Tag: European Union
Not ideal, but clearly a step forward
Lady Ashton’s patience has paid off. Belgrade and Priština have finally reached a compromise on integration of four Serb-dominated municipalities of northern Kosovo into the country’s regular institutions. Although the agreement is not ideal since it preserves ethnic-based political divisions, it is clearly a step forward, likely to resolve a number of currently burning issues.
What could prove a serious problem is implementation. Northern Kosovo Serbs have announced they will strongly resist any attempt to enforce the agreement on them. They can count on support from far-right extremists in Serbia who are already mobilizing. Even prime minister Ivica Dačić and his deputy Aleksandar Vučić are receiving hundreds of SMS messages with terrible death threats after their mobile phone numbers have been publicly revealed by members of Vučić’s former ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party. Moreover, a couple of days ago an extremist from the pro-Russian clerical fascist movement “Naši” approached and verbally attacked Dačić during the Belgrade marathon.
While militant nationalists in Serbia may not be as numerous as before, they still pose a considerable threat, in the first place to public safety. Now that Dačić and Vučić are also potentially at risk, they could use it as a well-grounded justification to finally crack down on the militants before it has become too late.
It is hard to say who among Serbian politicians will benefit most from the deal with Priština. Latest opinion polls indicate that more than 50 percent of the public support both the dialogue in general and this particular agreement, but they are at the same time feeling largely fed up with both Kosovo and the European perspective. People want to see a concrete improvement in their standard of living.
In terms of future relationships between Kosovo and Serbia, the dynamic between the two countries will be as important to watch as that within each of them alone. For full-fledged normalization the imperative must be to put an end to deep-rooted mutual distrust between ordinary Albanians and Serbs, not only in Kosovo but also in Serbia. That will require intensive cooperation and a great deal of good will on the part of both governments.
Even more important will be developments inside the European Union in relation to its own crisis, which seems far from over. It is only European integration that is somehow still keeping the Western Balkans relatively calm. The more the crisis deepens, the lesser will be the ability of Brussels to keep the region under control.
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The storm passes but clouds remain
Ganimete Asllani-Price, who is doing her doctorate at Queen’s University Belfast, writes:
On Sunday, Kosovo’s parliament convened to discuss and vote on the initialed agreement reached between Serbia and Kosovo on Friday. Getting parliament’s backing was hugely important for the government. Out of the 95 members of parliament (MP) who voted (there are 120 in total), 89 backed the agreement. This 74 percent approval gives Prime Minister Thaci a boost.
But the discussion in parliament was more nuanced. The majority of opinions expressed before the voting had the same message – members accept the agreement in principle, but worry about wording and implementation. The opposition parties (with one important exception discussed below) agreed on the need to negotiate with Serbia and reach an agreement, but they questioned some of the fifteen points and reserved the right to change their minds when implementation becomes an issue. We may well see more criticism during the next electoral campaign.
The Self-Determination Movement (Levizja Vetendosje) is not waiting. It continued its protest within and outside the parliament building against the negotiation process as a whole and the agreement in particular. They maintain that Thaci is selling Kosovo, that he is not the leader of Kosovo people but a coward and a traitor who serves the European Union and the United States.
For those who follow daily politics in Kosovo, the agreement has become part of the daily political abuse and personal exchanges that has characterized the negotiation process, not only in Kosovo but in Serbia as well. Thus discussion about next steps has not concentrated on the substance or implementation, but on personalities.
Out of the 5 votes that were cast against the agreement, there is one that Thaci and his government need to worry about. The co-founder of his political party and speaker of parliament, Jakup Krasniqi, voted against. Thaci and Krasniqi have been at odds for a while. If Krasniqi breaks with Thaci, it could endanger the majority coalition. Krasniqi’s main concerns are about possible future compromises that may have to be made in order to honor the current agreement. This was a carefully worded warning.
The immediate reaction of the Serbs in the north was decidedly negative, as expected. Serbia, which for the past 14 years has provided a lifeline to them, will have to play a major role in implementation there. Kosovo can do little in the north, as its unilateral attempt to seize border posts there two years ago demonstrated.
In Pristina, the storm is passing, but clouds remain. Any political damage will become apparent in the weeks, months, and possibly years to come, since the hardest part will unquestionably be the implementation of the fifteen points. Self-Determination continues to advocate a referendum on union with Albania, a proposition that Kosovo’s current constitution does not permit. The majority of Kosovo Albanians do not support it. But that could change. The Albanians displaced from northern Kosovo might rise in rebellion as Serbs in the north have. They are the ones who currently are the biggest losers in Kosovo. This agreement does not bring them any closer to their homes.
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Done deal, now the hard part
Belgrade and Pristina have both confirmed their agreement to the 15-point “First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations.” As a result, the European Commission has recommended that the EU open accession negotiations with Serbia and negotiations for a Stabilization and Association Agreement with Kosovo. The Kosovo parliament has already voted in favor of the agreement. The Serbian parliament will consider it this week.
