Tag: European Union
Low expectations met
The P5+1 (permanent five members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) finally met in Istanbul today with Iran and brought forth the squeak of a mouse. According to EU High Representative Katherine Ashton:
We have agreed that the non-proliferation treaty forms a key basis for what must be serious engagement to ensure all the obligations under the treaty are met by Iran while fully respecting Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Saeed Jalili, the chief Iranian negotiator, put it this way:
We expect that we should enjoy our rights in parallel with our obligations (toward the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty).
At least there is overlap in those two statements about what little happened. They also agreed to meet again in Baghdad May 23, with some expert meetings likely in the meanwhile.
For those with low expectations, consider them met. But if you are feeling urgency for a clear and unequivocal Iranian commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons, or to come clean on their past activities, or to end uranium enrichment, or stop enrichment at 5% (or at 20%), or to dismantle the underground enrichment facility at Fordo, you’ll need to wait longer. None of those things seem to have been discussed, despite their salience in Washington.
If the Europeans think that proceeding in this ambiguous way at an excruciatingly slow pace will somehow keep the dogs of war at bay, I’ve got bad news for them. Delay is surely one of Tehran’s objectives. Unless there is a good deal more agreed than the parties have acknowledged in public, the Iranians will likely get their delay, but have to suffer the consequences of impending sanctions as well. If they also continue to enrich, in defiance of the UN Security Council, it seems to me likely that someone will try to stop them.
The Europeans prefer to call these meetings “E3+3” rather than P5+1. I guess that’s three Europeans plus three unidentified also-rans (U.S., China and Russia). I’d be the first to claim that the Europeans have in the past played a useful moderating role vis-a-vis Iran. But I expect it won’t be long before the Americans or the Iranians, or both, decide that they need to try to settle the matter without three European countries that are supposed to have a common foreign policy and whose instincts call for misty generality rather than solid specificity. It was reported and denied that the Americans sought a bilateral meeting in Istanbul that the Iranians refused.
Yes, the Istanbul meeting has to be counted a “constructive” step forward, but the Europeans are kidding themselves if they think they can “manage” this conflict as they do their own disputes or those in the Balkans. They need to pick up the pace and meet far higher expectations if they are going to succeed in avoiding a sad end to this worthy initiative.
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Luck needs a policy
We got lucky Friday: the ceasefire in Syria mostly held. But luck is not a policy. Today things are falling apart. Belligerents adhere to ceasefires for many reasons, including to give themselves a break and to reorganize and rearm. When they see their antagonists doing likewise, they may figure they are losing relative advantage and go back to fighting. Certainly it is unwise to rely on good intentions, especially when one of the antagonists is Bashar al Assad.
What is to be done? The monitors the UN Security Council approved today are part of the answer. Inserting them will give the international community eyes and ears that it today lacks. That will tamp down violence and provide a means of holding one or the other side accountable when it happens. Some may doubt whether the Arab League observers did much good, but certainly the situation in many places deteriorated badly after their withdrawal. No ceasefire is going to last long in Syria without a means of policing it.
The Annan plan has important elements other than the ceasefire, which still need to be implemented. Hillary Clinton is precisely correct to be arguing for withdrawal of heavy weapons from Syrian population centers, freedom of expression, humanitarian access and freedom of movement for international journalists. But don’t expect Bashar al Assad to comply with these additional provisions of the Annan plan unless a lot of pressure is brought to bear and Moscow puts its foot down.
It is vital that Free Syria Army–the not so organized armed wing of the rebellion–hold its fire, giving the diplomatic machinery a chance to start up. If the opposition turns to violence–even in response to regime violence–the prospects for a negotiated solution will dim quickly.
What the opposition needs to do now is show its strength nonviolently–yesterday’s widespread demonstrations were a great start–and prepare for negotiations. Its lack of clear leadership and structure are an advantage while protesting, but fragmentation will turn to disadvantage once negotiations start. It is also important that the opposition make as many friendly contacts with the security forces as possible while the ceasefire holds, hoping to prevent them from returning to repression once it breaks down. If the opposition can make Bashar al Assad doubt the reliability of his security forces, good things can happen.
