Tag: European Union
Sanctions for destabilizing and corrupt activity
The US Treasury’s announcement today of sanctions on Milorad Dodik and Alternativna TV merits reprinting in full. I don’t expect this will have any immediate effect on Dodik or his TV station, both of which presumably anticipated it. Dodik probaby does most of his personal business in cash anyway. The TV station may have some trouble with international transfers. But more importantly this decision will have a PR and psychological effect. It is a clear and unequivocal signal that the United States wants Dodik gone and a warning to those politicians who support his destabilizing activities. The impact will be greater if European Union member states join in:
WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Milorad Dodik (Dodik), who is a member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), as well as one entity under his control, Alternativna Televizija d.o.o. Banja Luka, in response to Dodik’s corrupt activities and continued threats to the stability and territorial integrity of BiH.
Today’s action, the first designations under E.O. 14033, builds on the Biden Administration’s commitment to promote accountability for those who, among other things, undermine the stability of the Western Balkans region through corruption and threats to long-standing peace agreements. Dodik has undermined BiH institutions by calling for the seizure of state competencies and setting in motion the creation of parallel institutions in BiH’s Republika Srpska (RS) entity. Furthermore, Dodik has used his official BiH position to accumulate personal wealth through graft, bribery, and other forms of corruption. His divisive ethno-nationalistic rhetoric reflects his efforts to advance these political goals and distract attention from his corrupt activities. Cumulatively, these actions threaten the stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of BiH and undermine the Dayton Peace Accords, thereby risking wider regional instability.
“Milorad Dodik’s destabilizing corrupt activities and attempts to dismantle the Dayton Peace Accords, motivated by his own self-interest, threaten the stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the entire region,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian E. Nelson. “The United States will not hesitate to act against those who pursue corruption, destabilization, and division at the expense of their own people, as well as against those who enable and facilitate this behavior.”
DODIK’S DESTABILIZING AND CORRUPT ACTIVITIES
The Dayton Peace Accords (DPA), signed by the Presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia in 1995, brought an end to ethnic conflict in BiH and established the present-day constitution of BiH. Treasury previously designated Dodik on January 17, 2017, pursuant to E.O. 13304, for having actively obstructed or posed a significant risk of actively obstructing the DPA. Today’s actions build on this legacy by targeting his ongoing destabilizing activity with respect to the DPA, as well as his abuse of his official position to engage in widespread corruption, which undermines state institutions in BiH.
Dodik has also openly called for, and has taken action toward, the unilateral transfer of state competencies from the BiH government to the Republika Srpska (RS), one of two entities that comprise BiH along with the Brcko District. Dodik has also publicly opposed the internationally appointed High Representative for BiH and the composition of the BiH Constitutional Court. Additionally, Dodik has publicly denigrated other ethnic and religious groups within BiH, further sowing division and political gridlock. Dodik, therefore, is being designated pursuant to E.O. 14033 for being responsible for or complicit in, or having directly or indirectly engaged in, a violation of, or an act that has obstructed or threatened the implementation of, the DPA.
Dodik is also being designated pursuant to E.O. 14033 for being responsible for or complicit in, or having directly or indirectly engaged in, corruption related to the Western Balkans. Specifically, he has established a patronage network in BiH from which he and his associates benefit. As one example of his corrupt actions, Dodik has provided government contracts and monopolies in the RS directly to close business associates. With his corrupt proceeds, Dodik has engaged in bribery and additional corrupt activities to further his personal interests at the expense of citizens in the RS.
DODIK’S PERSONAL MEDIA STATION
Alternativna Televizija d.o.o. Banja Luka (ATV), a media outlet based in Banja Luka, RS, is privately owned by a company closely linked to Dodik’s family. However, Dodik himself exerts personal control over ATV behind the scenes, such as by requiring personal approval on media stories related to politically sensitive topics. Dodik acquired ATV to deliberately and expressly further his own agenda, which includes his efforts to denigrate other political figures, burnish his public image, and advance his own personal and political goals.
