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What good is the European Union?

Yesterday afternoon SAIS hosted a discussion of “Europe, Italy and the Libya” crisis to celebrate the publication of Federiga Bindi’s Italy and the European Union.  I couldn’t stay the whole time–I had to go teach my post-conflict reconstruction seminar–but I’ll try to give a sense of the hour and a quarter of the proceedings that I was able to attend.

The question on my mind, and I suppose on the minds of many of the Americans in the room, was “what good is the European Union?”  When we need help from it, can we get it?  And to what extent does it even exist on an issue like Libya, where disarray has been more apparent than the Common European Security and Defense Policy?  Will the EU be prepared to take over the post-conflict reconstruction once the war is over?  No one will be surprised I trust that the answers are uniformly gloomy.

I confess that the three Italian presenters are people I know and respect, as is Marta Dassu’, who chaired.  The gloom I felt should not really be blamed on them–they are more observers than participants.

Roberto Toscano, former Italian Ambassador in Tehran now at the Wilson Center, led off noting that the heady days when we were talking with abandon about “revolution” are already over.  In Egypt, the Army and at least part of the Muslim Brotherhood seem to be conspiring to chill revolutionary fervor while in Libya we really don’t know who the rebels are.  The outcomes there could be partition, or a failed state.  Contradictions and double standards hound the intervention there.  There are questions also about Yemen, Syria and Bahrain.  Our interests in these places often conflict with our principles. Maybe we went too far with humanitarian intervention in Libya, and also in Ivory Coast.  Can we say we are protecting civilians and then use military means that necessarily kill some of them?

I was relieved when Roberto finally got around to mentioning the positive part:  people who have been subjects are demanding their rights as citizens, things are beginning to change even if we are nowhere near the end of the transition process.  And then the inevitable but obvious:  the EU will find this a difficult challenge to meet and will require a major military, political and security effort.

Erik Jones of the SAIS center in Bologna, in response to a query from Marta, denied that the U.S. financial crunch would affect the American effort–after all, Defense is the one department of the government still getting an increase, and the Iraq and Afghanistan war expenditures are not included in the budget deal.  U.S. leadership, he went on to note, will still be needed.  There is a broad political consensus in the U.S. in support of U.S. global leadership, but President Obama has been wise to seek contributions from others.  In focusing on that, though, he failed to do all that was needed to line up domestic support for the Libya operation.

The key issues for the U.S. have to do with the timing of when it gets involved, and when it gets out.  It is now out of the direct combat operations but continues to provide unique capabilities like intelligence and refueling, even including close air support in some instances.  One of the contradictions in U.S. policy is that it asks the Europeans not to duplicate U.S. capabilities, but then the U.S. is stuck doing things that the Europeans can’t do. The Americans really don’t care who does what among the allies, so long as someone picks up a good chunk of the burden.  The Europeans though are preoccupied with who does what–whether it is the French or British, the EU or the member states.

The big problem now is when to declare victory.  This is especially important to the Europeans, since what frightens them most is the prospect of emigration from North Africa.  The longer the war goes on, the more likely that problem will grow.  Maybe regime change isn’t necessary?

Federiga Bindi noted that the public discourse in Italy, which for many years shied away from discussion of the national interest because it was associated with the Fascists, now allows for the discussion, but without firm conclusions to date.  Italy’s history in Libya is fraught with problems, from the time of the 1911 occupation, through the colonial period, to Gaddafi’s accession to power and expulsion of the Italians.  Italy depends on Libya today for important slices of oil and gas supplies and would have preferred a negotiated solution.  But that won’t work now, and the Foreign Minister at least (but perhaps not the Prime Minister) is betting on the Benghazi authorities, whom Rome has now recognized.

Italian interests are much more complex than French and British interests.  Essentially Paris and London had nothing to lose by intervening, Federiga thought, while the EU has remained largely silent and Turkey is using this and other developments as a means of emerging as a regional power.

Francesco Olivieri, who now represents the Italian electrical company ENEL in Washington but is a thoroughly  experienced Italian diplomat, doubted that oil and gas had much to do with the intervention.  Libyan exports at 1.6 million barrels per day were not very important during the recession, the earthquake/tsunami/nuclear crisis has sharply reduced Japanese demand, and OPEC has increased production to make up in part for the shortfall.  Whatever the outcome of the Libya crisis, its oil and gas will reach the market, as it did under Gaddafi.

One real issue, Francesco suggested, was what happens to the $60 billion dollars per year, more or less, that flows to Tripoli in payment for its oil and gas.  This could be used for bad purposes if the wrong kind of regime ends up in power.  A second big issue is the problem of refugees–so far the numbers are manageable, but the EU should recognize that it has a common purpose in making sure it stays that way.

