Tag: European Union
Maybe smaller is better, for now
I’ve been getting questions lately about the EU-sponsored dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. Will it restart in earnest? Is it just moribund or stone cold dead?
Certainly it has been unproductive. We are approaching the 10th year since the Brussels “political” agreement of 2013. A decade of stasis in the Balkans risks unraveling regional peace and stability. Just listen to Dugin:
So is there hope for progress?
The moment is not propitious. Serbia has aligned itself with Russia, not only on Ukraine, and the Serb-ruled 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina is Moscow’s lap dog, as Dugin makes clear. The US, UK, and the European Union are preoccupied with helping the Ukrainians respond to Russian aggression. The Balkan region is way down the list of urgencies.
Besides, the 2022 and 2024 US elections will soon focus American attention on domestic issues. Everyone in the Balkans will be holding their breath to see if Donald Trump has a real chance of returning to the White House. If it looks good for him, Serbia will want to continue to pause the dialogue with Kosovo, as Trump was sympathetic to Belgrade’s territorial ambitions. If Pristina wants anything from the dialogue, it needs to get it soon.
Acknowledgement of abuses may be a non-starter
Listening to both Kosovo President Osmani and Prime Minister Kurti’s public statements, my sense is that they would both like Serbian President Vucic to acknowledge the abuses of the Milosevic regime in Kosovo in the 1990s. Vucic, who served in that regime, has been unwilling, both in public and in private. He suffers from a severe case of amnesia and “bothsideism.” Kurti, who spent time reading Sartre in a Serbian prison during the 1999 war, remembers well. Neither has a domestic political constituency that yearns for an agreement.
But Vucic’s acknowledgement of the Serbian effort to ethnically cleanse Albanians from Kosovo and of the thousands of rapes by Serbian forces would open the way to improved cooperation, as exhorted in the 2010 General Assembly resolution that launched the dialogue. Kurti would need to acknowledge Albanian abuses against Serbs and Roma, even if much smaller in number. Such acknowledgements would need to be coupled with as full accounting for missing people by both governments as possible. That would clear the way for exchange of bodies and provision for appropriate memorialization in both countries.
License plates should be easier
There should be room to resolve the issue that caused a brouhaha last fall: mutual acceptance of license plates. So far negotiations for a permanent solution have failed, due to Serbia’s refusal to allow Kosovo plates to enter the country with indications of where they originate. The current practice–covering state symbols on both Kosovo and Serbian plates before allowing entry–is a modest improvement on Serbia’s prior requirement that Kosovo plates be replaced with Serbian ones, but it is still wasteful and juvenile.
Accepting license plates and Kosovo documents is not the same as recognizing Kosovo as a sovereign state. The five non-recognizing members of the EU accept lots of Kosovo documents and also maintain diplomatic representation in Pristina. Serbia should do likewise.
Electricity is harder
Pristina wants the Serbs in northern Kosovo to start paying for electricity, which a Kosovo entity has provided free since 1999. This is reasonable, but if Pristina insists Belgrade may supply the electricity from Serbia, further detaching the northern municipalities from Pristina’s governance, an important Serbian objective. As tens of millions of euros are at issue, this one won’t be easy to resolve on its own. A broader financial settlement may be possible.
Hedging and bandwagoning
While these issues eat away at mutual confidence, Serbia has been re-arming itself and deploying forces near and around Kosovo. Belgrade tells Washington Serbian cooperation with NATO is much deeper and more important than cooperation with Russia. But the Defense Ministry vaunts a historical maximum in defense cooperation with Russia, which has provided fighter jets and tanks as well as lots of other goodies. Vucic has increasingly aligned himself politically and militarily with Moscow and Beijing, not only on Ukraine. He claims non-alignment, but hedging is difficult in an era of geopolitical tension. He has tilted way over to the East. Dugin knows of what he speaks.
