Tag: European Union
Only Beppe Grillo knows
The Italian elections continue to provide amusement, albeit far from my usual obsession with war and peace. At this writing, not too many hours after the polls closed, the votes are counted. Surprised? This is a bit like waiting for luggage at Fiumicino: the electronic board predicts to the minute when your luggage will arrive, and it does!
It looks as if the leftist coalition of Pier Luigi Bersani has won in the lower house by a very slim margin of popular votes. But the leading party there gets a “premium” of seats that will enable him to wield a comfortable majority. In the Senate, Silvio Berlusconi’s rightist coalition is a couple of seats ahead, if I am to believe the algorithm nerds at La Repubblica. Comedian Beppe Grillo will hold the votes needed to gain approval in the upper house. He can’t make Berlusconi prime minister, but he could make it impossible to form a new government. The far more serious and sober Mario Monti, who so ably steered Italy through the shoals of financial crisis for the past year, will not have enough seats to make the difference. His big real estate tax increase weighed heavily against him.
This is Italy: the leftist candidate is the more fiscally conservative one. The right is much less likely to meet the needs of the financial markets, which is at least one reason American markets fell today on the news (though the impending sequester is likely another reason). Of course this should really be comprehensible in Washington: American deficits rose sharply under George W. Bush and in the first year of Barack Obama but have been declining for several years since. Of course in Italy there is also pressure for government spending cuts. Berlusconi never implemented any significant restructuring during three terms (10 years) as prime minister and isn’t likely to do any better the fourth time around. He could of course overcome the current electoral impasse by offering to join Bersani in a national solidarity government, perhaps even one with Monti as prime minister again.
But he shows as little sign of willingness to do that as to rein in his foul behavior. I’ll be in Rome next month: I’ll be asking how any woman could vote for such a mascalzone. The issue isn’t whether he paid for sex with underage girls. The issue is how little respect he has for women in general.
The key question now is what Beppe Grillo will do. That is the most unpredictable thing in Italian politics these days. To call him an iconoclast would minimize his resistance to paying Italy’s debts and remaining in the Eurozone. To call him a populist would minimize his promises to introduce a 20-hour work week and free internet and tablet computers for everyone. To call him a comedian would minimize the seriousness of his attack on privilege and corruption.
Italy of course has big problems: its mountain of public debt, its slow economic growth, its lagging exports, its aging population, its youth unemployment, its shaky banking system, its corruption, its organized crime and its scandal-ridden church, just to name a few. All of this now falls in the lap of someone who is better known for attracting hordes to V(affanculo) demonstrations than for deliberating seriously on issues of state. His choice is whether to back a former Communist who promises continuing austerity, which isn’t likely to be popular in piazza, or block government formation and push the country to a new election.
I have no doubt what I would choose. The combination of Monti’s sobriety about the budget deficit with Grillo’s passion for rooting out corruption in the public sector could be healthy. President Giorgio Napolitano, a former Communist himself, is likely to favor a left-supported government with Monti at the helm. It is hard to see how Grillo and Berlusconi, who in any event will not have a majority in the lower house unless the cavaliere wins a new election, would do anything more than roil markets with pledges to cut taxes and failure to cut expenditures.
But if Italians agreed with me they wouldn’t have given Berlusconi 30% of the vote. Nor would any Italian who agreed with me have given Beppe Grillo the votes needed to block Monti from finishing the serious work he started. Such are the glories of democracy. The Italians are entitled to, and deserve, the government they have voted for. But only Beppe Grillo knows what that is.
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Treachery could go a long way
With appreciation to the Etilaf (National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces) media department, here is the Interim Political Advisory Committee “framework for any political solution.” It was adopted in Cairo last Friday. I am publishing it in full here because I haven’t seen it elsewhere:
The Interim Advisory Political Committee of the Syrian Coalition held its regular meeting to discuss the latest political and field developments. Members of the committee examined the domestic, regional and international developments that relate to the Syrian revolution. As the Syrian Coalition is keen on elevating the suffering of the Syrian people, the protection of Syria’s national unity, saving Syria from the crimes committed by Assad’s regime, and preventing foreign interference, the committee developed the following framework for any political solution:
1. Achieving the objectives of the revolution in achieving justice, freedom, and dignity, as well as sparing the country from any further devastation and preserving the unity of Syria in order to achieve a transition to a civil and democratic system that ensures equal rights for all Syrians.
2. Bashar Assad and security leadership who are responsible for the current destruction of the country are outside the political process and must be held accountable for their crimes.
3. All Syrians will be part of any future political solution, including those currently serving with the state institutions, Baathists, political, civil and social forces as long as they did not participate in any crimes committed against other Syrians.
