peacefare.net

The EU is still a powerful magnet

My friends at tacno.net, where Milan Marinkovic has landed, have published this interview today in Serbian:

In a recent interview for „Anadolia“ (AA) news agency, you said that even „armed conflict cannot be ruled out“ following Belgrade’s platform for „normalizaion of relations with Kosovo“. If such a conflict really occurred, on what scale and of what intensity would you expect it to be, and what implications could it have for the rest of the region?

– It is difficult to talk about the possibility of armed conflict without readers thinking you are advocating it. I am not. But when a country claims territory it does not rightfully control, and refuses to recognize the authorities who do have a right to control it, that is a situation that can obviously lead to armed conflict. As KFOR is drawn down, Pristina and Belgrade need to make diplomatic arrangements that give both confidence no armed incursion will occur. Otherwise, they need to both make defensive military preparations, which would be excessively expensive and potentially destabilizing.

I don’t think a big war is possible in the Balkans any longer: no one has the force and sustainment capability any longer. Nor would it benefit any country in the Balkans to initiate hostilities. But bad things do happen, and war in the Balkans has always been more about violence against civilians than against other armed forces. We should not forget the 1990s.

Serbian Prime minister Ivica Dačić has warned on several occasions in the past couple of weeks that the police will remove, using force if necessary, a monument built in the south Serbian town of Preševo by the municipal Albanian-majority government in honor of fallen combatants from the former LAPBM, should the Albanians fail to remove it themselves by January 17. Local Albanians have so far rejected Dačić’s ultimatum, ignoring at the same time a compromising proposal by Western ambassadors to Serbia that the monument be moved from the town centre to another location. If the monument remains in its place after the deadline set by Dačić, he will find himself under considerable pressure from Serbian nationalists, including his own supporters, to fulfill the promise and remove the monument. Do you see any possibility that a middle groung could be found between Belgrade and local Albanians within these few days, which would help to relieve the tension?

– It is clearly preferable that this issue be resolved by compromise. I don’t know the situation well enough to judge whether the Western ambassadors’ proposal is one that will work. But it would make no sense for Serbia to destroy a monument to people whose comrades in arms were amnestied 10 years ago, thus reigniting a conflict that has largely died down. At the same time, Albanians have to appreciate that Serb lives were lost as well. I would note that in Sarajevo recently the government has decided to put up a monument to Serbs killed by Bosniak forces during the war. These problems are not insoluble.

Last November, during the celebration of the Albanian national holiday, the Day of Flag, Albanian and Kosovo prime ministers, Sali Berisha and Hashim Thaci respectively, hinted at the desire of Albanians who live across the region to unify into a single nation state. This raised some eyebrows in neighbor countries, especially Serbia. Although this type of rhetoric is not unusual in the Balkans on such occasions, Ilir Deda, a prominent expert from Kosovo, said that it should be taken seriously. Mr Deda warned that the idea is likely to gain ground over the coming years if Kosovo remains in limbo in terms of European integration and UN membership. There is a palpable fear that Serbian nationalists would use it as a perfect excuse in their attempts to revive the project of greater Serbia, primarily through secession of RS from Bosnia. If the idea of pan-Albanian unification became part of Albanian leaders’ official agenda at some point, what position would Washington be likely to take on the issue?

– Washington will oppose pan-Albanian unification, just as it opposed pan-Serbian unification. It regards the current borders in the Balkans as fixed. The next phase is EU membership. Once the Balkans states join the EU, borders won’t matter much. I’d be surprised if Albanians from Albania preferred pan-Albanian unification to EU accession. I doubt Serbs from Serbia would prefer pan-Serbian unification to EU accession. And let’s be clear: changing borders in the Balkans would lead to violence.

Let’s now move to Bosnia. In addition to enduring divisions along ethnic lines, the overall socio-economic situation is steadily deteriorating, not to mention people’s growing dissatisfaction with high levels of corruption, street crime and violence of various sorts. The EU, for its part, has managed to preserve the status quo in the sense that the country has not broken apart, but will it be enough to prevent destablization internally, given domestic politicians’ obvious inability to carry out meaningful reforms that would improve people’s lives in the foreseeable future?

– Bosnia and Herzegovina has a democratic system. It is up to its citizens to vote to fix what ails it. The EU and the U.S. have been extraordinarily generous. The incentives are there. And the EU will keep its door ajar for when the Bosnians decide to do the right things. Until then, they will have to live with the governments they elect.

A general assumption is that most important for stability of the Western Balkans is that Serbia and Croatia, as two major regional players, maintain good relationship. Serbian president Tomislav Nikolić has given a few undiplomatic statements since he assumed the office, provoking a negative reaction on the part of Zagreb. Meanwhile, Prime minister Dačić has been looking to arrange a meeting with his Croatian counterpart Zoran Milanović in order to sort things out, but some analysts are warning that Croatia’s looming accession to the EU might make the country become less interested in its future relationship with Belgrade. What is your view? How will Croatia’s EU membership affect Zagreb’s policy toward neighbors, especially Serbia?