Dodik has awarded ATV-related contracts directly to members of his family, which he has used as yet another avenue for corruption. He has funneled money directly from public companies to ATV for corrupt purposes. Dodik has substantially increased funding for ATV in recent years and engaged in malign social media influence campaigns through ATV to publish content that advances his political and personal goals.
ATV is being designated pursuant to E.O. 14033 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Dodik.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the individual and entity above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are generally prohibited. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
For identifying information on the individual and entity designated today.
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Those who ask for more than individual rights deprive others
Here are some reasonable questions a reader posed yesterday:
One question I have for you though? In your opinion, what can and should be expected from the citizens to take to prevent a possible escalation of the situation?
And one more question? Sometime in 2006, a constitutional program for Bosnia and Herzegovina was proposed. It is the so-called “April package” of 2006 proposed by the Americans and the EU. [It] was reportedly not accepted because one or two votes were missing. No one knows reasons why. Some politicians today still talk about the rehabilitation of the April package. I’m interested in your opinion on that? I was very young then, and do not have a notion of what “April-package” is?
Citizens are the key
Citizens are the key to preventing escalation. Only if popular opinion in Republika Srpska turns against Dodik will he moderate. Ultimately how citizens vote in the next election will determine his fate and the fate of the much-needed constitutional reforms. The Americans and Europeans can help. They can hold Dodik accountable with sanctions and ensure transparency about his finances and his relationship with Moscow.
What reforms, should citizens support? My own preference is a Bosnia and Herzegovina that reduces its elaborate system of protection of (ethnic) group rights towards better protection of individual rights. Several European court decisions have pointed in this direction, which EU membership will require. Best to get it done sooner rather than later.
The current, ongoing negotiations about the country’s electoral law are not going to produce that kind of reform. To the contrary, the current ethnic group leaders will use these negotiations to consolidate their own hold on power and eliminate competition that could come from politicians whose appeal crosses ethnic divisions. EU and US leadership of the negotiations, which have marginalized the citizens, risks making the situation worse.
The April package failed because of narrow-minded politics
The April package was a complicated array of constitutional reforms negotiated in 2005/6 by all the main Bosnian political parties (caveat emptor: that was done with support from the US Institute of Peace under my supervision). Notably, it included an “EU clause” that ensured to the Sarajevo government the authority required to negotiate and implement the requirements of EU membership.
The package failed to gain a two-thirds majority in parliament by two votes, both of which belonged to members who broke party discipline to vote against. But that was not the real issue. A major political party that had been involved in every aspect of negotiating the April package voted against it. Its leader wanted to win a seat on the collective presidency and railed against the April package in ethnically explicit terms. He won his seat and the opportunity for serious constitutional reform evaporated.
What now?
The future direction is up to Bosnia’s citizens. If EU membership is the goal, the right approach is constitutional reform that protects individual rights. Even if some member states diverge from it, liberal democracy is a prerequisite for EU accession. Strengthening individual rights would ensure people of all ethnic groups an equal say in how power is exercised and limited . No individual should ask for more. Those who do, often in the name of group rights, are depriving others of their most fundamental liberties.
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Focus on what matters
In addition to the previous, I did this interview with Besnik Velija of Kosovo’s Gazeta Express on New Year’s eve (it was published in Albanian this morning):
Q: I am writing about the US involvement in Western Balkans developments. Mr. Jeffrey Hovenier now is officially the new US Ambassador at Kosovo, Mr. Christopher Hill at Serbia. We have also Mr. Escobar as Special Representative for the Western Balkans.
With the completion of this mosaic of important people in the Western Balkans, do you expect an offensive by Joe Biden in 2022?
A: I expect this new crew to want to accomplish something in the Western Balkans, starting in 2022. Their focus initially will likely be on preventing disaster in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but they will also want to achieve something with Kosovo and Serbia.
Q: Do you expect concrete developments in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue?
