Tag: European Union
Deal, no deal, ceasefire, peace agreement?
Ukrainian President Zelensky will meet Friday with President Trump to sign a minerals agreement the Americans have been insisting on. The Financial Times reports:
The final version of the agreement, dated February 25 and seen by the FT, would establish a fund into which Ukraine would contribute 50 per cent of proceeds from the “future monetisation” of state-owned mineral resources, including oil and gas, and associated logistics. The fund would also be able to invest in projects in Ukraine.
The $500 billion demand has disappeared. No security guarantees are included. The US stake in the fund is unspecified.
Deal, or no deal?
It is hard to know what to think about this, as it all depends on the details and on implementation. It is certainly not common practice for countries providing support to insist on repayment. But Trump is Trump. Personally, I wouldn’t sign anything he offers, but Zelensky is in a difficult spot. I hope he knows what he is doing.
The bigger question is whether this will bring Trump around to supporting Ukraine rather than Russia. I doubt it. Moscow will offer to match any terms Zelensky signs for minerals at least in Russian-occupied Ukraine. Trump won’t resist. Two deals of this sort will solidify partition.
What now?
Trump will continue to insist on peace talks. He desperately wants credit for ending the war. He has already given President Putin most of what Moscow wants. Trump is ready to accept Russian occupation of the territory it controls inside Ukraine. He has blamed Ukraine for the war. And he no doubt wants to end the shipment of arms to what he regards as the losing side.
Ukraine can do without the arms, at least for the next year or so. President Biden shipped ample supplies. The more important question is whether the US is prepared to continue providing intelligence. That is vital to Ukraine’s targeting. Also important to Ukraine is the use of Elon Musk’s StarLink satellite network, which it uses for military communications.
Trump’s reluctance to continue supporting Ukraine makes the Europeans more important than ever. If they step up their military supplies, Ukraine has a chance to outlast Russia in the current war of attrition. If they don’t, Kyiv’s manpower shortage will become ever more visible and relevant. Ukraine needs both Europe’s arms and its economic and financial support.
What about peace?
If Trump continues to insist, a ceasefire is a real possibility. Both Ukraine and Russia need a respite, during which they will resupply and reorganize for renewed fighting. The Europeans are saying they are prepared to observe a ceasefire. But the confrontation line is 600 miles long, with forces on both sides stronger than any the Europeans will deploy. The experience of monitoring a much shorter confrontation line in southern Lebanon does not bode well.
Neither Kyiv nor Moscow seems to me prepared to compromise on their basic war aims. Russia wants to limit Ukraine’s sovereign choices, like joining NATO. Ukraine wants Russia out of all of its territory, including Crimea. There may be a mutually hurting stalemate, but there is no mutually enticing way out. A ceasefire will give both sides time to contemplate whether one exists, but they certainly haven’t defined one yet.
The hour of Europe really has arrived
The three-year anniversary of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has come and gone, with lots of fanfare. But nothing more discordant than the US vote in the General Assembly. Washington voted with Moscow and its friends against a resolution condemning the invasion. For the Trump Administration, calling an invasion aggression was just too much.
The real estate mogul views war
Trump has upended US policy on Ukraine. He has blamed Kyiv for the Russian invasion and asked for repayment of US aid. The Americans are talking with Russia about an end to the war without Ukrainians or Europeans in the room.
But none of that is the worst. The core problem is not procedural or rhetorical. It is the solution Trump will favor. He sees the war as a fight over territory, which he will propose to divide. Russia will keep whatever it has conquered and Ukraine will get the rest. This is a real estate mogul’s view of war. He takes a similar view of Gaza. It’s about territory for him. Get rid of the people and rebuild to Israel’s specifications, which means no Palestinians.
I need hardly mention that he is treating Panama, Canada, and Greenland with the same territorial eye.
It’s about sovereignty, not territory
But Ukraine is not about territory. Nor are Panama, Canada, and Greenland. Or even Gaza. In all these places the real issue is sovereignty, not territory. The Canada proposition is an obvious bad joke. It has already caused Canadians to look more to the UK and Europe for their future security. They are correct to do so.
But Panama and Greenland have good reason to fear Trump’s intentions. Neither is strong enough on its own to resist. The 1989 American invasion of Panama is forgotten in America, but it is living memory in Panama. Greenland has no military, and Denmark has a tiny one (16,000 total). Pituffik Space Base, until recently Thule Air Base, has fewer than 1000 Americans and contractors. If the US wanted to expand it, Denmark would no doubt have tried to cooperate. The Danes would also welcome US investment in mineral exploration and exploitation in Greenland. But Trump’s insistence on buying the island, and threatening that otherwise he’ll take it by force, will generate resistance. Denmark is small, but sovereign.