– My general impression is that EU membership has improved relations between new member states and their neighbors. Certainly Slovenia has played a very positive role in the Balkans generally over the past 20 years or so. Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria have also been more part of the solution than part of the problem. There are historical problems between Croatia and Serbia, but so far as I know relatively few big current issues. Croatia’s economic benefits from the EU will echo throughout the Balkans.

All former communist states of eastern and southern Europe are either already members of or aspirants to membership in NATO. The only exception is Serbia, and the reason is well known: most Serbs refuse to even consider joining NATO, largely because of the air campaign against Serbia in 1999. While some analysts believe that NATO membership would have no particular effect on Serbia’s EU prospects, arguing that these are two completely separate processes, others claim that it could be of great importance, helping Belgrade look more credible among its Western partners. Which argument is closer to your line of reasoning and why?

– I’m not sure Serbia’s hesitation about NATO is caused only by the 1999 bombing. Some in Serbia are attached to its friendship with Russia and nostalgic for its non-aligned status during the Cold War. It also knows it cannot become a member of NATO without changing its attitude on Kosovo.

Partly for these reasons, no one in NATO is campaigning for Serbian membership. Belgrade has a good deal of credibility in the West, but if it wants to become a full-fledged Western state it will need to adjust its foreign policy. This is not just a matter of “good neighborly relations” or “normalizing relations.” NATO is not going to bring the Kosovo issue into its membership. It has to be solved, completely, first. There is no use in pretending otherwise.

Contrary to a widespread belief of local conspiracy theorists, the Balkans are nowhere among U.S. foreign policy priorities. The ongoing economic crisis, which is becoming increasingly political, has caused EU membership to lose some of its attractiveness in the eyes of people both in EU member states and aspiring countries, which could make it more difficult for Brussels to keep us dedicated to the eurointegration process. If the crisis in Europe continues to deepen, leading eventually to resurgence of aggressive nationalism in the Balkans as a serious threat to already fragile peace, what is the breaking point at which Washington would begin to consider a stronger engagement in our troubled region?

– There are triggers that would motivate stronger engagement: widespread violence against minorities or interstate conflict, for example. But it is very difficult to picture anything that would precipitate the kind of heavy military intervention we saw in the 1990s.

Even in its current weakened state, the EU is a powerful magnet. And the financial crisis in Europe will not last forever. Anyone who doubts the attractiveness EU membership should just visit one of the nearby members and compare the standard of living. Skip Greece, as its crisis is profound, but self-induced.

After all, should we hope that ex-Yugoslavian countries could begin to view one another as major strategic partners rather than rivals any time soon, apart from mere rhetoric aimed at satisfying Brussels’ demand for good neighborly relations?

– I think you already see Slovenia taking that attitude, and I sometimes hear it also from Croatia, Montenegro and Macedonia. It will be hard for some of those who are lagging in the EU regatta to see the advantages of improved relations with their neighbors, but with time I think it will happen.

Montenegro will need to do more

This is an interview I did for Samir Kajošević of the Montenegrin daily Vijesti more than two weeks ago.  My English version may be a bit out of sync with the Montenegrin version, but I am hoping the content is identical.  They published it Thursday under the headline “Brussels will expect more and more from Montenegro”:

The Montenegrin government must show willingness to deal with organized crime and corruption, because Brussels will insist on that issue more and more during the negotiations, said professor Daniel Serwer from Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins School.

“It will have to show willingness to deal with organized crime and corruption if it wants to make progress in the EU negotiations. Brussels has become much more exigent in insisting on rule of law as one of the first chapters to be opened,” says Serwer.

Q:  How could Brussels  affect Montenegro’s willingness to deal with organized crime and corruption? Is it possible that the EU can stop the process of negotiations if there are no “big trials”?

A:  I don’t think Brussels has in mind a particular size or number of trials. The question is whether there is a concerted and effective effort against organized crime and corruption. Brussels will know it when it sees it, whether the trials are few or many, big or small. You will know it too, because there will be a lot to report on.

Q:  How could internal problems in EU affect Montenegro’s integration process? Can Brussels afford to slow that process, because Montenegro is the only country in region which is in negotiations?

A:  The EU is clearly suffering many fatigues: enlargement fatigue, euro fatigue, unemployment fatigue , immigration fatigue … But Montenegro is not a big pill for Europe to swallow. The important thing is to qualify for membership in every way and be ready when the political door opens. That won’t happen right away, but I do think it will happen. You would not want to miss the opportunity when it arises.

