Tag: European Union
Hobson’s nuclear choices
No one seems overwrought that the latest nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 (that’s US, UK, France, Russia, China + Germany) ended inconclusively yesterday in Almaty, Kazakhstan. An agreement on the eve of Iran’s presidential election campaign (voting is scheduled for June 14) was not likely. Iran is looking for acknowledgement of its “right” to enrich uranium, even if it limits the extent of enrichment and the amount of enriched material. The P5+1, led by European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, are looking for strict limits on enrichment (to 5% or below, with most more highly enriched materials shipped out of the country) and tight international inspections without acknowledging Iran’s right to enrich. They are also looking for suspension of enrichment at Iran’s underground facility at Fordo and a strict accounting for past activities, which appear to have included some nuclear weapons development.
There are related non-nuclear issues on which the gaps may be greater. Iran wants sanctions relief up front as well as cooperation on Syria and Bahrain. The Western members of the P5+1 want to maintain sanctions until they have satisfactory commitments and implementation that prevent Iran from ever having a nuclear weapons program. They are not willing to soften their support for the revolution in Syria against Iran’s ally Bashar al Asad or for the Sunni minority monarchy in Bahrain, which faces a Shia protest movement that Iran supports.
The Israelis are the only ones who seem seriously perturbed:
“This failure was predictable,” Yuval Steinitz, Israel’s minister of strategic affairs, said in a statement. “Israel has already warned that the Iranians are exploiting the talks in order to play for time while making additional progress in enriching uranium for an atomic bomb.” He added, “The time has come for the world to take a more assertive stand and make it unequivocally clear to the Iranians that the negotiations games have run their course.”
But there is precious little they can do about the situation. An Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities will do relatively little damage but will end the prospect of a negotiated solution and make Tehran redouble its efforts to get nuclear weapons. President Obama is in no hurry to do the more thorough job the Americans are capable of. He seems satisfied that there is still time. The Iranians have in fact been slowing their accumulation of 20% enriched uranium by converting some of it to fuel plates for their isotope production reactor, which makes the material difficult to enrich further. The Israelis may not like it, but it looks as if everyone will hold their breath until after the Iranian election, when the question of further meetings and a possible agreement will arise again.
In the meanwhile, the Iranians will be watching North Korea closely. It has tested several nuclear weapons and presumably made more. Pyongyang is sounding committed not just to keeping them but to acquiring the missile capability to deliver them. While the press makes a great deal of Kim Jong-un’s threats against the United States, he represents a much more immediate threat to South Korea and Japan. If he manages to hold on to his nuclear weapons and thereby stabilizes his totalitarian regime, the Iranian theocrats will read it as encouragement to continue their own nuclear quest.
With the “sequester” budget cuts forcing retrenchment on many fronts, Washington is trying for negotiated solutions and hesitating to enforce its will that neither Iran nor North Korea acquire serious nuclear capabilities. It is hoping the Chinese will help with Pyongyang, which nevertheless seems increasingly committed to maintaining and expanding its nuclear capabilities. Tehran has slowed its accumulation of nuclear material but is expanding its technological capability to move rapidly if a decision is made to move ahead. President Obama could soon face a Hobson’s choice in both cases: either act militarily, despite the costs and consequences, or accept two new nuclear powers, despite the costs and consequences.
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Black smoke and fortitude
The EU-sponsored talks between Belgrade and Pristina concerning northern Kosovo and related issues ended last night without an agreement. The delegations returned home to consider their options. The Kosovo delegation appears reasonably satisfied with whatever is on the table, which presumably meets Prime Minister Thaci’s requirement that any agreement be consistent with the Kosovo constitution (which incorporates the Ahtisaari Comprehensive Peace Settlement).
Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Vucic offered to resign. This I suppose means that he was the stickler. This is not as surprising as some may imagine. While allowing “Socialist” Prime Minister Dacic lots of rope (to hang himself with) in the bilateral dialogue, “Progressives” President Nikolic and Vucic have been absolutely committed to maintaining Serbia’s claim to sovereignty over all of Kosovo. They will also want a deal for the Serbs in northern Kosovo that includes police and courts as well as most other things outside Pristina’s control. Why they thought they could achieve either of these goals is beyond me.