Sovereignty isn’t divisible, but it is shareable
The problem with sovereignty is that it isn’t divisible. But it is shareable. The European Union is a case of shared sovereignty. Its currency, the euro, belongs to no single member state. Likewise its common market and its rules for the circulation of people, capital, and services.
The Minsk I and II agreements that Moscow and Kyiv negotiated, but never implemented, entailed shared sovereignty. Let’s leave aside who would have benefited most and who was responsible for their non-implementation. They would have required Kyiv to devolve authority. That would have given Moscow a good deal of say in the governance of Russian speakers in Donbas. But it would have left the rest of Ukraine unconstrained.
Putin wants it all
For Putin, Ukraine is not about territory. He will accept a ceasefire. But he will not respect a serious solution that leaves even part of Ukraine as a sovereign state. That would mean Kyiv can make its own choices, like joining NATO, or developing nuclear weapons. Russia wouldn’t like that.
I still have some hope that Europe will step into the gap the US is leaving. The Europeans have more at risk. They have also paid more to date:

If Europe comes up with the $700 billion rumored, that would give Ukraine the means to outlast Putin. It would also give Europe the clout to counterbalance the US. Those are two desirable outcomes, under current circumstances.
Ukraine doesn’t like Trump’s surrender
Ukrainian President Zelensky is understandably an unhappy man. President Trump organized a meeting to discuss Ukraine behind his back. Trump also conceded most of what the Russians were seeking in advance. Besides the continued Russian occupation of 20% of Ukraine, Trump is prepared to meet other Russian demands. They include no NATO membership for Ukraine, no US forces in Ukraine, and sanctions relief for Russia. It is rumored Trump has also agreed to withdrawal of US forces from other Russian neighbors.
Why?
The US interests the Administration has cited are economic and geopolitical. That is bogus. Russia’s economy at this point is smaller than Spain’s. Alienating Europe, a wealthy market of over 500 million people (EU+UK), to curry economic favor with Russia is absurd. Its population is less than 145 million and its GDP smaller than California’s or Texas’. Russia’s giant Eurasian land mass is of little interest to the US. America has greater oil and gas reserves and produces much more of both. We bought the most important part Russian territory in 1867. It is now called Alaska.
Besides, Russia is now firmly aligned, as a vassal state, with China. Putin couldn’t get out of that relationship if he wanted to. But he doesn’t want to.
One reason for Trump’s capitulation was seated at the negotiating table. Dmitry Rybolovlev, one of Putin’s favorite billionaires, bought a house in Palm Beach from Trump in 2008 for $95 million. Trump had paid less than $42 million for it four years earlier. Even in Palm Beach, that’s wild. Dmitry must have had very good reasons making his money disappear. Trump collaborated in the laundering. If this were a mafia movie, you would know what having him sit in the negotiations yesterday means.
US interests
This is not even appeasement. It is capitulation. There is no reason for Ukraine or the US to give in at this point. Russia has been making very slow progress in attacking Ukraine at very high cost. The war has eliminated Russia as a peer military competitor to the US, if it ever was one. That alone is worth the aid we’ve given Kyiv.
Ukraine is also bleeding, but that is Zelensky’s problem, not Trump’s. Zelensky wants a decent negotiated solution, not the capitulation Trump is offering. Yesterday Turkiye President Erdogan backed Ukraine’s “indisputable” sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Fortunately, the Europeans are said to be assembling a 700 billion euro package for Ukraine. That far exceeds all US assistance to Ukraine, which totals $183 billion. It is a good thing for the US. If Trump’s supporters want to claim credit for getting the Europeans to do it, I’ll gladly applaud with one hand. But the Europeans need to move as quickly as possible after the German election this weekend. Derailing a bad settlement is vital.
Perfidy unlimited
Trump has also tried to shake down Ukraine for $500 billion in mineral deposits, or maybe more. Zelensky has made it clear that deal isn’t going anywhere. He is correct to do so. If anyone should pay for the US aid to Ukraine, it is Russia, which invaded. Asking the victim to pay is a new level of perfidy for Trump, though consistent with past behavior.
The United States should be offering the full support that Erdogan is voicing. Instead, a president who is dismantling the US government is doing the same to its alliances and interests abroad. These will be days that live in infamy.
Europe needs to unify and toughen up, fast
Yes, the US is trying to exclude Europe from an issue of vital European interest. No, it is not the first time.
Why Washington excludes Europe
My personal familiarity with this apparently undiplomatic behavior dates from the Dayton agreements that end the Bosnian war. The Europeans were present, but excluded from the key decisions. Holbooke was convinced that they would only complicate things and slow the negotiations. So he ordered Bob Gallucci to get them involved in an endless discussion of the international police force. Should it have executive authority, as the Americans wanted, or not, as the European insisted?