Q:  How do you comment the fact that the Milo Đukanović party is constantly ruling in Montenegro for two decades? Such situations are not characteristic of democratic regimes.

A:  It is unusual but not unheard of. There are other democratic regimes in which a single party has ruled for longer: Japan is one. Djukanovic is in power because he has the votes. I don’t really see anything wrong with that. The problem is with the opposition: why has it been unable to gain significant ground?

Q:  After retiring in 2010, Đukanović again returned as a prime minister. What do you think are the main reasons of his return:  fear of loosing power or stopping of reforms?

A:  I haven’t seen him in recent years, so I really can’t say. There are precious few politicians who want to leave power, and even fewer who do it for two years, then return. If he came back to stop reforms, he did it at the wrong time: both NATO and the EU will insist on reforms.

Q:  Soon as Đukanovic came back as prime minister this November, higher US officials sent a message that he is one of the main political figures in the Balkans. Why is Đukanovic so important to Washington despite charges of his criminal history and lack of democracy?

A:  As prime minister of a Balkans country that helped in the fight against Milosevic and has embarked on what are taken here as serious efforts to join the EU and NATO, he will get some respect in Washington. As for criminality, I would be the first to denounce corruption or organized crime.

But I don’t accuse people who have not been formally charged, much less tried and convicted. The assumption of innocence needs to apply. If you have evidence to the contrary, best to publish it or provide it to the courts. More than one Balkans prime minister has landed in difficulty because of courageous journalists and courts , but you have to get the facts straight and provide evidence to support them.

Q:  Part of the Montenegrin public claims that he is back to make Montenegro a part of a NATO. What do you think?

A:  I hope it is true. Montenegro belongs in NATO, which will welcome it and benefit from its membership, as will Montenegro.

Q:  Is he capable to do that, after his businesses connections with Russian tycoons such as Oleg Deripaska?

A:  NATO is mainly concerned with the institutions of the state, not the business connections of its leaders. And Russia is no longer the enemy it once was. You may know much more than I do about his business connections. If you have evidence of wrong doing , publish it or give it to the courts. Innuendo is not what I would regard as good journalism.

Q:  In Montenegro there are still fears of Serbian influence in domestic politics. Regarding their problems with Kosovo and internal affairs, is Belgrade capable to influence in the neighborhood countries or is it just a “ghost from the past”?

A:  Serbia is still an important country in the region: geographically central, in population and economy relatively big, well-connected in the world, cosmopolitan and culturally important. Not everyone in the region wins so many tennis games. It does not dominate the region as it once did, but its neighbors, especially Kosovo, can’t ignore it. Nor can Montenegro.

My Fantasyland

I gather the Serbian parliament will not actually approve the Fantasyland platform for Kosovo but will instead pass a resolution containing some basic principles to which its negotiators will adhere in the future political-level talks.  This inspires me to suggest a few basic points that, if adopted, would go a long way to ensuring that peace and stability are maintained in the Balkans and that Serbia gets an early date to start negotiations on EU accession.  This is my Fantasyland.  No, I don’t expect Belgrade to listen to me, but here it is anyway:

Serbia hereby acknowledges the evil that was done in its name during the Milosevic regime.  We have prosecuted criminals involved and delivered all the international indictees to the Hague Tribunal.  Our current government is a democratic one that understands sovereignty cannot be maintained over a province in which human rights were so grossly violated.  Milosevic lost sovereignty over Kosovo in 1999.  Democratic Serbia cannot regain it.

Nor would we want to:  governing a young and rapidly growing population of more than 1.6 million Albanians, many of whom no longer speak Serbian, is simply not what we want to be doing.  They can and should govern themselves.

But we expect proper treatment of Serbs and other minorities there.  This is Serbia’s primary concern:  to ensure the safety, security and prosperity of its citizens who live in Kosovo, as well as the protection of Serbian monuments, churches, monasteries and other property, both religious and secular.  For these purposes, Serbia accepts the Ahtisaari plan, whose letter and spirit were intended to provide real protection.  We cannot accept pro forma implementation but will insist on substantial guarantees of the rights and privileges provided therein, which we negotiated for in good faith.  This will be the main subject of discussion in our talks with the Pristina authorities.

The Pristina institutions are distasteful to us because they include people who have done deadly harm to Serbs in Kosovo.  But we understand that they are the product of an internationally sponsored state-building process and represent the will of the majority population of Kosovo.  We will respect and cooperate with these institutions as we do others legitimately elected and empowered, so long as they respect the human rights of the Serb population.

Despite our pleas, the International Court of Justice has advised that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not breach international law.  Once the Ahtisaari plan has been fully and faithfully implemented to our satisfaction, we will reconsider whether we can recognize and establish diplomatic relations with the Pristina government.