The critical wording of the provisional Security Council resolution was this (I haven’t yet been able to verify where this wording is in the resolution that passed within the hour):
…a Syrian-led political transition leading to a democratic, plural political system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations, ethnicities or beliefs, including through commencing a comprehensive political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition;
This is obviously, and importantly, intended to signal to Syria’s many minorities that they will be treated correctly in the transition. Reference to the “whole spectrum” of the Syrian opposition opens the door to inclusion of groups not part of the Syrian National Council, which does not have adequate representation of on-the-ground protest groups. But it will also open the door to what could be interminable arguing over who should be at the table.
Uniting the opposition behind a single set of negotiating positions and a broadly representative delegation is the next critical step, if the six-point plan has even partial success. The responsibility is more for Syrians than foreigners, but I can at least hope that the U.S. and Europe are trying hard to insist on a single platform, carried to the negotiations by people representing the full spectrum of diversity in Syria. Luck needs a policy if is to last.
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Dačić’s shameful revenge
A friend of Hasan Abazi, an Albanian labor unionist arrested in Serbia March 28, has provided the following update:
After 13 days in prison, the ILLEGAL detention of Hasan Abazi continues without word from the Serbian government regarding the case other than obtuse and inflammatory statements made in the media by [Interior] Minister Dačić regarding his intention to “continue arresting Albanians”.
Procedural regulations that have been violated:
- Mr. Abazi was unlawfully detained for 53 hours before being brought before a judge—Serbian law dictates that within 48 hours a person needs to be either brought to court or released
- He was arrested without him or his attorney being given his charges for 53 hours while Serbian law dictates that it must be done within 12 hours
- He was denied access to a lawyer and to his family for 53 hours
- Mr. Abazi’s prison term was extended for 30 more days even though no evidence or witnesses have been presented
- The appeal filed by Mr. Abazi’s attorney has yet to be reviewed one week later, even though court practice dictates it should be done within 3 days
- Mr. Abazi’s attorney is still being denied access to his client’s full file with no explanation as to why
- According to the decision extending his detention, Mr. Abazi is being held on the basis that there is danger of his escape due to his “permanent place of residence” (i.e. Kosovo). The same document calls for the interrogation of other witnesses, namely Kosovo Albanians, and does not take into account the same fact use against Mr. Abazi—that they too reside outside of Serbia, namely in Kosovo.
Mr. Abazi is being charged for alleged crimes committed in 1999 under Milosevic-era laws and based on witness statements taken during the war when Milosevic’s structures were in charge of interrogation. The indictment was abolished after the democratic transition in Serbia but for unknown reasons it was renewed in 2005 by a prosecution that no longer exists and did not even have jurisdiction over Kosovo at that time.
Mr. Abazi is a TRADE UNION LEADER. He has never been affiliated with any militant or armed groups such as the KLA. It is shameful that the government of Serbia would blatantly exploit this case for pre-election vote-mongering. It is incumbent upon EU officials, as stewards of Serbia’s EU candidacy process, that they immediately demand Mr. Abazi’s release in accordance with Serbian and international laws.
PS: If anyone asks, yes I would publish a similar plea concerning the arrest of Serbs in Kosovo, who however I understand to have been released some days ago.
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Brčko needs EU forces, not vowels
Last week saw a lot of journalists in Sarajevo for the 20th anniversary of the start of the Bosnian war. They tended to emphasize the downside: persistent ethnic division and tension. Tim Judah, who has never stopped going to Bosnia, sees the glass as half full, or better.
This is especially true for the northeastern Bosnian town of Brčko and the surrounding “district” (population about 80,000), the object of many bad wartime jokes about the need for a humanitarian shipment of vowels. It was the site of terrible atrocities at the beginning of the war and much skirmishing nearby during it, due to its strategic position in the narrow corridor linking the two wings of what is now Republika Srpska (RS), the Serb-dominated 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory.