European friends:  I appeal to you to stop worrying about whether we should have intervened or not, about why the French went first and the British soon thereafter (with the Germans ducking out), about whether oil and gas were the real issue (or not), about Italy’s complicated relationship with Tripoli, about our interests and our values.  This is all water under the bridge.

The issue now is to make this “humanitarian intervention” come out right.  There are two things required for that:  get Gaddafi and his family out of there (I suspect the Americans, as Hillary Clinton has been implying, are still taking the lead on that, likely with help from the Turks) and begin planning for the post-war stabilization and reconstruction.  That is something the EU can really help with, as it has lots of experience in many difficult places.

Is it time to negotiate with Qaddafi?

Theatlantic.com published this piece of mine this morning:

Apr 11 2011, 9:50 AM ET

It’s time to look for a way to end the war in Libya, but dealing with the regime won’t be easy

Louafi Larbi/Reuters

With self-appointed African Union mediators shuttling between Tripoli and Benghazi meetings with the Libyan government and rebel leaderships to try and end the war, the important question is whether the international community should be negotiating with the Qaddafis. The answer depends on what we are negotiating about and how well prepared we are to pursue our shared interests.

The subject of the negotiations must begin with the departure of Muammar Qaddafi and the rest of his family from Libya. Anything less than that would create a difficult fractious post-war situation in Libya, with a de facto division of territory between Qaddafi-held west and rebel-held east, and with Qaddafi continuing to control Tripoli. If, as former Congressman Curt Weldon proposed, Muammar were to step aside but his son Saif al Islam continued to play a role in the transitional structures, the probability of a successful transition would likewise be reduced to nearly zero.

The Qaddafi family will not give up power in Libya so long as it remains physically present. It has its own armed forces as well as security agents and controls the vast funds derived from Libyan oil exports over the past 42 years. Tens of billions squirreled away in U.S. banks have been frozen, but we can be certain more billions remain unfrozen elsewhere, or stowed in gold ingots in Tripoli. It is not even clear what “step aside” would mean for Muammar, since he has no official position in a Libyan state.

Since Qaddafi’s power does not depend on his position in the Libyan state, he and his sons could well maintain their military and political power even if they were to accept retirement to a desert tent. In any case, Saif al Islam, who was educated at the London School of Economics-educated and has spent much of his life enjoying Europe’s most luxurious hotel, would be unlikely to accept such a life out of power. Libya is quite unlike Egypt in this respect. Hosni Mubarak’s retirement to Sharm el Sheikh was acceptable to the protesters not only because Sharm is far from the maddening crowd but also because the army seemed prepared to guarantee the political transition. It was accepted by the protesters as loyal to the Egyptian state, not to Hosni Mubarak.

Even in Egypt, there are now profound doubts about what the army is up to. Mubarak’s return to the public sphere with a statement flatly denying corruption and the army’s harsh treatment of protesters in Tahrir square the last few days have left many wondering whether the counterrevolution is in full swing. But Libya has no army loyal to the Libyan state. This lack of institutional framework (no constitution, few ministries, no chief of state, not even a real rubber stamp parliament) would make the transition in Libya so problematic.

The ongoing violence contributes to this uncertainty as well. Under violent attack from security forces, the opponents of Qaddafi long ago gave up nonviolent protests for an ill-prepared military assault on his regime. Qaddafi has redoubled his efforts, ensuring that there will be many dead on both sides. Accountability for the violence will not come quickly, but it will probably not come at all if Qaddafi and family are allowed to remain in the country. Most Libyans simply won’t stop resisting if they remain.

So if we are negotiating about Qaddafi and his family departing from Libya, then how well prepared are we to pursue that objective?

Leverage in negotiations depends on what other options you have, should the negotiations fail. In this case, our best alternative to a negotiated solution appears to be to continue fighting. That is not a very good option. NATO will have increased difficulty finding legitimate targets, as Qaddafi’s forces park their heavy armor near schools and mosques and disguise their remaining vehicles to look as much like rebel vehicles as possible. Enthusiasm for the continued military effort is likely to fade. Neither the French nor the British — the leading forces striking Libya — will want to go on ad infinitum, and some of the others participating will likely want to quit even earlier.