The tactic worked. Only the Germans, who worked bilaterally with the Americans without EU cover, had any impact at Dayton. Holbrooke encouraged Bonn, to prevent a united European consensus against him. The other Europeans had no significant role. The British and French complained bitterly without effect. But they and the rest of the EU were left holding the bag–they paid for much of the reconstruction.
Something similar had happened a few years earlier in the reunification of Germany. The Americans agreed to a 2+4 (two Germanies plus the four occupying powers) format for the diplomacy. But Washington then prevented most important issues from getting on the 2+4 agenda. The format was a fig leaf for US and (West) German decisions.
I’m sure there are many other examples.
The Ukraine negotiations
The Americans are trying the same trick now in the Ukraine negotiations. They intend to work directly with the Russians, excluding not only the UK and EU but also Ukraine. Washington wants to avoid the complications and delays dealing with them would cause. It again intends to leave the Europeans holding the bag. They will be expected not only to pay for the reconstruction but also to field peacekeepers.
The Americans have already made one big mistake. They have telegraphed what they are up to. Defense Secretary Hegseth’s scolded the Europeans at NATO. President Trump’s undertook his talk with Russian President Putin without consultation with allies. The Russian and American Foreign Ministers are meeting this week in Riyadh. Vice President Vance’s offensive talk at the Munich Security Conference told the Europeans all they needed to know.
The US is moving to conclude the Ukraine war on Moscow’s terms. That means surrendering Ukrainian territory for peace. The Americans want, as they have for several presidencies, to pivot away from the defense of Europe. They are also playing to their domestic audience, some of which is Russophilic and anti-European.
What the Europeans need to do now
Amply alerted, the Europeans are reacting quicker than usual. Key states are meeting in Paris today to plan what to do. Here is what I would suggest:
- They agree to monitor a peace settlement only if it in principle preserves Ukraine’s pre-2014 sovereignty and territorial integrity.
- They supply Ukraine with all the weapons and intelligence it needs to win, substituting for any shortfalls from the US.
- Europeans should examine any agreement reached without their presence on its merits, but with prejudice.
- They deploy trainers and technicians to Ukraine to help with both military and civilian tasks.
The Americans won’t like this. They may even try something like what Holbrooke did: convince a big country like Germany or Poland to cooperate bilaterally. That would block a European consensus. But so long as Europe continues to insist on point 1 above, they won’t be stuck with a bad deal.
Trump is different
The difference between Holbrooke’s exclusion of the Europeans and Trump’s is significant. President Clinton, Holbrooke’s boss, backed the NATO alliance and was sympathetic to the EU, which then included the UK. After Dayton, there was no need for a continuing rift between Europe and the US. The agreements reached accorded with European preferences. The rift ended quickly and Europe carried a big burden post-war.
The same won’t happen with Trump. He is unsympathetic to alliances in general, NATO in particular, and the EU most of all. The Americans are pushing for an agreement that will encourage future Russian aggression. If Europe is going to punch at least its weight in future trans-Atlantic issues, it needs to unify and toughen up, fast.
Peace in our time will bring more war
Pete Hegseth announced a major change in US policy on Ukraine today. The most unqualified Defense Secretary ever offered to appease Russia by
- Ending US support for Ukraine’s membership in NATO;
- Abandoning Ukraine’s war goal of regaining control of all its sovereign territory;
- Anticipating an end to most US assistance to Ukraine;
- Excluding US troops from any post-war peacekeeping force;
- Asking European allies to provide such a force without a NATO Article 5 guarantee.
This gives Russian President Putin everything he hopes for except direct and immediate control over the government in Kyiv.
This is not peace through strength
Hegseth claimed he was proposing peace through strength. But that is pure illusion. He is pulling the rug out from underneath Ukrainian President Zelensky. At best (from Ukraine’s perspective), his remarks would make Ukraine a buffer state between NATO and Russia.
But maintaining Ukraine as a buffer state would be impossible. The Europeans would need to monitor a confrontation zone between Russia and Ukraine that is more than 1200 miles long. Kyiv, abandoned by the US, would want nuclear weapons to ensure Ukraine’s survival. That Russia would not allow.
Another Russian invasion of Ukrainian territory would be just a matter of time. And in the meanwhile Russia would be doing everything it could to bring down Zelensky. That wouldn’t be difficult if he agreed to anything like what Hegseth proposes.
I hardly need mention that partition of Ukraine as Hegseth proposes will have a dramatic impact in the Balkans. Serbia will try to grab territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Kosovo. American and European troops will be at risk.
Worse: appeasement of Russia in Ukraine will be a signal to Beijing that Washington won’t defend Taiwan. Some of that damage may already have been done with Hegseth’s speech. He has undermined the deterrence he claims to find vital.