A: Yes. I certainly hope to see progress on missing people and on financial issues. I would also like to see adoption in the Western Balkans, including by Pristina and Belgrade, of principles that govern correct behavior towards neighbors, along with implementation plans.
Q: Do you find the EU negotiation model profitable, and do you think that the US should take over the entire Kosovo-Serbia dialogue process, in order to end the protracted negotiations?
A: I think the EU process is still the best forum available, but it requires more support and commitment from the US, including monitoring implementation of agreements reached. I doubt the US will take it over, as the destiny of the Western Balkans is in Europe.
Q: What do you think about a meeting at the White House, led by Biden, that would not end without the parties reaching a final agreement?
A: Such spectaculars happen only when carefully prepared. I see no prospect that either Belgrade or Pristina will be ready for it before the Serbian presidential election next year, and perhaps not after that either.
Q: If a final agreement is not reached with these people and with Joe Biden at the helm of the US, what do you foresee for the Western Balkans and specifically for Kosovo and Serbia?
A: Whether a “final” agreement is reached or not, what I hope is the Western Balkans will focus on what matters: preparation for EU accession and, for those who want it, NATO membership. The benefits of both come mainly from those preparations. Once qualified, potential EU member states will need to wait for the political window to open, likely not much before the end of this decade. The road is long. Slow but steady will win this race.
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Long live the dialogue, even if it is stalled!
Two interviews I gave last month were published in Kosovo, in Serbian and Albanian respectively, over the weekend.
Veljko Nestorovic of Kosovo Online did this one:
Q: Was 2021 an unsuccessful year when it comes to the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina?
A: Yes the dialogue is stalled and will continue to be stalled at least until after the Serbian elections in 2022.
Q: With the appointment of the UK Special Envoy, as well as two US Envoys for the Western Balkans, will the US and the UK take the lead in dialogue?
A: The US continues to want the EU to lead, but I think both the UK and US will be more prepared to work in tandem with the EU than was at times true in the past.
Q: How do you view US sanctions. Are you expecting new names on the US list?
A: Yes, I imagine there will be more people named.
Q: Prime Minister Kurti has repeatedly stated that the issue of the missing must be resolved. At the moment, about 1,600 people are listed as missing, but in addition to Belgrade, given that one-third of the missing are non-Albanians, most Serbs, does Pristina have a responsibility in the search for those missing?
A: Yes of course. Pristina should be accounting for any missing on which it has information. That should include any victims of the KLA or of other Albanian armed groups.
Q: Is there a possibility for an agreement and a new meeting between Kurti and Vučić during 2022?
A: There is always a possibility, but I doubt it before the Serbian elections.
Q: Do you expect visa liberalization for Kosovo in 2022?
A: I’d be foolish to expect it, but I do hope it will happen in 2022. The French and Dutch need to tell Pristina why they have hesitated and give Pristina an opportunity to satisfy them.
Q: Do you expect a greater role of the USA in the Western Balkans during 2022 when it comes to dialogue, but also BiH [Bosnia]?
A: The US is already more focused on BiH than it has been in the past and will likely continue its diplomatic efforts there in 2022. But let me be clear: the right direction for the US should be more respect for individual rights in BiH. Nothing the US does should strengthen the stranglehold of ethnic nationalist political parties on power. They are the problem, not the solution. A more civic state would be a more functional state in BiH.
Besnik Gashi of Lajmi.net did this one:
Q: The first issue that I would like to discuss is the steps that Kosovo has taken in recent years in the framework of the dialogue with Serbia. I would like to ask what do you consider to be the most progressive and regressive agreements since the beginning of the technical dialogue between the two countries, where they were mediated by Brussels?
A: I’m not going to answer your question, for a good reason. There is no definitive evaluation of the agreements and their impact, despite the laudable efforts of civil society organizations in both Kosovo and Serbia.
This is not good. I believe the US and EU should regularly issue progress reports on implementation, obstacles to implementation, and impact. These should be based on close cooperation with civil society and government organizations in both countries.