Lady Ashton, who has handled this negotiation well, now needs to wait the Serbs out. No one in Belgrade ever agreed to a deal until the very last moment, hoping to get more by holding out. Ashton does not report on progress in the talks until mid-April. Letting Nikolic and Vucic contemplate the loss (at least for a couple of years) of the opportunity to open accession negotiations with the EU is the only way to get them to move from whatever position they’ve dug themselves into.
Vucic in particular has a lot at stake. He has been riding high on anti-corruption efforts, including some that have embarrassed Dacic. It had been widely anticipated that Nikolic would call early elections, hoping to capitalize while blaming Dacic for any loss in the Kosovo negotiations. I suppose it is possible for the Progressives to do well in elections by saying that they chose Kosovo over the EU, but if they do that they will be nailing the door to EU accession shut for a good long time. It would be much better for Serbia to go to early elections with an EU date for accession talks announced.
Suzana Grubjesic, the minister in charge of EU integration, was in Brussels with the Serbian delegation. I trust she will tell her bosses how dumb it would be to pass up this opportunity. Serbia needs the funds that come with accession talks. There is also a real possibility the EU could close the political door to new members, even though Serbia has been moving relatively quickly to meet the technical requirements. The euro crisis is not yet history. If it gets worse, Serbia could find itself on the slow boat to EU membership, along with Kosovo.
A lot now depends on something the EU is often lacking: fortitude. But this is a case where the EU requirement for consensus does not necessarily lead to a lowest common denominator solution. All 27 members have to agree to open accession talks with Serbia. German Chancellor Merkel has been vital to keeping the EU dialogue on track. If she remains stalwart in insisting on dissolution of the parallel Serbian structures in northern Kosovo, we could see not only progress in normalizing relations between Kosovo and Serbia but also an EU that learns to use its diplomatic clout well.
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Peace picks April 2 – 5
We are late with the peace picks, but here they are for the remainder of the week:
1. Nagorno-Karabakh: Understanding Conflict, Tuesday April 2, 4:30 PM- 6:00 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Rome Building, Johns Hopkins SAIS, 1619 Massachusetts Ave NW DC
Students from the January 2013 SAIS trip to the Caucasus region will discuss their findings and present reports based on their interviews with leaders and members of international organizations in the region about the roots of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Website: http://sais-jhu.edu/events/2013-04-02…
2. ‘New Challenges in Europe and the Middle East: A Conversation With Julianne Smith’, Tuesday April 2, 6:00 PM – 7:30 PM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Rome Building Johns Hopkins SAIS, 1619 Massachusetts Ave NW DC
Speakers: Julianne Smith
Julianne Smith, U.S. deputy national security adviser in the Office of the Vice President, will discuss this topic.Note: The speakers comments will be off the record. A reception will follow the event immediately after in Room 812, Rome Building.
Website: http://sais-jhu.edu/events/2013-04-02…
3. Colombia: Land and the Agenda for Peace, Wednesday April 3, 1:00 PM -5:30 PM, US Institute of Peace
Venue: US Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Ave NW, Washington
Speakers: Absalón Machado, Carlos Salgado, Ricardo Sabogal, Ángela Suárez Álvarez, Zoraida Castillo, Yamilé Salinas and more
Five months ago, formal peace talks were launched between the government of Colombia and the FARC-EP guerrillas. The early rounds of talks have focused on the issue of agrarian development-the first of six agreed agenda items. Highly skewed land tenure patterns, a root cause of Colombia’s longstanding internal armed conflict, have worsened over time as guerrilla insurgents, paramilitary groups, drug traffickers, agro-industrialists and the State battle for control of land, resources, and geo-strategic corridors. This violence has displaced five million Colombians, forced the evacuation of an estimated 20 million hectares of land, and produced a ‘reverse agrarian reform’ that consolidates one of the most inequitable land tenure systems in the world. What proposals are being developed to address these land inequities, to restitute the victims of Colombia’s internal armed conflict, and to build sustainable peace?
Please join us on April 3, 2013 to discuss the relationship of land and the peace agenda. The event will provide a platform for discussion among a variety of stakeholders from the U.S. and Colombian governments, victims and affected parties, academics, international organizations, and NGOs. This event is co-sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace and the U.S. Office on Colombia, with the support of U.S. Agency for International Development, U.N. Development Program, Latin America Working Group Education Fund, Mercy Corps, Inter-American Foundation, and Lutheran World Relief.