In the meanwhile, we will seek for Serbs in Kosovo governing arrangements comparable to what we are willing to provide Albanians and other minorities within Serbia, particularly in the south.  We understand that these contiguous populations will one day, like the Serbs in northern Kosovo, enjoy the privileges of citizens of the European Union, including the disappearance of the borders that now temporarily divide them from their co-nationals.  We look forward to, and seek to hasten, that day.

We have sought a status-neutral approach to international community relations with Pristina.  We will continue to be status-neutral ourselves, meaning that we will no longer claim Kosovo is a province of Serbia.  But we understand that about half the members of the UN have now recognized the Pristina institutions as sovereign and independent.  We will no longer oppose such recognitions and will ask that Russia allow Kosovo to enter the General Assembly.  This will help ensure that the Pristina institutions feel the full weight of responsibility for maintaining peace and stability as well as the security and welfare of all their citizens.

What a fine day that would be, eh?  This is not entirely fantasy.  I know lots of Serbs in Belgrade who would sign up to something like this.  The issue is not whether this is beyond imagination, but rather whether Serbia’s current leadership can bring itself to break with an approach that is causing both Serbia and Kosovo unnecessary pain.  Unfortunately, it cannot.

Serbia’s new year

Publication of my reflections on Kosovo’s new year made me wonder why I hadn’t done a comparable piece on Serbia.  So here it is.

Serbia struggled through 2012, which saw the fall from power after more than 10 years of its Democratic Party and the defeat in the May election of its incumbent president, a tougher line from the European Union and the United States on dismantling Belgrade’s governing structures in Kosovo and continued weak economic growth.  Belgrade’s success in slowing recognition of Kosovo has not translated into anything positive for Serbia, which seems to be running a foreign policy based on inat (spite), or at least on delaying the inevitable.  This has driven it in showy but unproductive directions:  the Non Aligned Movement and Russia are far from the European aspirations of most of Serbia’s citizens.  Former Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic’s presidency of the General Assembly keeps Serbia’s profile high but has produced few concrete results.  His announced intention to hold a debate on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which has acquitted several high-level indictees of alleged crimes committed against Serbs,  promises more of the same.

Relations with Kosovo have nevertheless improved, with implementation of some of technical agreements progressing and political-level talks begun.  Serbia’s platform for the talks was prepared late.  I welcomed it with my version of a Bronx cheer.  It may be revised, but more likely ignored.

According to the platform, Belgrade continues to claim sovereignty over all of Kosovo and aims at separate governance of the Serbs there, including those south of the Ibar river who have already integrated to a significant degree in Pristina’s institutions while enjoying the autonomy the Ahtisaari plan provides.  Serbia’s campaign against recognition of Kosovo by other states has been moderately successful, but recognitions continue (13 in 2012).  Belgrade failed in its concerted effort to prevent Kosovo from joining the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Serbia faces two big problems on the domestic front:  its slow economic growth since 2009 and its rapidly aging population.  Combined, they are straining the country’s finances, causing the dinar to depreciate and inflation to rise, while unemployment remains high.  Per capita income is now at about the same level as Kosovo’s, which used to be much lower.  The global economic environment is not positive, in particular in Europe.  “Doing business” conditions have improved and foreign direct investment has been a big plus.

Serbs are already enjoying visa-free travel to the Schengen area of Europe and Serbia has achieved the status of candidate for European Union membership.  It does not, however, yet have a date to begin negotiations.  Brussels, reluctant to open the door to further enlargement, will be exacting not only in the eventual negotiations but also in agreeing to a date for their start.

The still fairly new president and government in Belgrade have yet to solve the equation that stumped their predecessors.    Serbia’s European ambitions require modernization and reform.  But Serbia is still attached to ideas about state legitimacy, the role of religion in the state and the relationship of Serbs to non-Serbs that are backward-looking.  It is not surprising that President Nikolic and Prime Minister Dacic think it natural that they visit Banja Luka before Sarajevo, a move that presumably foreshadows their intention to continue their predecessors’ habit of favoring relations with Republika Srpska over relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, the hastily arranged visit of the foreign minister to Sarajevo notwithstanding.

The American role vis-a-vis Serbia has declined significantly.  The Europeans have most of the leverage.  Berlin has the biggest say in how they use it, though London, The Hague, Ljubljana and eventually Zagreb will also insist on reform and modernization while Paris, Rome, Stockholm and others try to win Belgrade’s affections with softer approaches.  In the end, though, it takes consensus of all the EU members to decide on membership.  Serbia will get there, but the road is going to be long and difficult.

In 2013, the key issue will be a date to begin negotiations.  That depends on improving relations with Pristina.  A solution for the Serb-controlled north seems far off, but I hope it will be found.  Serbia needs to declare independence from Kosovo.

PS:  There is a translation (thank you Milan Marinkovic!) into English of the picture here.