Real peace through strength is the alternative?
The Biden Administration pursued a Goldilocks policy on Ukraine. Enough support to make Russia’s territorial gains slow and costly. But not enough to provoke Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, which Putin has contemplated in the event Moscow faced calamity.
That worked well enough given its objectives. But it wasn’t enough–nor did it intend–for Ukraine to win the war. Kyiv, like Moscow, is struggling with manpower shortages. The only way for it to win the war is with overwhelming technological superiority. Ukraine’s forces have developed a lot of their own weapons and tactics. But they will need more unqualified US and European support to win.
The alternative to Hegseth’s appeasement is to provide that support. That would be real peace through strength.
A Ukraine win would strengthen the West
The implications of Kyiv winning are good for the US and Europe. Moscow would then need to abandon its imperial ambitions. Putin might survive using repression, but only as a much-diminished figure at home and abroad. Russia’s economy and demography will need rebuilding. It will be at least another generation before Moscow can threaten a neighbor.
Reasonable people in Moscow would quickly switch the position on Ukrainian membership in NATO. They would come to see that as the best guarantee of a Ukraine without nuclear weapons. They know better than anyone else that NATO membership has kept Germany non-nuclear.
Europe would gain enormously from the opening of a peacetime free market with Ukraine reconstructing itself. The US would get the privileged access to Ukrainian rare minerals it seeks.
Kosovo is democratic but complicated
Kosovo voted yesterday. The electoral mechanism seems to have worked reasonably well except for a cyberattack. That appears to have been overcome. Prime Minister Kurti (LVV) got 41%, his PDK opposition 22%, the LDK opposition 18%, and AAK (Ramush Haradinaj) 7%. Minorities will hold 20 seats. Turnout was relatively low (around 40%), despite a lively campaign. I haven’t yet seen how the preliminary percentages translate into parliamentary seats. That could change the picture.
For background, here is a primer. So far as I can tell, the EU observer mission has not yet reported its findings.
The winner loses…but the losers didn’t win
The Prime Minister led by an almost a 2/1 margin over his nearest competitor. But he lost his absolute majority in parliament. While minority votes could put him in the majority, he won’t get enough of them. He will now need the seats of either the PDK or the LDK to regain the majority. The freewheeling way he has governed will make that difficult. Both the PDK and AAK have said they are unwilling to govern with VV. Still, it can’t be ruled out, especially if he is willing to give up the prime ministry. The LDK seems more open to the idea.
The PDK, LDK, and AAK did not win either. Even if the PDK and LDK join together in coalition, they won’t have enough seats to gain the majority. Putting together a 3-party coalition isn’t going to be easy. Resentment of Kurti might help. The three opposition parties were united during the campaign in criticizing him. They don’t like his handling of the economy and blame him for strained relations with the US and EU.
What next
Parliamentary systems that produce ambiguous results of this sort generally need some time to work things out. Despite strains between them, I suppose President Osmani will give Kurti a chance to forge a parliamentary majority. If he fails, the PDK may get a chance to bring in a government that includes the other opposition parties.
If Kurti keeps the prime ministry in coalition with an opposition party, the US and EU will pressure him to consult more. They want him to show more flexibility in dealing with Serbia. That isn’t likely to produce results, given past experience.
Almost any conceivable alternative prime minister will try to reduce strains with the US and EU. All the other political parties have criticized Kurti for inflexibility.
But all have governed in the past, with not much better results when it comes to dealing with Serbia. Belgrade is likewise is inflexible in dealing with Pristina. It demands creation of an Association of Serb Majority Municipalities inside Kosovo with no quid pro quo.
The broader context
Kosovo’s future depends today more on what happens beyond its borders than on this ambiguous election result. Ric Grenell, Trump’s former envoy, is telling everyone in the Balkans he will again be in charge of the region. He loathes Kurti. Last time around, he tried to partition Kosovo. Likely he’ll try again. Or at least insist on self-governance for the Serbs in the north that compromises the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. And he’ll wield control over NATO accession as a stick. He’ll also wield USAID assistance, which will need to be unfrozen.
Even without the American push for partition, any discussion of partition of Ukraine will open the question in the Balkans. Russia and Serbia will encourage Republika Srpska to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina. They will also try to get the Serb-majority north to leave Kosovo. Moscow and Belgrade will figure the US and EU will be unprepared to defend either country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
While the Trump Administration is bad news for Kosovo, so too are future elections in Europe. Further strengthening of the right in Germany this month will stymie EU expansion, already slowed to a crawl.
Kosovo is a good example of successful democratization in the Balkans. But it is also complicated, both internally and in the broader geopolitical context.