Website: http://www.usip.org/events/colombia-l…
4. Muslim Nationalists and the New Turks — A Conversation with Jenny White, Wednesday April 3 6:30 PM – 8:30 PM, Elliott School of International Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20052 Lindner Family Commons
Speakers: Jenny White
Jenny White, Associate Professor and Director, Undergraduate Studies, Anthropology Department, Boston University
Jenny White is an associate professor and director of undergraduate studies in the anthropology department at Boston University. She is the former president of the Turkish Studies Association and of the American Anthropological Association Middle East Section, and sits on the board of the Institute of Turkish Studies. She is the author of Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics (2002, winner of the 2003 Douglass Prize for best book in Europeanist anthropology) and Money Makes Us Relatives: Women’s Labor in Urban Turkey (second edition, London: Routledge, 2004). She also has written three historical novels set in 19th century Istanbul, The Sultan’s Seal (2006), The Abyssinian Proof (2008), and The Winter Thief (2010).
She will be discussing her most recent book: Muslim Nationalists and the New Turks.
*A book signing and wine reception will follow. Limited copies of the book will be available for GW students.*
RSVP: tinyurl.com/afppzwu
Sponsored by the Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS
Website: http://www.elliottschool.org/events/c…
5. China’s Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas,Thursday April 4 9:00 AM- 3:00 PM
Venue: Dirksen Senate Office Building, Constitution Avenue and 1st Street, NE, Washington, DCG-50
The hearing will explore the security, political, and economic drivers of China’s maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas. In addition, this hearing will examine the implications of these disputes for the United States as well as prospects for resolution.
Website: http://www.uscc.gov
6. Women in a Changing Middle East: An Address by Under Secretary of State Tara Sonenshine, Thursday, April 4 11:00 AM – 12:30 PM, Brookings Institution
Venue: Falk Auditorium Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW D.C.
Speakers: Tamara Cofman Wittes, The Honorable Tara Sonenshine
As Arab citizens struggle to rewrite the rules defining their societies, the role and status of Arab women is a sharp focus of debate. Arab women have been at the forefront of change, but have also faced unprecedented challenges. How central is women’s empowerment to the success of Arab societies, and how important are women’s rights in the struggle for democracy? What is the U.S. doing to help Arab women (and men) to advance women and girls in their societies?
On April 4, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Tara Sonenshine for an address on women in the Middle East. Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes, director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, will provide introductory remarks and moderate a discussion with Under Secretary Sonenshine after her remarks.
Website: http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~r/Broo…
7. U.S. Foreign Policy: The Next Four Years, Thursday April 4 6:00 PM-7:15 PM, Elliott School of International Affairs
Venue: Lindner Family Commons,
Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street, NW, D.C.
Speakers: Maurice Mickey East, Harry Harding, Michael E. Brown, Hope M. Harrison
Maurice Mickey East, Dean, School of Public and International Affairs, GW (1985-1987); Dean, School of International Affairs, GW (1987-1988); Dean, Elliott School of International Affairs, GW (1988-1994)
Harry Harding, Dean, Elliott School of International Affairs, GW
(1995-2005)
Michael E. Brown, Dean, Elliott School of International Affairs, GW (2005-Present)
Moderated by:
Hope M. Harrison, Associate Professor of History and International Affairs
RSVP: go.gwu.edu/ThreeDeans
Sponsored by the Elliott School of International Affairs
Website: http://www.elliottschool.org/events/c…
8. Afghan Elections: One Year to Go, Friday April 5 10:00 AM-12:00 PM, US Institute of Peace
Venue: USIP, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW D.C.
Speakers: Nader Nadery, Scott Smith, Hossai Wardak, Scott Worden
Webcast: This event will be webcast live beginning at 10:00am ET on April 5, 2013 at www.usip.org/webcast.
April 5 marks the start of the one-year countdown to Afghanistan’s presidential election. Because of constitutional term limits, this will be the first time in post-9/11 Afghanistan that Hamid Karzai is not on a presidential ballot. The fact that this unprecedented handover of presidential power occurs in the same year that international forces hand over security responsibility to Afghan national forces further increases the importance of the presidential election.