4. Any acceptable political initiative must have a clear timeline and clearly stated objectives.
5. Member States of the Security Council, especially Russia and the United States of America, must secure appropriate international support and adequate safeguards to make this process possible. They should adopt such political initiative, which could result in issuing binding resolution from the UN Security Council.
6. We expect Russia to turn its statements about not adhering to having Bashar Assad into practical steps. Any agreement between Russia and Syrians must be done with legitimate representatives for the Syrian people. Such agreement will not be implemented as long as Assad and his regime are controlling the government.
7. The Iranian leadership must recognize that its support of Bashar Assad is pushing the region towards sectarian conflict, which is not be in the interest of anyone. Iranian government should realize that Assad and his regime have no chance to stay in power nor will they be part of any future solution for Syria.
8. The friends of the Syrian people should understand lasting political solution that ensures the stability of the region and preserves the institutions of the state will only take place through changing the balance of power on the ground which requires supporting the Syrian coalition and Joint Chiefs of Staff with all possible means.
I take this to be the political committee’s effort to reframe the proposal by the Coalition’s leader, Moaz al Khatib, for talks with the regime. That “personal” (i.e. uncoordinated) proposal was conditional on release of political prisoners and renewal of passports for expatriates, two conditions that were not met within the time limit al Khatib proposed.
Now we have this more elaborate, and more opaque, proposition from al Khatib’s followers. It does not suggest talks with the regime but rather an internationally sponsored political process backed by both the US and Russia and approved in a Chapter 7 resolution of the UN Security Council. While the details of that process are unspecified, the committee asks for a timeline and clear objectives, which clearly include a democratic Syria. Bashar al Asad is not to be part of the political process envisaged.
There’s the rub, the same as almost a year ago. So far, Asad has refused exclusion from the political process and backed his refusal with brutality. The regime has cracked but not broken. The Coalition is saying only a military response to its brutality (“changing the balance of power on the ground…with all possible means”) will enable a “lasting political solution.” But the Europeans yesterday refused to lift their arms embargo in order to help the opposition. The Americans are likewise still sitting on their hands.
Serious international negotiations don’t sound likely. Moscow and Washington are still unable to agree on a plan. But the interim political committee is correct that ultimately it will be conditions inside Syria, not the best laid plans of those outside, that will determine what happens. Both the expatriate opposition and the regime leadership are insulated from the violence, which is creating a much bigger humanitarian problem than has been acknowledged so far. My admittedly limited contact with opposition people inside the country suggests they are more inclined to negotiate, albeit not with Bashar. I can only hope that the same is true of some within the regime. Treachery could go a long way to ending this criminally violent regime.
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US policy toward Iran in 2013
Unrealistic though it may sound in the wake of Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei’s trenchant rejection of Vice President Biden’s offer of bilateral talks, negotiations represent the best tool to deal with the nuclear challenge Iran poses for the US. The key to successful negotiations is a credible US threat to use force, Ambassadors Jim Jeffreys and Tom Pickering agreed at the release this week of the Washington Institute’s new paper on US policy towards Iran.
It will not be easy to mount a credible threat. The memory of the Iraq war and the drawdown of the US presence in Afghanistan leave little political appetite for the use of force against Iran. Israel may eagerly throw around the idea of a pre-emptive strike, but American political and economic realities cast the military option in an unfavorable light. A military strike against Iran could at best set the program back by four to five years. The boots on the ground needed to eradicate the threat of a nuclear Iran are politically and economically inconceivable.
Regime change is another woefully inadequate tool to cracking Iran. As Pickering put it,
Regime change is not something we do successfully.
US influence on the prospects for regime change inside Iran is at best limited and at worst undesirable. Iranian-led regime change is desirable, but would suffer from US endorsement. Any attempt to openly encourage regime change during a burst of popular regime opposition in Iran would be counter-productive.
The ambassadors disagreed on “containment” of Iran’s nuclear capability. Jeffreys prefers “confront and resist” to “containment.” He recommends this approach, among others. According to Pickering, adopting a strategy of containment now would represent a “premature capitulation to failure.” Containment in the classical sense amounts to treating Iranian nuclear break-out as inevitable and deterrence as the only available course of action. Such a fatalistic approach would weaken the nuclear non-proliferation regime, unnerving regional actors Turkey and Saudi Arabia and setting in motion a regional arms race with cataclysmic implications.
Both ambassadors praised the American-led mobilization of the international community to isolate Iran, mainly through the use of sanctions. But at the end of the day, both Ambassadors called for the pursuit of negotiations, even in the face of resistance and distrust.
