Tag: European Union
Can Syria be saved?
I spoke yesterday on “Can Syria Be Saved” at the Italian Institute of International Affairs (IAI). I was honored at the last minute by Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Staffan de Mistura, who joined the event and provided some comments. Here are the notes I used, amplified with Stefano’s comments and a bit of the Q and A:
1. The situation inside Syria
Military: The regime can clear, but less and less; the revolution can clear more and more. Neither can hold securely or build without the other being able to strike. This is the significance of air power and Scuds, which prevent consolidation of rebel control.
Civilian: The government is doing all right in areas that are loyal, but not gaining and under severe economic pressure. The revolution is unable to supply many areas outside government control and therefore unable to consolidate control and support.
2. Who is doing what outside Syria
There is no sign of the Russians or Iranians abandoning Assad, despite some change in Russian rhetoric. Russian arms supplies continue. Iranian forces are active within Syria, as is Hizbollah. Arms are flowing to the opposition, but unevenly and not always what they need.
The June 2012 Geneva communique, which provides for a fully empowered transition government approved by both the regime and the opposition, is still the only agreed diplomatic route. Brahimi is quiet, which is the best way to be until he has something definite. The Americans are exasperated but unwilling as yet to send arms. The naming of a prime minister this week should bring more civilian assistance, which is already topping $400 million from the US.
3. Why Obama hesitates to intervene more decisively, why Putin backs Assad
President Obama’s hesitation has little to do with Syria. He recognizes full well that a successful revolution there will be a blow to Iran and Hizbollah, but even an unsuccessful one is bleeding them profusely. The main issues for Obama are the Northern Distribution Network, which is vital for American withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the P5+1 nuclear negotiations with Iran. He does not want to risk alienating the Russians on either front.
For the Russians, the main issues are no longer the port and arms sales, if ever they were. Now the question is one of prestige and power. Putin is defining his Russia in explicitly anti-Western terms, all the more so since what he portrays as Western trickery during the Libya intervention.
For Iran, the issue is an existential one. Loss of Syria would disable the connection to Hizbollah and isolate Iran from the Arab world, with the important exception of Iraq. This would be a big loss to a country that thinks of itself increasingly as a regional hegemon. The Islamic Republic would regard the loss of Syria as a big blow.
4. Options for the US and Europe
Britain and France are considering supplying weapons. That is unlikely to buy much allegiance. The best that can be hoped for is to strengthen relatively secularist and pro-Western forces, but that is going to be diffficult given the good military and relief performance of the Islamists, including those the US regards as extremist and even linked to Al Qaeda.
The US hesitates about arms transfers because of “fast and furious,” a US government scheme to track weapons transferred to the Mexican cartels. One of the weapons was used to kill an American border patrol agent. If an American-supplied shoulder-fired missile were to bring down a commercial aircraft, the incident would have major domestic political repurcussions.
Washington is instead focusing on enabling the civilian side, in particularly the newly named Prime Minister Ghassan Hitto and whatever interim government he cobbles together. This should certainly include ample humanitarian assistance and operating expenses.
It might also include military intervention, since the Hitto government won’t be safe inside Syria if Assad continues to use his air force and Scuds. The idea gaining ground outside the US administration is to destroy as much of that capability as possible while it sits on the ground. No one in Washington wants a no-fly zone that requires daily patroling. This is also a possible response to chemical weapons, whose possible use was mentioned during the IAI event but the facts were still very unclear (as they still are today so far as I can tell).
5. Possible outcomes and their implications
The fall of Bashar will be a beginning, not an end. It is not clear that the state structure in this Levant will hold. Lebanon is clearly at risk. You’ve got Kurds in Syria and Iraq who want to unite, in addition to an ongoing if somewhat sporadic Kurdish insurgency inside Turkey. You’ve got Sunnis in Iraq fighting in Syria who might eventually turn around and fight again in Iraq. You’ve got Alawites, Druze, Christians and others who will want to protect their own communities, isolated from others in enclaves.
Even if the state structure holds, there are big questions about the future direction of Syria. Will Islamists triumph? Of which variety? Will secularists do as badly in a post-war transition as they have in Egypt? The opposition in Syria agrees that the state should remain intact, but will it be able to under pressure from a “stay-behind” insurgency like the one that Saddam Hussein mounted in Iraq?
I also ran quickly through the options for post-war Syria that I’ve already published.
Staffan reacted underlining the importance of continuing to talk with the Russians, who are convinced that the intervention in Libya has opened the door to Al Qaeda extremism in Mali and Syria. He also underlined the importance of the opposition forming an inclusive and cohesive government that enunciates a clear plan for how to deal with the previous regime, including an exit for Bashar al Assad, and how to provide guarantees to the Alawites. He underlined that we should be putting together an international peacekeeping force now. We should not be tricked into international intervention by allegations of chemical weapons use.