Afghans frequently highlight the inter-related nature of the upcoming security and political transitions in Afghanistan, and the importance of elections that produce a legitimate outcome for future peace and stability of Afghanistan. Furthermore, previous flawed elections have made many Afghans doubt the integrity of the democratic process.
If the April 5 election is not a marked improvement on past elections, the democratic progress that Afghanistan has made so far will be put in jeopardy. Please join a panel of experts at USIP to discuss the critically important technical and political issues that need to be addressed during the next 365 days in order for the elections to produce a credible and legitimate outcome.
Website: http://www.usip.org/events/afghan-ele…
9. Women’s Roles in Terrorist Movements, Friday April 5 6:00 PM-8:00 PM, Institute of World Politics
Venue: Institute of World Politics, 1521 16th Street NW DC
Speakers: Paula Holmes-Eber, Christopher C. Harmon
This event is hosted by IWP’s Student Government Association.
In the Latin, Asian, Middle Eastern, and European regions, revolutionary political movements have been accepting and deploying women in various and important roles: cadre; mid-level organizers; intelligence agents; couriers; combatants of many sorts; and suicide bombers. In unusual cases, women have also held senior leadership posts in undergrounds; a few have run their own terror organizations. What are the reasons for, and effects of, incorporating females into sub-state fighting organizations? What are the ‘lessons learned’ for intelligence analysts, military personnel, and students of the social sciences focused on culture and war?
IWP is holding a lecture-and-discussion opening to such issues on Friday, April 5, at 6:00 PM. The speakers are Dr. Paula Holmes-Eber (anthropologist) and Dr. Christopher C. Harmon (who teaches a terrorism course for IWP). Both represent Marine Corps University in Quantico, VA.
Paula Holmes-Eber, Ph.D. is Professor of Operational Culture at Marine Corps University. She is responsible for creating and teaching curricula on cultural aspects of conflict for all four schools at the university: Expeditionary Warfare School, Command and Staff College, School of Advanced Warfighting and Marine Corps War College. She also supports and advises staff at the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, Quantico, VA on academic matters concerning warfighting and culture, Islam, Arab society and North Africa.
Dr. Holmes-Eber completed her Master’s and Doctoral degrees in Anthropology from Northwestern University. She holds a B.A. magna cum laude from Dartmouth College, a Certificate in African Studies from Northwestern University and a Certificate in Tunisian Arabic from the Ecole Bourguiba des Langues Vivantes in Tunis, Tunisia. Her research and expertise focus on kinship and social networks in Arab and Muslim culture in North Africa.
Prior to her current position at Marine Corps University, Dr. Holmes-Eber was an Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and a Visiting Scholar in the Middle East Center at the Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington. She is fluent in French, Arabic, German and Italian and has lived and traveled in over forty countries around the world including Tunisia, Morocco, Turkey, Israel, Mongolia, China, Taiwan, Japan, Russia and Tonga.
Christopher C. Harmon, Ph.D. has had 21 years of teaching security studies, strategy, military theory & history, and courses on terrorism at six graduate schools, including a division of National Defense University, and the Naval War College.
Currently, he teaches Terrorism and Counterterrorism at IWP and is MajGen Matthew C. Horner Chair of Military Theory at Marine Corps University.
Dr. Harmon has served as Curricula Director for the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch Germany. He has also served as the Kim T. Adamson Chair of Insurgency & Terrorism, Marine Corps University at Quantico, VA, and as Professor of International Relations at the University’s Command and Staff College. He has done academic research fellowships with the Earhart Foundation; Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace; Claremont Institute.
Dr. Harmon holds a B.A. in History and French Language from Seattle University, where he graduated summa cum laude, and an M.A. in Government and a Ph.D. in International Relations and Government from Claremont Graduate School.
Dr. Harmon is the author of Terrorism Today, co-author of Toward a Grand Strategy Against Terrorism, and co-editor of Statecraft and Power. His article ‘Spain’s ETA Terrorist Group is Dying’ was published in the geopolitics journal ORBIS in Fall 2012.
Website: http://www.iwp.edu/events/detail/wome…
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The time to settle is now
Regular readers will find it odd that I recommend a piece by Jerry Gallucci, with whom I often disagree. But this time he has got it mostly right.