Speaking more broadly, I think the dialogue has had a positive impact on Kosovo’s international standing by putting it on an equal and symmetrical basis with Serbia in the EU context, even though it has had a negative impact by allowing Serbia to encourage countries to delay recognition while the dialogue proceeds.
Q: Since we are talking about Brussels, it should be noted the achievement of the Agreement on the formation of the Association of Municipalities by Kosovo is facing full opposition from the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Albin Kurti. According to him, the agreement has been achieved by previous governments and is endangering the “Bosnianization” of Kosovo, in the sense of building a new Republika Srpska.
What is your opinion about the Association and the opposition that is being made to it by the Prime Minister?
A: The Prime Minister is doing something I think is a good negotiating tactic: holding back on Serbia’s top priority because Serbia is holding back on Kosovo’s top priorities, namely recognition and UN membership. The Association issue would look very different if Serbia were prepared to recognize Kosovo and tell Moscow and Beijing to allow Pristina into the UN.
Q: On the other hand, the US has issued a sort of ultimatum to Kosovo to reach a comprehensive agreement with Serbia during the term of the current Kosovo government, which culminates in mutual recognition of the two countries. What do you think, can the mentioned agreement be finalized within 3 or 4 years?
A: It can be finalized in 3 or 4 months once there is the political will on both sides to make the necessary compromises. But there is no sign at all of that from Serbia, and little of it from Kosovo.
Q: There has also been rumours of active US involvement in the dialogue, or even direct, in order to speed up a final agreement. Do you think such a thing should happen?
A: It can happen, but if it triggers Russian involvement it would not be a good thing.
Q: The US, namely the U.S Department of the Treasury, has recently targeted smuggling and criminal groups in Kosovo, some of them politicians. Do you think that there is a example of similar actions that the US has implemented in other countries and will follow them in the case of Kosovo, as well as whether the politicians of the countries in the region can be spared?
A: My understanding is that the US sanctions for corruption are and will continue to be global, not just the Balkans. No one guilty should be spared.
Q: In an interview last year, you told that Grenell is not a friend of Kosovars. Does this opinion still stand, given that Grenell during this year, following the diplomacy in the shadow of Kosovo, came to visit and said that he would take care of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue and the implementation of the Washington Agreement?
A: Grenell should be avoided by anyone in either Serbia or Kosovo who wishes the dialogue well. He is a grifter, not a diplomat. The Washington Agreement isn’t worth much more than the two separate pieces of paper it was typed on.
Q: We are nearly in the end of this year and next year is expected to be more promising for Kosovars when it comes to visa liberalization. Hope has been raised with the arrival of a new chancellery in Germany, which in their political program for the Western Balkans also envisage visa liberalization for Kosovo. Do you think that Germany will be active enough to convince the skeptical countries of the EU Council?
A: I certainly hope so. Kosovo merits the visa waiver. Germany is the de facto leader of the EU in the Balkans. Berlin needs to make its weight felt.
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Blunter would be better
In a tweet this morning, I called these words about the Western Balkan non-EU members harsh but true:
…they do not fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, despite an accession process that has lasted around 20 years: They have neither stable democratic institutions nor functioning market economies….Another factor…against early accession to the EU: their unwillingness to establish good neighbourly relations…German European policy should change course here and make it clearer that these states have no place in the EU without making efforts towards peaceful coexistence.
https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/german-foreign-policy-in-transition#fn-d57704e4133
Of course there are nuances. Here I’ll try to explore some of them.
None of the Balkan states, even the current EU members, has achieved a truly independent, honest, judiciary. I’m hard put to distinguish among them, as is the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index. But there Kosovo and North Macedonia are headed in the right direction and Serbia in the wrong direction, which jibes with my own impression. Montenegro isn’t rated, but wouldn’t depart much from the regional average. Albania is worse than that average, despite decades of reform efforts.