Brčko was the hard nut that could not be cracked at Dayton, so it became the subject of a post-war arbitration process and American-led “supervision,” which provided decisions on issues the local politicians found too difficult and ensured more inclusive power-sharing arrangements than they would have concluded on their own. A U.S.-led arbitral tribunal decided in 1999 that Brčko would belong to both the RS and the Federation, which controls the other 51% of Bosnia’s territory. This really meant it belonged to neither. International supervision has gradually eased off, and later this spring the assembled powers that still guide the Dayton peace process (the Peace Implementation Council) will consider whether to end it. They likely will keep in place the arbitral tribunal, which decides the larger strategic questions concerning Brčko’s status (now formalized in the Bosnian constitution).
Things are far from perfect in Brčko–I am told it is still governed under an ethnic “key” that gets down to the level of interns and even its hotels sport ethnic identity–but its children go to more integrated schools than in the rest of Bosnia and power is shared in a way that each of the three ethnic groups seems to accept. The place has gone from the nut that couldn’t be cracked to the glue that holds Bosnia together. The RS cannot hope to leave Bosnia unless it controls Brčko. Federation control would spell the end of RS. Brčko District has to remain distinct.
This makes the end of supervision a more delicate moment than would otherwise be the case. The European Union, some of whose more powerful members are anxious to get rid not only of Brčko supervision but also the High Representative who oversees Dayton implementation, would be wise to take notice. The EU still has troops stationed in Bosnia but spread around the country in militarily insignificant contingents. Better to concentrate them in Brčko, thus signaling to both Bosniaks (Bosnia’s Muslims) and Serbs that no effort to “take” Brčko will be tolerated. Such a move might also satisfy Turkey, which supplies a good number of the troops and has hesitated to end Brčko supervision.
Some will argue that no one is prepared to start a war, so why is EUFOR (the European force) needed at all? Certainly neither Croatia nor Serbia, the neighbors most inclined towards war in the 1990s, is interested in blotting their EU copybook by trying to gain territory in Bosnia. Milorad Dodik, the RS president, wants independence and says so repeatedly, but Serbia won’t back him. He can gain more by cooperation with the EU on membership than he can by going to war. Zagreb is disinclined to support Bosnian Croat pretensions, since Croatia is scheduled for EU membership next year.
The Bosniaks, so unprepared for war in 1992, are another question. It should not be assumed that they will be as passive as they were 20 years ago. A serious Dodik move toward de jure independence would provoke some Bosniaks to violence. Taking and holding Brčko would be vital to prevent RS from leaving Bosnia.
If the EU wants the Americans and the Bosnians to take it seriously, it will concentrate its remaining forces in Brčko District, signaling to all concerned that Bosnia will not be allowed to fall apart, or fall into conflict. The move would also help convince the Americans that the Europeans know what they are doing. We’ve all learned to do without the vowels. Brčko needs EU forces.
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David Kanin responds
David Kanin writes, in response to my last:
Dan–
Thank you for sending me your twist on our discussion–it’s your blog, of course, and so you can post any interpretation you desire. In my view, you conceded a great deal more to me than I did to you (for example, over the failed US diplomatic efforts to replace 1244, and the fact that the error of forcing an asterisk on Kosova makes it essential to get the recalcitrant 5 EU members to recognize the new state and to convince the EU to make it clear Serbia does not get in without a solution to the question of Kovosar sovereignty–which, whether you admit it or not, remains contested).
Still, I am disappointed that you chose to misstate my position so baldly. From the beginning (by which I mean the piece I wrote that drew your ire), my position on the asterisk had nothing to do with the contents of 1244. My choice not to challenge your legalistic defense or the asterisk was based–as I said repeatedly but you chose not to mention in your blog–was that the details of the resolution were irrelevant. You are welcome to disagree with my opinion, but you really should at least reflect the views you are disagreeing with accurately.
In fact, I thought about bringing up 1244’s security annexes, because they provide a stronger Serbian claim to residual sovereignty than the language you noted, but–because I do not consider the 1244 argument important–I did not want to get bogged down in the minutiae of the resolution.