Qaddafi knows all this. Like us, his best alternative is also to continue fighting. No one should be fooled by Saif al Islam’s London School of Economics degree or his smooth talk about transition to democracy. Qaddafi and his family give every indication of wanting to preserve their own power. It is hard to know for how long they can go on without running out of money, troops, or cronies, several of whom have already defected. But we can be certain that Muammar regards the issue as one of life or death and will therefore fight on until he finds a way out that enables him and his family to survive.

That is what we may very well need to put on offer: a way out, but one that will only be available if Qaddafi and family to take advantage of it soon. That is what the five AU “mediators” could usefully offer: a comfortable retirement, available only for a short time, in Mauritania, Mali, Congo, Uganda or South Africa. Of these, only Mauritania is not a state party to the International Criminal Court, which may eventually want to prosecute. Venezuela is another possibility, but it is also a state party to the ICC, and the Americans are unlikely to welcome Qaddafi as a resident of the Western Hemisphere. For those who worry that the ICC might never get hold of Qaddafi, remember Charles Taylor, who was allowed to retire to Nigeria only to later be captured and put on trial.

It appears doubtful that the AU delegation will take the kind of hard line required to get Qaddafi to leave Libya. It is much more likely that it will come back with a vague, wishy-washy offer from Qaddafi that sounds good on paper but enables him and his sons to remain in Tripoli making all sorts of trouble and preventing transition to a new, more representative regime. We should not be tempted. Compromised conclusions to NATO air wars in Bosnia and in Kosovo have proven frighteningly difficult and expensive to implement. Nor should we be tempted to put boots on the ground, as we know from Iraq and Afghanistan how painful that can be.

A satisfactory outcome in Libya will be one that vindicates Responsibility to Protect and allows the Americans to stand aside from the post-war reconstruction and leave it to the Europeans, whose energy interests give them motive and means to be helpful to the New Libya.

Post-war plans are needed, urgently

Tonight the President will clarify what we are doing in Libya and tomorrow a London diplomatic conference will assemble to congratulate itself on what we have achieved so far.  But I doubt either one will seriously address post-war planning, which is needed right now.  The President can’t call attention to it because his message will be that we aren’t going to spend much money on Libya, which Secretary Gates has already classified as “not vital” to the U.S.  The London conference won’t do it either, because the Europeans should lead on support to Libya but they are still in their all too usual disarray.

So let me offer some guidance about the elements I would consider important in a post-war plan.  The first thing to lay out is a satisfactory end-state, as Gideon Rose so eloquentlysaid in the Washington Post last weekend.  Let me borrow from the ill-fated lexicon of George W. Bush and suggest that a Libya (note the singular) that can govern itself, sustain itself and defend itself would be a satisfactory outcome.

I don’t mean to suggest that this is a U.S. responsibility; only that Washington should be happy if that is the outcome.  I fully expect the U.S. to avoid responsibility for the post-war efforts, which in my view should fall mainly to Libyans and Europeans.  Libyans because it is their country.  Europeans because it is their neighborhood (and a major oil and gas supplier).

There is no cookie-cutter approach, but post-Cold War state-building efforts have generally focused on five broad objectives.  Here they are, with some pertinent questions (with thanks to my SAIS class for our discussion of several weeks ago):

1.  Safe and secure environment: Libyans seem to quickly organize themselves for community protection, but in the aftermath of this war the big problem is likely to be the Gaddafi loyalists, who may conduct the kind of stay-behind operation that plagued the Americans in Iraq (and troubled Benghazi just 10 days ago, when Gaddafi appeared on the verge of taking the city).  There is also likely to be a serious rash of revenge killings, especially targeted against Gaddafi’s mercenaries.  Preventing emergence of an insurgency and blocking the revenge impulse will require serious leadership on the part of the Libyan rebels.  Failure to prevent revenge killings will incite further resistance from Gaddafi loyalists and haunt the New Libya for years to come.

There is also a need to secure whatever chemical and other weapons of mass destruction Libya may still have, as well as an eventual effort to collect first heavy and then lighter weapons still in the hands of rebels and Gaddafi’s forces.  Failure to do this will mean a constant threat to the state from well-armed organized crime, which will grow naturally out of whatever smuggling operations both the Gaddafi regime and the rebels have been enjoying.  The objective should be to establish the state’s monopoly on the legitimate means of violence, with all deliberate speed.

2.  Rule of law: Libya’s police force will need vetting and reform–this is something the Europeans have assisted in many other places and should help with in Libya, at Libyan invitation.  I know precious little about the judicial system in Libya, but as the head of the Transitional National Council is a former Justice Minister I trust we can rely on him to ask for what the judicial system needs.  Some prisons seem to have been emptied during the fighting, releasing extremists.  They will need to be recaptured, before they begin to wreck havoc in Libya or get to Somalia.