When it comes to freedom and democracy, I depart from Freedom House’s rating of Kosovo as less free and democratic than the other non-EU members, which are all clustered together. Kosovo has perhaps the freest press in the region, has repeatedly seen alternation in power (unfortunately viewed as instability by many outside observers), and has a relatively free economy. Corruption is a big problem (one the current government is targeting) but it is also a big problem in the other countries.
As for the other countries, Serbia lacks a free press and power is concentrated in the hands of its current president, who has drifted towards autocracy rather than democracy. The most significant institutional governance issues are in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which at Dayton was given a constitution that makes democratic governance impossible. One person one vote is inconsistent with the group rights that the warring parties insisted on at Dayton and afterwards. Montenegro and Macedonia have both struggled with alternation in power, but both have managed it, with some violence. Albania has improved its electoral performance and has a vigorous political competition between government and opposition.
As for good neighborly relations, the main issue is between Serbia and Kosovo, since the former does not recognize the latter and has even recently menaced the use of military force. Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo (the first three NATO members and the last defended by NATO-led forces) are for now getting along pretty well, partly because they are all feeling the heat from Serbia’s Russian-sponsored re-armament. Kosovo has issues also with Bosnia and Herzegovina, but those are entirely derivative of Belgrade’s non-recognition. SWP would have done better to point the finger towards culpability rather than resort to generalities.
All that said, the SWP basically has it right. The Western Balkan countries are all looking for easy ways into the EU, but even those that have adopted and implemented much of the acquis communautaire do not completely meet the Copenhagen criteria. Besides, the EU member states have gotten more particular about accession, due in part to their own domestic politics (and economics) and in part to the poor performance of some of the more recent members, especially Bulgaria and Romania. The reforms the EU wants should be the reforms aspiring members want as well. The benefits of EU membership largely precede accession for aspirants who are serious. Germany and the EU should indeed get blunter about this.
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Friends in need can get you in big trouble
A young colleague asked some questions this week. I replied. I’ll have a longer piece on these issues and what should be done about them in the next day or two:
Q: What do you believe Dodik realistically hopes to gain from his increasingly alarming proposals to pull RS from the federal government and to establish parallel institutions in Banja Luka? As many have noted, complete secession is highly unlikely. Thus, is he trying to erode federal institutions to gain concessions for greater RS autonomy?
A: I wouldn’t rule out secession, if circumstances permit, but even if they don’t he is trying to achieve de facto independence.
Q: Is it possible that Dodik, as he’s done in the past, is making such claims in an effort to posture for the upcoming elections in 2022?
A: Sure, but more or less democratically validated politicians come under a lot of pressure to deliver what they promise.
Q: Over the past month, much has been written about the West’s loss of focus in the Balkans, and the resulting failure of its deterrence. Many observers have called for greater involvement from the West and its institutions. Few, however, have offered concrete suggestions on what the West’s response should look like. I am curious if you have any thoughts
A: You are seeing the emergence of one prong of Western engagement in the sanctions levied yesterday. I hope to see them extended to people in Belgrade and Pristina, along with clear US and EU denunciations of the authoritarian drift in Belgrade. More direct engagement with the issues, both in the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue and in the discussion of constitutional reform in BiH, could be another prong. So too could be a joint US/EU effort to monitor implementation of dialogue agreements similar to the International Civilian Office, which monitored implementation of the Ahtisaari plan after Kosovo independence.
Q: I assume that Dodik’s antics put Vucic in a difficult position. For one, he has to maintain the nationalists in his base by continuing to act as the figurehead for all Serbs, and thus, at least apathetically, support the plight of the Serbs in Bosnia. At the same time, however, Vucic knows Serbia’s economic future lies with the West. Serious derailment of Dayton in Bosnia, especially with his public support, could further hinder Serbia’s economic future with the West. So, that leads me to ask, can Vucic play a positive role in mitigating Dodik’s brinkmanship?
A: Yes, and that’s what Brussels and Washington count on. But Dodik, like Karadzic, regards himself as a potential rival to Vucic in Serbia, not only as a provincial chieftain in Banja Luka. With Russian encouragement, Dodik may go further than Vucic would like.
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