Hooah! as the Marines shout. Congratulations are due especially to Catherine Ashton, the EU’s High Representative, for sticking with this and using the leverage Chancellor Merkel’s insistence on abolition of “parallel structures” in northern Kosovo provided. In a period when Europe is on the ropes, this small victory in its (very) near abroad is particularly welcome. Kudos also to the US government, which played a vital supporting role. This was not “leading from behind” but rather supporting from the wings. It was the right role and well played.
Now comes the hard part. Implementation is never automatic in the Balkans, though the European Commission’s report includes a positive picture of how the previous “technical” agreements are being implemented. The problem now is that the current leadership of the population in northern Kosovo is opposed to integration into Pristina’s police, judicial and electoral frameworks, which is the heart of the new agreement.
Pristina should of course do its best to make integration attractive. It can do this by making funding available for the north and moving with “all deliberated speed” on implementation. Provoking the northerners will do Pristina no good. Provocative language and actions should be avoided. At the same time, the agreement is admirably clear and requires concrete steps be taken. Transparency is important: people need to know what to expect. There will be resistance. Pristina needs to be patient, but firm.
Belgrade has an even greater, if less visible, role. Northern resistance is financed with funding from Belgrade security institutions and from smuggling. Both need to shut down. Some northerners will not want to stay in Kosovo. Their entirely voluntary movement needs to be welcomed in Serbia. Belgrade and Pristina need to collaborate in blocking the illicit trade in goods that are brought into northern Kosovo tax-free from Serbia only to be returned to Serbia or sold south of the Ibar in Kosovo. The political economy is no less important than the politics.
While relieved that an agreement has been reached, I am still concerned about the future. The Belgrade/Pristina dialogue is a classic case of elite pact-making without a broader peacebuilding process. The underlying drivers of conflict have not been addressed. Kosovo Albanians and Serbs, both in Serbia and in Kosovo, still think badly of each other and rank themselves as victims. There has been little mutual acknowledgement of harm in the public sphere. Few Albanians and Serbs have renewed personal ties with the other. It is becoming increasingly difficult to do so as many younger people literally lack a common language (other than English).
It is almost 14 years since the end of the NATO/Yugoslavia war. Europe, which played a supporting role in that conflict, has now played the lead. But it needs Belgrade and Pristina to continue to play their parts. Leverage from the negotiations–respectively for accession and for Stabilization and Association–will be important. But to be self-sustaining, this peace process is going to need to go deeper and involve many more citizens on both sides.
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What Serbs get
I am struck in rereading the Serbia/Kosovo agreement that it is called “First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations.” I assume this reflects mainly Pristina’s view, since the agreement does not go as far as it would like in recognizing Kosovo as a sovereign state. In practice though, this is a moment of strong leverage for Pristina, as the EU is insisting on a settlement of the north as a condition for a starting date for Serbia’s EU accession negotiations. With a date comes money, which Belgrade needs. It is also negotiating a standby arrangement with the International Monetary Fund, but in practice that too may depend on acceptance of the Serbia/Kosovo agreement.
So what else is there in the agreement for Serbia and Serbs?
First and foremost, they get an “Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo.” Established under Kosovo law, the association will “have full overview of the areas of economic development, education, health, urban and rural planning” as well as other areas delegated by the Kosovo authorities. It will also represent the Serb municipalities to the Pristina authorities, including in the council of communities. None of this is new. It is foreseen in the Ahtisaari plan, which Belgrade rejected. It looks to me consistent with the Kosovo constitution.
Belgrade has been particularly concerned to get something on police and justice. Here the agreement is unequivocal in providing for integration of the Serb police into the Kosovo police, with salaries paid only by Pristina. What Serbia got on police was a regional police commander for the north chosen by Pristina from a list of four nominated by the northern Kosovo municipalities. This seems eminently reasonable and hopefully workable.
The agreement is also unequivocal in providing for integration of the justice system in the north under Pristina’s legal framework, but with “a panel composed of a majority of K[osovo]/S[erb] judges to deal with all Kosovo Serb majority municipalities” established by the Appellate Court in Pristina to sit permanently in Mitrovica. This too seems to me consistent with the Ahtisaari plan, though not explicitly provided for in it.
Belgrade has also agreed to elections in the north conducted under Pristina’s legal framework.
The picture is clear: Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo will have wide-ranging authority over their own affairs, as provided for in the Ahtisaari plan. But the parallel police, judicial and electoral structures are to be integrated into the Kosovo constitutional and legal framework. This is precisely what German chancellor Angela Merkel has been asking for: an end to the parallel structures and acceptance by Serbia of Kosovo’s territorial integrity, with wide-ranging self-governance for the Serb community.
I might have liked the EU to go further, and in a back-handed way it did. The final point of the agreement is this:
It is agreed that neither side will block, or encourage others to block, the other side’s progress in their respective EU path.