By contrast, Kosovo has no hedging option so bandwagons with NATO, which is still responsible for defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Pristina’s army, which the US and UK mentor, is slated to be fully operational in 2027. It will be NATO compatible. A few of its soldiers have already deployed with the Americans. Kosovo quickly welcomed Afghan and now Ukrainian refugees, aligns solidly with sanctions on Russia, and is providing de-mining training to Ukrainians.
So the dialogue is not just between Kosovo and Serbia, but also between West and East. As Lenin put it: “show me who your friends are, and I will tell you what you are.”
Maybe smaller is better for now
The situation is not “ripe” for a big agreement. Before 2010, when the more political version was launched, the dialogue focused on small, “technical” issues like Kosovo’s international calling code, return of cultural artifacts, and mutual recognition of diplomas. Maybe it is time to go back to those–including missing persons and license plates. Another possibility is a regional negotiation of basic principles of mutual behavior, which are sorely lacking. Neither idea is as grand as “normalizing relations” or mutual recognition. But maybe smaller is better for now.
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The nice thing about winning elections
I can do no better than the OSCE in evaluating Serbia’s presidential and parliamentary elections. They were conducted on an “uneven playing field” that favored the incumbent President and parliamentary majority. Media coverage and government resources favored them. There was not much more than a token opposition. Alternation in power was not a real possibility. Serbia has reverted to semi-authoritarianism of a contemporary sort. Lots of political brouhaha, but little real competition.
Serbia’s shame
This is a shame, as it make Serbia a less than ideal candidate for what it says it really wants: EU membership. The EU will be lenient. That is its longstanding habit with Belgrade, which has the great virtue of implementing much of the acquis communautaire. Where Serbia is wanting is implementation of the Cophenhagen criteria for democratic governance.
Not only is its electoral playing field uneven, but Belgrade continues to laud war criminals and fails to prosecute human rights violations during the now more than two-decade-old conflict in Kosovo. It hasn’t even prosecuted the murderers of the American Bytyqi brothers killed in Serbia in 1999. Its press not only ignores past Serbian human rights violations but continues to use hate speech against Kosovars.
In addition, the incumbent government coalition has been enthusiastic for what it terms the “Serb world,” which amounts to little less than Slobodan Milosevic’s Greater Serbia. We see in Ukraine the consequences of irredentist ambitions of this sort. Russian President Putin is likewise fond of the idea of a “Russian world” that denies the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. The result is war and war crimes. The “Serbian world” idea forebodes nothing better. It is a clear and present danger to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Kosovo.
Vucic won his first presidency on a pro-EU platform. He won the second on a pro-Russian one. He has refused to join in sanctions against Russia, while paying lip service to Ukraine’s territorial integrity. It’s a pretty trick, if you can pull it off.
Success entails choices
Still, there is little reason to doubt that President Vucic has the support of the majority of the Serbian electorate. The question is what he will do with his electoral success. He can continue to encourage Serbian world fantasies, or he can decide to make Serbia into a serious candidate for EU membership. The latter will take courage. Vucic’s main political competition comes from ethnic nationalism and ultra-nationalism, not from liberal democrats. The nationalists are not only a political threat, but also a physical one. They killed Prime Minister Djindjic for fear he would give Kosovo away. They could kill again.
Tough choices in Kosovo too
Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti likewise has strong political support. He faces a domestic political scene that generally opposes concessions to Belgrade. He too needs to choose whether to take the political risk of reaching an agreement that will entail compromise with the enemy. The EU, which has been ungenerous to Kosovo in denying it a visa waiver program, complicates his calculus. Whether Brussels would reward Kosovo for an agreement with Serbia is doubtful, not least because countries like France, the Netherlands, and above all Hungary are hostile to Pristina. Promises made might not be kept, as with the visa waiver.
The nice thing about winning elections
Both Vucic and Kurti are now in a position to make choices. I really don’t know what they will do. If the past is a guide, neither will pursue a definitive agreement that ends the standoff between Pristina and Belgrade. But the past is only a guide if people don’t change their minds. We’ll have to wait and see. The nice thing about winning even unfair elections is that you can do what you want.