I’ll stop my account there, as I’ve already gone on too long. It was a stimulating discussion. Many thanks to my hosts at IAI!
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Doing the right thing
Belgrade daily Blic asked this afternoon:
We would like your short[ly] comment on the statement of president of Serbia Mr. Tomislav Nikolic that vicepresident of USA Mr Joseph Biden is not well informed about Serbian politics on Kosovo.
I responded:
That just means Mr. Biden said something Mr. Nikolic did not like. It would be surprising if it were otherwise: Mr. Biden knows the Balkans better than any other prominent American politician. He has been a strong supporter of Kosovo independence and a united Bosnia and Herzegovina. What could he have possibly said that would please Mr. Nikolic?
A word or two more may be in order.
Joe Biden has also been an advocate of a softer approach to Serbia, which the Obama Administration assiduously pursued for its entire first term. It got nothing, so far as I can tell, in return. That of course corresponded mainly to Boris Tadic’s presidency, when both Europeans and Americans tredded lightly so as not to weaken the relatively moderate Tadic, who was challenged only from the nationalist right (principally by Nikolic).
Now that Nikolic is in power, there really is no reason to tred lightly. Neither Europeans nor Americans are inclined to do so. The Germans have been particularly forceful in insisting on the dismantling of Serbian parallel structures in northern Kosovo. The result has been realy progress, though no final agreement yet, in the Belgrade/Pristina talks.
There is some hope in Washington that Nikolic will also prove more pliable on Bosnia. He is not tied, as Boris Tadic was, to the Republika Srpska president, Milorad Dodik. My guess is that Dodik is doing his best to remedy that. The Americans likely figure that they will get more from Nikolic on Bosnia with a tough line these days than with the failed soft line they used without success in the past.
The Balkans do not rank high on Washington’s list of priorities these days. Even Joe Biden may not be so well-informed about Serbian politics on Kosovo, as Nikolic suggested. But the Vice President is still doing the right thing to insist that Serbia accept reality in Kosovo and Bosnia.
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Delaying the inevitable
Blic Online late last night published what purports to be a draft text of a Pristina/Belgrade agreement, one supposedly agreed by the EU and Pristina. It seems to me, as one would expect, consistent with the Ahtisaari plan in many of its details, and it follows the spirit of the Ahtisaari plan in ending at least some of the Serbian campaign against Kosovo membership in “international bodies” with
economic, cultural, and social (including sporting) purposes. Serbia shall not block Kosovo’s membership in the OSCE.
But it falls short of Kosovo membership in the United Nations.
It is difficult to comment on a text that was likely prepared originally in English, translated by Blic and retranslated into English for me by a kind reader. Nor is it clear where the original came from or how close to a final agreement this text may be. Is it being published now to test Serbian and Kosovar reaction? Does it genuinely represent something Pristina can accept?
I don’t know. Nor am I likely to know, as the diplomats will not want to discuss in public the status of this text.
What it shows, however, is that the two sides, one way or the other, are dealing with key issues: how can the Serb population of northern Kosovo participate in Kosovo institutions and still avail itself of the Ahtisaari plan’s provisions for governing themselves? How can Kosovo’s interest in maintaining a single judicial and security framework be satisfied while allowing wide latitude to local governance in the other respects provided for by Ahtisaari?
The devil here is not so much in the details. It is in the broader context. While this text purports to be status neutral, it would in principle allow Kosovo to join a lot of international bodies, some of which are open to membership only to sovereign states. That is, so far as I know, the case for the 57-member Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
Here there is a problem. The text obligates Serbia not to block (or encourage others to block) membership, but others would of course be free to continue to do so. The European Union has five non-recognizing states any one of which might block Kosovo membership. It is my hope that there is a clear and unequivocal understanding that none of the EU member states will block Kosovo membership.
That still does not solve the problem, because Russia could still be an obstacle where it is a member, including the OSCE. What this shows it seems to me is the difficulty of partial solutions that purport to be status neutral. Kosovo membership in the UN would end all discussion of its eligibility for membership elsewhere. Taking a step-by-step approach is fraught with difficulty, and inconsistent with the spirit of the original Ahtisaari plan, which foresaw universal recognition of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state.
The simple fact, recognized almost as much on the streets of Belgrade as on the streets of Pristina, is that Kosovo is no longer part of Serbia and will never again be. Delaying the inevitable may be the best that can be done right now, but it means a continuing uphill struggle for a state that needs to focus on other things: jobs and economic development, the fight against corruption and organized crime, proper treatment of its Serb citizens and other (numerical) minorities.