3.  Stable governance: This will be a big challenge. Libya under Gaddafi was a “republic of the masses” and lacked many functioning state institutions.  The Transitional National Council (TNC) will presumably be the seed from which other governing institutions–a parliament, ministries, a presidency, local governments–will grow. The TNC needs to remain broadly representative of all elements in Libyan society if it is to have the legitimacy required.  As the rebels move west, this will mean enlarging or changing its composition, a difficult maneuver while trying to keep so many moving parts in place.

Of course it is possible that a new strongman will emerge to replace Gaddafi and he’ll decide what happens next.  But experience elsewhere suggests that once people taste freedom it is hard to reimpose dictatorship.  The UN has extensive experience helping to reform and reconstruct governing structures, not to mention holding elections and writing constitutions.  The Libyans might do well to look there for help.

4.  Sustainable economy: Libya has the great benefit, and curse, of oil and gas in sufficient quantities to make its 6.4 million or so citizens reasonably well off.  Nothing of that sort happened under Gaddafi.  It is hard to imagine where all the money went, though the freezing of about $30 billion in Libyan assets by a single U.S. bank gives a hint.  The oil and gas companies will get in and fix whatever is physically broken once a safe and secure environment is in place.

What the Libyans need to focus on is making sure they have the fuel they need for their own consumption and establishing a system for oil revenue that makes citizens better off.  They could do worse than consult with Norway, which uses its oil revenue to fund an endowment and spends only the earnings on the endowment, but that is just one option.  Alaska’s approach, which provides per capita payments (much like welfare, but don’t tell Sarah Palin I said that) to each of its citizens, is another.  The worst approach is the most likely one:  giving the revenue to the government, which will then have no need to establish a rapport with citizens to fund its voracious desires.

5.  Social well-being: The most immediate problems are food, water, shelter and health care for the hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people.  But Libyans have been through four decades of a reality-defying dictatorship, one that ultimately divided them into loyalists and rebels.  National reconciliation does not come naturally and will need care and attention. It will be easier if those revenge killings are few.

Again:  I don’t mean to suggest that all this is a U.S. responsibility.  It is not.  The Libyans should take the lead.  But Washington needs to think hard about ensuring that the necessary assistance is available.  That doesn’t cost much–we’ve already paid for the nation’s diplomats, at least until early April–but it is vital if Libya is to get where we want it to go:  govern itself, sustain itself, defend itself.

PS:  Those who are going to want to vaunt the Libya operation as a triumph of responsibility to protect should be particularly concerned about the lack of post-war planning.  The ultimate judgment of whether this was a wise humanitarian intervention will depend not only on the military outcome but also on the civilian results.

PPS: Steven Metz discusses the insurgency issue.

Even good resolutions don’t suffice

The Libya Security Council resolution no. 1973 that passed this evening looks very good to me, though I confess I failed to notice that the arms embargo applied to the rebels when the last one passed (and I don’t think this one fixes that problem).  I guess the Egyptians are fixing it. I would also note that a cease-fire in place really favors Gaddafi’s forces, but I have my doubts it will take effect any time soon.

The important thing is that this resolution authorizes all necessary means, short of an occupation, to protect civilians.  It also tightens the arms embargo as well as the financial and other sanctions.  It passed, with five abstentions, including China, Russia, Brazil, India and Germany.  That is a remarkable achievement, and my hat is off to US Permanent Representative Ambassador Susan Rice.

The key thing now is implementation.  The Srebrenica UNSC resolution (no. 819 of 1993) looked pretty good to a lot of people too, and its purpose was remarkably similar to this one:  to protect civilians from murderous thugs.  But Colum Lynch listed it last year as among the 10 worse UN Security Council resolutions ever.

The difference, if there is to be one, has to come from implementation.  The problem with the resolution declaring Srebrenica a “safe area” was not the objective–it was the lack of ways and means to achieve the objective.  When the U.S. did eventually seek to protect the UN safe areas in Bosnia by bombing the Serb forces in response to an attack on Sarajevo, it quickly shifted the tide of war and led to a very rapid advance by the Croat and Bosniak forces.

Precious little has been said so far about implementation of no. 1973.  There are rumors the French will begin acting tonight, but there are also rumors that NATO is not yet ready.  Some Arab countries are said to be willing to participate in military action, but that is not confirmed.  It is not clear whether the U.S. will participate, or whether it will do so in stand-off fashion with cruise missiles and the like.

So the Benghazis do well to celebrate, but this fight isn’t over yet, and its outcome is still very much in doubt.