deprived the two embassies of casual daily interaction.

The DCMs of the three embassies, all then in separate premises, tried to meet regularly to sort things out.  This was more useful than our ambassadors knew or cared.  Most of what we talked about were the trivia of daily embassy existence, but sometimes more important things got done.  The Vatican embassy DCM, Cameron Hume, and I decided that he would handle the then on-going negotiations to end the civil war in Mozambique, mediated by a Catholic organization known as the Community of Sant’Egidio.  It was an Italian nongovernmental organization rather than a Vatican one, but I had my hands full with the first Gulf War and its aftermath so we happily decided Cameron would take on Mozambique.  He did a great job supporting Sant’Egidio and wrote a fine book about it.

The notion that moving the Vatican embassy into fabulous quarters on the via Veneto constitutes a demotion in stature will amuse generations of diplomats. The Vatican itself is all right with the arrangement. The administrative and security savings are said to be only $1.4 million (per year of course), but that does not count sale of the Vatican embassy property, which according to its website the US government purchased in 1994. The savings in terms of staff time and energy will be far greater.  The ambassadors might even learn to get along a bit better.  But if they don’t the DCMs will try to smooth things out.

More interesting is the State Department’s assertion that staffing will not be reduced.  It should be, at both the embassy to Italy and the embassy to the Vatican.  These are vastly overstaffed for current requirements.  Embassy Rome is back up to 800 people (about half Italian and half American).  When I was DCM we cut it back to about 720, which was hard to do because there were 36 different agencies of the US government represented.  Most of its 63 diplomats are servicing non-State agencies, who are there because of legacy and inertia rather than current requirements.  I today think 50 Americans would suffice in Embassy Rome; there are 400 there today.

The Vatican embassy occasionally takes on enormous significance, but presidential visits and the like have always required the Rome embassy to pitch in.  That will be much easier once the two embassies are co-located.  Day to day business is usually pretty tame.  The Vatican doesn’t do a lot of radical policy change and instant reaction.  So the Vatican embassy could also do with a slimming down.  Its staff of seven diplomats is more than twice what it was when I was DCM twenty years ago.  Has the Vatican doubled its significance since then?  Has technology improved productivity at all?  We’ve got to take a much harder look at our diplomatic presence abroad and cut it back to more reasonable dimensions.

The move of the US embassy to the Vatican into glorious via Veneto quarters should be seen as a first step in the right direction.  Listening to people who complained about inadequate security in Benghazi advocate keeping another facility separate from a well-protected embassy would be funny if it weren’t sad.  I hope the administration has the gumption to drop the other shoe: cut staff back to what we really need.

 

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Deal, or no deal?

The nuclear talks with Iran are officially with the P5+1 (that’s the US, UK, France, Russia and China).  But they are increasingly looking like a negotiation (at a distance) between Israel and Iran, with the P5+1 acting as mediators and looking for a mutually acceptable compromise.   What are the odds of finding one?  It depends on what we all call leverage.  That comes from being able to walk away, because you’ve got a “best alternative to a negotiated agreement” (BATNA) that you prefer over the agreement on offer.

Iran’s BATNA is clear:  it can continue its nuclear program, which entails continuing also to endure increasingly tight sanctions as well as the risk an Israeli or American attack.  President Rouhani doesn’t like this option, because he has promised Iranians relief from sanctions, improved relations with the rest of the world, and an improved economy.  Iranians are not interested in going to war.  But Supreme Leader Khamenei can still veto any proposed agreement.  There is every reason to believe he would do so if somehow his negotiators dared to bring home an agreement that completely dismantled Iran’s nuclear program, blocking it from any future enrichment (or reprocessing). Read more

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The real deal

While I’m posting intereviews, I’ll put this one up too.  I did it for Marin Dushev, who writes for the Bulgarian weekly Capital, last week.  But far better than reading me is reading Kurt Basseuner and Bodo Weber’s Not Yet a Done Deal:  Kosovo and the Prishtina-Belgrade Agreement.  They are right about many things, but most important of all that “normalization of relations” means mutual recognition and exchange of ambassadors, which will have to occur before Serbia enters the European Union.

Q:  Belgrade is considered to have been strongly interested in high turnout among Serbs in the North because of the expected beginning of negotiations with the EU in January. And it seems that the Serbian government was pretty active in persuading the local Serbs to vote. But still the turnout in the North seems to have been relatively low. How can we explain it? Did Belgrade use all its leverage in the North to convince or even pressure the people to vote or did they underestimate the strength of the opposition towards the agreement? Read more

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