It would be far preferable–and less painful in the long run–to end Serbia’s empty sovereignty claim. There may be five non-recognizing EU members that can block Kosovo’s entry into international organizations, but there are 22 EU members that can block Serbia’s eventual entry into the EU. Delaying the inevitable makes life harder not only for Pristina, but also for Belgrade.
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Do unto others…
As soon as the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo was elevated to the prime ministerial level, the process began to proceed much more smoothly, until the current round. The slowdown is understandable given the complexity of the topic: dismantlement of illegal Serb institutions in northern Kosovo.
In an attempt to prevent full integration of the Serb-dominated municipalities into the institutional framework of Kosovo, the government in Belgrade is demanding the formation of an association of Serb municipalities in Kosovo. The problem is that Serbia insists that the association should have executive and legislative powers, including in the area of public security and rule of law. Priština has rejected the proposal as inconsistent with Kosovo’s Constitution. Washington also seems to oppose the idea, as the US Ambassador to Serbia, Michael Kirby, said that his country would not like to see another Republika Srpska in the Balkans.
The growing divergence between the two sides has prompted Brussels to intensify its diplomatic activity. For that reason, EU High Representative Catherine Ashton held a meeting with Serbia’s top figures – President Tomislav Nikolić, Prime Minister Ivica Dačić and his deputy Aleksandar Vučić.
Prior to the meeting, President Nikolić was pessimistic about the outcome, expressing concern that Serbia could be asked to concede more than it can accept. But when the meeting was over, he appeared in a quite different mood and told media that an agreement would likely be reached by the end of the month, as Priština agreed to make some concessions. Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi denied Nikolić’s words, demanding an explanation. This week Lady Ashton will visit Kosovo to try to sort things out.
Whatever Belgrade is hoping for, it is clear that no executive or legislative powers beyond the Ahtisaari agreement should be granted to the Serb municipalities. The most Serbia should get is more clarity on the implementation of Ahtissari in northern Kosovo, so that the government can save face in the eyes of more nationalist voters. The probabilty that premature elections will be held this autumn is growing with each passing day. Fortunately for the governing coalition, two thirds of people in Serbia accept that Kosovo is independent according to the latest opinion poll. For the record, the support to European integration is also on a steady decline for two years already.
Meanwhile, Albanians from the Preševo Valley in southern Serbia have requested an association of Albanian municipalities in Serbia along the lines of the one that Belgrade wants for Kosovo Serbs. Zoran Stanković, a Serbian government official, countered that the institution of such an association would violate Serbia’s Constitution. But so too would the Serb one in Kosovo, if it extends its functionality to police and courts.
Thaçi likewise faces elections, in 2014. He will need to save face as well. Even if the appeal for the Albanian association in Serbia was made only to put pressure on Belgrade to soften its own demands, the idea is worth considering. As Daniel Serwer wrote:
Whatever the Serbs of Kosovo gain in this negotiation should also be available to the Albanian-majority community of Presevo in southern Serbia.
Stability in the long-term requires reciprocity. It may be the only feasible solution.
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Drop it now
The failure of the latest round of Belgrade/Pristina talks to reach agreement on an association of Serb municipalities in Kosovo is neither surprising nor particularly discouraging. Mundane as it sounds, this is a delicate issue.
An association is clearly permitted under the Ahtisaari plan, which Belgrade has not accepted but Pristina has pledged to implement. Were it to become more than an a consultative body and acquire executive functions, such an association could come close to creating a Republika Srpska-like governing entity within Kosovo, one that would make it virtually impossible for Pristina to exercise full control over those functions it requires to qualify for EU membership. Pristina needs to make sure that it does not fall into this trap.
Tanjug (via B92 English) quotes Alexandar Vulin, Belgrade’s office chief for Kosovo, as saying Serbia:
simply supports the constitution of an association (of Serb municipalities) that would have the authorities, control and influence over the judiciary, police, education and all aspects important for the life of citizens.
This is a precise description of what no one in the international community should expect the Pristina authorities to accept. It would legitimize, not dissolve, the “parallel” (illegal) Serbian institutions in Kosovo.
To me, there is a simple, first test of what should be permissible for Belgrade within Kosovo: is it also permissible within Serbia? Whatever the Serbs of Kosovo gain in this negotiation should also be available to the Albanian-majority community of Presevo in southern Serbia. That community has nothing like the privileges in the Ahtisaari plan, never mind what Vulin is claiming. Belgrade needs to come to the negotiating table with wants that correspond to what they are willing to offer in analogous circumstances.
Of course the circumstances are not entirely analogous, because Belgrade does not accept Pristina’s authority as sovereign. This is a real problem and should not be ignored, as both the Brussels and Washington prefer. Belgrade’s bold assertion of continuing sovereignty over all of Kosovo conflicts with what Ahtisaari offered. It is wrong for Serbia to ask for the privileges contained in his plan (and then a good deal more) without paying the price of admission.