While buying a bit of Serb credit with stabs at the EU and US as “misguided” and even “dangerous” and Pristina as “maximalist,” Jerry goes on to reject what Belgrade is asking for in the negotiations over northern Kosovo. The Ahtisaari plan, he suggests, is adequate.
He’s right. Belgrade is the maximalist party in this negotiation, not Pristina, which has realized from the first that reintegration of northern Kosovo will require time and patience as well as improved relations with Belgrade.
Belgrade’s bottom line, as cited by Jerry, requires satisfaction on all these criteria for the Serb association of municipalities:
- whether it would have its own powers (or carry out those given to the municipalities), executive council and assets
- whether it would operate under the law of Kosovo
- whether it would have an elected or delegated assembly
- whether it would have the power to assign and confirm places of residence, determine electoral registers and the composition of a separate court
- whether its decisions would need to be approved by Pristina
- whether there would be a “mechanism” for Serb participation in central government bodies
- whether Kosovo security services would stay out of the north.
Meeting these requirements would not only create a separate Serbian “entity” (like Republika Srpska, the Serb entity within Bosnia) but would also in essence make that entity virtually independent and give it de facto power to block Kosovo’s entry into the European Union by ensuring it could not implement the acquis communitaire on the entity’s territory.
No one in Serbia would imagine that Belgrade could or would agree to such arrangements for the Albanian-majority communities of southern Serbia. There is no reason to expect Pristina to agree to them for Serbian-majority communities in northern Kosovo. Kudos to Jerry for recognizing that this is a road to nowhere.
And more kudos for recognizing, albeit obliquely (the headline writer did it more directly than in Jerry’s text), that the Ahtisaari plan is adequate for purposes of protecting vital Serb interests in northern Kosovo. The sooner Belgrade realizes that the negotiation with Pristina is about how the Ahtisaari plan is to be implemented, not about additional criteria that need to be met, the quicker it will see the EU and US plump for opening accession negotiations. Conditionality has brought the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue as far as it has come. And it will be vital to closing the deal, no matter how much Jerry (and Belgrade) don’t like it.
Given what is happening between the EU and Cyprus, whose banks have handled (shall I say laundered?) a lot of Serb funds over the past two decades, it would be a serious mistake for Belgrade to cause any further delay. The EU has somehow kept open the possibility of beginning accession negotiations with Serbia, despite Belgrade’s continued insistence on claiming sovereignty over all of Kosovo, growing enlargement fatigue and the euro crisis. There is a real possibility the door will slam shut after Croatia’s entry in July. The time to settle on the reintegration of northern Kosovo (and allow Kosovo to join the UN as well as other international bodies) is now.
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We expect our friends to govern well
Margarita Kadriu, editor of the Pristina daily Kosova Sot, asked some questions. Here is what I replied. The interview should have been published in Albanian today:
Q: There are different statements in Belgrade and Prishtina about the possibility of an agreement between the parties, with the guarantee of Mrs. Ashton. Do you expect this dialogue to succeed?
A: I hope it succeeds. It is not guaranteed to succeed. There are real difficulties ahead for both Belgrade and Pristina.
Q: Serbia requested an autonomous community of the Serb municipalities, while Kosovo is agreed to have an Association of Serb Municipalities without executive powers. Is it dangerous for the stability of Kosovo such an association if it creates a new level of legislative or executive power?
A: Kosovo is well within its rights to ask three things: that whatever is agreed be consistent with the Ahtisaari agreement; whatever the Serbs get inside Kosovo should be available also inside Serbia to Albanians; that nothing should impede Kosovo’s progress towards European Union membership.
Q: Despite talks about normalizing relations, Serbia continues to have territorial claims about a part of Kosovo. Will the pressure from Brussels be sufficient to make Belgrade give up from this claim?
A: I don’t know, but I do think it important. Kosovo should not need to live with a neighbor claiming all or part of its territory. As I understand the situation today, the claim is over all of Kosovo, not just a part.
Q: It is mentioned an amnesty for the Serbs of the North who have been part of parallel structures. Is this a right thing to do?
A: I don’t see participation in the parallel structures as something people should be punished for, in and of itself. The question is whether they committed criminal acts: violence, property theft, expulsion of people from their homes and other crimes. A bit of understanding for those who cooperated with institutions that they thought legitimate is in order.