Negotiations must proceed on the premise that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue exists. To stop Iran from dismissing American engagement as a ploy to trigger a regime change, Jeffreys insisted that the Obama administration set clear red lines establishing which Iranian actions the US would not tolerate (nuclear break-out), and which actions the US could live with (human rights violations). Presenting military action as the consequence of nuclear break-out would prove to the Iranians that negotiation means negotiation, not mind games.
Pickering agreed with making lines clear, just not so red. He cautioned against trying to trade “horses for rabbits.” The degree of distrust between the two countries is too great for early negotiations to tackle the big ticket items head-on. The US cannot expect Iran to halt it’s nuclear program in exchange for reversal of a few sanctions. Engagement can result in small steps. The US would ask that the Iranians cap their enrichment at 3.5 to 5.0 percent. In exchange, the US would promise no new sanctions and repeal the more easily reversible (European) sanctions. The Iranians would also reserve the right to enrich uranium for civilian purposes.
Challenges between the US and Iran will continue even after resolution of the nuclear issue. In Jeffreys‘ words, Iran’s regional “hegemonic schemes” at the core of the nation’s foreign policy since “time immemorial” are not going away anytime soon.
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What difference does it make?
Presidents Nikolic of Serbia and Jahjaga of Kosovo will meet in Brussels Wednesday. This is a first since Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence. But the prime ministers have met several times in Brussels since last fall. Official talks have been ongoing since 2011. What difference does a meeting of the presidents make?
Likely not much on the substantive side, though we’ll see soon if enough progress has been made on resolving issues in Serb-controlled northern Kosovo to warrant sealing a deal. As my friends over at Transconflict have been anxious to note, the main issues there are between the local Serbs and Belgrade. Once those are resolved in a way that meets German concerns about parallel institutions, a deal with Pristina should not be difficult, provided Serbia forgets about the ludicrous platform it put forward recently still claiming sovereignty over all of Kosovo. An announcement on exchanging liaison officers, to work out of EU missions in the respective capitals, is another possibility.
But even without specific outcomes, the presidents’ meeting is significant symbolically. Serbia has been careful in its dealings with Kosovo to try to preserve its own symbols of sovereignty and deny any to the Pristina authorities. That’s what silly quarrels about Kosovo license plates (whether they can have an “R” on them for “Republic”) and Kosovo* (that’s how Serbia wants Kosovo identified at regional meetings) are really about.
I am not privy to the preparations for Wednesday’s meeting, but I imagine that the Kosovo authorities will be exigent in insisting on reciprocity and symmetry in every aspect of the meeting. I don’t really think symbolism is all that important, but the Serbs do. Atifete Jahjaga is the living symbol of Kosovo statehood, independence and sovereignty. She should insist on nothing less than full respect for those hard-won attributes from Tomislav Nikolic, who is himself the living symbol of Serbia’s statehood, independence and sovereignty. Yes, also independence: ridding itself of Kosovo is vital to Serbia’s future as a European state.
Tim Judah, surely one of the most experienced analysts of Serbia, Kosovo and the Balkans in general, sees the current avowedly nationalist Serbian leadership as continuing to normalize relations with Kosovo, like its allegedly liberal predecessor. Surely there has been progress in the EU-sponsored talks under Nikolic, but let’s be clear about why: it is the German insistence on settling the issues in northern Kosovo that is driving Belgrade in the direction of rapprochement with Pristina. Serbia wants a date for EU accession negotiations to begin, in part because the date will bring money intended to fund the adjustments required as Belgrade makes its way through the 35 chapters of the acquis communitaire, to which it must conform its laws and practice before becoming an EU member.
Serbia, whose economy is in doldrums linked to the European financial crisis, needs that money. Kosovo, while less developed economically than Serbia, is in better financial shape: it has borrowed little and invested heavily in infrastructure, while keeping overall government expenditure relatively tight. Its population is much younger than Serbia’s, which makes its pension burden far lighter.
There is another big difference: Kosovo’s population is 90% committed to NATO and EU membership. Serbia’s is negative on NATO and not much better than that on the EU (plurality, not majority, support). The irony of course is that NATO and the EU are much more interested in Serbia than in Kosovo. That’s another reason the meeting of the two presidents is important. Jahjaga, a former deputy chief of the much-respected Kosovo police, is the picture of propriety and rule of law. She polishes Kosovo’s image in Europe, the United States and beyond. Symbolism does sometimes count.
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Adagio
There is slow movement, adagio not andante, on two fronts, Syria and the Iran nuclear issue:
- Syrian opposition leader Moaz al Khatib’s proposal for conditional talks with the regime has elicited some interest on the part of Syria, Iran and Russia.