Belgrade is saying that this provision originally asked that neither side block or encourage others to block entry into international organizations. Certainly it is less expansive than that in the final version. But the implicit meaning here is clear: Kosovo is an independent and sovereign state that will progress towards the EU at its own pace and enter without Serbia exercising a veto. This provision is ample basis for EU non-recognizers to proceed with recognition of Kosovo, if they are so inclined with Belgrade standing down from its campaign against.
What Serbs get then is this: Ahtisaari-style arrangements for the governance of Serbs in Kosovo with some modest additional details of implementation, unequivocally within Pristina’s constitutional and legal framework. It is not a bad deal at all, but one they might have had six years ago.
Belgrade is still claiming it will not recognize Kosovo, but for many practical purposes it already has. If Kosovo governs, polices, administers justice, holds elections and also applies for EU membership like a state on a well-defined territory, it is one, independent and sovereign. This agreement confirms it.
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Credit is due
As the Pristina Gazeta Express has published the Kosovo/Serbia agreement in English and Albanian, I did some quick answers to Shpend Limoni’s questions, which naturally come from the Pristina perspective:
1. Is this agreement in collision with Kosovo’s Constitution ?
A: I don’t see any contradictions with the constitution, but I’ll be interested to hear what others say on this subject. It clearly provides for the police and courts in the north to be part of the Kosovo police and courts, which was a critical issue.
2. Does this agreement mean that Kosovo finally is establishing its own authority in the North ?
A: I think it means the north can now be integrated into the Kosovo constitutional framework, which provides for a good deal of municipal authority as well as cooperation among municipalities.
3. Many in Kosovo are saying this means practically autonomy for Kosovo Serbs? Do you agree with this ?
A: No. The Ahtisaari plan provides for a great deal of self-governance for Serbs throughout Kosovo. It was unrealistic to expect it to be less for the northern municipalities. The association is in the Ahtisaari plan. It is not new.
4. Do you expect swift implementation process ?
A: Anyone who expects swift and easy implementation has not worked long in the Balkans. But there is a good chance of implementation over the next year or so.
5. Part of agreement is about EU integration process. Both sides agreed that won’t block each other ?
A: Yes, that seems to me a good thing and should open up several possibilities for Kosovo: negotiations of a Stabilization and Association Agreement, movement towards a Schengen visa waiver, possibly recognition by at least some of the EU non-recognizers.
6. How all this would reflect in international stage. Could we expect more recognitions ?
A: I hope so. Kosovo has in this negotiation demonstrated a good deal of statesmanship. Consider: a Kosovo prime minister negotiating with a Serbia prime minister extension of Kosovo police and court structures into a territory that Serbia has dominated for 14 years. That does not make anything happen automatically, but I do hope to see some more countries recognize. Credit is due.
PS: Credit is also due to Lady Ashton!
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Priceless
The initialing of the much-negotiated agreement between Kosovo and Serbia is certainly a source for celebration, though of course for Americans it is overshadowed by the capture in Watertown, Massachusetts of a suspect in the Boston marathon bombings. The Tanjug photo of Catherine Ashton looking like a stern schoolteacher with her two unruly but subdued pupils, Prime Ministers Dacic and Thaci, is priceless.
It is impossible to give even a preliminary assessment of the agreement without a text. For the moment, journalistic commentary focuses on who got who to change what. That’s not very interesting to me, though I understand why it interests politicians who have to face the voters. The key questions are the balance in the agreement and the extent to which it can be implemented in a straightforward way. I can’t respond on either issue without a complete text.
Nor is the deal quite done, yet. Initialing froze the text, but as I understand the process Ashton still expects the two sides to confirm their agreement. They will. It is not clear to me whether there is to be a formal signing or not. I imagine Thaci would want one and Dacic not, since it would represent one more step on the way to Serbia acknowledging Kosovo’s statehood.
Serbia is already well down that path. Every time the parties meet, or reach an agreement, Belgrade is implicitly acknowledging that Thaci is the legitimate representative of democratically validated institutions. What Serbia has not acknowledged is Kosovo’s sovereignty, even if the integrated border management inches in that direction. Serbian President Nikolic says it’s the best that could be done and reiterates that Serbia will not allow Kosovo into the UN or recognize it. A close examination of the agreement text is needed to see if there has been any further movement in that direction.
I’ve got colleagues who hail from Kosovo and Serbia working on blogposts about the domestic implications in each of the agreement. Thaci, who has been criticized in Kosovo for knuckling under to American and European pressure, will likely still gain a bit if Kosovars like the substance of the agreement. Dacic has to hope that whatever he gave is more than compensated for by getting a date for EU accession negotiations. That is not a hard test to pass so far as I am concerned, but I am not a typical Serbian voter.
One thing should be clear: Kosovo should likewise move ahead on the path to the EU, albeit several steps behind Serbia. That means a date for negotiation of a Stabilization and Association Agreement as well as expeditious movement on the Schengen visa waiver.
I assume none of these important side deals is written in the agreement, which is meant to bind Belgrade and Pristina, not Brussels. But let’s not kid ourselves: what Brussels had on offer is vital to getting this done and cannot be reneged on.
The text please. Then we’ll really have something to write about.
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