Q: Serbia’s urgent need is to get “the date,” while Kosovo has been promised the launch of negotiations for the S[tability and] A[ssociation] A[greement]. Which country has more urgent need to find a solution for the North in relation with the EU?
A: It seems to me clear that Serbia has the more urgent need. I don’t think a launch of SAA negotiations has the same significance in Kosovo that the launch of accession negotiations has in Serbia.
Q: Seeing the progress of dialogue, do you see any opportunity for creation of some sort of Republika Srpska in northern Kosovo?
A: I think it is something people in Kosovo are right to worry about. The question is whether the authority entrusted to the Pristina government will be sufficient to qualify the country for EU membership. That is not the case in Bosnia today. I would not want to see that disease infect Kosovo.
Q: A part of the opposition, “Vetevendosje,” is calling Prime Minister Thaci traitor, saying that he is trading with the North. How consistent is this accusation?
A: I don’t think it is appropriate to call anyone a traitor. The opposition has to criticize the government—that’s its role. But the Prime Minister is clearly trying to do the best he can for the country. I find it a bit surprising that an opposition that opposes clauses of the constitution and advocates a referendum on union with another country would call anyone a traitor.
Q: While continuing talks with Serbia, Kosovo has other important emergencies, especially in the development of the economy, attracting foreign investors, improving the environment for doing business. Recently, there is an increase of people’s dissatisfaction about the living standard, bills, privatization of public companies. Do you think that there is a risk from social unrest?
A: There is always a risk of social unrest, even when times are good. That Kosovo has a lot of problems is clear. I too look forward to the day it can focus on those and not on relations with Belgrade
Q: The rule of law is a strong concern in Kosovo. Judiciary suffers from political influences, various abuses, nepotism and misuse of justice. Is EULEX THE rescue mechanism, or Kosovars themselves should be able to strengthen the justice?
A: In the end, it will be courageous Kosovars who bring justice to the country. EULEX is trying hard to help, but there is no substitute for courageous police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and journalists.
Q: We hear a lot about corruption and it is a disease of all the countries in the region. How do you see the way out of this high degree of corruption affairs that have characterized the country several times?
A: The way out is good governance, which depends on transparency and accountability. You’ve seen how Croatia has moved in that direction. Serbia is moving too. Join the parade.
Q: This year there are foreseen local elections to be held, but there are voices that support the idea of holding national elections, too. Is this a good idea, or a premature one?
A: I think I’ll leave to Kosovo’s elected politicians the responsibility for deciding when to hold elections.
Q: Let’s talk a little bit now also about some developments in the region. Again, we have tensions in Macedonia. Why this country is continuing to have troubles?
A: Macedonia has well-known problems: the name issue with Greece, sometimes tense inter-ethnic relations and difficulty in meeting European political standards, even where ethnic differences are not involved. But it has done relatively well economically, has reformed its military and participates in the NATO mission in Afghanistan, and has a long record of inter-ethnic collaboration in governing the country. I hope to see Macedonia sort out its problems and continue to progress.
Q: In Albania, this year is crucial election year in relation to the EU. Do you believe that Tirana will pass this test?
A: I really don’t know. I hope so. Good elections are fundamental to qualifying for EU membership.
Q: Let’s conclude this interview with a Gallup poll that shows Albania and Kosovo as the most pro-American countries. What effect has this sentiment in relation to Washington?
A: Albanian and Kosovar affection for the United States are much appreciated in Washington, including by me, but of course we expect our good friends to contribute to regional peace and security, govern well and respect the rights of all their citizens.
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Can Syria be saved?
I spoke yesterday on “Can Syria Be Saved” at the Italian Institute of International Affairs (IAI). I was honored at the last minute by Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Staffan de Mistura, who joined the event and provided some comments. Here are the notes I used, amplified with Stefano’s comments and a bit of the Q and A:
1. The situation inside Syria
Military: The regime can clear, but less and less; the revolution can clear more and more. Neither can hold securely or build without the other being able to strike. This is the significance of air power and Scuds, which prevent consolidation of rebel control.
Civilian: The government is doing all right in areas that are loyal, but not gaining and under severe economic pressure. The revolution is unable to supply many areas outside government control and therefore unable to consolidate control and support.