- The P5+1 (that’s the US, UK, France, Russia and China + Germany) have agreed to meet with Iran to discuss nuclear issues February 25 in Kazakhstan. The US and Iran are indicating willingness to meet bilaterally as well.
There is no breakthrough here. These are small steps forward at the glacial pace that often characterizes diplomatic moves. But given how frozen things seemed on both fronts even a few days ago, this is progress.
On Syria, Khatib’s proposal was a personal one, made initially on his Facebook page without approval of his Coalition. It reflects in part the view of the National Coordination Committee, which is an inside Syria opposition group that has long wanted to start a dialogue with the regime. The expatriate opposition was not pleased with the proposition. My guess is that the Americans are okay with it, even though they continue to insist that Bashar al Asad step aside.
Dialogue could lead to a split in the regime between hawks who want to continue the crackdown and doves who see promise in talking with the opposition. Of course it could also lead to a similar split in the opposition, with hardline Islamists opting to continue the fighting and relative moderates interested in talking. The key issue is whether Bashar is prepared to leave power. If not, dialogue with the regime is likely to become a snare and a delusion, wrecking the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces that Khatib leads.
On Iran’s nuclear program, the outline of a deal is increasingly clear:
- limits on uranium enrichment (e.g., an end to Iranian enrichment above 20%, shipment out of the country of stockpile uranium enriched beyond 5%, and likely also something restricting plutonium production, which has not been much of a public issue so far);
- a serious, verifiable and irreversible commitment not to develop nuclear weapons (including “coming clean” on past nuclear weapons-related activities);
- an end to American and multilateral economic and financial sanctions.
It is the sequencing of the many steps that need to be taken to get to this result that has caused so much difficulty. The Americans and Europeans want the nuclear commitments implemented up front. The Iranians want sanctions relief first. Lack of trust makes compromise difficult, but it would not seem completely out of reach, provided Iran is prepared to make a serious and verifiable commitment not to develop nuclear weapons.
What we’ve got here are two instances of coercive diplomacy, where outside powers are bringing pressure to bear in order to end one regime and to curtail fundamentally the options available to another one. The odds of success are not high, since the regimes involved have a good deal at stake (and are allied with each other). Bashar al Asad would have to come to the conclusion that his life is worth more than his position. Tehran would have to come to the conclusion that regime survival is more likely if it accepts limits on its nuclear program than if it rejects them.
On the other side, the key ingredient is credibility.
The Americans and Europeans need to convince Bashar that they are fully committed to end his rule. To do so, they need to back more fully and visibly Khatib’s Coalition, making it a serious governing alternative to the Syrian regime. This is more important now than arms supplies, which seem to be reaching the rebellion in substantial if not overwhelming quantities.
Washington and Brussels also need to convince Tehran that they will tighten sanctions further if there is no nuclear deal. And Washington needs to make the threat of military force more credible than it appeared at former Senator Hagel’s confirmation hearing last week.
Even if talks with the Syrian regime and with the Iranians begin soon, at this pace we still have a long way to go before we can be certain of acceptable outcomes on either front. But slow movement is better than none.
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An exclusive club, not the movies
Danijela Milinkovic at Belgrade daily Vecernje Novosti asked me some questions. I responded a week ago. I gather they published the interview yesterday. Here is the interview in English:
Q: Wanting to achieve its strategic goal – joining the EU – Serbia faces numerous demands on Kosovo, which, it seems, getting bigger and bigger as we progress in integration. Is our path towards the EU charged masochism and do you believe that giving up on Kosovo for Serbs will be the ticket for entry into the European track?
A: As I understand it, normalizing relations with Pristina is the EU’s current requirement in order to give Serbia a date to begin accession negotiations. It has been understood from the first that this “normalization” includes reaching mutually satisfactory agreements with Pristina on northern Kosovo.
But Serbia will not become an EU member without going further. It will have to establish diplomatic relations with Kosovo and exchange ambassadors, because becoming a member will require agreement of the 28 existing members. More than one will insist on diplomatic relations between Pristina and Belgrade, even if the EU as a whole does not. Nor is that the only thing Serbia will have to do: it will have to meet the many other criteria for membership. There is no single “ticket” for entry into the EU. There are many tickets.
Accession to the EU is a long and complicated process of conforming Serbia’s laws and practices to European norms. It will take at least a decade. Once you get finished with one chapter, there will be another one. There are currently 35 chapters of the acquis communitaire, which form the basis of the accession process. There may be more by the time Serbia completes the process.