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Stevenson’s army, March 31
– WSJ says many Europeans don’t want a security guarantee for Ukraine.
– WaPo says Gulf countries unhappy with US.
– US pressured to open consulates in Western Sahara and Jerusalem.
On Ukraine, US continues info ops by claiming Putin angry at military and intelligence.
– UK intelligence chief adds more details of Russian problems.
– Many Russian dead are ethnic minorities.
– WaPo details Russian logistical problems.
-Reuters details repression in Russia.
FY 2022international affairs budget has small increase. Much more proposed for FY 2023
Yesterday I sent Kori Schake’s critique of the new defense budget. Today, read Fred Kaplan’s complaint about excessive spending on nukes. CNAS has its reports on defense. DOD released mere 2 pages summarizing new National Defense Strategy. WaPo shows how Facebook uses K Street to fight TikTok.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, March 18
– WaPo reports a secret transfer of materiel.
– Yahoo News reports earlier CIA training of Ukrainians.
– CNN says drones raise risks.
– Pentagon isn’t saying much about US troops in Europe.
– Axios says Ukraine sought resistance aid.
– Axios reported India’s refusal to condemn Russia.
– WSJ reports on Ukraininan counteroffensive.
– The politics of Ukraine: Politico says GOP “out-hawks Biden.”
– WaPo notes members who claim credit for aid they opposed.
– NYT reports GOP pivot.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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A bad 1995 idea that is worse now
An invitation to meet with Croatian officials this week has prompted me to think once more about the Bosnian Croats. I dealt extensively with them between November 1994 and June 1996 as the State Department Special Envory for the Bosnian Federation. The Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks (Muslims in American usage, but many prefer Bosniaks because it lacks religious connotation) had made their peace by then. My role was to help them implement its provisions for creating a joint Federation. In parallel, the Croat Defense Council (HVO) and the Bosnian Army (ABiH) were fighting the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS), supported by Serbia. That continued until November 1995, when the war ended with the Dayton accords.
The Bosnian Croats were uninterested in a “third entity”
The Bosnian Croats were a force to be reckoned with in 1995. The Croatian Army, fresh from victories earlier in 1995, backed the HVO to the hilt. That was a major factor in the successful HVO/ABiH summer offensive against the VRS inside Bosnia. Croatia controlled the Adriatic coast, through which arms shipments to the Bosnian Army had to pass (in violation of a UN arms embargo). So when we got to Dayton, the Bosnian Croats were in excellent negotiating position.
Dick Holbrooke did not make it easy. He refused to meet at Dayton with Kresimir Zubak, the President of the Federation. But still the Bosnian Croats got an excellent deal. Zubak asked for and got a tripartite presidency (Croat/Serb/Bosniak) despite the relatively small percentage of Croats in Bosnia even before the war. They were 17.38% in the then most recent (1991) census. They are now fewer: 15.43% in 2013.
Dayton gave them one-third of what the Bosnians call “the state” in addition to their half of the Federation, which became 51% of the territory. They also held, like the Bosniaks and Serbs, various constitutionally established vetoes. A Bosnian Croat became Foreign Minister in the state government. There were lots of other goodies along the way. No wonder no Bosnian Croat at that time asked for what is now known as “the third entity,” that is a Croat sub-state like Republika Srpska.
Now things are different
That has changed. Despite favorable election rules and constitutional provisions, the ethnic nationalist Croats have not been adept. The country has even dared elect an anti-nationalist Croat to the presidency, thrice. So the Croat nationalist leader, Dragan Covic, has conducted a major campaign to change the rules in his own favor. This despite several court decisions to the contrary.
Covic does this in collaboration with Serb nationalist leader Milorad Dodik. Russian President Putin encourages them, both because he is an ethnic nationalist like them and because it causes the US and EU heartburn. Covic gets a lot of face time with weak-kneed Western diplomats desperately seeking to make progress on electoral reform.