I could correct your misstatement of my views on your blog, but that would just draw out a discussion on a topic that–on this I agree with you–is getting somewhat old. It would be nice if you would at least correct the dodgy strawman you misrepresented as my view (or choose to reprint this note on your blog), but I leave that to you.
All that aside, I very much enjoyed yesterday’s discussion and am grateful you proposed it. I stand ready to reprise the experience on any topic at any time you desire.
David
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Serbia*
Yesterday’s shoot out over the Kosovo asterisk surprised me. David Kanin conceded the merits of my argument that legally UN Security Council resolution 1244 does not guarantee Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo but rather provides the basis for a decision on Kosovo’s final status. Nevertheless, he said, the asterisk was still a defeat for Kosovo because Pristina resisted it. Serbia, which has argued long and hard that 1244 preserves its sovereignty, somehow won the political match.
This is a bit like deciding who won a soccer game by listening to which team’s fans cheer louder rather than by the score. That’s not my way. I admit that I’d have liked to see reciprocity in the asterisk requirement: Serbia* with reference to both 1244 and the International Court of Justice opinion, which condition Belgrade’s sovereignty more than Pristina’s. But the score is at least 2-zip (1244 and ICJ), no matter how loud Belgrade cheers.
There is one aspect of 1244 that is negative for Kosovo: the continuing presence on its territory of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which has now been reduced to uselessness or worse. Pristina has been trying to get it out of there. Washington should help.
David also made two other points with which I can wholeheartedly agree: that the five EU states that have not yet recognized Kosovo should do so, and that the EU should make explicit that neither Kosovo nor Serbia will get membership until they have settled the outstanding issues between them.
But I disagree with David’s reasoning on the first point. On the second, it is already clear, to anyone whose eyes are open.
Contrary to David’s claim, the five nonrecognizing EU states (Cyprus, Romania, Greece, Spain and Slovakia) are no longer a serious obstacle to Kosovo’s relationship with the EU. So long as the asterisk is used, they cannot block Kosovo’s progress towards a visa waiver or a Stabilization and Association Agreement, unless there is good substantive reason to do so. They have in essence given up their vetoes now that there is a clear basis for Kosovo’s “contractual relationship” with the EU. The main reason now for the five to recognize Kosovo is that it makes no sense not to do so. This they will realize gradually and one by one will succumb, Cyprus last.
Several EU states have already publicly stated that Kosovo and Serbia will not enter as members until they’ve settled the issues between them. More say it privately. Just one (of the current 27) is really required to make this threat real. My guess is that more than 20 current members (plus Croatia, which will join next year) will insist on this point, which is consonant with the EU requirement for “good neighborly relations.” Presumably the reason the EU does not state this as policy is reluctance to pull the rug out from under Serbian President Boris Tadic, who has promised his country both EU membership and sovereignty over Kosovo.
Tadic is not blind and knows full well that he is making a promise he cannot fulfill. He may still to be hoping for partition of Kosovo, a proposition neither the Americans nor the Europeans will permit because of its broader regional consequences. But membership is a long way off still. As long as the EU doesn’t threaten too explicitly to keep Serbia out until it gives up Kosovo, Tadic can continue his charade. If I were a European diplomat, I would want that game to end as soon as the May elections are over.
One more thing: I understand that Belgrade is still holding Hasan Abazi, a Kosovo trade unionist it arrested in retaliation for Pristina’s arrest of several Serbs, now released. Abazi is being processed in a Serbian court whose jurisdiction is nominally in Kosovo. The very existence of this court is a violation of UNSC resolution 1244. This is an outrage. I trust the Kosovo authorities (prime minister and foreign minister) will mention this issue to the Americans during their current visit to Washington. I certainly encourage them to do so.
I promise: this is my last post mentioning the asterisk, which is an issue that has lost its charm. But I am tempted to have badges made up with a big * on them. Maybe I should parade with one in Mother Theresa Street on my next visit to Pristina?
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