I would not regard preparation for EU accession as “masochism.” Countries do these things because they want rule of law, security, prosperity and social well-being. There are enormous rewards. If you enter the process feeling nothing but pain, maybe you are in the wrong process. You are not going to the cinema; you are joining a privileged and highly selective club that will enable all of Serbia’s citizens to enjoy far better and freer lives.
Q: Whatever Serbia does, it seems that is not enough to change the attitude of the great powers towards our country us? Where are we wrong?
A: While I often hear this complaint, it seems to me that both Europe and America are today respectful and friendly towards Serbia. Once Milosevic was gone, sanctions were lifted, Serbian leaders were welcomed in Washington, Brussels and European capitals, and substantial resources were made available, mainly through the IMF and private channels. There is ample cooperation on many issues: drugs, organized crime, nuclear technology. There are really only two issues that give people in Washington pause about Serbia: Kosovo and Bosnia. On those, I would describe the pressure from Washington as firm but relatively light-handed. The two governments disagree on Kosovo and on Milorad Dodik, but this is not affecting their basically friendly relations on many other issues.
The EU is taking a tougher attitude right now on Kosovo, largely due to German initiative. From my perspective, that is a good thing: if the issues in the north can be resolved, Kosovo will certainly benefit but so too will Serbia.
Q: Would you say that Serbia is today at a turning point?
A: No. It seems to me Serbia is still clinging to romantic notions about its ties to Russia, the Non-aligned Movement and the claim to sovereignty over Kosovo that have nothing to do with its future in the European Union. Serbia will not be at a turning point until it makes a decision to turn. Even then, it will have a long process of negotiation and adjustment of its laws and practices before entering the EU. Even once fully prepared, it may have to wait for the 28 members to arrive at a convenient political moment.
Q: Do you think that decomposition of the Balkans is over or we will see new changes of borders in the future?
A: The changes that have occurred so far have been in the status of borders (from internal boundaries to international borders), not where the borders are drawn. I would describe this not as “decomposition” but as dissolution of former Yugoslavia. I see no possibility of additional changes of borders, which won’t be acceptable to either Europe or the U.S.
Q: The European Council has decided to grant Serbia a “conditional date”, in other words, to determine the beginning of the pre-accession negotiations with the EU for March. What does Serbia need to do until then, in order to make the next step in the integrations?
A: This is a question for the EU, not for me. But my understanding is that the EU wants to see normalization of relations with Kosovo, including a settlement of the main issues in the north, before it starts accession negotiations.
Q: Is Serbia going to face with the new conditions regarding Kosovo in the coming months?
A: Yes, in coming months and years. Kosovo will be an issue in many of the 35 chapters of the negotiations, unless there is a comprehensive solution early in the process.
Q: How do you comment on the platform and Kosovo resolution, adopted by the Government and the Parliament? Will this document contribute to the solution of the Kosovo issue or contrary?
A: I don’t believe the platform is a step forward: it reiterates Serbia’s claim to sovereignty over all of Kosovo while proposing separate governance of the Albanians, who would become second class citizens inside Serbia. They won’t accept that, and no one in Europe or the United States will ask them to do so. But let’s see what happens in the talks between Dacic and Thaci. That is more important than what it says in the platform.
Q: You said that this platform is “Milosevic`s dream”. Could you, please, explain that?
A: I don’t think I need to say more: my previous answer explains fully. Milosevic would have been delighted with sovereignty over all of Kosovo and second class citizenship for Albanians.
Q: What is, in your opinion, the most disputing in the platform for the international community and Kosovo Albanians?
A: For the moment, northern Kosovo is the big issue, but in the future it will be something else: protection of monasteries and religious sites, military forces or who can go where for Christmas. Underlying all the issues are questions of sovereignty and territorial integrity. When you reach agreement with Pristina on those issues, the story will be over.
Q: Serbia is required to withdraw from the institutions in northern Kosovo, and our government has consistently refused this request as inadmissible. Will the proposal for broad autonomy of the Serbian community in Kosovo be acceptable to the West and Pristina?
A: I see no problem if Serbia will accept the autonomy provided for in the Ahtisaari plan. That is already accepted in Pristina, Washington and Brussels, all of which will be prepared to see additional agreements reached to implement the Ahtisaari arrangements.
Q: What do you expect to happen in the next few months in the Balkan region and can we expect new instabilities and conflicts?
A: Troublemakers can always make trouble. But I hope to see the leaderships in Belgrade and Pristina make a real effort to come to terms with each other, for mutual benefit. I see some indication that Prime Ministers Dacic and Thaci are headed in the direction of a comprehensive resolution of issues. That would be a good thing.
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