That effort has failed, but the Croat/Serb campaign continues. Both leaderships feel threatened. They fear a civic Bosnia. Each person would then have one vote. Ethnic nationalist institutions and vetoes would be reduced or eliminated. Dodik and Covic denounce this option as leading to an Islamic state. Bosnia now has a slight Bosniak (Muslim in their terms) numerical majority.
No one should be fooled
The real threat is different. Strengthening ethnic division in Bosnia, which is what the nationalist Croats and Serbs advocate, would lead to the formation of an Islamic state. The third entity implies two others, one of which would necessarily be Muslim. It would be land-locked and barely viable. Most Bosniaks don’t want that. They are too fractious to achieve it anyway. Only Croat success in getting a third entity could make it happen.
Franjo Tudjman, the war-time father of independent Croatia, understood this. He was no liberal democrat. He collaborated despite his ethnic nationalist politics with formation of the Federation and its role in post-war Bosnia. The reason: preventing the emergence of three entities. Somehow Zagreb has forgotten that an Islamic state next door would not necessarily be a good neighbor. Too many Americans and Europeans have forgotten it too. So I hear lots of third entity talk, either explicit or implicit, especially from Croatians as well as Bosnian Croats.
It was a bad idea in 1995. We in the State Department worried then that it would become a platform for Iranian-supported terrorism in Europe, because Tehran was providing ample support to the Bosnian Army. Sunni Islamists didn’t teach us about terrorism in the US until 2001. A democratic Bosnia has no need of ethnically defined sub-national entitites. If a third entity was a bad idea in 1995, it is a worse idea now, including for Croatians and Bosnian Croats.
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Irredentism is not limited to Russia
I am pleased to publish this piece, which I co-authored with SAIS colleague Sinisa Vukovic:
One of us has been critical of US State Department praise for President Vucic of Serbia. Some American diplomats are accepting the notion that he is genuinely pro-European and concerned only with the welfare of Serbs in neighboring countries. That is a mistake, especially in the midst of the Ukraine war. His reasoning about Serbia’s responsibilities and relations with its neighbors bears a distinct resemblance to Vladimir Putin’s justifications for aggression:
– Protection of ethnic kin, based on the assumption that the President of Russia or Serbia is responsible to defend Russians or Serbs wherever they live.
– Exaggeration of the threats Russians/Serbs face in other countries and calls for preventive action, including interference in the internal politics of neighboring countries.
– Use of gross disinformation to exaggerate urgency, while attributing the reports to others so as to maintain plausible deniability.
– Exploitation of the Orthodox Church to claim ethnic unity in the face of alleged religious persecution.
– Abuse of linguistic identity to claim that anyone who speaks Russian/Serbian is protected by Moscow/Belgrade.
These and other examples indicate that Vucic, like Putin, rejects civic identities and the notion that sovereignty stops at a state’s borders.
Vucic has moved definitively away from liberal democracy and back towards repressive ethnonationalism. The press is not free in Serbia and dissent is increasingly perilous. Vucic has befriended Vladimir Putin, refused to align with EU sanctions on Russia, and even now is allowing Air Serbia to double service Moscow. Vucic claims to support Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as he must because of Serbia’s claims to Kosovo, but he is doing little to support Kyiv.
Like Putin, who advocates a “Russian world,” Vucic has also attached himself to people who believe in creating a broader ethnonationalist polity than the territory Serbia currently occupies, the “Serbian world.” He habitually refers to his own role vis-a-vis “Serbs” (Serbi) not Serbians or citizens of Serbia (Srbijanci).
Here is some of the evidence for Vucic’s irredentist ambitions:
Serbian world
September 26, 2020, (then) Minister of Defense Aleksandar Vulin started talking it up:
Vucic must create the Serbian world. Belgrade must gather in itself and around itself all Serbs, and the President of Serbia is the President of all Serbs.