2. Who is doing what outside Syria
There is no sign of the Russians or Iranians abandoning Assad, despite some change in Russian rhetoric. Russian arms supplies continue. Iranian forces are active within Syria, as is Hizbollah. Arms are flowing to the opposition, but unevenly and not always what they need.
The June 2012 Geneva communique, which provides for a fully empowered transition government approved by both the regime and the opposition, is still the only agreed diplomatic route. Brahimi is quiet, which is the best way to be until he has something definite. The Americans are exasperated but unwilling as yet to send arms. The naming of a prime minister this week should bring more civilian assistance, which is already topping $400 million from the US.
3. Why Obama hesitates to intervene more decisively, why Putin backs Assad
President Obama’s hesitation has little to do with Syria. He recognizes full well that a successful revolution there will be a blow to Iran and Hizbollah, but even an unsuccessful one is bleeding them profusely. The main issues for Obama are the Northern Distribution Network, which is vital for American withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the P5+1 nuclear negotiations with Iran. He does not want to risk alienating the Russians on either front.
For the Russians, the main issues are no longer the port and arms sales, if ever they were. Now the question is one of prestige and power. Putin is defining his Russia in explicitly anti-Western terms, all the more so since what he portrays as Western trickery during the Libya intervention.
For Iran, the issue is an existential one. Loss of Syria would disable the connection to Hizbollah and isolate Iran from the Arab world, with the important exception of Iraq. This would be a big loss to a country that thinks of itself increasingly as a regional hegemon. The Islamic Republic would regard the loss of Syria as a big blow.
4. Options for the US and Europe
Britain and France are considering supplying weapons. That is unlikely to buy much allegiance. The best that can be hoped for is to strengthen relatively secularist and pro-Western forces, but that is going to be diffficult given the good military and relief performance of the Islamists, including those the US regards as extremist and even linked to Al Qaeda.
The US hesitates about arms transfers because of “fast and furious,” a US government scheme to track weapons transferred to the Mexican cartels. One of the weapons was used to kill an American border patrol agent. If an American-supplied shoulder-fired missile were to bring down a commercial aircraft, the incident would have major domestic political repurcussions.
Washington is instead focusing on enabling the civilian side, in particularly the newly named Prime Minister Ghassan Hitto and whatever interim government he cobbles together. This should certainly include ample humanitarian assistance and operating expenses.
It might also include military intervention, since the Hitto government won’t be safe inside Syria if Assad continues to use his air force and Scuds. The idea gaining ground outside the US administration is to destroy as much of that capability as possible while it sits on the ground. No one in Washington wants a no-fly zone that requires daily patroling. This is also a possible response to chemical weapons, whose possible use was mentioned during the IAI event but the facts were still very unclear (as they still are today so far as I can tell).
5. Possible outcomes and their implications
The fall of Bashar will be a beginning, not an end. It is not clear that the state structure in this Levant will hold. Lebanon is clearly at risk. You’ve got Kurds in Syria and Iraq who want to unite, in addition to an ongoing if somewhat sporadic Kurdish insurgency inside Turkey. You’ve got Sunnis in Iraq fighting in Syria who might eventually turn around and fight again in Iraq. You’ve got Alawites, Druze, Christians and others who will want to protect their own communities, isolated from others in enclaves.
Even if the state structure holds, there are big questions about the future direction of Syria. Will Islamists triumph? Of which variety? Will secularists do as badly in a post-war transition as they have in Egypt? The opposition in Syria agrees that the state should remain intact, but will it be able to under pressure from a “stay-behind” insurgency like the one that Saddam Hussein mounted in Iraq?
I also ran quickly through the options for post-war Syria that I’ve already published.
Staffan reacted underlining the importance of continuing to talk with the Russians, who are convinced that the intervention in Libya has opened the door to Al Qaeda extremism in Mali and Syria. He also underlined the importance of the opposition forming an inclusive and cohesive government that enunciates a clear plan for how to deal with the previous regime, including an exit for Bashar al Assad, and how to provide guarantees to the Alawites. He underlined that we should be putting together an international peacekeeping force now. We should not be tricked into international intervention by allegations of chemical weapons use.
I’ll stop my account there, as I’ve already gone on too long. It was a stimulating discussion. Many thanks to my hosts at IAI!
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