This phase of the Pristina/Belgrade talks is putting the Pristina authorities in an awkward situation. It is quite clear that no one in the Kosovo government, including its Serb participants, wants to go further than the Ahtisaari plan in accommodating Serbia. Anyone who does is likely to pay a price at the next election. Moreover, there is a real risk that Serbia will use an association of Serb municipalities to pry the southern Serbian enclaves away from their grudging acceptance of Pristina’s limited authority. That’s what Vulin is openly proposing.
No one has asked my advice on these issues, so I am free to state publicly what it would be: going any further than Ahtisaari would be a mistake. Even implementation of Ahtisaari should be conditional on Serbia’s dropping its claim of sovereignty and accepting the plan as a whole, rather than picking off the parts it likes and leaving the parts it doesn’t.
Belgrade can drop its claim of sovereignty elegantly (and silently) by allowing Kosovo to enter the United Nations. This would be a gesture to which Pristina could be expected to respond generously. Belgrade’s sovereignty claim is going to have to be dropped eventually in any event. The EU will never take in another member whose borders are uncertain, as it did to no good effect with Cyprus. Serbia would do best to drop it now. Once that is done, Vulin’s pretension will be voided and the question of the association of Serb municipalities will be far more manageable.
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Beginning to do the right thing
John Kerry ‘s first trip abroad as Secretary of State is focusing on a problem the Obama Administration has been trying hard to ignore: what to do about Syrian President Bashar al Asad, whose recent use of Scud missiles against civilian population centers is just the latest of his war crimes. His indiscriminate shelling of Homs, Hama, Aleppo and smaller Syrian towns will long be remembered as crimes against humanity that went on for far too long.
Washington has so far preferred to focus on the humanitarian crisis in Syria. A million Syrians are now refugees in other countries, several million are displaced inside Syria, more than 70,000 are dead and half of those alive and still inside the country are in need of relief. The U.S. government has committed upwards of $365 million already on humanitarian assistance, hoping an opposition military victory would determine the political outcome.
It has not worked out that way. The Asad regime has cracked with myriad defections but has not crumbled. Its core, based on an Alawite minority that has reason to dread its fate if the regime fails, remains intact. Iranian and Russian military and financial support remains solid. Scud missiles and the Syrian air force have provided the regime the means to challenge the opposition even in liberated areas. The regime is unable to “clear and hold” territory, but it can still prevent the opposition from doing so.
The flow of military assistance is increasing. Saudi and Qatari funding has flowed mainly to Sunni Islamist groups, some of them affiliated with Al Qaeda. This tilts the playing field against the more moderate opposition, now more or less unified in the Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. It is fractious, but has managed to put forth parameters for a political solution that would allow talks with the regime while reaffirming that Bashar al Assad and his coterie have no role to play in Syria’s future. The Coalition will appoint a provisional prime minister on Saturday.
The Obama Administration has hesitated to provide lethal assistance to the Coalition for good reasons. It fears anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons would fall into the wrong hands and be used against civilian targets outside Syria. This would amount to “fast and furious” (an operation in which guns provided by the U.S. were used in the murder of an American border patrol agent) on steroids. The Administration also worries about the Russian reaction. It needs Russia to keep open the routes through which American withdrawal from Afghanistan will occur this year and next. It also needs Russia to maintain sanctions and UN Security Council unity against the Iranian nuclear push, promising talks on which occurred this week in Almaty, Kazakhstan.
While others (including some Europeans) supply arms, President Obama should support the Syrian Coalition with the resources it needs to begin governing liberated areas inside Syria. At Thursday’s meeting of the Friends of Syria, Secretary Kerry announced that the United States will provide $60 million to the Coalition, for use in supplying humanitarian relief, essential services and law and order through the local administrative councils that have been set up in liberated areas of Syria.
As soon as the provisional Syrian prime minister is named, Secretary Kerry should also announce that the Syrian embassy in Washington, already in the hands of employees sympathetic to the revolution, will be turned over to the Coalition. These gestures would give the Coalition credibility and legitimacy with Syrians that it has all too obviously lacked in the past. They would also signal to Bashar al Assad as well as his Russian and Iranian sponsors that the Coalition will eventually become the internationally recognized authority in whatever territory it is able to liberate.
Washington today is focused mainly on its own budget problems. Convincing Americans it is a good idea to shell out hard cash for a Syrian revolutionary government that has yet to prove itself is a hard sell. But there are members of Congress on both sides of the aisle who find the situation in Syria intolerable. And there is every reason to believe that the bill for humanitarian relief in Syria will grow by far more than $60 million if the fighting continues. If there is even a 50/50 chance that strengthening the Coalition will shorten the war, the investment is likely to be a good one.
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