(Vučić treba da stvara srpski svet. Beograd mora da u sebi i oko sebe okupi sve Srbe, a predsjednik Srbije je predsjednik svih Srba)
On April 9, 2021, Vulin specified:
Current geopolitical circumstances do not favor the idea of unification of all areas where Serbs live, but this will inevitably happen in ten, twenty or fifty years…wherever they live, in Serbia, Montenegro, Republika Srpska. What we need is the situation where the care for all Serbs, wherever they live, is managed from one center, and that is Belgrade, and I see nothing controversial about it.
During his party convention, July 18, 2021, Vulin explained the rationale behind Serbian world:
The people that has experienced genocide in Jasenovac, that has experienced Oluja [the Croatian military Operation Storm in 1995], and the March pogrom [in 2004 in Kosovo] does not have the right to surrender its fate to the hands of others, that others decide about the future of their children. People whose experience postulates that when it does not have its own soldier, its own police officer, its own judge, it does not have the rights…Serbia needs to have an army that can defend Serbia and Serbs wherever they live.
Effectively, he is calling for protection of Serbs by creation of Greater Serbia, the idea that drove Slobodan Milosevic to war at least four times.
On the same day Vucic reacted:
The official state policy is that Serbia’s state borders are inviolable, and we do not care about others’ borders. We have to protect our own, and unequivocally demonstrate what is our policy.
No doubt having gotten an earful from Western diplomats, Vucic backed off a bit the next September:
In that notion [Serbian world] there is nothing threatening, nothing that would endanger anyone else… it does not talk about borders or anything else, and besides, it is not part of the official state policies.
But it is
It is state policy and Vucic must know it. The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia, that the Parliament adopted in December 2019, is centered around the following premise:
Protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity, military neutrality, safeguard of Serbian people outside of the Republic of Serbia’s borders, European integration, and efficient rule of law
(očuvanje suverenosti i teritorijalne celovitosti, vojna neutralnost, briga o srpskom narodu van granica Republike Srbije, evropske integracije i efikasna pravna država)
Regarding the safeguard of Serbian people living outside of Serbia’s borders, the Strategy specifies it “is an existential matter for the survival of the Republic of Serbia.”
It’s dangerous to Bosnia, Montenegro, and Kosovo
The same Strategy also exclaims:
Preservation of Republika Srpska is one of the foreign policy priorities of the Republic of Serbia
(“Očuvanje Republike Srpske jedan je od spoljnopolitičkih prioriteta Republike Srbije”)
To explain what is meant by this, Vulin (again as MoD) stated in May 2019:
Republika Srpska has always been a priority of the Government and the President of the Republic of Serbia. Republika Srpska may not have its own army, but Serbian people heve their own army.
(“Republika Srpska je uvek prioritet politike Vlade i predsednika Republike Srbije. Republika Srpska nema svoju vojsku, ali srpski narod ima svoju vojsku.”)
This is essentially a pledge to intervene militarily in Bosnia if the RS is threatened, something Milosevic declined to do.
Vucic agrees:
We are one people, as President Milorad Dodik said. There is no such thing as Croatian Serbs or Bosnian Serbs. My father is not a Bosnian Serb, he is a Serb. He may be from Bosnia, but he is not any other Serb but only a Serb.
The threat to intervene is not only against Bosnia. Responding to Montenegrin President Djukanovic’s accusations that Serbia is expansionist, Vucic stated:
Djukanovic should know that I will always defend Serbs, and I will always defend Serbia. I have not alternative, but my own country and my own people
On Kosovo, the risk is even clearer: Vucic mobilized the Serbian army when Kosovo insisted on implementation of an agreement concerning cross-boundary/border recognition of license plates (!).
Serbia is serious
I take Serbia seriously. Its vast re-armament (with Russian and Chinese as well as Western weapons) serves its national security purposes, which are clearly not limited to the current territory of Serbia. No one watching Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine should fail to recognize the risks in the Balkans.
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